



PROMOTING LEADERSHIP IN THOUGHT
THAT LEADS TO ACTION

THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Global Perspectives on Causes and Consequences

REPORT TO THE WORLD ACADEMY OF ART & SCIENCE

July 2022

CADMUS

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PROMOTING LEADERSHIP IN THOUGHT
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CADMUS

CADMUS' VISION

The world is in need of guiding ideas, a vision, to more effectively direct our intellectual, moral and scientific capabilities for world peace, global security, human dignity and social justice. It needs evolutionary ideas that can spur our collective progress without the wake of destructive violence that threatens to undermine the huge but fragile political, social, financial and ecological infrastructures on which we depend and strive to build a better world. History has recorded the acts of creative individual thinkers and dynamic leaders who altered the path of human progress and left a lasting mark on society. Recently the role of pioneering individuals is giving place to that of progressive organizations inspired by high values and committed to achievement of practical, but far-reaching goals. This was the intention of the founders of the World Academy of Art & Science when it was established in 1960 as a transnational, transdisciplinary association to explore the major concerns of humanity. No single organization can by itself harness the motive force needed to change the world, but a group of like-minded organizations founded with such powerful intentions can become a magnet and focal point to project creative ideas that possess the inherent dynamism for self-fulfillment.

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The War in Ukraine

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Preface

For the past five months, national and global media have been filled with news regarding the war in Ukraine, its immediate consequences and future implications viewed from the perspective of different nations, regions, communities, sectors, ideologies and stakeholder groups. This report on the War in Ukraine contains a series of papers by Fellows of the World Academy of Art & Science (WAAS) and invited guests reflecting on the causes and significance of the Russian invasion and the anticipated consequences of the war from the perspective of global society as a whole. The authors draw lessons and present insights from recent and historical events to address issues of great concern for the future of the human community.

The report seeks to reach beyond the news flooding the media daily. It is dedicated to a broader and deeper examination of the root causes and circumstances which led to the invasion of Ukraine, its historical precedents, missed opportunities, the pressure of unresolved nationalistic and complex cultural identities, the residue of past events, and the search for security in a world undergoing ever-increasing rates of social change, restructuring and evolution in its movement toward a future which is as yet difficult even to envision no less to guide, govern and lead.

Too many unanticipated recent events have already surprised and shocked leaders, experts and the general public to attempt with any confidence the prognostication of eventual outcomes. The war in Ukraine is still on-going. Its eventual outcomes and impacts are difficult to foresee because they are yet to be determined. Critical choices are yet to be made. It is not too late for all those concerned to make them more wisely.

Conscious of these limitations to our knowledge, the report considers the most likely immediate and longer-term implications of the war for the countries of this region, refugees of the war, other vulnerable populations and the global community of nations. It explores a wide range of political, economic, social and ecological issues and their likely impact on global affairs. It also reflects on the deeper forces and factors which will need to be addressed in order to prevent the expansion and repetition of similar events in future. Peace, the common security of nations and the human security of people around the world will be determined by how we respond in thought and action.

As a transnational organization, the mission of WAAS is to address the global challenges confronting humanity from a non-partisan perspective. The specific issues and examples examined are selected because they are representative of global problems with implications for humanity-at-large. The views expressed in the chapters of this report are those of their authors, rather than the official position of the World Academy of Art & Science, which is described in the first chapter “A Time for Solidarity”.

A TIME FOR SOLIDARITY!

STATEMENT OF THE WORLD ACADEMY OF ART & SCIENCE

The World Academy of Art and Science condemns the Russian military invasion of Ukraine. It is an illegal act of aggression. It is causing the death of innocent civilians and placing the security of the entire world at risk.

The threat or use of force to resolve disputes is prohibited under Article 2 of the UN Charter. Russia was not under any threat that offered no recourse other than force. In fact, President Putin, in ordering military attacks against Ukraine, has committed a Crime Against Peace in violation of the UN Charter by planning, preparing, initiating, and waging a war of aggression.

Russia's acts of war will burden Ukraine with an enormous cost in human suffering, stimulate a massive crackdown on the civil liberties of Russians who respect international law and peace, expand the conflict, and even place the entire world at risk of elevation to a nuclear exchange. President Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons against adversaries in this conflict. Such a threat places the entirety of civilization in jeopardy and is unacceptable.

A war of aggression is not only illegal and immoral, it is also impractical. Every nation today needs to cooperate in addressing many pressing issues such as climate change, eliminating poverty, protecting the health of all species and the oceans, curtailing and eliminating the pandemic, and fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals.

We regret that better use was not made of diplomacy, mediation, and common security mechanisms earlier in the conflict to address and resolve historical grievances. We now call the international community to use all non-military means possible, including those outlined in Articles 33–41 of the UN Charter for the peaceful settlement of those disputes. These provisions of the UN Charter provide a route to mitigate, contain, and reverse the dangerous present situation and provide diplomatic tools to obtain peace.

We respect the courage and rights of the people of Ukraine to exercise self-defense, express our solidarity with them, and encourage support for them from all peace-loving nations. Further, we decry the curtailing of civil liberties of Russians who do not agree with the policies of their leaders and honor their courage.

We encourage the utilization of further diplomatic mechanisms available in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in which both the US and Russia are participants. We further urge the UN Security Council and the General Assembly to remain seized of the issue of ending the violence and conflict in Ukraine, and to obtain an immediate ceasefire. Furthermore, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission should be considered with the consent of all parties involved.

We call on world leaders to demand an immediate cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, as requested by the international public opinion, and we urge all parties and individuals in a position of influence to renew efforts for a diplomatic solution, starting with immediate negotiations under UN aegis.

Adopted by the Board of Trustees on March 2, 2022

HIGHLIGHTS

We are at a turning point in history and are faced with a choice: should we go back to the past or accept the present, wherein lies the answer to our present problems.

– *Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga*,
Implications of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

We need to recover the soft power of diplomacy which is the only conduit for lasting peace.

– *Donato Kiniger-Passigli*,
War in Ukraine and its “UN”intended Consequences

We need an updated “operating system” based on nascent stakeholders of the global international society.

– *Alexander Likhotal*,
The Root Causes of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The concept of “security” still favoured by major weapon manufacturers is not only obsolete but highly prejudicial.

– *Federico Mayor*,
Pressing International Responsibility: A New concept of Human Security

Ukraine has survived the Russian invasion precisely because it reminded people and nations around the world about the value of their most precious resource–freedom.

– *Garry Jacobs*,
Missed Opportunities: Ukraine is an UN-finished Story of Global Proportions

The concept of human security has not yet reached its potential to catalyse progress.

– *Jonathan Granoff*,
Human Security: A Strong Foundation for Multilateral Cooperation

Can we envisage Russian membership of NATO, as some thought possible thirty years ago?

– *Philippe Destatte*,
Russia in NATO: Thinking the Unthinkable?

Russia provided the perfect incentive for the world to create a new architecture for international relations.

– *Ketan Patel & Christian Hansmeyer*, Lessons from the
Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Moving the World Beyond War

The significance of the Ukraine crisis is that it acts as a true instrument for unifying the world through values.

– *Robert Van Harten*,
The Significance of the Ukraine Crisis

Seminal events that underline the new movement towards deglobalisation include: the shift in US foreign policy, Brexit, and protectionist response to the pandemic.

– *Patrick Liedtke*, The World will never be the same:
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict as a Trigger Point for Deglobalisation

Sanctions remain the weapon of choice as Western governments sidestep the choice between neutrality and direct military intervention.

– *Walton Stinson*, An Assessment of the Efficacy of
Economic Sanctions in Response to Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine

Putin's War will be a major setback to the SDGs & Agenda 2030. Nations should be widely engaged in a forward-looking "good war" for security & sustainability.

– *Michael Marien*,
Putin's Folly and Rethinking the SDGs

To end the war in Ukraine, and for sustained global peace, we need an improved NAM that gives expression to the views of sincere, honest reason and goodwill.

– *Janani Ramanathan*,
A Renewed Non-Aligned Movement

The lack of convincing scientific principles and of effective and accepted solution mechanisms for conflict management leads to a vulnerable global space-economy.

– *Peter Nijkamp, Karima Kourtit & Gabriela Pascariu*,
Ukraine: A Post-war Phoenix Perspective

We need a global learning and training package that provides life-long learning about Human Security which promotes universal engagement in its preservation and promotion.

– *David Harries*,
Evolving Meanings of the War for Ukraine: Winning, Losing, Fearing, Needing

Can we not rid ourselves of both nuclear weapons and the institution of war itself? We must act quickly and resolutely before our beautiful world is reduced to radioactive ashes.

– *John Scales Avery*,
The War in Ukraine Must Stop Now

The fantasy of exclusion, the denial of complexity are ways we use to protect ourselves from the anxieties we face everyday in our eternal quest for meaning.

– *Carlos Alvarez-Pereira*,
War or Dance? Blind Spots and the Locus of our Fears

It is time to reconsider the veto structure and replace it with a structure that acknowledges the equality of nations under UN law.

– *Fadwa El Guindi*,
Globalization Weaponized, Dominance Fragmented, World Stability Ruptured

Openness is the only way through which we will learn to meet global crises.

– *Rodolfo A. Fiorini*, A Brief Review of Major Divergences
Underlying Current Human Security and The Modern World Order

World leaders on both sides of the Atlantic assume that the Ukrainian tragedy somehow will be over soon. They are fatalistically “sleepwalking into the unknown.”

– *Reno Cianfanelli*,
Ukraine: Sleepwalking into the Unknown

Present predicaments are a rare opportunity to correct our mistakes, rethink our strategies and set the path to a better future of energy security and sustainability.

– *Maria da Graça Carvalho*,
Energy – Adjusting to a New Global Order

Societal and economic action needs to be clearly driven by a new purpose: revitalizing, enhancing and sustaining life.

– *Petra Kuenkel*,
Can the Future be Predicted? Deliberations on a war we cannot afford

Risk, emergency, conflict, education, communication, politics, democracy and life itself: none of these can be reduced to mathematical formulas or sequences of data.

– *Piero Dominici*,
War, Complexity, and One-dimensional Thinking

We need a change in the UNSC structure. It does not necessarily need to be the dissolution of the veto power. Instead, the veto needs to be limited.

– *Elena Andreevska*,
The UN as a Guardian of World Peace and its Role in the Ukraine Crisis

International science and academic collaboration should be built on a shared global philosophy of openness and collaboration.

Marcel Van de Voorde,
Current Threats to Global Academic Collaboration

The Root Causes of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Alexander Likhotal

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Fellow, World Academy of Art and Science

Abstract

Russian invasion of Ukraine goes much further than phantom pains of Russia's imperial dreams. This unfolding confrontation must be understood as a major clash in the rising strategic competition to determine the future architecture of the world order and the European security system. To analyse the essence of this aggression, one should not succumb to the temptations to deny Putin and his entourage rationally. Most of the steps taken by the Kremlin, both before and after February 24, 2022, look quite rational, if framed by the regime's evaluation of the state of the world. This war is not just about Ukraine, in fact Russia tests in Ukraine the US and the West's "acceptability red lines" and this is seen in Moscow as a prelude to the destruction of the rules-based world order. Global governance indeed begs not just for modern institutions' reform because their credibility has been substantially eroded by inaction and lack of solidarity but for revision and remodelling because their inadequacy and inefficiency have become ever-present, crying and overwhelming. Redefining multilateralism will not be enough. We will have to reinvent it..

Every day people die in Ukraine. The count may already be in dozens of thousands. These are Ukrainian soldiers, civilians, children and even Russian soldiers who came to a foreign land as aggressors, but many of whom are forced, almost teenage conscripts. Russia has already begun the "second stage of military operation" in eastern Ukraine, the consequences of which are very difficult to predict, but which, no doubt, will claim thousands of more lives. The West is increasing sanctions against Russia and supplying Ukraine with more and more heavy weapons.

As a regular conflict, the ongoing Ukraine war is being fought with kinetic weapons in conventional operational battlefields. However, its impact exceeds the domain of military statecraft. It goes much further than phantom pains of Russia's imperial dreams. In fact, this unfolding confrontation must also be understood as a major clash in the rising strategic competition to determine the future architecture of the world order and security system—a dangerous gamble played for the highest stakes.

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has put an end to the rules-based world order as well as to the endless debates about a "new iteration" of Cold War together with all kinds of theorising about the differences and peculiarities of "cool" versus the cold wars.

For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the world got a real hot war in Europe in which Ukraine, practically single-handedly supported only by the provision

of the military equipment by several countries, has heroically and successfully resisted the aggression of an outnumbered and outgunned enemy.

“The past will be haunting us as long as we do not close all past pages that remain open.”

What are the root causes of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the catastrophic breakdown in the European security system? What are the options for the future world order?

Our main trouble is paradoxical in nature: our future is already with us, but our past is yet to come.

Disintegration of the Soviet empire was an unfinished business—look at the Russian borders where you will see many semi-legal entities—Luhansk and Donetsk “peoples republics”, Osetia, Abkhazia. The existence of these parastates is the symptom of the continuing disintegration of the empire—the borders are still unclear, flexible and debatable. And there might be further fault lines in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and many other territories.

However, Russia is not unique. China and Taiwan, South and North Korea, Kashmir, Israel and Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan—you can easily continue the list of border conflicts, occupied territories, which are various forms of irredentism.

And the past will be haunting us as long as we do not close all past pages that remain open.

Actually, it was Gorbachev who warned prophetically (though in a different context) when he said in 1989 that “those who are late are punished by history”.

And late we were, catastrophically late, when after the end of the Cold War we missed the chance to craft a new world on the ruins of the dilapidated structures of the traditional balance of power system.

When Gorbachev overturned the Cold War chessboard it was not just the Russian elite who was not ready, which explains why Russia has taken the direction that led her into the current shape. The happily slumbering West, used to functioning in a bipolar world, was not ready either. Gorbachev’s actions caused consternation and even shock in Western establishments, disrupting as they did the customary rhythm of life and rising challenges the West was not ready for.

As Georgy Arbatov said to Henry Kissinger at one of the public debates, “Henry, we will do something really terrible for you (the US), we will deprive you of the enemy”. Later Senator Fulbright echoed this warning: “The USSR ... provided us with excuses for our own failures”.

However the West could not resist the temptation to declare itself the absolute winner of the Cold War and the sole heir to history.

For years since, analysts have debated whether the United States incited Russian interventions in Ukraine and other neighbouring countries or whether Moscow’s actions

were simply unprovoked aggressions. Now this conversation has been muted by the horrors of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

“If Russians are responsible for keeping Putin in power and thus for letting him start this Cain’s war against Ukraine, the US and the West are responsible at least for failing to diagnose timely and offset the threat at a much earlier stage.”

However, although it is immoral to blame the United States or the West for Putin's brutal attack on Ukraine, to insist that the invasion was entirely unprovoked or at least not rooted in the preceding developments is also misleading.

This is in no way a blame-shifting attempt, Putin's Russia is alone responsible certainly for the aggression that has already cost colossal loss of life, but the invasion of Ukraine is taking place in a historical and political context in which the United States has played and will continue to play the leading (though far from hegemonic) role.

And if Russians are responsible for keeping Putin in power and thus for letting him start this Cain's war against Ukraine, the US and the West are responsible at least for failing to diagnose timely and offset the threat at a much earlier stage. After all, you need two for a tango.

So in what way might the United States have provoked Putin?

One thing should be clear: it was not by compromising the security of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has objectively enjoyed greater security than at any time in recent history.

What occurred was what frequently happens even in human relations—there was a failure to realise shared interests in a complex, evolving context.

Pope John Paul II warned as early as 1992 that “the Western countries run the risk of seeing this collapse of Communism as a one-sided victory of their own economic system, and thereby failing to make necessary corrections in that system.”

Instead the US and the West rushed to establish “the victory dividends”, quickly converting moral principles of liberalism and democracy into geopolitical instruments. As Condoleezza Rice wrote in the *Foreign Affairs*: “it is America’s job to change the world...Democratic state-building is now an urgent component of our national interest”.

Well, as they say “we wanted the best, you know the rest...”, many regions of the world are still facing the consequences of the “democratic state building” programs, imposed on the people and communities historically and culturally not being prepared for it.

As Fareed Zakaria famously noticed: “In the early twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson put before the United States this goal: to make the world safe for democracy. In the twenty-first century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.”

But the new “promised” world looked wonderfully pretty. Democracy—and, indeed, decency—had triumphed (in reality in many countries it was largely a made-to-order imitation). Aggressors would be punished (not always and not everywhere). When difficulties appeared, America would ride in to the rescue, encouraged by an accommodating Russia and all sorts of other, newly acquired friends. The United Nations was flourishing, and seemed to be finally fulfilling its purpose—“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

“The NATO expansion that many point to as the main reason for the Russia-West discord was perceived by Russian people within a framework, not so much on the basis of security but rather disregard and disrespect.”

None of this lasted long. When the Cold War ended, half a century of certainties went out of the window. And the frosty clarity of the Cold War bipolarity had given way to the fog of peace.

Quite soon, after a bloodstained sequence of disasters—in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Albania and Algeria—the pattern looked neither pretty nor orderly. And the self-nominated victors of the Cold War seemed no more able to sort out the world than before.

Indeed, they were no more able to understand it. They found the rise of conflictuality largely incomprehensible and, when they took their eyes from the map, they did not even know what to look at—countries, regions, statelets or tribes, religious organisations, ethnic resentment? It looked as if the ages long conflicts have been “defrosted” in the new world and popping up unpredictably and with accelerating speed.

The West’s failure to recognise the new realities of the world after the end of the Cold War and the dismissive attitude to Russia planted the seeds of deep mistrust in the Russian political class.

It is helpful to remind that it is not only Putin, but also his predecessors Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev, who expressed their concern over the U.S. course. The former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recalls in his memoir a conversation when then-President Bill Clinton put himself in Yeltsin’s shoes: “We keep telling Ol’ Boris, ‘Okay, now here’s what you’ve got to do next—here’s some more shit for your face.’ And that makes it real hard for him, given what he’s up against and who he’s dealing with.” And by the middle of his presidency, even initially pro-Western Yeltsin could not hide his bitterness, saying that President Clinton was treating Russia “like Haiti.” “I don’t like it when the U.S. flaunts its superiority ... Russia will rise again!” he said, “I repeat: Russia will rise again!”

Gorbachev similarly pointed that, after he let the Berlin Wall come down and worked to put an end to the Cold War, the United States kept trying to “push Russia out of geopolitics”, discarding all projects of inclusive European security system.

Neither Gorbachev's promoted project of the "common European home" part of which the reformed Soviet Union was to become, nor the later idea of creating new structures of collective security on the continent (including possible creation of the European security Council), which could have helped to avoid the tragedy of the bloody war in Yugoslavia, and the modern drama of Ukraine, was implemented.

And the NATO expansion that many point to as the main reason for the Russia-West discord was perceived by Russian people within this framework, not so much on the basis of security but rather disregard and disrespect.

However, the feeling of "disrespect" was artificially cultivated in Russian society, it was a kind of its continuous psychological self-flagellation. The Perestroika and the end of the Cold War were seen as a "gift" that Russia had offered to the world that was not duly appreciated. But the world, welcoming Russia's return to "normality", did not feel "indebted" by its come-back rightfully assuming that Perestroika was an internal development even if it had some positive spin-off effects for the world at large.

Thus, this feeling of "disrespect" or rather disregard was nothing more than the pretext to release deeply engrained feeling of resentment, that is, slavish morality, when people consider themselves offended (even when they were not), morally inferior for a long time and, on this basis, ready to take revenge on the whole world. This is what Dostoevsky described in the "Notes from the Underground"—"extracting the sweetest juice from humiliation", but in this case self-imagined humiliation.

Russia felt humiliated because it has been dominated by post-imperial gene of submissiveness rather than responsibility. It does not want to control itself. It likes that someone (Tzar, Secretary General, President) decides for it all the time. The population has not become a nation, and consequently it experiences a strong inferiority complex and envies anyone who dares to decide its own fate.

And Ukraine has become an embodiment of all these complexes, which testifies to the Russian deep post-imperial trauma. The Ukrainians were too close, too similar, for Russia to let them go so easily. Throughout all of 30 years of independence, Ukrainian independence was perceived as a misunderstanding, an anecdote—the very word in Russia is usually pronounced with ironic overtones. The Russians accepted the Moldavian, Tajik, even Belarusian independence calmly, but they could not digest Ukrainian independence, and we are not talking about the imperial and "soil" minded society's fractions, but about the widest layers of the educated class, who looked at Ukraine as a "banana republic" and at the same time harboured a deep resentment against the "unreasonable younger brother who arrogantly denied consanguinity".

And when Putin came to power, he immediately realized that by riding these phobias and complexes, he would be able to endlessly control the society and remain in power. Munich speech (2007), Georgia war (2008), annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas (2014) became the steps to the current invasion of Ukraine.

In March 2018, Putin fired up Russian national pride in a fiery speech boasting of powerful new nuclear weapons that “reconfirmed” the status of a great military power that had to be reckoned with, challenging the West: “You didn’t listen. So listen to us now.”

“The war in Ukraine is seen in Moscow as a stage in the destruction of norms, rules and institutions of the modern world system.”

At that point it became clear—he took the bit in his teeth. And if it were not for the COVID epidemic, he would have probably moved into Ukraine earlier.

Has Putin gone nuts? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with its epic failures (the losses of Putin’s army in Ukraine are simply unbelievable: during the 50 days of the war, the “second army of the world” lost more than during the 8 years of the war in Syria) so far has prompted comments from numerous observers—from experts to political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic—and speculation that Putin has become either derailed, perhaps due to pandemic isolation or illness, or misinformed by his entourage and intelligence.

It is not wise to dismissively doubt Putin’s sanity or quality of his information, which inadvertently blurs his responsibility for criminal orders—after all he remains the President of the country. To analyse the essence of this aggression, one should not succumb to the temptations to deny Putin and his entourage’s rationality, fixing attention on the emotions behind their decisions. In any case, most of the steps taken by the Kremlin, both before and after February 24, 2022, look quite rational, if framed by the regime’s evaluation of the state of the world.

Firstly, Moscow has not been happy with its role in the liberal world system and its share of the benefits in terms of influence and power projection capacity, especially in comparison to that of “the weak and decadent” West. In the joint statement released by the Kremlin, Putin and Xi called on NATO to rule out expansion in eastern Europe, denounced the formation of security blocs in the Asia Pacific region, and criticised the Aukus trilateral security pact between the US, UK and Australia.

Secondly, according to Moscow the world system itself as a whole and its key elements—the key stakeholders—looked to be in decline. It was not Putin who authored this idea. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that “the well-trying and familiar framework of order is under strong pressure at the moment.” Many also argued that what is known as the liberal international order has been damaged to such a degree that it is hard to return to the status quo ante. As French President Emmanuel Macron puts it, this is not “an interlude in history before things return to normal [...] because we are currently experiencing a crisis of the effectiveness and principles of our contemporary world order, which will not be able to get back on track or return to how it functioned before.”

Thirdly, Kremlin believed the erosion of governance institutions system has gone beyond repair, since the principles of the 20th and 21st centuries intertwined in it have been largely irreconcilable. In fact, it was also not entirely baseless. The institutional architecture of globalisation failed to develop as had been hoped. The World Trade Organization, established in 1995, found itself in agony, just 25 years after its creation. Plans for global institutions to oversee investment, competition, or climate and environment are shelved. The whole system of the basic international arms control and security agreements (from NPT to Open Skies and New START treaties) was in limbo, etc. It was not incidental that on April 19 a group of more than 200 former senior UN officials wrote to the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, warning him that unless he takes personal leadership in trying to mediate peace in Ukraine, the UN risks not just irrelevance, but its continued existence.

Consequently, fourthly, the Russian ruling class reckoned that triggering the system's collapse should bring dividends to its perpetrators. Putin, who considers USSR implosion "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe", concluded that the time has come for decisive action. And if South Ossetia and Abkhazia could be considered elements of a (bad) foreign policy, and the seizure of Crimea could be considered an (illegal and ill-conceived) attempt to secure the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, then the attack on Ukraine was no longer even draped. Putin considered the scores for the collapse of the USSR unresolved, and the post-Cold War transformations required revision.

Therefore, the aggression is not just about Ukraine, in fact Russia tests in Ukraine the US and the West's "acceptability red lines".

Thus, the war in Ukraine is seen in Moscow as a stage in the destruction of norms, rules and institutions of the modern world system: it was supposed to show the insignificance of NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the transatlantic partnership in the face of a Russian attack, the inability of the West to present a united front. And even the failure of the blitzkrieg and the level of sanctions unexpected for the Kremlin do not weaken the grim determination to break the old world, but rather exacerbate it: people familiar with the situation at the top say that they are now in euphoria from the "historical moment", from the global collapse of institutions, rules, norms, from the disastrous Karamazov's "everything is permitted."

Also this decision fits into the general logic of public administration in Russia. Its perniciousness was due not to the specifics of Russian policy towards Ukraine, but to more fundamental factors that include:

- the characteristics of the Russian political regime,
- the mechanisms of governance of the Russian state,
- misconceptions about the possible consequences of decisions made, and
- likely assessments of the consequences of one's own actions based on previous war experience.

It is very important at this moment to take a sober and balanced look at the situation, to be conscious of the existence of both external and internal core reasons of the crisis. And let us not forget that many western observers used to say that Putin played a weak hand skillfully.

However, Putin has played a weak hand well exactly because the United States and its allies have let him, tolerating Russia to violate arms control treaties, international law, the sovereignty of its neighbours, and the integrity of elections in the United States and Europe.

“Today’s circumstances call for an updated “operating system” — call it “effective multilateralism” or “pluri-lateralism”—that is based not only on the Westphalian sovereign states pattern but involves also nascent stakeholders of the global international society.”

Actually, Putin had outmaneuvered the United States and its allies, who played a strong hand poorly.

Washington and Europe stood by as Putin increased Russian military capabilities, and did little as he probed and tested Western resolve, first in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine in 2014.

They did not act when Putin consolidated Russia’s position in Belarus or when he established a robust Russian presence in Syria, from which his weapons could reach the southeastern flank of NATO.

And if his “special military operation” in Ukraine had gone as planned, with the country subdued in a matter of days (even the US intelligence expected initially that Kiev would fall in 48-72 hours), it would have been a triumphant coup, the end of the first stage of Russia’s “comeback” and the beginning of the second. And rather than excoriating him for his inhumane folly, the world would again be talking about Putin’s “savvy” and his “genius.”

But he is neither savvy nor a genius. Simply the western political class has never faced a thug among their ranks before. And Putin has the psychology of a thug. If he starts a conflict, then this conflict must end with the complete destruction of the opponent. He cannot back down and he will not back down. He never allows himself to show weakness, he never admits mistakes, he never compromises, he never agrees to anything, he only increases the pressure.

Putin and his entourage see the world as a map with borders, zones of influence, fortified objects and bomb and missile targets. Next to each country name there is a relevant “caliber” tag. There are powerful and independent powers with the prefix “super-”, there are simply great powers, there are regional—and, of course, “just ordinary” countries—pawns in the “super league” games. People on this map do not count as they simply do not exist: they are indistinguishable at this scale, when the world is looked at through the bomber sight.

And now it is naive to expect anything else from him. He may pretend to compromise for tactical purposes, to gain breathing space, to regroup the troops, to rebuild military supply infrastructure, or simply to mislead the enemy.

Therefore, in Putin's case, it is impossible to seriously count on compromises—he has crossed the Rubicon, his total defeat is required. Otherwise instead of the UN proclaimed “perpetual peace” ideal we will face perpetual unpeace in reality, because this war has all the chances to fit into 60% of the modern wars that have lasted for at least a decade.

From Afghanistan to Libya, Syria to Congo DRC. Neat and tidy wars endings, even if sometimes illusory, are rare these days. As the defence strategist Sean McFate warned: “Future wars will not begin and end; instead, they will hibernate and smoulder”. But in this particular case we have the war that is not sealed against nuclear escalation unfortunately. Otherwise we will have another endless war but this time with a nuclear power's participation or involvement.

Henry Kissinger famously stated: “The new World Order is not installed as an emergency measure. But for its emergence the world needs extraordinary circumstances.” It looks with COVID-19 and now full-scale war in Europe we are not in short supply of them.

However, global governance indeed begs not just for modern institutions' reform because their credibility has been substantially eroded by inaction and lack of solidarity, but for revision and remodelling because their inadequacy and inefficiency has become ever-present, crying and overwhelming—redefining multilateralism will not be enough; we will have to reinvent it.

The notion of interstate relations no longer captures the entirety of global interactions. Look at The Black Lives Matter movement spreading across the world like a wildfire...it is not just antiracist or national, it is more profound, and to large extent this was provoked by the existing global governance system's inadequacies. A key driving force behind them is a deep awareness of the need for radical change—not reforms to a “perfectly engineered system”, but the desire to replace the entire mechanism and start anew.

Traditional world order seems to be too tight for development of humankind, it is like when a teenager all of a sudden finds his jeans too tight having simply grown out of his clothing.

The article is not a proper place to talk about the details of a new system of international relations, but *de facto* its outlines are dimly visible. The emerging system resembles a hybrid of a bipolar and Vienna “concert” system, with only two “concerts” playing at the same time—authoritarian and liberal. This looks like a new iteration of a familiar balance of power system in a new disguise.

However, we need to change not just our clothes. Instead of interstate world system we need to develop inter-social forms of effective multilateralism to face global challenges and opportunities.

Today's circumstances call for an updated “operating system”—call it “effective multilateralism” or “pluri-lateralism”—that is based not only on the Westphalian sovereign states pattern but involves also nascent stakeholders of the global international society.

The gap between the expanding networked pluri-lateral world and governance, traditionally understood and applied within post-Westphalian concepts, is widening and feeding disorder and disruptiveness of the global system. And this gap will not be bridged by any new iterations of a traditional uni-, bi- or even multi-polar global world order.

Albert Einstein said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome. As a historian, I have the rather disappointing impression that this is a very fitting description of how we have dealt with the crises inevitably producing two new ones replacing the one we dealt with, at the end.

We are all now deeply, deeply interconnected and the current model of multipolarity with the diverging perspectives of its states as the only poles has become not only obsolete but dangerous on many counts.

And the prescription was given 100 years ago by President Woodrow Wilson: “There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace”.

We have been trying to achieve it by reshuffling states based governance system over and over again with the same outcome. Maybe its time to listen to Einstein and try something new?

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War in Ukraine and its “UN”intended Consequences

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This article addresses a great many points of importance related to the war in Ukraine, especially the need for negotiations and the role of the UN in peacekeeping, which no one seems to be thinking about. It offers a balanced view that shifts the focus from moral outrage shouted from every rooftop (on both sides) to a reference to root causes, missed opportunities and absence of leadership (also on both sides). – Editors

Abstract

Resurgent imperialism, extreme nationalism and mighty rearmament are among the long-lasting consequences of the ongoing war in Ukraine that, by virtue of its ferocious intensity, has taken the world by surprise. Rampant militarism is on the rise along with projected military spending and no country in Europe seems immune to the heavy rearmament syndrome. As military spending goes up, it is inevitable to ask to whom it is a benefit: Cui prodest?

There is still time to avert a long period of obscurantism, but ultra-nationalism and militarism are recipes for disaster. Restoring peace is however the one and only overriding priority for humanity. In the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we all regretted that better use was not made of diplomacy, mediation, and common security mechanisms earlier in the conflict to address and resolve historical grievances.

Peace agreements are never completely just, but they can be wise. If adequate pressure were put in place on the parties involved, it is likely that the UN Security Council that failed condemn Russia for its aggression on Ukraine, would authorize a UN peace-keeping contingent. That would be probably the most effective way to deescalate tension between the East and West.

We need to recover the soft power of diplomacy that is the only conduit to a lasting peace.

This article is written with the humble, personal intent of seeing some way out of the quagmire the world is currently in, owing to the Russia-Ukraine crisis. However, it is hard to do so, through the fog of news and gunfire smoke. It is also written to remind us that the preservation of international peace and human security is the objective of the United Nations. Its failures seem to repeat and perpetrate the failures of the League. After 70 years of balance of powers and armed diplomacy, the world is again on the brink of widespread open conflict. The UN Security Council impasse is not the only cause of failure of the international security system. But politicians have no doubts and threw the dice. They are oblivious of their own nightmares.

Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General that perished in Congo during his relentless attempts to bring peace, kept saying that peace-keeping missions are not meant for the military. However, the military is perhaps the only factor that can sustain the peace. His legacy was one of a true leader that has doubts. His words should be a source of inspiration for the current “fast and furious” leaders.

*Sleepless questions in the small hours:
Have I done right? Why did I act just as I did?
Over and over again the same steps,
The same words: Never the answer*

(Dag Hammarskjöld – Markings, 1964)

1. Unintended Consequences

Resurgent imperialism, extreme nationalism and mighty rearmament are among the long-lasting consequences of the ongoing war in Ukraine that, by virtue of its ferocious intensity, has taken the world by surprise.

Humanity was just about to recover from an epochal disease that swept across continents and a war erupted in the coal mining, industrialized, Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk invaded by the Russian Army, de-facto resuming a dormant conflict in those separatist regions. The war of aggression has spread quickly throughout the country and large cities like Odessa and Mariupol have been targeted with the intent of annihilating and terrorizing civilians through wanton destruction, creating a gigantic wave of refugees in the heart of Europe.

As the conflict is unfolding, we see Ukraine exhibiting heroic resistance. There is a high toll of misery and death among civilians, but the propaganda machinery seems well in place, and it is not only one-sided. Patriotic rhetoric is being used to continue the invasion, to amass troops and weaponries, and to destabilize the coalitions of the willing, those in favour, and those against war.

Rampant militarism is on the rise along with projected military spending and no country in Europe seems immune to the heavy rearmament syndrome. Germany alone announced commitments to defence spending for 100 billion euros in 2022, doubling its annual budget. The UK, France and Italy followed with similar moves, complying with NATO demands. The planetary heavy rearmament race has just begun, in a quick turnaround. As military spending goes up, it is inevitable to ask to whom it is a benefit: *Cui prodest?* The answer would be clearly pointing towards the military industry as the list of war profiting corporations is well known. But for those in command, the rationale for a military build-up is not always the same: Investments in national defence and security. It does not matter if this is not people's priority.

The occurrence that building trust among people and nations would better serve international security is not even considered by political leaders at this time. After all, why bother with soft power and negotiation skills when you can buy tanks?

Vladimir Putin, the despotic tyrant that provoked all this, is apparently defiant, but knows well that down the line, with the Damocles sword of a likely criminal court indictment, and with a possible international arrest warrant over his head, plans to go skiing in St. Moritz might be postponed indefinitely.

“The war in Ukraine and its level of destruction has, in less than a month, wiped out beliefs and convictions baby-boomers thought they could pass on to millennials as their legacy with generations of good memories, traditions and wealth.”

In the meantime, a new demagogic narrative is shaping up for popular consumption on all sides of the barricades. A sudden war for the capture of an underestimated, lost province of the former Soviet Empire has, in the collective imagination, quickly transformed yesterday’s friendly, extravagant, Russian tycoons with super yachts in *Cap d’Antibes*, into NATO members’ worst enemies. The fact that they voluntarily relinquished foreign companies’ shares and football teams in Premier League does not make them less guilty. By popular demand, “espionage” by those *nouveaux riches* must be stopped, as after three decades of courting them in the best European vineyards and chateaux, someone high up realized their money was gained unlawfully. They are all thieves! It was thus emphatically proclaimed. What’s next? A staggering drop in the consumption of Champagne and best Italian wines must be accounted for.

On the opposite side, while Putin’s chauvinism is climbing to 83% of civic support in public polls, silly demonstrations of patriotism make Russian models and influencers tear Chanel handbags into pieces as sanctions harden. It is the end of the West’s Vanity-Fair. But it is also the sign that the Belle Epoque of two generations of high-flyers, with its myth of globalization, brands and fashion bloggers is coming to an end. Abrupt, and without an ideological chasm dividing East and West. We still look the same, but are different. Or we are simply told we are different when similarities still match. Retrogressive forces are at work sowing the seeds of hatred, sectarianism, and obscurantism. Putin’s aggression is the result of a miscalculation, an ill-fated perception of the enemy’s weakness, and is also the consequence of what a disgraceful combination of autocrats, old-styled apparatchiks and sycophants can do.

One could say that this is an unprovoked, surreptitious assault against human wellbeing and security. It could be true, but even bystanders are not exempt from guilt. On the western camp, no visionary leadership is in sight to propose alternatives based on human dignity and real values. Lack of understanding of respective positions and grievances has already caused two consecutive world wars. The inability to listen and to keep the dialogue going is the main cause of terrible scenarios in front of us. There is still time to avert a long period of obscurantism, but ultra-nationalism and militarism are recipes for disaster.

The war in Ukraine and its level of destruction has, in less than a month, wiped out beliefs and convictions baby-boomers thought they could pass on to millennials as their legacy with generations of good memories, traditions and wealth. All the securities and codes of our civilization are now in peril, while the essence of globalization is questioned, and once permeable borders now resemble barricades and thick walls.

New greed has provoked unprecedented large-scale destruction, with a level of tension between East and West that is rising fast and appears to be without control. A vast region in the heart of Europe, disseminated with atomic power plants, is now the battlefield of young military recruits, intoxicated by propaganda and clouded by cheap vodka, which could easily provoke a nuclear accident many times more deadly than Chernobyl. The use of nukes, that we all thought was not even a remote option, is now evoked as a last resort by Washington and Moscow.

The confrontation between Russia and the United States continues to escalate at the time of writing and immediately flared up with verbal accusations, sanctions and forced expulsions, which were never witnessed during the Cold War. Europe, through the NATO alliance, followed the US lead and once more demonstrated its total lack of independence, not to mention a common foreign policy. The EU's constitutional resolve to uphold peaceful means of change instantly dissolved and no meaningful contribution was given by preventing the conflict's outbreak. Dispatching armaments, defensive or offensive, to support Ukraine, is the only highly debated question in parliaments, as appeasement scenarios have been abandoned for long, dissenting voices are accused of treason, and each country strikes best deals separately for oil and gas with the redemption and blessings of formerly labelled "pariah and terrorist" states.

The prolonged state of siege that Putin is inflicting on Ukraine, nurtured by the new Russian imperialism, is leaving behind hatred, destruction, and a common sense of defeat. Defeat of the new world order but also the demise of democratic ideals that transcend the glow of nationality. Hardly a voice was heard in 2014, among western nations, which would approve a war to prevent Russians from retaking Crimea. Now, prospects of a long conflict are hardening the resolve to overthrow the ultimate Leviathan and his imperialist nostalgia. Lessons from Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan are yet to be drawn, if ever.

Henry Kissinger asked himself if a hypothetical beneficial evolution should compromise global security interests. He also warned that "independent nationalism is a virus that might spread contagion". The present crisis, as it was well documented by John Mearsheimer,^{*} is the by-product of two irreconcilable ambitions: the expansion of NATO and Moscow's expectations that Western enemies should not be allowed to play in its own backyard, alias Ukraine. The foretelling analysis of Mearsheimer is outright striking: "The West's triple package of policies—NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion—added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite". Western affront is the unequivocal demonstration of turning Ukraine into its stronghold on Russia's border.

^{*} John Mearsheimer, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014

Consequences of insensitive moves and wrong signals are in front of our eyes. The world system will never be the same.

Now, whatever the conclusion of the conflict will be, a gaping void between East and West will prevail for long, with new alliances (Russia and China have never been so close), vital interests and the relinquishment of hard-won international benchmarks and safeguards, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate accords, fight on poverty and Sustainable Development Goals—all victims and unintended consequences of the war.

2. Peacekeeping and Diplomacy

Trying to explain the rationale of the conflict would be presumptuous and insensitive towards those who are suffering the most as bombing continues. However, never before has the world faced such a sudden shift in policy, from appeasement to direct confrontation and consequent escalation of threats.

Restoring peace is however the one and only overriding priority for humanity.

Peace agreements are never completely just, but they can be wise. If parties to a conflict had real grievances arising out of previously attempted negotiations, as it was the case after the 2014 violence in Donbass and war of Crimea, they should have been explored and addressed.

The Balkan conflict of the 90s, yet the deadliest war of the second half of the last century, despite all tragedies, unprecedented civilian targeting, ethnic-cleansing, rapes, and crimes of genocide, ultimately remained a regional conflict where superpowers were not directly engaged. That allowed for an arms embargo (not fully observed) and led to early diplomatic talks backed up by the UN Security Council. A Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General was promptly appointed and dispatched to the region. It was Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State, that immediately attempted to negotiate a cease fire. That happened three months after the war broke out (December '91) and it was sanctioned by the Security Council resolution 724, putting pressure on Javier Perez de Cuellar, then UN Secretary-General, to establish a voluntary peace-keeping force. An interim agreement was reached in February 1993 (UN SC resolution 743) that established a peace-keeping force of 25,000 soldiers, initially 11,000, made of 29 nationalities. Its role was primarily to create the conditions for peace negotiation. The Vance-Owen plan, named after the two negotiators, did not reach the intent of a peaceful agreement between belligerents. However, UNPROFOR, the UN peacekeeping mission, certainly averted further destruction in the first phase of the war. With the ceasefire, the city of Osijek under constant threat, did not follow the fate of Vukovar, the neighbouring town, sadly known for being obliterated by the shelling. Humanitarian assistance was made possible to large segments of population in former Yugoslavia, with assistance to refugees too. In addition, a UNPROFOR battalion was sent to Macedonia for conflict prevention.

Marginal containment of the war continued until 1995, but many lives were also preserved and bastions of civilization kept hopes of many alive.

Only those who have been living in a country at war can appreciate the value of UN presence, of a peace-keeping force that is certainly not equipped to withstand large scale military offensives, or to prevent mass atrocities, but it is up to the UN to provide a buffer between belligerents, and primarily an indispensable channel of communication and dialogue, the prologue of each peace agreement.

Peace-keeping operations are traditionally put in place after a ceasefire, when a peace settlement is elusive. In those contexts, the presence of a peace-keeping contingent serves to buy time and to control possible conflict escalation. We can credit UN peace-keeping with preventing or at least limiting the amount of armed conflict globally and reducing human casualties. Peacekeeping effectiveness is based on the principles of neutrality and consent of the parties involved. The great virtues of peace-keeping operations are their non-threatening and therefore face-saving character.* Exactly what Putin might be seeking for a way out of a long-lasting conflict that is certainly not in the interest of Russia.

The problem is that even if Russia and Ukraine both had an interest in a ceasefire once the respective strategic objectives are attained, meaning the preservation of its independence and most of its territory for Ukraine, and some territorial gains as a buffer zone for Russia, others would have to approve the dispatch of a sizable peace-keeping force.

The United States Administration so far has not evoked a similar prospect. It might very well be that the US is not seeking compromise but a regime change. The words of former Secretary of State, Anthony Lake, come to mind: “Let us be clear: peacekeeping is not at the centre of our foreign or defence policy. Our armed forces priority mission is not to conduct peace operations but to win wars.”† Long ago, another context, but those ideas are still floating. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin seems echoing those words when saying that the US wants “to see Russia weakened”.

However, if adequate pressure were put in place on the parties involved, it is likely that the UN Security Council that failed condemn Russia for its aggression on Ukraine, would authorize a UN peace-keeping contingent.

That would be probably the most effective way to deescalate tension between the East and West. But it would require a vision and the talent of a JFK. Graham Allison’s book “The essence of Decision” refers to the Cuban missile crisis and Kennedy’s tenure “as a guide to defuse conflicts, manage great-power relations and make foreign policy sound decisions”.

Calling your antagonist, a “butcher” and a “criminal”, as done by President Biden, is probably not mentioned as a good tactic in that ideal negotiations’ manual. It may be correct, but it is hardly wise.

In the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, we all regretted that better use was not made of diplomacy, mediation, and common security mechanisms earlier in the conflict to

* Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, described peacekeeping in such terms as “an effective symbol of the new determination to relieve the people of the world of unnecessary conflict, excessive armaments and the constant threat of war”. Beyond the “sheriffs’ posse” – *Survival*, Global Politics and Strategies, Volume 32, 1990- Issue 3

† Anthony Lake, The Limits of Peacekeeping, *The New York Times*, 6 February 1993.

address and resolve historical grievances. There are ways to contain, and reverse dangerous situations and provide diplomatic tools to obtain peace. Among them, techniques normally used by the UN when the Council is not unanimous in its resolve, are: good offices, conciliation, mediation and delegation of responsibility to the Secretary-General.

*“Peace-makers should
fit in one vehicle
– Brian Urquhart.”*

Peace-making and good offices describe the UN Secretary-General’s activities to promote dialogue, facilitate the achievement of agreements and defuse tensions between parties in a dispute. Peace-making itself normally determines the size, scope, and duration of the process.

In the case of Russia and Ukraine, what is going on at the negotiation table? Peace-making activities are not visible these days. It is hoped that they take place behind the scenes. Silent diplomacy can still sort out positive effects and help craft a deal acceptable to all, ending, or at least suspending, the high intensity conflict.

Already in the 80s, with the UN Security Council paralyzed, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar decided to undertake a political gamble. Gambling was applied to two issues with a high-risk factor: one was the crisis in Afghanistan and the other one was Cyprus. The Secretary General won a personal battle carving for himself a key role in mediating among the parties in those crises.

As delegations of Ukrainian and Russian negotiators assemble for TV coverage in Istanbul, it is hoped that a small team of skilled mediators is at work someplace. We need to recover the soft power of diplomacy which is the only conduit for lasting peace. “Peace-makers should fit in one vehicle”– Brian Urquhart said to the author of this article when interviewed about the means to solve conflicts. And he meant it.

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Human Security: A Strong Foundation for Multilateral Cooperation

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Abstract

Human Security is the conceptual framework through which multilateral cooperation and common security amongst nations, which is now necessary, can be achieved. The article argues that the concept of human security has not yet reached its potential to catalyse progress. Human Security focuses on people-centered and context-specific responses to challenges. Several existential challenges such as a stable climate, healthy oceans, and pandemics cannot be addressed successfully at a national level. Even the SDGs require a human security integrated approach in order to overcome the inefficiency of silos. Change is needed quickly. Human security can help make that change.

Today, numerous threats challenge every person on our fragile planet. The ancient admonition found in the Upanishads that the world is one family might be understood as a necessary and very practical perspective to address successfully these global threats. Although there is clearly a value in levels of political organization and expression from cities, to states, to nations there is a pressing need for global cooperation to meet these threats. The practical pursuit of global human security is a valuable principle to gather political will to advance multilateral cooperation.

Likewise, to bring sustainable human security to any nation, multilateral cooperation is necessary. There is no other way to effectively address pandemics, stabilization of the climate, the health of the oceans, rainforests, cybersecurity, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, even stabilization of financial markets, and poverty. These are not the only issues of today requiring a multilateral approach. Moreover, we can see on the near horizon artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and intrusive surveillance putting fundamental freedoms everywhere at risk. Efforts at multiple levels of society are needed to push rapidly for change from adversity to cooperation.

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on 10 December 1964, Dr. Martin Luther King said: “I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of nuclear annihilation... I have the audacity to believe that people everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality, and freedom for their spirits.” Even today, his profound words resonate and call us to pursue policies that provide human security.

But whose words are guiding the policies of the most powerful nations in their aspiration to fulfill the first duty of every state and make their citizens safe and secure? Perhaps the 4th century admonition of the Roman general Vegetius Renatus, in his landmark treatise *Epitoma Rei Militaris*: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” This ancient text guides budgets, strategies, and distorts geopolitics into institutionalized adversity, a view that has led us to the profligacy of military expenditures that hover just short of \$2 trillion dollars yearly. This is nearly double the global military expenditures of 2000.

“Human security goals and multilateral cooperation do not diminish sovereignty but are the very tools needed for sovereign states to fulfill their duties to keep their citizens safe and secure.”

These expenditures, based on cycles of fear and adversity in derogation of trust and cooperation, are reinforced by values and ideas that place national identity before our common humanity. Like other obstacles to multilateral cooperation such as religious fanaticism or terrorism, there remains the problem of nuclear weapons threats which rely on an intentional existential threat to obtain security.

There are certainly appropriate defensive roles for militaries and proportionate budgets would evidence them, but today’s expenditures demonstrate a profound distortion of values. As President Joe Biden once said, “Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.”

Can the dynamic of national militarism provide security in the face of the actual threats of today? Will a primarily military approach bring lasting security to problem areas such as Syria, Israel/Palestine, India/Pakistan, Taiwan/China, and especially Ukraine/Russia? Of course not. Worse, in a nuclear age, the danger of war expanding into the unthinkable remains ever over our heads.

Is there a way to fulfill the United Nations’ aspiration to ensure freedom from the “scourge of war” based on cooperation amongst nations, commonly expressed as multilateralism? Indeed, there is. The potential for true human security has been explicitly expressed in UN General Assembly Resolutions* and substantive reports. Though the concept is supported by the United Nations Secretariat, and there is even a functioning United Nations Human Security Trust to fund projects fulfilling its promise, the concept has not yet reached its potential to catalyze progress. Reinforcing the very practical approach of common security, which identifies the need for human security as its first principle, has similarly not been adequately utilized.

Common security refers to building security between nations through international law, diplomacy and conflict resolution. It is based on the notion that national security cannot be sustained by threatening or reducing the security of other nations, but only by ensuring

* <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/reports-resolutions/>

that the security of all nations is advanced. It relates specifically to multilateral traditional security concerns and for that reason human security is highlighted in the outstanding Common Security: For Our Shared Future 2022 Report, Olaf Palme Centre as its necessary framework.*

“Nations are spending obscene amounts of intellectual, social and economic capital on expanding arsenals, building new and more destructive weapons of mass destruction, further institutionalizing adversity based on an inadequate approach to achieving security. We need this new dimension. We cannot drive 21st century vehicles on highways built in the horse and buggy age.”

Human Security refers to meeting the security needs of people as the core obligation of states. Common security refers to bringing more effective security between and amongst states. They are mutually reinforcing concepts.

As noted in General Assembly resolution 66/290, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.” The resolution calls for “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people.”

It is a powerful idea that can integrate the Sustainable Development Goals, which presently are burdened by the inefficiency of being in silos. The development of the concept of human security lays a firm and coherent foundation for the much-needed multilateral cooperation amongst the world’s nations.

Human security is an idea that parallels the power of the ideas behind the creation of the modern state system, based on sovereignty rights expressed in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), from which arose treaties that changed the political architecture of the world. The new system ended the massive slaughters of European Catholics and Protestants fighting over definitions of Christianity. The change of political architecture formed the basis of our modern sovereign state system. That system must now function far more cooperatively to fulfill the vision of the United Nations multilateral system.

The UN system was created in response to the carnage of the 20th century World Wars and is focused on preventing the scourge of war. Today our political architecture must quickly adjust to meeting 21st Century challenges for which mere national self-interest is insufficient. There are numerous existential threats that require multilateral cooperation for any state to

* https://commonsecurity.org/CommonSecurity_Report_2022_Blue.pdf

be safe. In other words, human security goals and multilateral cooperation do not diminish sovereignty but are the very tools needed for sovereign states to fulfill their duties to keep their citizens safe and secure.

Human security focuses on how people actually live and how to meet their achievable real needs. These include ensuring a clean sustainable environment, useful education, secure jobs, fulfilling culture, stable communities, good health, nourishing food, and the flourishing that comes from freedom of worship, conscience, human rights and the rule of law. These needs require safety in neighborhoods and a culture of peace. Meeting these needs enhances the dignity of each individual. In other words, human security refocuses the pursuit of security from military nationalism and increased threats, violence, and fear to cooperation in meeting present actual real human needs.

Today so many of the needs of people and the needs of their governing institutions, states and businesses require global cooperation because the threats before us cannot be adequately addressed at a national level.

No matter how much is spent on weaponry nor how much an economy of a nation grows, if its people are unhealthy, insecure in their livelihoods, persons, or property, security and wellbeing will evade them.

Today, as never before in human history the regenerative processes of the natural world are at severe risk. The capacity of humanity's impact on the natural world is increasing and accelerating. Nations are spending obscene amounts of intellectual, social and economic capital on expanding arsenals, building new and more destructive weapons of mass destruction, further institutionalizing adversity based on an inadequate approach to achieving security. We need this new dimension. We cannot drive 21st century vehicles on highways built in the horse and buggy age.

Responding to and preventing pandemics, protecting the climate, rainforests, the health of the oceans, water, and topsoil, stopping the destruction of species and impairing the web of life we call biodiversity, along with eliminating the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and achieving an equitable secure global financial system that does not destroy the regenerative processes of nature cannot be met by national security approaches. These challenges require an approach that centers on how people everywhere actually live. They require nations to cooperate and minimize adversity.

While brandishing nuclear weapons at each other, over 70% of the world's malnourished children are in Pakistan and India. In each of these countries, one third of the children are burdened by this tragedy. For these children what does the security of the state mean?

What is happening to the very breath of life which depends on the health of the forests and the phytoplankton of the oceans to provide oxygen? Our financial system privileges enterprises that ignore their environmental and thus climate impact, as they impose unsustainable stress on forests and the oceans. There is no regime in place to adequately stop pollution of the oceans or the destruction of forests. Our very definition of security cannot ignore these facts any longer.

The myths of infinite growth in a finite planet and the myth that security can be found by increased militarism must be met with the realism of science in understanding our relationship with the natural world and an ever increasing sense of gratitude for its bounty.

Change is needed quickly. Ideas that can generate that change are critically important. Human security is such an idea.

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Missed Opportunities: Ukraine is an UN-finished Story of Global Proportions

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Abstract

This paper seeks to look beyond the sense of justifiable outrage and horror over the events still unfolding as a result of the war in Ukraine to examine the root causes of the current conflict and the essential issues that need to be addressed in order to end and prevent its recurrence. It challenges simplistic assumptions underlying the sense of pessimism, fatality and inevitability that pervade current thinking so much and which is used to justify the revival of deeply flawed ideas and failed policies, discarded as obsolete decades ago. It re-examines the concepts and strategies on which the current model of security is founded, calling for a shift from competitive national security to an inclusive cooperative security system and for a broadening of our approach to encompass the full gamut of interdependent human security threats—political, economic, social, cultural, technological, personal and environmental—the indivisible dimensions of the three cardinal human aspirations for peace, security and sustainable development. It calls also for immediate affirmation of Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and other measures to drastically reduce the threat of nuclear war with its calamitous impact on humanity and our planet's life support system. Finally, it focuses on the essential, irreplaceable function of global rule of law and multilateral institutions in any viable and sustainable system of global governance resting on the foundation of a slowly emerging, richly varied culture of universal human values. Nothing can justify the horrendous suffering and destruction resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but outrage and the aggressive defense of human freedom are not sufficient to address the root causes which have enabled it to occur. Wise, visionary, courageous leadership is needed to fashion a multilateral system that can end and prevent its recurrence.

Events of the last three months cast doubt on many fundamental assumptions, expectations and projections regarding the direction and future course of human history. The sudden onset of the invasion of Ukraine marks the greatest mobilization for war in three-quarters of a century. And the round-the-clock cycle of TV, internet and press coverage by the global media has brought real-time coverage of the war into the homes of millions of people around the world, leaving many stunned, perplexed, outraged, frightened, and disillusioned, as if all the gains of the last three decades and perhaps much of those made since 1950 are vanishing before our very eyes.

People around the world have borne witness to the brutal onslaught and devastating impact of the Russian attack on Ukraine and its people in the most widely televised, closely

documented war in history. The glamour of armies battling heroically has been replaced by scenes of innocent civilians, schools, hospitals, residential communities helplessly caught in the line of fire. The inspiring heroism and resolve of the Ukrainian people have evoked outcries of sympathy and support from around the world and unprecedented condemnation of the aggression by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.^{1,2,3} The plight of 14 million refugees has evoked from the countries of the EU and NATO a degree of unity, common economic action and financial support few would have thought possible in these times of political discord and social polarization.

At the same time the war has sent shockwaves around the world in the form of the mounting threats of food shortages and famine, soaring energy prices, inflation, disrupted supply chains, severed commercial relationships, and declining global economic prospects. Fossil fuel has once again been transformed from a natural resource into a weapon to support mass destruction. The war has spurred a sudden shift in national priorities from investments in sustainable development to the boosting of defense budgets and production, wiping out hopes of a peace dividend to fund the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). And the resurgent threats of nuclear warfare have brought back memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis and revived fears of a nuclear-induced global environmental calamity that no climate strategy could control or mitigate.

In the time it takes for winter to transition into spring, decades of diplomacy, arms control negotiations, global economic relations, long term investment plans, regional security agreements, international legal frameworks, multilateral institutional arrangements, the evolving political configuration of the world's nations and the future security of humanity have been cast in doubt.

The sense of sympathy, outrage and righteous indignation over the events that have unfolded have made it extremely difficult to rationally reflect on the root causes of the conflict, the likely consequences of the expanding war between Russia and NATO-backed Ukraine, or the ultimate impact of these events on the future of humanity. But no matter how tempting it is to take sides emotionally, legally, and morally, we fail in our responsibility to humanity when we respond with passion and self-justification where calm reflection, perceptive insight, adept diplomacy, and courageous leadership offer the only possible means that can lead to a better future.

1. Looking Backward with Prophetic Hindsight

Even as people were struggling to get accustomed to the sensational scenes of violence and suffering, the attention of many political leaders, diplomats and academicians has turned to the past in search of explanations and scapegoats for the events that are now unfolding. Warning signs that had been ignored, errors and omissions of diplomacy, failures to act sooner or more forcefully have been identified in the Maidan Revolution of 2014, which was quickly followed by the invasion of Crimea, the Orange Revolution of 2004, the growing dependence of Western Europe on Russian energy, and the failure to heed the repeated efforts of Russia to either stop the eastward expansion of NATO or to be admitted among NATO members.

Some have traced recent events still further back to the circumstances, promises and actions that immediately followed the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, focusing on deeper fundamental political and cultural differences such as democracy vs autocracy or individualism vs collectivism or to Russia's imperial past—factors which were previously discounted but suddenly appear as insurmountable obstacles to future peace.

At the same time attention has been turned forward to imagine the ultimate cessation of fighting, the future of Ukraine and its people, the growing confrontation between Russia and NATO, implications for future relations with China, the retreat from the globalization of markets and the international financial system, and the revival of the Cold War nuclear and conventional arms race. And the resort to unprecedented economic and financial sanctions is likely to spur a reconfiguration of the international financial system. The vulnerability of global supply chains has spurred a shift back to self-sufficiency, prompting some to herald the end of globalization or its reversal. It is perplexing to see how quickly acceptable possibilities seem to have disappeared and trapped humanity on an irreversible course.

It is easy to see the dire warnings of the writing on the wall staring us in the face, and more difficult to look beyond the appearances to the latent opportunities waiting to recast our world. Assuming the worst in bad times imparts a sense of wisdom and certainty which sanctions and energizes the very thing we most fear. Focusing on the cracks and crevices in that vision points us to the hidden opportunities for rapid and radical transformation at a time when prevailing structures and ways of life need to change as radically as life behind the Iron Curtain changed after 1990. Are we willing and prepared?

In retrospect it is evident that the sudden and near miraculous succession of events that led to the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet empire and of the USSR itself were accompanied by serious blunders, unaddressed problems and missed opportunities that would eventually come back to haunt us as they are doing today. Among these errors and omissions two stand out most prominently: the failure to establish a truly inclusive global cooperative security system that would safeguard the rights of all nations and the failure to completely eradicate nuclear weapons after the doctrine of mutually assured destruction had been discarded as obsolete. Resolution of the problems underlying the current conflict in Ukraine ultimately will depend on the courage, wisdom and vision of world leaders to address these two issues.

2. Looking forward with Uncertainty and Nostalgia

The prevailing feeling today is increasingly anxious uncertainty about the future. Uncertainty is a sign of the confusion that invariably appears at times of radical change. It is also a sign of recognition that the ideas, premises, assumptions on which we have been working up until now may no longer be valid. Consciousness of the limitations of our present knowledge and beliefs constitutes a form of self-awareness and humility that can open up unexpected opportunities which no one has foreseen.

In trying to foresee the future, it is wise to know the limits of our knowledge and the mental instrument, ideas, facts and understanding on which it is based. Who among us had the vision

to foresee the revolutionary events that followed in quick succession after the fall of the Berlin Wall right up to the birth of the global internet? As former WAAS President Harlan Cleveland observed in one of his last recorded speeches,

Although political change has moved swiftly in other times and places, it is hard to think of a historical moment with a comparable rate of acceleration. One observer said that, in 1989, the ouster of a Communist party took roughly 10 years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in East Germany, ten days in Czechoslovakia, and ten hours in Romania. Real history doesn't come in such neat packages, but the remark helps remind us of that cascade of political surprises that filled our television screens in the autumn of 1989 and again in the autumn of 1991, when the Soviet Union itself fell apart and its republics started trying to pick up the pieces.⁴

In July 1989 President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl met privately and discussed the future of Europe. They both agreed that German reunification was inevitable. But they also agreed that it might well take 30 or 50 years or even more for it to happen. Within 12 months of their meeting, it became a reality. In hindsight there are innumerable scholars who can explain the events that unfolded following the summer of 1989. But during the period in which they occurred, very few if any on either side of the Iron Curtain accurately foresaw the events that subsequently unfolded in quick succession to usher in a new age of unprecedented peace, commerce and interrelationship among the people and nations of the world.

Nor was this blindness regarding what was about to happen a historical aberration. At the end of the Second World War, the Allied imperial powers were anxious to maintain their empires around the world, in spite of having fought a war to stop imperial empire-building by their Axis opponents. Yet within a few decades one third of humanity was liberated from imperial oppression and the original 51 founding members of the UN multiplied into 120, then 150 and eventually the 193 we have today.

Our response to uncertainty depends on our attitudes and expectations. For tens of millions of former Soviet citizens and allies, the future in 1989-90 was filled with goodwill for their erstwhile Western enemies and naïve euphoria regarding a better future under democracy and capitalism. When the dissolution of the USSR was announced at the end of 1991, I asked the head of a Russian economic institute in Moscow what he expected would be the impact of the breakup on the tightly integrated Soviet economy. With typical Russian pessimism, he predicted a 50% fall in per capita GDP. When I protested that such a catastrophe far exceeded the impact of the Great Depression, he shrugged his shoulders—a lone dissenting voice among the prophets of rapid prosperity. I was stunned with disbelief. It turned out we were both wrong. The actual average decline in the former Soviet republics was 54%. And it took many years for the majority of citizens of the former Soviet Bloc to regain the security they had lost at the time and to surpass their previous standards of living under communism. Looking forward prophetically is a hazardous profession regardless, whether one is an optimist or a pessimist. Foresight is never as reliable as hindsight, regardless of the conviction and enthusiasm with which it is predicted.

So too, the rising uncertainty of the prosperous West today appears differently when viewed from different perspectives. Many of those more concerned with the destruction of the earth's environment and the catastrophic threat of climate change may look with relief at a slowdown or reversal of economic growth. And the 140 plus nations which lie outside the Western collective security system may not feel reassured by the growing strength or cohesion of NATO, since they are not protected by its security umbrella.

3. From Competitive to Cooperative Security

Indeed, it is just such a lack of appreciation for perspectives other than our own that led the USA and NATO to underestimate and ignore the serious security threat perceived by Russia when the West began to back out of the commitments it had given to keep NATO out of the Russian security sphere in the 1990s. In October 1994 a report by the International Commission on Peace and Food (ICPF) entitled *Uncommon Opportunities: Agenda for Peace and Equitable Development*, was released by Harlan Cleveland at the WAAS Minneapolis General Assembly and then by Gus Speth, Administrator of UNDP in New York and Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO in Paris, before being formally submitted to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali with a personal endorsement by Gorbachev. Among its recommendations, the report stressed the need for a radical shift in security doctrine from a competitive national system to a global cooperative security paradigm.⁵

In a chapter authored by international security expert and WAAS Fellow Jasjit Singh, the ICPF report argued:

The competitive security paradigm is a state-centred, egocentric approach in which the security of each nation is perceived in terms of its military superiority over potential adversaries. The push of each nation for unlimited security through military power is inherently destabilizing, since it inevitably increases the level of insecurity of other sovereign states. In practice, the effort of nations to arm themselves against perceived external threats generates a sense of insecurity among other nations and compels them in turn to increase military preparedness, thus initiating a vicious spiral, as it did during the Cold War. When NATO and the Warsaw Pact had armed themselves to the point where direct confrontation became too risky, mutual suspicion and insecurity led them to fight each other through proxy wars in the developing world. Every move by either side was perceived as a potential security threat, prompting a counter by the other. Compounded by the inherent instability of nuclear weapons, this doctrine led to the anomaly of increasing military power and steadily decreasing national and international security.⁶

The report called for action to prevent perpetuation of this flawed competitive security paradigm.

This is an occasion that demands visionary and courageous leadership to usher in a better world. The children of the next millennium will judge us by our response... Historically, all landmark changes in the international political and security system

have been the result of armed conflicts, wars and revolutions. In each case the victors who emerged from the ashes of war sought to build on a static formula for enforcing peace in a dynamic world. In each case, the arrangements for conflict termination contained a dynamism that would produce the tensions, disputes and conflicts of the future. These in-built limitations and imbalances resist adjustment until a new round of fighting sweeps away the old frame work and replaces it with another, fashioned in much the same way.⁷

It is no wonder that as NATO expanded in recent decades, the calls by Russian leaders, including Putin, for Russian admission to NATO became increasingly fervent. Meanwhile Russian objections to NATO expansion to include former Russian allies became increasingly strident. At a meeting of NATO Ambassadors at Split in May 2013, a WAAS delegation questioned NATO officials regarding the future role they perceived for Russia in the alliance. Our question was met with a deafening silence. The following year Putin invaded Crimea.

NATO's refusal to admit Russia or bar the future admission of Ukraine is not sufficient justification for Russia's aggression, but it is evidence of a widespread failure of leaders to understand the depth and intensity of the concerns which eventually led to war. And it is an indication that efforts to finally address the outstanding security concerns of all parties must complete work left undone three decades ago.

We find ourselves once again in the position anticipated by the ICPF report a quarter century ago:

We are now at an historic crossroads: one path leads us back to a static, unstable and exclusive competitive security paradigm; the other leads to a far more stable and dynamic cooperative security paradigm inclusive of all nations and responsive to future needs and challenges. A global cooperative security system is needed that seeks to strengthen national security without increasing the insecurity of other states. It should be based on the fundamental principle that force will no longer be tolerated by the international community as a legitimate instrument of national policy.⁸

4. Nuclear Weapons

The second intractable security threat which the world failed to address at the end of the Cold War was that posed by nuclear weapons. In spite of a dramatic reduction in nuclear warheads by Russia and USA from over 64,000 in the late 1980s to less than 13,000 today, the number of nuclear weapons states has nearly doubled from five to nine and the continued threat of nuclear weapons has suddenly become more real and imminent than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The catastrophic consequences of all-out nuclear war are too horrible to imagine. Moreover, the potential environmental impact of detonating even one percent of the current nuclear arsenals would so severely impact the earth's climate, agricultural production and global food supply as to exceed the worst case IPCC scenarios of the havoc that will accompany global warming.

But even if no weapons are ever used, the continued presence and perceived “legitimacy” of threatening the use of nuclear weapons has already undermined fundamental tenants of international relations and global rule of law. If a nuclear superpower like Russia can use the threat of nuclear retaliation as an offensive weapon to prevent the international community from defending the sovereign rights of Ukraine from foreign invasion, then what will the world do if a North Korea, an even smaller country or a terrorist group obtains and threatens to use nuclear weapons to forestall interference with their blatant acts of blackmail and aggression against their neighbors?

The most insidious threat of these and other weapons of mass destruction is that they threaten the sanctity of the very principles upon which international relations are founded. Even if we do not have the power to compel the physical destruction of all nuclear weapons, humanity does have the power to immediately adopt more limited measures to drastically reduce the threat of nuclear war. The most practical immediate first step would be the universal adoption of Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) by all nuclear weapon states.

A NSA is a guarantee by a nuclear state that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state. In the past the five Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states have made several pledges regarding negative security assurances. In April 1995 the five original nuclear-weapon states did provide pledges on NSAs to the non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995).⁹ In spite of persistent efforts under the NPT and the Disarmament Committee, NSAs have not yet been made universally legally-binding.¹⁰ Global Security Institute (GSI) and others have highlighted the extreme risk of nuclear conflict generated by the Ukraine conflict and called for a General Assembly resolution reaffirming the essential importance of NSAs to set limits on the potential consequences of the fighting in Ukraine.

The second most urgent step would be universal adoption by all nuclear weapon states of a no-first-use policy as advocated by WAAS partners such as GSI, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, European Leadership Network and many other organizations.

The Ukraine crisis is a call to address a far greater threat to humanity than prolonged fighting in Eastern Europe. Until the threat of nuclear war is completely abolished, all our efforts to build a permanent peaceful security and governance system for the world community can never be achieved.

5. Facts & Myths about Cultural Universality vs. Irreconcilable Conflict

A case is once again being made that the conflict between Russia and NATO and the rising tensions between China and the West in recent years are signs of an inevitable conflict between cultures founded on democratic values and those founded on autocracy. The revival of this thesis appeals for its simplicity and historical precedent, but it may not survive a deeper consideration. The intolerance of autocracy in the West and the mistrust of democracy in China and Russia is an overly simplistic stereotype.

Historically, the gradual evolution from various forms of autocracy to democracy has been occurring for centuries in nations around the world. No culture can claim a monopoly on monarchical, feudal and imperial forms of government. None can claim it has been exempt from autocratic tendencies in the past. Even today we are shocked by its rise in bastions of democracy such as France and the USA. At the same time, economic democratization has made great strides in China up until China's continued progress came to be perceived as a threat to Western economic dominance. And Russia made considerable progress toward a more liberal political system until its efforts to be admitted on equal footing to Western society had been continuously shunned with suspicion. As a result, both countries now perceive the West as a threat.

“To aggrandize their own power, the Putins and Trumps of the world create walls that divide us by fear, suspicion, anger and self-righteousness, but those walls can be torn down. Let us not now legitimize those divisive, self-serving tactics by reconstructing an impenetrable mental or cultural wall.”

In times of perceived external threat, centralized authority at the national level gains prevalence, as illustrated by the unilateral actions of the US government against Japanese immigrants during World War II and on the falsified grounds for the 2003 US invasion of Iraq based on fabricated evidence of a nuclear threat. It also happens at times when internal social forces undermine people's confidence in the future prospects offered by their own system, as during the appeal of Communism in the US during the Great Depression. Even in times of relative prosperity, such as Americans now enjoy, the rapid and radical changes in technology, economy, immigration, social values, inter-religious and inter-cultural relations can generate a perceived threat to national identity which revives ultra-conservative and reactionary undemocratic tendencies.

It is true that some 40 nations chose to abstain from taking sides in the General Assembly vote on Russia's invasion of Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Some, no doubt, were under pressure or obligation to Russia. But some also perceived that the wholesale assignment of blame on Russia was a gross oversimplification of the issues. It failed to take into account similar violations of national sovereignty by other countries and Russia's legitimate security concerns.

It is right to recognize and take into account the real differences in present political, social and cultural values, but it is an error to conclude that current distinctions are absolute and unchangeable differences. The notion of a permanent cultural divide between the people of the world fails to take into account just how far the more economically advanced nations of the world have evolved in recent times. The American Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men are created equal, but the men referred to were white, Christian, English-speaking property-owners who constituted less than five percent of the population. English democracy

at the time admitted a comparable portion of its population. Neither recognized the equal rights of women, blacks, slaves, religious minorities, or the indigent. Women only obtained the right to vote in both countries during the 1920s. Slavery and slave trade were prominent among the most “civilized” nations of the world during the 18th century. America had to fight a bloody civil war to eradicate the legal right to slavery. For the past 150 years it has been fighting legal battles for the equality of women and blacks which are still going on in court rooms around the country. On many of these issues, almost all nations are more socially liberal and advanced than the West was in 1950s. Even at the time Western democracies were extolling the values enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one-third of humanity were forcibly oppressed citizens of imperial colonies around the world. None of the world’s leading democracies were willing to accord the UDHR force of law in 1948.

The illusion of irreconcilable differences with Russia was broken for me on my very first visit to Moscow in August 1989 when all the stereotypes of the cultural divide dissolved before the humanity of breathing hearts and minds. The Russian soul is that of an anarchist kept temporarily under wraps by external authority, as its religious impulses were during 70 years of communism, only to explode back with renewed passion since 1990. Let us acknowledge the real differences imposed by prevailing politics—like the waves of MAGA ultra-conservatism sweeping America today—without making the error of dividing humanity into airtight incompatible cultures. Every nation has its Taliban and other varieties of extremism. The peaceful assimilation of the world’s immigrants into liberal American culture is evidence that the contradictions are largely temporal, special and circumstantial, rather than fundamental, and they evolve over time. In times of stress, the social pendulum can rapidly shift from one extreme to another, as it did in the USA after Obama completed two terms as the first African-American President. No society has a monopoly on autocracy and fundamentalism. To aggrandize their own power, the Putins and Trumps of the world create walls that divide us by fear, suspicion, anger and self-righteousness, but those walls can be torn down. Let us not now legitimize those divisive, self-serving tactics by reconstructing an impenetrable mental or cultural wall, which has taken so many decades to tear down.

A further complication has arisen in the case of the war in Ukraine as observed by Jonathan Granoff. It is the inability of nations at different stages of social-political evolution to fully understand the conduct of one another. In order to generate trust and provide a reliable basis for relationships, diplomacy requires a sense of stability, continuity and reliability in the positions taken by parties on both sides. Autocratic governments expect a level of continuity which the frequent changes in leadership common in democracies are often unable to provide. Thus, the verbal assurances of American governments to Russia at the end of the Cold War were mistaken for long term guarantees for Russian security to such an extent that even written agreements were not initially deemed essential. Whereas successive democratically-elected leaders in the West have not felt bound to the oral assurances and commitments made by their predecessors from different political persuasions. The remarkable aura of trust that prevailed between East and West at the end of the Cold War turned gradually to disappointment, a sense of betrayal and anger, as it underwent different interpretations and mutations by successive governments. In the absence of effective, empowered multilateral

institutions to arbitrate and enforce agreements, cultural differences, even when transient, can result in serious misunderstandings and conflicts. So the issues are very real, even if they are not necessarily permanently irreconcilable.

Nothing that has happened can ever morally justify the suffering caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, any more than it could justify the inhuman conduct of the Nazis during World War II which Russia disingenuously claims is the type of conduct it is now fighting to combat in Ukraine. But after 1945 Western Europe learned from its past errors rather than repeating them again. Erstwhile enemies embraced one another and embarked on the greatest and most successful experiment so far undertaken to transcend the pernicious side of nationalism and imperialism in favor of regional cooperation and integration on an unprecedented scale. We too would be wise to learn from the past and seek to devise solutions based on this remarkable achievement, rather than retreat to failed practices of the past.

Ukraine has survived the Russian invasion precisely because it reminded people and nations around the world about the value of their most precious resource—freedom. No one imagined that the nations of Europe would join together to defend Ukraine in the face of Russia's threat to cut off vital energy supplies. The aspiration for freedom that spurred the American, French, Russian, Indian and countless other freedom struggles in the past is still alive in the hearts of all human beings and waiting for its time to burst forth. The world is divided by serious political, social, economic and cultural barriers, but at a deeper level we share common aspirations for freedom and human security that can be suppressed for some time but never eradicated. No country or culture can claim a cultural monopoly on it.

The notion that universal values represent an effort to impose the cultural biases of one portion of humanity on all the rest is both a gross oversimplification and distortion of reality. For what we are witnessing today is not the wholesale superimposition of one set of values on all humanity but rather an increasingly rich and complex mixture, synthesis and integration of different cultural perspectives to forge a composite global culture of unrivaled tolerance for differences and recognition of a level of social equality never before achieved by human civilization. The evolution of global culture is an achievement of humanity, not a victory for any particular culture. And as it continues, we may anticipate increasing variety rather than uniformity, as the universal spiritual values of the East have already so deeply penetrated the thinking and religious traditions of the West.

The adoption of universal human values has been and will continue to be an evolutionary process much more than a cultural one. It is fostered in conditions which provide physical security for individuals and communities from external threats, economic security and remunerative employment, and rising levels of education, and other forms of human security universally sought after and cherished. When any of these are under threat, the retreat to authority gains appeal. Recognition of this truth explains why 193 nations of the world unanimously endorsed the 17 Sustainable Development Goals which are an effort to transform the idealistic universal values affirmed in the UDHR into practical, ground realities in the lives of their citizens.

At the same time, it is true that several sub-motifs of this evolutionary progression do complicate the issue and generate genuine sources of conflict along the way. The first is the increasing heterogeneity within societies that results in tensions between the more educated, urban and cosmopolitan communities and the more insular, homogeneous parts of society less exposed to other cultural influences, as shown in the urban-rural divide in America, which grows more prominent and provocative as the speed of globalization increases.

This reaction has been further aggravated by the rapid intrusion of the internet into previously insular communities and the conscious exploitation of these differences by political parties, financial interests and, in the case of both Russia and the West, by the intentionally polarizing impact of fake news and propaganda, which demonstrate how sensitive and vulnerable even the most highly educated societies can be to efforts to weaponized social and cultural conflicts.

6. Solution to Global Challenges demands a Global Perspective

The problem with much of the discussion about the future today is that it is conducted from the perspective and with regard to the interests of particulate stakeholder groups at a time when what is needed is thinking of solutions that will address the uncertainty, anxiety, aspiration and concerns of all humanity. That is the kind of leadership in thought the world needs in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1945 and 1991.

In 2019-20 WAAS collaborated with the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) on a project entitled “Global Leadership in the 21st Century”. The objective was to address the vacuum in leadership at the global level. This leadership deficit in thought and action had been widening for decades due to the increasing speed and complexity of global social interrelationships and the lack of support for multilateral institutions by UN member states, combined with their persistent refusal to increase access to the UN for other important stakeholder groups, particularly NGOs, representatives of future generations, academia, business and finance. The joint WAAS-UNOG report in September 2020 included 24 catalytic strategies to enhance the effectiveness of global leadership under five broad headings—Redefining Multilateralism, Sustaining Peace & Human Security, Mobilizing Civil Society, Financing Implementation of SDGs, and Transforming Education.¹¹

The inability of the UN system to play a lead role in the Ukraine crisis is reminiscent of the way it was bypassed by the major powers in dealing with previous crises, such as the war in Afghanistan from 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Syrian Civil war from 2011 and countless other examples. The uncertainty the world faces today is largely the result of the refusal of nation states to vest sufficient power in the institutions of international law and governance, which is so essential to effectively address global threats such as pandemics, global security and climate change.

The UN was established and funded by member states and it can only be as strong and effective as its members enable it to be. Retreat to the Cold War model of a world divided into power blocs is bound to fail. The current crisis presents an opportunity to compensate for our collective failures in 1945 and 1991 and build the kind of institutions and leadership needed to address uncertainty and insecurity in the 21st century.

7. Human Security

Our present uncertainty and insecurity are undermined not only by institutional weaknesses. They are also severely impaired by prevailing concepts and dogmas. The three most pressing challenges confronting humanity in recent years—the COVID-19 pandemic, the consequences and repercussions of the invasion of Ukraine, and the existential climate crisis—all share several things in common. None of them can be effectively addressed by individual nation states acting unilaterally, by the piecemeal policies of specialized institutions acting separately and independently of one another. Addressing these challenges necessitates a coordinated collective action by the world community as a whole acting in and through the multilateral system.

The very notion that security can be won by \$2 trillion in annual military spending is deeply flawed and was supposed to have been discredited thirty years ago when military spending declined by one-third within three years and arms control agreements led to an 80% reduction in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The recent rise to record levels of military spending, which is now expected to climb dramatically due to the war in Ukraine, reflects the fact that we have already forgotten the lessons learned during 40 years of Cold War and we have failed to strengthen the institutions needed to prevent a repeat of the errors made after World War II.

The problem of security today is not limited to war between nations. No war since 1945 has impacted the security of global society as severely as the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of loss of life, economic costs, economic paralysis, blockage to transportation, shutting down of factories and businesses, closure of schools and colleges, loss of jobs and incomes. And these temporary losses pale into insignificance when compared with the anticipated and rapidly approaching consequences of climate change, which will impact all nations, all regions and all levels of global society for the long term.

Today the solution to the war in Ukraine is primarily viewed in military terms by both sides. But a military solution of any description will leave unaddressed the underlying root causes that led to the conflict in the first place. The more resources are poured into an arms race on both sides, the greater the insecurity, instability and prospect of greater violence in the future. Is that the kind of solution and the kind of world we should be heading for?

The real security threats today are threats which impact all dimensions of the life of global society—political, economic, health, education, community, personal and environmental. They include all the issues identified and being addressed by the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. And they are all interlinked, interconnected and interdependent with one another, so they will defy efforts to address them in the piecemeal, fragmented manner which now predominates. And we must add to the traditional list of security threats new ones which were not envisioned in UNDP's original report on human security in 1994 or in the 17 SDGs and 169 targets included in Agenda 2030. Take, for example, the Internet which renders both democracies and autocracies socially vulnerable, regardless of whether they are economically all-powerful and or ruthlessly authoritarian over their own populations. For

today we also confront severe threats to personal, social, national and global security from other directions—financial crisis, fake news, cyber wars, artificial intelligence, increasing social fragmentation and polarization, and decline of faith in the major institutions on which all our present achievements are founded.

The only viable solution to human security is to approach the full gamut of threats in a comprehensive, integrated manner that views all these dimensions as aspects of a single issue and objective—to promote Human Security for all people and nations everywhere on earth. We must abandon the narrow partisan viewpoints of competing nation states and join together to promote the concept of human security for people everywhere.

8. Observations and Conclusions

This paper concludes with a few central observations and suggestions.

1. **International Law is the Foundation for Peace and Human Security:** War has always involved terrible offenses against human rights, dignity, justice and universal values. But never before has the whole world witnessed those offenses close up, first hand, and felt so outraged by their continued existence. Moral indignation is not sufficient to eradicate them. That can only be done by establishing an institutional framework for law in which no nation is exempted and no nation can exercise an inordinate power to veto condemnation by the global community. **Refusal of nation states to cede authority to a global system has left us all vulnerable.** Russia's disregard of global authority has its earlier counterpart in the example of other nations in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.
2. **Emerging Global Social Consciousness:** Law is the codification of public conscience. Enforceable law is not determined by what is written in the statutes but what the general public accepts, endorses and demands be enforced. The consensus of the politically and socially polarized fractured American public on the appropriate response to Ukraine was certainly not what Putin expected. Nor the equally remarkable unity of the energy-dependent nations of the European Union to assert their independence at a moment of maximum vulnerability. Nor the radical swing in public opinion within traditionally neutral Sweden, Finland and Switzerland renouncing neutrality in the face of Russian aggression. Nor the 141 members of the UN General Assembly that approved the UN resolution condemning the aggression and calling for immediate cease-fire. Not even the 40 nations that abstained for different reasons: for apart from political considerations of self-interest, the fact remains that there is more than one side of the story which needs to be heard and considered by the global community. Nor the International Court of Justice's preliminary decision ordering Russia to suspend military operations in Ukraine and affirming the Court's compulsory legal jurisdiction under the UN Charter over matters regarding genocide.¹² Three-quarters of a century after the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the contents of the UDHR have still not acquired the full force of international law—but recent events can bring us at least one step closer to that goal.

3. **Nuclear lawlessness undermines the authority of international law:** The very existence of nuclear weapons and the perceived right of nations to use them, even in self-defense, undermines the very basis for international law. For it means that any nation, no matter how small or ill-justified, can hold its neighbors, region or perhaps the whole world for ransom the way Russia has recently threatened to respond to any nations that interfere with its aggression against Ukraine. Without enforceable international law, there can be no viable human community and international law can never be sacrosanct and inviolable until nuclear weapons are fully outlawed and abolished.
4. **From Competitive to Cooperative Security:** The mutual interdependence of states has rendered the costs of global warfare suicidal. Exclusive collective security systems are provocative and unstable. It is not too late to compensate for the missed opportunities of 1991 by reversing acceleration of the arms race and transforming NATO into an inclusive cooperative security system that admits all those who commit to its fundamental principles. Regardless of the outrage over Russia's invasion or the mutual distrust on both sides, it is nothing to compare with the crimes against humanity committed during World War Two or the level of animosity between the Allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other. If the world could overcome the hostility of those times to forge strong alliances that have stood the test of seven decades, then it is certainly possible to do so now.
5. **From Militarism to Human Security:** The choice is not between national security backed by military preparedness and human security focused on sustainable and equitable development for all. National security and human security are complementary dimensions of a comprehensive perspective of what is required to promote safety, stability, protection, rights and dignity for all human beings. But the one-sided reliance on military preparedness and lopsided investment in armaments is counterproductive and dangerous. For without addressing security in this wider sense, peace and cooperation between people, communities and nations are unattainable and unsustainable.

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Notes

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2. "Ukraine: General Assembly passes resolution demanding aid access, by large majority" 24 March 2022 United Nations <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632#:~:text=During%20its%2011th%20Emergency%20Special,more%20commonly%20known%20as%20North>
3. "UN international court of justice orders Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine" 16 March 2022 *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine#:~:text=The%20UN's%20international%20court%20of,the%20east%20of%20the%20country>
4. Harlan Cleveland, *The Cold War Cadmus Journal* 4, no. 6 (2022): 101-110
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6. *Ibid*, p.40.

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7. Ibid, p.40.
8. Ibid, p.43.
9. “The Conference On Disarmament And Negative Security Assurances” *United Nations* <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/CD-and-NSA-Fact-Sheet-Jul2017.pdf>
10. “Negative security assurances” *Reaching Critical Will* <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5442-negative-security-assurances>
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Russia in NATO: Thinking the Unthinkable?

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Abstract

It was a newspaper cartoon that inspired this text, in particular the reflection it carried on the relations between Russia and NATO: what seems unthinkable today was thought yesterday and could be made possible tomorrow. Hence this question: Russia in NATO, thinking the unthinkable. With the dual perspective of a historian, trained in the history of Russia, and a futurist, the author analyzes the ambivalent relationship that Russia and NATO have maintained from 1954 to 1998, a period during which the Kremlin, from Khrushchev to Yeltsin, has, on several occasions, formally requested its membership in the Atlantic Alliance. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, NATO reached out to Russia, but also to the former Warsaw Pact countries, while carefully keeping the door closed to Moscow. The year 1999 was a turning point in relations between Russia and NATO, with the two major events of the military intervention in Kosovo and the enlargement of the Alliance to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the eyes of observers at the time, the arrival in power of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin the following year appeared in many respects to be a fork in the road. Indeed, at that time, good relations were still possible, which would deteriorate until 2022. By 2050, many metamorphoses are possible, the best and the worst. Can we still think of Russia's entry into NATO, as it was conceivable to some thirty years ago?

Think outside the agreed framework. That is the message of the cartoon by Nicolas Vadot in the economic newspaper of Brussels *L'Echo* on 12 March 2022, the 17th day of the Russian army's assault on Ukraine. In the top third of this image, a group of senior NATO officers set the tone. The one in the center offers *a solution which, he says, no one has thought of and which would solve everything: what if we included the Russians? That would create a large, unified, NATO-type family stretching from Washington to Moscow, Paris to Ankara, and Ottawa to Kyiv!*^{*}

Like *The Emperor's New Clothes*, the tale by Danish author Hans Christian Andersen (1805-1875), in which only a little boy dares tell the truth—“*But he's not wearing anything*”—, Vadot, with the finesse that characterizes his drawings and analyses, touches on an essential dimension in the evolving relationship that we, the Atlantic alliance, and therefore also part of the European Union, maintain with Russia. There is no right time to think outside the box, even when global media attention is on the suffering of Ukraine, or when the focus is on the now hated figure in the West, Vladimir Putin.

^{*} *Vadot au Carré*, 2022. <https://www.nicolasvadot.com/fr/dessins-de-presse/dessins-de-presse-2022/vadot-au-carre-2022/>

For historians and futurists alike, the unthinkable is not always very far away,^{*} conscious, as they are, that the exercise is not without danger, while the war, like any war, entails so much blood, death, tears and violence, including—as we see on a daily basis—in terms of information and disinformation, both worldwide and sometimes in Europe. It is clearly time to remember our source criticism and heuristic lessons.[†] Attempting to shed light on such an important subject as Russia’s candidacy for NATO enlargement is no less perilous, especially as this issue should be seen in the context of a much broader system which we certainly will not be able to explore: European defense, global disarmament, market penetration, etc.

A further warning, from Edgar Morin on 20 March 2022, pointed out that *it is an extremely widespread intellectual weakness to consider that explanation is justification.*[‡] I do not know to which specific context the sociologist was alluding, but his observation is certainly applicable to the subject under discussion here.

1. An Ambivalent Relationship (1954-1998)

1.1. A request from Nikita Khrushchev in 1955

Moscow, 31 March 1954. Joseph Stalin had died a year earlier. The ruthless Lavrentiy Beria (1899-1953), former head of the NKVD and then Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was in prison awaiting execution. In the struggle to succeed Stalin, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) had also ousted Georgy Malenkov (1901-1988) on his way to power. Nikolai Bulganin (1895-1975) was Defense Minister. Once again, it was the prominent Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986) who was in charge of international relations.

At the Big Four Conference, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the nations that had defeated Nazism (the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France), which was held in Berlin from 25 January to 18 February 1954, Molotov put forward a Soviet alternative to the West’s plans to create a European Defense Community (EDC), involving the participation of a rearmed West Germany. The Molotov Plan of 10 February 1954 was a plan for collective security in Europe inspired by the Inter-American Treaty signed in Rio in 1947. Since this plan was rejected by the Allies after the conference ended, the Kremlin launched a new initiative. The aim of the Soviet proposal of 31 March 1954 was simply to allow the USSR, under certain conditions, to join NATO, which had been founded five years earlier.[§] In May 1954, the Western powers rejected the Soviet proposal for accession to the Alliance on the grounds that allowing the USSR to join the organization was incompatible with the democratic and defense objectives of the Alliance. Thwarted simultaneously by the Communists, the Gaullists and several other French deputies, the European Defense Community (EDC)

* Richard J. Krickus, *Russia in NATO: Thinking about the Unthinkable*, Copenhagen, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

† Philippe Destatte, “Opinions which are partial have the effect of vitiating the rectitude of judgment”, *Heuristics and criticism of sources in sciences*, *Blog PhD2050*, October 21, 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/10/26/heuristics/#_ftn1

‡ Edgar Morin’s Tweet, March 20, 2021.

§ “Molotov’s Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954,” *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*, Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, or AVP RF), F. 6, Op. 13, Pap. 2, D. 9, L1. 56-59. Translated for CWIHP by Geoffrey Roberts and included in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 27. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113924>; Geoffrey Roberts, *A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955*, Working Paper No. 57, Cold War International History Project, December 2008. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP57_WebFinal.pdf

founded after the failure of its ratification at the National Assembly at the end of August 1954. On 9 May 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became a member of NATO. Moscow, which had been notified in advance, feared that German vindictiveness would turn the Alliance from a defensive system into an aggressive coalition. On 14 May, in response, the USSR brought together the Iron Curtain countries of the East in an organization known as the Warsaw Pact. The blocs were now set for confrontation.*

1.2. After the Fall of the Iron Curtain

It was, of course, not until the fall of the Iron Curtain and the accelerated collapse of Communism in the East, 45 years later, that an idea as disruptive as allowing Russia to join NATO resurfaced. It comes as no surprise that it was the great reformer, President Mikhail Gorbachev, who raised the possibility. According to James A. Baker, US Secretary of State during the presidency of George H. Bush (1924-2018), Gorbachev had put forward this suggestion on at least three occasions in 1990. In Baker's view, the Russian leader had tempered his remarks by indicating he himself considered the idea both premature and ambitious.† However, the former president was not the only person to think that way.

Was there room for Russia in the Allies' thinking? On 12 December 1989, in a famous speech he gave at the West Berlin Press Club, the same James Baker outlined a new Atlantic order in which the Alliance's role would be political rather than military. He argued in favor of strengthening the European Community and advocated developing closer institutional and economic ties between the Alliance and the United States.‡ To allay Soviet concerns during the German reunification negotiations, James Baker soon had to rely on ideas developed previously by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher (1927-2016).§ In the article which appeared in the *Evangelische Akademie Tutzing*, in Bavaria, on 31 January 1990, Genscher declared that whatever the future of the Warsaw Pact, NATO was not looking to increase its territory in the East, *in other words, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union*.¶ At his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev on 9 February 1990, barely a week later, James Baker aligned himself with this position, telling Gorbachev: *we understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction*.** Baker asked the Russian leader about the possible links between

* Robert Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia, From Tsarism to Twenty-First Century*, p. 337, Penguin Random House, UK, 4th ed., 2020.

† James A. Baker III, *Russia in NATO*, in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, Nr. 1, Winter 2002, p. 102 et 103. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36660/pdf>

‡ J. Baker, *A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era*, 12 Dec. 1989, in *US Department of State Current Policy*, nr. 1233. <http://aei.pitt.edu/101501/1.1.pdf>

§ Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne Westad dir., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 3, *Endings*, p. 344, Cambridge University Press, 2012; Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, p. 584-85, Munich, Droemer Knaur, 2005.

¶ Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, p. 584-85, Munich, Droemer Knaur, 2005. - Stephen F. Szabo, *The diplomacy of German unification*, p. 58, New York, St Martin's, 1992.

** Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker February 9, 1990, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16117-document-06-record-conversation-between>; Declassified files released by the National Security Archive, Svetlana Savranskaya & Tom Blanton, Dec 12, 2017; - Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1 - *NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard? Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner. Slavic Studies Panel Addresses Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?*, National Security Archive, Washington, *The George Washington University*, Dec 12, 2017 <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>

reunified Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. Replying that he was going to discuss the matter with his colleagues in the Kremlin, Gorbachev stated that enlargement of the NATO area was unacceptable, which the US Secretary of State confirmed with the words: *we agree with that.** The following day, on 10 February 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl also came to Moscow to say that NATO did not need to expand beyond East Germany and that he clearly understood Russia's security interests.†

The Secretary General of NATO, the German Manfred Wörner (1934-1994), also wanted to offer reassurance, pointing out several months later that the Alliance's strategy was purely defensive, that NATO would never threaten anyone and that it was in favor of large-scale disarmament. *This assertion* added the Alliance spokesperson in May 1990, *and the assurance that NATO troops would not go beyond the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, offer the Soviet Union robust security guarantees.*‡

In his introductory speech at the NATO Summit held at Lancaster House in London on 5 July 1990, George H. W. Bush (1924-2018) confirmed before the Atlantic Council Mikhail Gorbachev's request for the Soviet Union to join NATO. For the President of the United States, that idea was *out of the question*. However, he did say that he was in favor of the proposal to create a liaison mission which could help to push aside the image held by Russians of NATO as an enemy, *an image so deeply engrained in the mind of the Soviet public*§. At the same summit, French President François Mitterrand (1916-1996) stated that NATO needed to *consider the interests of all countries in Europe, including those that are today still members of the Warsaw Pact, even though we do not know precisely which ones are, especially—and I have no hesitation in saying it—the Soviet Union.*¶ Wilfried Martens (1936-2013) declared that the Soviet Union *has its place in the European entente*. Noting that the Soviet Union would remain the principal military power on the continent, the Belgian Prime Minister thought it *neither desirable, nor reasonable, nor even thinkable to maintain a marginal position*. That did not mean, he added, that the Soviet Union, an important element for security in Europe, also had to be part of the European integration process, since, in his view, it could not be part of it without distorting it.**

1.3. NATO's hand of friendship and closed door

On the day after this Summit, Manfred Wörner went to Moscow at the invitation of Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze (1928-2014). It was the first time that a NATO

* *Ibidem*.

† Philippe Descamps, *Quand la Russie rêvait d'Europe, "L'OTAN ne s'étendra pas d'un pouce vers l'Es"*, in *Le Monde diplomatique*, September 2018, p. 10 et 11. <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2018/09/DESCAMPS/59053>

‡ Manfred Wörner, *The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s*, Address by NATO Secretary General, to the Bremer Tabaks Collegium, 17 May 1990, NATO, 1990. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_23732.htm?selectedLocale=en

§ Gorbachev has even publicly suggested Soviet membership in NATO. Now that is in our view out of the question but the Liaison Mission proposal could help him work to push aside the image of NATO as an enemy, an image so deeply ingrained in the mind of the Soviet public. NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, *Verbatim Record of the North Atlantic Council Meeting with the participation of Heads of State and Government held on Thursday, 5th July 1990 at Lancaster House, London*, NATO Confidential, Verbatim Record C-VR(90) 36, PART I https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20141218_C-VR-90-36-PART1.PDF

¶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

** 17 *Ibidem*, p. 45.

Secretary General had made an official visit to Moscow. Wörner addressed the Supreme Soviet in a famous speech:

I have come to Moscow today with a very simple message: we extend our hand of friendship to you. And I have come with a very direct offer: to cooperate with you. The time of confrontation is over. The hostility and mistrust of the past must be buried. We see your country, and all the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, no longer as adversaries but as partners in a common endeavour to build what you call a Common European Home, erected on the values of democracy, human freedoms, and partnership.

*There is a way that leads us beyond confrontation and towards a Europe whole and free: through the building of new structures, a new architecture that includes all of us; through arms control negotiations to reduce weapons to the minimum, and to increase stability and reassurance; through cooperation between us in all fields, political, economic, scientific, cultural.**

It was to maintain this attitude of friendship without integrating Russia that, following the decisions taken at the Rome Summit of November 1991, NATO created the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). At the inaugural session, a month later, the Soviet ambassador announced that he no longer represented the USSR but rather the Russian Federation. The Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the NACC the following year. This Council would go on to play a positive role in issues such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States and the regional conflicts in the former USSR and in Yugoslavia.†

In December 1991, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007), wrote to the Cooperation Council with the simple request that his country be allowed to join NATO.‡ This request is understood to have been greeted unenthusiastically by the Allies.§ In the same month, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Gennady Burbulis, visited the NATO Headquarters, where he was received by the Secretary General of the Alliance, Manfred Wörner. Burbulis raised the issue of Russia joining NATO without success.¶ It appears that this idea was also supported by the Vice-President, Alexander Rutskoy, and the economist Yegor Gaidar (1956-2009), who became Prime Minister of Russia in 1992.** In February 1992, on a visit to Moscow, Wörner met not only Boris Yeltsin but also Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who held that post from 1990 to 1996. Kozyrev is said to have emphasized genuine cooperation mechanisms rather than *grandiose ideas such as swift membership of NATO*.††

* *A Common Europe-Partners in Stability*. Speech by Secretary General, Manfred Wörner to Members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, NATO, Jul. 16, 1990. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_23719.htm

† *North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)* (Archived), NATO, October 24, 2011. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm

‡ Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990–1997: Blessings of Liberty*, (Westport: Praeger publishers, 1998).

§ *NATO Mr. Manfred Woerner's visit to Moscow Assault of good intentions* Feb. 27, 1992. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/02/27/otan-la-visite-de-m-manfred-woerner-a-moscou-assaut-de-bonnes-intentions_3880346_1819218.html

¶ Yuriy Davydov (NATO Research Fellow), *Should Russia Join NATO?*, Final Report, p. 21, Moscow, NATO Office of Information and Press, Academic Affairs Unit, 2000. <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/davydov.pdf>

** Yuriy Davydov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

†† *Ibidem*.

At a time when the Russians were demonstrating their interest in NATO, they also proved very sensitive to requests from some of their former allies in Central Europe for membership of the Atlantic defense system. In mid-September 1993, Boris Yeltsin sent a secret letter to the leaders of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States recalling the spirit of the German unification treaty, which stipulated the abandonment of any expansion of NATO to the east of that border. The President of the Russian Federation felt that relations between his country and the Alliance ought to be *several degrees warmer* than relations between NATO and the countries of Eastern Europe. In this letter, Yeltsin also declared that, even if such a relationship seemed purely theoretical at that moment, Russia could join NATO in the fullness of time.* In October 1993, at a NATO meeting in Travemünde, in the Baltic Bay of Lübeck (DE), the US Defense Secretary under the Clinton administration, Les[lie] Aspin (1938-1995), also said that he opposed such enlargement. At the same time, the German Federal Defense Minister, Volker Rühle, indicated that *stability in Europe could only be achieved with, not against, Russia*.

For his part, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Willy Claes—who would succeed Manfred Wörner the following year,—felt that a new member of NATO must at least be a candidate for membership of the European Union, which was one way of explaining to Moscow why other countries could join the Alliance before Russia.† As a result, the wording chosen by the Alliance for the former members of the Warsaw Pact appears to focus more on collaboration contracts, without offering any guarantee of assistance to the East.

1.4. James Baker's Road Map

On the American side, it was James Baker who, that year, launched an initiative to expand NATO to include not only the countries of Central and Eastern Europe but also a *democratic Russia*.‡ With an eye on the Brussels Summit of January 1994, the US Secretary of State wrote an opinion piece in the *Los Angeles Times*§: *in Brussels, the NATO leaders should draw up a clear road map for expanding the alliance eastward to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, especially a democratic Russia. Otherwise, the most successful alliance in history is destined to follow the threat that created it into the dustbin of history*.¶

Baker noted that the peoples of Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and the other emerging democracies had their eyes on the Alliance Summit, in the hope that NATO would give them the opportunity to join. He observed that objections to the enlargement were coming from two camps: the first, made up of Alliance purists, feared inefficiency,

* Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990–1997: Blessings of Liberty*, (Westport: Praeger publishers, 1998).

† G. B. Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate...*, p. 21.

‡ “In 1993, I proposed that NATO draw up a clear road map for expanding the alliance eastward to include not only the states of Central and Eastern Europe but also a democratic Russia. Otherwise, the most successful alliance in history is destined to follow the threat that created it into the dustbin of history”. James A. Baker III, “Expanding to the East, A New NATO: Alliance, Full membership may be the most sought-after ‘good’ now enticing Eastern and Central European states—particularly, Russia”, in *Los Angeles Times*, Dec 5, 1993. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-12-05-op-64339-story.html>

§ The *New York Times*' chief White House correspondent, Peter Baker, disagrees with this analysis of James Baker's statements, particularly because the Secretary of State has not enshrined the issue of NATO's expansion to the east in a treaty. Peter Baker, “In Ukraine Conflict, Putin relies on a promise that ultimately wasn't”, in *New York Times*, Jan 9, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/09/us/politics/russia-ukraine-james-baker.html>

¶ *Ibidem*.

impotence, and implosion if NATO was enlarged beyond its sixteen long-standing members. The second camp was concerned that enlargement might constitute a provocation for Russia, and that Moscow might react angrily if it was threatened by further confrontation between Slavophiles and the West. For the US Secretary of State, such concerns would be valid if the NATO enlargement were to include the States of Central and Eastern Europe, while excluding the former Soviet Union States. *Such an ill-advised approach, he added, would not only sow the seeds for revanchism and a revived Russian empire, it would also undermine the independence of the 11 non-Russian independent states of the former Soviet Union.**

And Baker continued:

This is why Russian eligibility for membership is key to any long-term vision for NATO and should be announced as a goal at the summit. A democratic Russia can play a constructive role in European security and play it best through NATO's institutional framework.

Clearly, full Russian membership in NATO will not occur overnight. Russian democracy, whatever the outcome of this week's election, remains precarious and the future of economic reform in doubt. But offering the possibility of NATO membership will signal support for reform and bolster reformers.

Much as the Russian people can choose democracy this week, the Russian leadership in the months ahead should be given the choice of aligning with the West. Ruling Russia out of NATO would only undercut the hopes of Russia's Westernizers while fueling the fear-mongering neo-fascists.†

After pointing out that it was not possible to give a right to veto NATO membership for democratic countries to those who did not want to reform Russia, James Baker ended his article by stating that *if democracy prevails, NATO membership for Russia will mark a milestone on the road to full integration with the West. If reform fails, an expanded NATO will protect democracy where it has taken firm root—in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest.*‡

It was from this perspective that, on the initiative of the United States under Bill Clinton, the NATO Summit held in Brussels in January 1994 established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a new, mainly military, cooperation programme. The aim of this cooperation platform was to bring together the members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)—47 countries, including Russia and Ukraine—and some other countries, including those of the OSCE.§ The Russian Federation joined the partnership in June 1994. The objective was to promote a common security culture around the Alliance and to enable each member to strengthen its own links with NATO. Some member states of the PfP saw it as a waiting room

* *Ibidem.*

† *Ibidem.*

‡ James A. Baker III, *Expanding to the East*.

§ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization, bringing comprehensive and co-operative security to a region that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok, founded by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and which during the Cold War provided a forum for dialogue between East and West.

prior to membership of the Alliance, which was not a surprise, given that certain US officials presented the mechanism in that way.*

In August 1994, Boris Yeltsin again declared that Russia could join NATO in due course.†

1.5. The Russians at SHAPE in Mons

Who, today, remembers the presence, at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons (Wallonia, BE), of Russians who had come to plan the operation carried out in Bosnia under NATO command?‡

On 15 October 1995, a group of staff officers from the Russian Army arrived at the headquarters of the allied forces in Europe under the direction of General Leontiy Pavlovich Shevtsov.§ He would go on to become Deputy Supreme Commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR). Their mission originated directly from the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, and his Defense Minister, General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev (1948-2012). It involved negotiating with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),¶ US General George A. Joulwan, to define the principles and criteria for the participation of a Russian military contingent in the Implementation Force (IFOR). This NATO operational force was intended to succeed the United Nations Protection Force (FORPRONU) in Bosnia, which would later become SFOR. The command-and-control mechanism that regulated these Russian troop operations in IFOR was the subject of a protocol signed on 8 November 1995 by the Defense Ministers of the United States and Russia. This protocol established an operational liaison and decision-making group within SHAPE under the command of General Shevtsov,** along with coordination on the ground in Tuzla, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ensure liaison with the Russian brigade on deployment. Another Russian liaison group was also active at the Vicenza air base in Italy, the headquarters of the 5th ATAF (Allied Tactical Air Force). The Russian brigade was deployed and operational on the ground in Bosnia on 2 February 1996 and carried out its mission as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) from December 1996, with a view to implementing the treaties signed in Dayton (Ohio) on 21 November 1995 and ratified in Paris on 14 December 1995.††

As General Shevtsov would later write in the *NATO Review*:

Our participation in IFOR has given a new impetus to the military cooperation between the Russian and NATO forces.

Whereas we had been divided for fifty years, now, for the first time in history, officers from the Russian Ministry of Defense have been working at SHAPE for over a year.

* Les Aspin, *A new Europe, a new NATO*, Revue de l'OTAN, Vol. 42, N°1, February 1994, p. 12-14. <https://www.nato.int/docu/revue/1994/9401-03.htm>

† Yuriy Davydov, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

‡ Did you know that SACEUR had a Russian General as his deputy at SHAPE in the 1990s? <https://shape.nato.int/page2148203020>

§ Shevtsov Leontiy Pavlovich - biography, 14 March 1946 – <http://viperson.ru/people/shevtsov-leontiy-pavlovich>

¶ The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is one of NATO's two strategic commanders and is the head of Allied Command Operations (ACO). He is responsible to NATO's highest military authority, the Military Committee (MC), for the conduct of all NATO military operations. NATO, May 3, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm

** This center was located inside the Live Oak building, which until 1991 had housed the Allied planning staff responsible for preserving access to Berlin in case of a Soviet blockade.

†† The role of NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *NATO*, 1999. <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-fra/06bosni.pdf>

*Naturally, things have not always been easy, but gradually, by working alongside SHAPE, we are learning to collaborate. The Russian Ministry of Defense operational group at SHAPE guides the Russian contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also serves as an operational communication channel between the NATO headquarters and the headquarters of the Russian armed forces.**

At that time, Shevtsov welcomed the discussions on permanent missions between the Russian armed forces at SHAPE and the NATO forces at the headquarters of the Russian armed forces. The Russian general observed that each party was beginning to understand that the interaction should continue and be extended to senior government officials and to diplomatic and political experts and institutions. He considered it self-evident that *if cooperation between Russia and NATO [were] to be strengthened, it [would] be necessary to set up permanent authorised structures capable of dealing with a wide range of cooperation issues.*† The General also felt that it was possible for NATO officers to be sent to the headquarters of the Russian armed forces on a permanent basis to strengthen the trust between the Alliance and the Russian Federation.

NATO also thought that the cooperation with Russia within IFOR had been excellent, and the NATO management wanted to go further and strengthen ties with Moscow at the political and the military level. In June 1996, the North Atlantic Council felt that this collaboration could serve as a catalyst for developing ties between NATO and Russia. The Alliance wanted such ties to be *founded on mutual respect, reciprocal trust and friendship*. At the same time, the Council said that it valued its relations with Ukraine, and was convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine had an important role to play in strengthening harmony in Europe.‡

However, at the *Wehrkunde Tagung*, the annual high-level conference on security policy, which was held in February 1996 in Munich, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1930-2017) warned against an over-rapid expansion of the Alliance to the former members of the Warsaw Pact, adding that *the West must consider the position of Russia. Those who fail to pay sufficient attention to this matter will be faced with stalemate*, he said.§

Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down

When Boris Yeltsin came to power in December 1991, Russia certainly experienced *the most pro-Western government in its history*.¶ Yet the liberal domestic policy and the somewhat idealistic, even friendly foreign policy towards the West were constantly highlighted, even

* Leontii Shevtsov, *Russia-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?*, in *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 2, March 1997, p. 17-21.

† Leontii Shevtsov, *Russia-NATO Military Cooperation*.

‡ *Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session*, June 13, 1996. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25065.htm?selectedLocale=en

§ Frits Bolkestein, “Deepening and expanding NATO?”, *NATO Review* n°4, July 1996, p. 20-24. <https://www.nato.int/docu/revue/1996/9604-5.htm>: “NATO was aware of this, or at least aware of it. In the preparatory study for any enlargement that it had commissioned, it was well established that: *Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance. The Alliance is addressing these concerns in developing its wider relationship with Russia and the Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all*”. Study on NATO Enlargement, *NATO*, Sept. 3, 1995. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm?selectedLocale=en

¶ David Teurtrie, *Russie, Le retour de la puissance*, (Paris : Armand Colin, 2021), p. 126.

if the Kremlin had to be realistic when considering its structural weakness since the end of the Soviet Union.

From the West's point of view, more than ever, the NATO goals defined by Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay (1887-1965), Winston Churchill's closest military adviser during the Second World War and the first Secretary General of the Alliance from 1952 to 1957, were maintained: *keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.** Whereas NATO could have disappeared following the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and with it the permanent presence of American troops,† Washington and Evere (Brussels) found new momentum. London was also very much in favor of maintaining this presence since it provided reassurance to several European capitals in the face of German reunification. For the Americans, maintaining NATO to the detriment of any other strictly European configuration had the advantage of maintaining American influence in Europe. At the same time, as James Baker had hoped in his speech in Berlin on 12 December 1989, Washington was busy giving NATO a broader geographical scope, assigning it a general European security function beyond territorial defense.‡

The turn of the 21st century would see a major shift in a refashioned landscape.

2. 1999: When Storm Clouds Gather...

2.1. Russia casts a shadow over the partnership

Although General Leontiy P. Shevtsov, Deputy to the Supreme Commander of SFOR (the NATO-led stabilization force in Bosnia) and First Deputy to the Head of Operations at the Russian headquarters, saw the cooperation arising from the implementation of the peace agreements in that region of the Balkans as *the basis for a solid partnership in the next millennium*, he expressed his views with a note of caution:

As already indicated above on several occasions, NATO expansion remains the major obstacle to broader cooperation as it is not in Russia's national interests. Nor is it aligned with the supreme objective of strengthening security and stability in Europe. NATO expansion, if it takes place, will create a fundamentally new geopolitical situation which risks causing a total revision of security policies. If Russia remains outside the security system that will emerge on the continent, the threat of a new division of Europe will become a reality.§

* Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Free Press, 1989), p. 412. – *NATO Leaders: Lord Ismay*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm; Note that in this NATO text, the formula is: *keep the Soviets out...*

† Roland Lomme, then in charge of research at the Sociological Observatory of Eastern Europe (CNRS), wrote in 1991, after the announcement of the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, that it was a safe bet that NATO would not survive long after the Warsaw Pact, whose official dissolution was announced for 1991. Roland Lomme, *The USSR and disarmament*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1991), p. 142.

‡ Notably in reference to the NATO Summit held in Rome in 1991, Georges Labaki, then Director of International Relations at Notre-Dame de Louaïzé University (Lebanon), wrote: *even if they recognize a growing role for the European Community in its defense, there is a consensus among U.S. officials on the need to maintain a permanent U.S. presence in Europe, even if reduced. (...) Indeed, the United States considers this presence essential to the stability of Europe, which has been the scene of two world wars in less than a century. Moreover, this presence ensures the continuity of its influence in Europe. However, the real stakes in terms of American interests in Europe are more economic than military or economic.* (Translation from French). Georges T. Labaki, *The United States and European Integration*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1993), p. 133.

§ Leontii Shevtsov, *Russia-NATO Military Cooperation*; S. NEIL Macfarlane, *NATO in Russia's Relations with the West*, in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 32, 3, p. 281-296, Sept. 1, 2001.

The arrival of Yevgeny Primakov (1929-2015) as Russian Foreign Minister (1996-1998) and then Prime Minister in Moscow (1998-1999) marked a change in approach which would be theorized in what is called *the Primakov doctrine*. This superseded the Kozyrev doctrine, which was characterized by an Atlanticism—if not American centrism—conceived as a partnership with the USA in which Russia would be the number two,* and by a multipolar alternative. The Primakov doctrine was based on three premises: first, prioritizing the national interest by avoiding tensions with the West, second, pursuing a multi-pronged policy which included *global centres* other than the USA, such as Europe, China, and the Arab states, and third, continuing to integrate Russia and its economy into a globalised world[†]. Thus, upon observing, in the late 1990s, the diplomatic manoeuvres of the former allies of the Warsaw Pact to join the Atlantic Alliance, Primakov felt that, for NATO, the *red line* not to be crossed was that of the former state border of the Soviet Union, and he ruled out any possibility of allowing the former Soviet republics to join the Alliance.[‡] As a result, he himself also closed the door on Moscow joining NATO.[§]

2.2. The NATO-Russian Federation Founding Act

The Americans, Europeans and Russians, however, took concrete steps towards collaboration. On 17 May 1997, cooperation and partnership agreement was signed in Paris: the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. This Act was ratified at the NATO Summit in Madrid, in July 1998. In this document, the parties, who state that they no longer consider each other as adversaries, demonstrate their desire to eliminate the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation. The Act reaffirms the commitment of the Alliance and Russia to *build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples through a strong, stable and enduring partnership*.[¶] NATO recalls its own transformation, and its new peacekeeping and crisis-management missions with the support of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OCSE), such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Alliance also recalls the *European Security and Defense Identity* (ESDI), which it was developing internally. As for Russia, the Act indicates that it is continuing *the building of a democratic society and the realization of its political and economic transformation*. The signatories also note that Moscow has withdrawn its forces from Central and Eastern Europe and from the Baltic Region, and has withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. The Atlantic Alliance and the Federation undertake to work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and

* Vyacheslav Nikonov, *La Russie et l'Occident : des illusions au désenchantement*, in *Critique internationale*, vol. no 12, no. 3, 2001, pp. 175-191, z. 15 ; Evgueni Primakov, *Gody v bolchoi politike*, p. 231-233, Moscou, Soverchenno sekretno, 1990.

† Evgueni Primakov, *Le monde sans la Russie ? A quoi conduit la myopie politique*, p.10sv, Paris, Economica, 2009 ; V. Nikonov, *La Russie et l'Occident*, z.24-25.

‡ E. Primakov, *Le monde sans la Russie?*, p. 149. Primakov wrote in 2009: *In embarking on a frenzied expansion of NATO, the United States has not taken into account Russia's extremely negative position on the admission of former Soviet republics into the North Atlantic Alliance. We did not have a written agreement with the United States on this. But when I was Russian Foreign Minister, I repeatedly told Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbot and other American colleagues that the admission of former Soviet republics into NATO would mean for us that "the red line" had been crossed. I was told that there was no reason to assume that this would happen in the near future. But it did happen.* (Translation from French).

§ Y. Davydov, *Should Russia Join NATO?*, p. 23.

¶ *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation*, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1997; *The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1998.

comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states. They also affirm their desire to strengthen the OSCE and to cooperate to *prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state*.^{*} Taking into account the OSCE's work on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st Century, NATO and Russia announce their determination to seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE, with the aim of *creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state*.[†]

NATO and Russia also state in this Act that they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter (1945) and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), as well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and subsequent OSCE documents. These objectives are then translated into principles. In practice, the Act announces the creation of a *NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council*. This will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. However, it is stated that the consultations *will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia*.[‡] With the aim of strengthening their partnership, NATO and Russia end their Act by highlighting the need to ensure that their activities are grounded in practical activities and direct cooperation, including through the development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, again described as positive by the parties.

Thus, each party recognises the importance of this mutual undertaking. As General Shevtsov stated at a global security conference in Prague, in June 1997, the signing of the Act in Paris served to establish a political basis for the further development of military cooperation between Russia, NATO and the United States.[§]

2.3. Drawing Russia out of its isolation

However, at this same meeting in Prague, Vitaly Churkin (1952-2017), Russian Ambassador to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC[¶]) and Permanent Representative to NATO in Brussels between 1994 and 1998, expressed his great concern on the subject of NATO expansion. The future Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN Security Council (2006-2017)^{**} considered at that time that, in the process, NATO had made too many promises to too many people and too many countries, *promises which could*

^{*} *Founding Act on Mutual Relations.*

[†] *Founding Act on Mutual Relations.*

[‡] *Founding Act on Mutual Relations.*

[§] General Leontiy Pavlovich Shevtsov, *Russian Participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14th International Workshop on Global Security - Prague, 21-25 June 1997*, Under the patronage of President of the Czech Republic Václav Havel, the 14th International NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making was held in the Rudolph and Spanish Halls of Prague Castle on 21-25 June 1997. The Workshop's theme was "The New NATO: The Way Ahead." <http://www.esdr.org/97Book/SHEVTS.HTM>

[¶] The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by the Allies on December 20, 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with former NATO Warsaw Pact adversaries.

^{**} Marie Bourreau, "Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitali Churkin is dead", *Le Monde*, Feb. 20, 2017. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/02/20/1-ambassadeur-russe-a-l-onu-vitali-tchourkine-est-mort_5082637_3210.html

not be kept because some problems relate to areas in which NATO has little involvement. The Ambassador pointed out that those countries with high hopes of achieving increased security from NATO could quickly and radically improve their security situation simply by complying with some of the recommendations from the OCSE and the Council of Europe on human rights and minorities.* Despite these Russian remarks, Robert E. Hunter, United States Ambassador to NATO and to the NACC, promptly confirmed his country's intention to support the immediate entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance, while keeping the door open to further expansion for as long as there were European countries ready and willing to assume the responsibilities of membership. Evoking the Partnership for Peace, which he described as *NATO's most successful flagship venture*, Hunter announced the US's desire to implement the NATO-Russia Founding Act, *recognising that Russia's security is as important as everything else that we are doing, and underscoring the effort to draw Russia out of its isolation to play a full and legitimate part in European security.*†

A month later, in July 1997, Moscow joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC from that year. For the Allies, it was a question of establishing a security forum which, in the very diplomatic words of the Alliance, was *better suited to the increasingly complex relations between the partners, many of whom were strengthening their cooperation with NATO.*‡

In fact, rather than political doctrine or regime change, it appears that it was the cooperation experience itself that affected the convergence of the pathways between NATO and Russia, even though the post-Cold War period seemed to be following the path of cooperation. To say that the 1997 Founding Act, which opened up the prospect of organic relations between Russia and NATO, failed to deliver would be something of an understatement. Admittedly, however, as the Allies had hoped, bilateral relations did become more formal, particularly through the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).§

For its part, at the beginning of 1998, the Russian Parliament described NATO expansion as the most serious military threat for Russia since the end of the Second World War.¶ The mention of this new red line was repeated until the end of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. At the security policy conference held in Munich on 7 February 1999, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Gusev, reiterated to NATO its advice not to cross the *red line* formed by the countries that previously made up the Soviet Union.** A few days later, the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, sounded more threatening when he declared that if NATO continued to expand in the East, and especially if this process included the Baltic countries

* Vitaly Churkin, *European Security Opportunities: The Need for Cooperation*, 14th International Workshop on Global Security - Prague, 21-25 June 1997. <http://www.csd.org/97Book/churkin-C.htm>

† Robert E. Hunter, *European Security: Problems, Risks, and Challenges*, <http://www.csd.org/97Book/hunter-C.htm> *We have also concluded, and will make effective over time, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, recognizing that Russia's security is as important as everything else that we are doing, and underscoring the effort to draw Russia out of its isolation to play a full and legitimate part in European security.*

‡ Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO, March 19, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm

§ NATO-Russia Relations, NATO, February 2022. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220214-factsheet_NATO-Russia_Relations_e.pdf

¶ Igor Zelev, *NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers*, Final Report, NATO, 1998. (I. Zelev is professor of Russian Studies at George Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany). RFE/RL *Newsline*, Vol. 2, No 16, Part II, 26 January 1998. <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/zelev.pdf>

** Robert Burns, *Russia opposes more NATO expansion*, Associated Press, Feb. 7, 1999. - I. ZEVELEV, *op. cit.* p. 5.

or the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, *Russia would take any steps it deemed necessary to guarantee its national security*.*

2.4. Kosovo, 24 March 1999

The discovery by OSCE observers, on 16 January 1999, of the massacre of 45 people, nearly all men, in the Kosovan village of Račak, around thirty kilometres from Pristina, was a significant moment in the conflict between the Serbian government and insurgents from the Kosovan Liberation Army (UCK) and the Democratic League (LDK). Even though what actually happened on the day before the discovery in the Kosovan village remains controversial,[†] there is little doubt that this event lay behind the international conference on Kosovo, which began on 6 February 1999 in Rambouillet in Île-de-France. Attending this meeting, with the aim of stemming the spiral of violence, were representatives from the governments of the grouping known as the Contact Group of Foreign Ministers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia—under the joint presidency of French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine and his British counterpart Robin Cook (1946-2005). The delegations from the Serbian and Kosovan warring parties present in Rambouillet kept their distance and refused to talk to each other directly, a clear sign of the difficult negotiation process. We should remember that this conflict had already lasted almost ten years, having begun in 1989, when the independent status enjoyed by Kosovans within Yugoslavia was withdrawn. Yugoslavia had also had difficult relations with its Albanian neighbour since 1948.[‡]

Despite their efforts, the diplomats were unable to unite the Kosovans around the new proposals agreed by the members of the Contact Group. These proposals maintained the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which appeared unacceptable for the UCK and the LDK. For their part, the Serbs refused to withdraw their troops from the province, and they rejected any deployment of NATO-led forces (which, in their view, were not a neutral force[§]) in support of the OSCE observers. The UCK, meanwhile, rejected all disarmament. The US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright (1937-2022), also intervened, with the carrot of reintegrating Belgrade into the international community and the stick of military intervention. But she was unable to wear down the Yugoslavian side any more than her colleague Richard Holbrooke (1941-2010), Bill Clinton's former Special Envoy for Kosovo. Meanwhile, with the shadow of war hanging over Chechnya, the Russian delegation saw its objections to a military intervention scenario rejected by the United States and its allies.[¶]

* RFE/RL Newline, February 18, 1999. - I. Zevelev, *op. cit.* p. 12. - The CIS was founded in Minsk on 8 December 1991 to bring together the former countries of the Soviet Union.

† The event is said to have taken place during a deliberate campaign of provocations organized by the Kosovo Liberation Movement (UCK-KLA). Jaime Castan Pinos, *Kosovo and the Collateral Effects of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 38-45 (London: Routledge, 2019); Christophe Chatelot, *Les morts de Racak ont-ils vraiment été massacrés froidement?* in *Le Monde*, January 21, 1999. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1999/01/21/les-morts-de-racak-ont-ils-vraiment-ete-massacres-froidement_3533047_1819218.html; Jean-Arnault Derens and Catherine Samary, *Les 100 Portes des conflits yougoslaves*, p. 294-296, L'Atelier, 2000; The British historian Tony Judt, of New York University, is less dubious about this massacre than the French historian and attributes it without doubt to Serbian forces. Tony Judt, *Après-Guerre, Une histoire de l'Europe depuis 1945*, p. 794, Paris, Hachette, 2007. ; Christophe Chatelot, *Les morts de Racak ont-ils réellement été massacrés de sang-froid?* in *Le Monde*, January 21, 1999.

‡ Jean-Michel De Waele and Kolë Gjeshaj, *De la question albanaise au Kosovo*, Brussels, Complexe, 1999 ; Hans Stark, *Kosovo, Du problème serbe à la question albanaise, dans Rapport annuel mondial sur le Système économique et les Stratégies (RAMSES 2000)*, p. 346-347, Paris, Dunod-IFRI, 1999.

§ Barbara Delcourt, *La position des autorités serbes et yougoslaves au sujet du Kosovo : entre raison d'État et logique nationale*, dans Jean-Michel De Waele and Kolë Gjeshaj, *De la question albanaise au Kosovo*, p. 105.

¶ Marc Weller, *The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo*, in *International Affairs*, 75 (2), p. 211-251.

With the failure of the Rambouillet talks, and of the Paris follow-on conference, the United States and most of its European partners pushed for military action but were met with vetoes from China and Russia at the United Nations. On 17 March 1999, at the NATO-Russia Permanent Council, the ambassadors continued their consultations on the Kosovo crisis, underlining the urgency and importance of the negotiations being held in Paris.* Meanwhile, the Russian *Duma* passed a resolution describing any future military action by NATO in Kosovo as *illegal aggression*, while Ukraine and Belarus expressed their *unconditional solidarity with their Slavic brothers in Serbia*.†

On 24 March 1999, despite the absence of United Nations' backing, and with the Serbian forces having renewed their offensive, NATO commenced action against the Yugoslavia of President Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006).‡ Thus, the Alliance took the unilateral decision to ignore Moscow's position and overlook the Kremlin's misgivings. Moscow considered the NATO initiative a blow not only to Yugoslavia but also to Russia.§

For nearly three months, until 9 June 1999, in almost 39,000 sorties,¶ NATO aircraft and ships rained bombs and missiles down on Serbia, Montenegro, the province of Vojvodina, and Kosovo, inflicting serious damage on the country and its people but failing to prevent atrocities on the ground and the expulsion of the Albania population in Kosovo. Although the bombardments were launched *under pressure from the US*, as Henry Kissinger pointed out in 2001,** President Bill Clinton unwisely declared in public that NATO would not engage any ground forces.†† Kissinger, former Secretary of State under Richard Nixon (1913-1994) and Gerald Ford (1913-2006), noted that NATO *was so afraid of suffering losses that the bombs were dropped beyond the range of the Serbian anti-aircraft batteries—from five miles up, or even higher, —which might suggest that, in Kosovo at any rate, the Western democracies were limiting their risk taking to carefully calculated heights in the name of morality*.‡‡

As the French historian and journalist, André Fontaine (1921-2013) rightly observes, *the fact that NATO is intervening, under pressure from the US, without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, in the territory of an orthodox Slavic State, has allowed Russian political forces, which are hostile to openness towards the West, to increase their influence in public opinion and in foreign policy in their country*.§§ This intervention created unease from

* NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting at Ambassadorial Level, NATO Press Statement, 17 March, 1999. <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p990317e.htm>

† T. Judt, *Après-Guerre...*, p. 794.

‡ I have been informed by SACEUR, General Clark, that at this moment NATO Air Operations against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have commenced. Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General following the Commencement of Air Operations, Press Release, (1999) 041, 24 March 1999. <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-041e.htm>

§ See the intervention in the Security Council of Sergueï V. Lavrov, who was then the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the UN: Press release CS/1035, Russian Federation demands immediate end to NATO military actions in Kosovo March 24, 1999. <https://www.un.org/press/fr/1999/19990324.cs1035.html>

¶ 38.116 sorties. Rebecca Grant, *Wesley Clark's War in AirForce Magazine*, Sept 1, 2001 <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0901clark/>

** Henry Kissinger, *La Nouvelle puissance américaine*, (Paris : Fayard, 2003) , p. 283.

†† T. Judt, *op. cit.*, p. 795.

‡‡ H. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

§§ André Fontaine, Pierre Melandri, Guillaume Parmentier, *NATO, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique nord*, dans *Encyclopædia Universalis* <https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/otan-organisation-du-traite-de-l-atlantique-nord/> These authors also note that: However, the conduct of the campaign created tensions between Americans and Europeans. The Alliance headquarters in Europe, Shape, was excluded from military planning, which was in fact designed by the American command in Europe. As a result, the Europeans were unable to control operations, and it was therefore through the Atlantic Council, a diplomatic body, that they were led to object to the choice of certain targets to be bombed. The American military felt that this political interference in military affairs was detrimental to the proper conduct of operations.

a Western perspective also, especially since the Allies found Madeleine Albright's tactics annoying. According to British professor of international law Michael J. Glennon, when Robin Cook (1946-2005), British Foreign Minister under Tony Blair, told Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that he was having problems with his lawyers over using force against Yugoslavia without Security Council approval, Secretary Albright reportedly responded: *Get new lawyers.** In May 1999, in *Le Monde diplomatique*, the American linguist Noam Chomsky also pondered the legitimacy of the NATO bombardments in Yugoslavia in the name of a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Chomsky, a professor at the MIT, also observed that this precedent now entitled China, India, Russia and other countries to carry out interventions similar to those of NATO in their own areas of influence.† At a conference held on 20 May 1999 at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Free University of Brussels, with the support of the National Fund for Scientific Research, Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi, a Hungarian-born geopolitics expert and professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, pondered:

What would we say in Europe if, one day, Russia or Turkey rightly or wrongly invoked the oppression of Russian or Turkish minorities in Ukraine as grounds for bombarding or invading that country? This is clearly the question that the Ukrainian authorities have been asking in order to indicate, among other things, their radical opposition to the bombardments in Yugoslavia.‡

During this period, although NATO and Russia held detailed negotiations and convened extraordinary meetings on several occasions, they were unable to agree on a political solution to the conflict. They did, however, agree that such a solution should be based on Kosovan autonomy, not on its independence. While the Allies felt, after the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations, that Belgrade had acted in bad faith and that the government of President Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006) had no intention of complying with the Security Council resolutions and had used force,§ Moscow accused NATO of destroying the standard system of international relations and of undermining the foundations of international law.

Since NATO's military action in Yugoslavia had then been used by the nationalists in Russia to wage an unprecedented anti-West campaign after the end of the Cold War, Boris Yeltsin's government was forced to suspend the cooperation process that was being pursued with NATO under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at a time of crisis during which close relations and discussions became even more important.¶ For the Russians, this cooperation was becoming meaningless. Moscow suspended its participation in the Founding Act. Russian military representatives were recalled to the Alliance's headquarters in Evere, official NATO representatives became *persona non grata* in Moscow, and the establishment

* When Robin Cook, the British foreign secretary, told Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that he had "problems with our lawyers" over using force against Yugoslavia without Security Council approval, Secretary Albright responded: "Get new lawyers." Michael J. Glennon, *How War Left the Law Behind*, in *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 2002. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/21/opinion/how-war-left-the-law-behind.html> Consulté le 17 April 2022 ; Jaume Castan Pinos, *Kosovo and the Collateral Effects*, p. 66, note 12.

† Noam Chomsky, *Guerre dans les Balkans, L'OTAN, maître du monde*, dans *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 1999, p. 1, 4 and 5. <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/05/CHOMSKY/2976>;

‡ N. Chomsky, *Humanitarian Imperialism, Lessons from Kosovo*, (London : Pluto Press, 1999). Nicolas Bardos-Feltoronyi, *La question albanaise est-elle à nouveau balkanisée?* in Jean-Michel De Waele and Kolë Gjelošaj, *De la question albanaise au Kosovo...*, p. 47. (Translation from French).

§ *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, p.95-96, NATO, 1999. <https://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-rdge/rdrgrde-c.pdf>

¶ E. Primakov, *Le monde sans la Russie?*, p. 156.

of the NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow was suspended.* The deputies in the Russian State Duma demanded that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who had held office since December 1995, be tried for crimes against humanity.†

The Russians returned to the diplomatic table when President Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin (1938-2010), his former Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998, as his personal Special Envoy for Kosovo to find a diplomatic solution. From the outset, it appeared to Western eyes that Chernomyrdin might be more flexible than Yevgeny Primakov. That was not the case, although he did maintain some friendships in the United States, particularly with Clinton's Vice President, Al Gore. Despite extensive shuttle diplomacy, between Moscow, Belgrade, New York and Washington, and an attempt to involve the United Nations,‡ Chernomyrdin seemed unwilling to make any concessions on Russian positions. Then, in early June, at Yeltsin's initiative once more, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, who led the government from May until the beginning of August 1999, informed Clinton of Russia's desire to seek a solution to all its disputes with NATO.§

The KFOR troops were deployed in the province, under NATO authority, as a result of the agreements signed at Kumanovo airbase, near Skopje (North Macedonia), on 9 June 1999, between the military and police forces of Belgrade and the International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR). United Nations Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, while reaffirming the commitment of Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established a United Nations protectorate in Kosovo but failed to end the atrocities.¶

For Russia, this was an about-turn in relation to the fierce criticism of the NATO positions which, according to Chernomyrdin, had put US-Russian relations back several decades.**

While its planes were bombing Yugoslavia, NATO, in its 50th anniversary year, completed the process of redefining its defense doctrine, a process begun at the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7 and 8 November 1991, against the backdrop of the break-up of the Soviet Union, as previously mentioned. It was, therefore, in parallel with celebrating its jubilee that NATO held its Washington Summit on 24 and 25 April 1999, almost fifty years to the day since its formation in the US capital on 4 April 1949. In the sixty-five paragraphs describing the new Strategic Concept—which we have not covered here,—it should be noted that NATO intended not only to broaden its expertise in order to extend its field of activity beyond the territorial area of its members, a process it had begun in 1991, but also to open up a huge sphere of activity by announcing its desire *to promote security, prosperity and*

* Y. Davydov, *Should Russia Join Nato?*, p. 18.

† Y. Davydov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

‡ Chernomyrdin calls for greater UN role in Kosovo diplomacy, CNN, May 4, 1999. <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/04/kosovo.diplomacy.02/index.html>

§ *To find a way to settle all differences with NATO*. William Drozdiak, *Russia's Concession Led to Breakthrough*, in *The Washington Post*, June 9, 1999. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/diplomacy060699.htm>

¶ Christophe Chielet, *Balkans, les conséquences régionales de la guerre au Kosovo*, dans *Universalia 2000*, p. 141sv, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2000).

** William Drozdiak, *Russia's Concession Led to Breakthrough*, in *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1999. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/diplomacy060699.htm>

democracy in the entire Euro-Atlantic region.* These provisions certainly enabled NATO to encompass its activities in respect of the Balkan States and other regions in Europe which were not members of NATO.† However, as André Dumoulin points out, NATO's new strategic concept, unveiled in Washington without naming the United Nations Charter, did not explicitly state that NATO could act only if it had a mandate from the Security Council. Writing in 2000, Dumoulin, a researcher at the Centre for Political Analysis and International Relations (CAPRI) at the University of Liège, states that *NATO's air intervention in Kosovo and Serbia [...] is of the utmost ambiguity; it is regarded by NATO as an exception to the general rule that a decision from the Security Council is necessary.*‡

Similarly, the Washington Declaration indicates that the Member States are determined to stand firm against those who violate Human Rights, wage war and conquer territory.§

Thus, in Russian eyes, the use of military power against a sovereign State such as Yugoslavia, which is outside NATO responsibility, without approval from the NATO Security Council and without consulting its Russian partner as provided for in the Founding Act, illustrates NATO's new intervention concept as had been applied in the Kosovo affair. Moreover, the interpretation given later by US General Wesley Clark, former commander of the allied forces in Europe, may still resonate today: *indeed, it was not a war; it was a campaign of coercive diplomacy.*¶

2.5. Independence, Missouri, 12 March 1999

It was in the presence of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Martonyi, his Czech counterpart, Jan Kavan, and the Polish minister Bronislaw Geremek (1932-2008) formerly ratified their countries' membership of NATO, at a ceremony in the President Truman Library in Independence (Missouri), on 12 March 1999.

At the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997, the Alliance leaders had invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to enter into membership negotiations with NATO. At the same time, the Summit reaffirmed that NATO would remain open to potential new members.** The Allies had also indicated their intention to increase political consultation and practical cooperation within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, to develop more individualised cooperation through the strengthened Partnership for Peace, and to give substance to the specific arrangements agreed previously with Russia and Ukraine.†† In December 1997, the NATO foreign ministers signed the membership protocols for the three

* Press Release NAC-S (99) 65, April, 24 1999. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/>. https://www.nato.int/eps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedDocId=en

† Wael Badawi, *Les opérations de maintien de la paix en Europe, Essai d'évaluation et de prospective à la lumière du cas de la Bosnie-Herzégovine*, p. 246, Thèse présentée en vue de l'obtention du grade de docteur en science politique, Orientation relations internationales, Faculté des Sciences économiques, sociales et politiques, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2003

‡ André Dumoulin, *Défense, L'OTAN au seuil du XXIe siècle*, dans *Universalia 2000*, p. 152-155, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2000).

§ *We remain determined to stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war and conquer territory. The Washington Declaration, signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. 23 April 1999.* <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>

¶ Sylvie Kauffmann, *Le général Wesley Clark fait ses adieux au Pentagone et tire les leçons du Kosovo*, in *Le Monde*, June, 28 2000.

** *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit, 23-25 April 1999*, p. 81, <https://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde/rdr-gde-e.pdf>

†† NATO's Enlargement, Press Info, 4 July 1997. <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-enl.htm>

countries. These protocols were ratified by the Allies and the applicant countries within their national procedures during 1998, and the membership instruments were then submitted at the ceremony in Missouri.

On 5 February 1997, the renowned American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan (1904-2005), one of the designers and architects of the American policy of containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and also a former State Department employee and former US Ambassador to Moscow, wrote an article in *The New York Times* entitled *A Fateful Error*. *The view, bluntly stated, he writes, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.**

Kennan's fear was that such a decision would inflame Russian nationalism and the anti-West and militarist tendencies of Russian public opinion, and that this would harm the nascent democracy in the Russian Federation and reinstate a Cold-War atmosphere at a time when uncertainty was hanging over East-West relations and when the START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) treaties were due to be ratified by the Duma. Following the Washington Treaty of 8 December 1987, the United States and Russia had concluded the START I arms reduction treaty in 1990 and the START II treaty in 1993, the latter being signed between George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin on 3 January 1993. These were intended to lead to a very significant reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two major powers.

Kennan observed that the Russians were unimpressed by the American assurances and the efforts made to persuade them that NATO's intentions were not hostile. Kennan, the author of *American Diplomacy*,[†] felt that the Russians would view NATO expansion as an attack on their prestige—something that was very important to them,—and as a threat to their security. He then called on the Sixteen to make the most of the time remaining before the final ratification to amend the declared expansion format in order to mitigate the impact on Russian opinion and policy.

On 26 June 1997, fifty eminent American foreign policy experts, including Robert McNamara (1916-2009), former Defense Secretary under JFK, signed an open letter to Bill Clinton. They, too, believed that the United States' efforts to expand NATO *were a political error of historical proportions which would disrupt European stability*. They pointed out that the President of the Defense Committee in the Duma, General Lev Rokhlin (1947-1998), had questioned the good faith of the United States, claiming that NATO expansion would constitute a repudiation of the assurances given to Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze when Russian consent had been obtained for German reunification and for NATO membership of a reunified Germany. The signatories urgently requested that the expansion process be suspended and alternative actions pursued, including opening up the European Union to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, developing an improved Partnership for Peace programme, supporting NATO-Russia cooperation, and continuing the arms reduction process. They concluded their letter with the following phrase:

* *The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.* George F. Kennan, *A Fateful Error*, in *New York Times*, February 5, 1997.

† G. F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1951; *American Diplomacy, Sixtieth-Anniversary expanded Edition*, 2012.

*Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbours and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason, and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should be put on hold.**

On 30 April 1998, the US Senate approved the expansion by 80 votes to 19, much more than the two-thirds majority needed to approve the resolution. As the *New York Times* pointed out, this historic vote crossed party and ideological lines, since 35 democrats had joined 45 republicans in favor of allowing Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the Alliance. Ten democrats and nine republicans opposed the resolution.[†]

After the expansion was approved by the US Senate in the spring of 1998, Kennan felt that this decision demonstrated a poor understanding of the history of Russia on the part of the United States and that it was a *tragic error*, opening the door to a new Cold War.[‡]

2.6. Russia is still waiting at the door...

When, in 1989, Europe and the world thought that they were on the road to reducing tension, a new wave of uncertainties reached the Old Continent. In 1991, it was clear that the collapse of the Soviet Empire raised not only the question of decolonization in the Central Asiatic republics and the Caucasus region, and the issue of the future of the Baltic countries and Moldova, but it also affected the heart of Russia, namely Ukraine and Belarus. The thawing of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, and even more so in the Balkans, is resurrecting the secular rivalries that threaten borders.

As British historian Robert Service wrote, in the decade that followed the implosion of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Russia lost its position as a global power. Even in Eastern Europe its influence has waned[§]. Fascinated by the United States and the American model, the former satellite countries fought tirelessly to distance themselves from Moscow, while Washington, believing that it had won the Cold War, was ready to welcome them, not only as favored allies, but also as members of an Atlantic Alliance rising from its ashes. The issue of NATO's survival, which had been clearly raised and which had become the *obsession* of Republican President George H. Bush—in the words of Hubert Védrine,[¶]—would be resolved during the presidency of Bill Clinton. In an interview with French historians Pierre Nora and Marcel Gauchet in May 1997, Védrine, who became Deputy Foreign Minister under Jacques Chirac (1932-2019) and Lionel Jospin, recalled the

* *Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbours and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason, and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should be put on hold. Opposition to NATO Expansion, Letter to the President of the United States, Mr. Bill Clinton, June 27, 1997. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-06/arms-control-today/opposition-nato-expansion>*

† Eric Schmitt, *Senate approves expansion of NATO by vote of 80 to 19; Clinton pleased by decision*, in *New York Times*, May 1, 1998. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/01/world/senate-approves-expansion-nato-vote-80-19-clinton-pleased-decision.html>

‡ Thomas L. Friedman, *Foreign Affairs. Now a Word from X*, in *The New York Times*, 2 May 1998. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html>; Michael Pembroke, *The Decline of US Leadership from WW2 to Covid-19*, (London: Oneworld, 2021), p. 115.

§ Robert Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, p. 539.

¶ Hubert Vedrine, *Les Mondes de François Mitterrand*, Paris, A. Fayard, 1996. Reproduit dans H. Vedrine, *Une vision du monde*, (Paris : Bouquins, 1992), p. 468.

ambition of the former Communist countries to feel fully Western, and the determination of the United States to assert its leadership in Europe.

For Védérine, *in this case, it was the United States that decided whether and how to proceed. Europe was treated like an object, not a subject, as in the good old days of the cohabitation. Is this an unfortunate consequence, or was this the objective? In any event, we are now required to stand by the decision, while trying to counteract the expansion through an appropriate relationship with Russia, to be established by NATO or by Europe, continued Védérine, former Secretary General of the French Presidency under François Mitterrand.**

The combined effects of the refusal to acknowledge Russia as a partner worthy of an alliance with the West, the indifference, if not contempt, shown towards its position in the Kosovo tragedy, and allowing Prague, Warsaw and Budapest to join NATO are just some of the reasons behind a return to the historical mistrust with which Russia once held NATO and the United States, to the detriment of Europe, even though this mistrust had abated during the final decade of the 20th century.

In 2019, Thomas Gomart, historian and Director of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), noted that *the Russian elite experienced the escheat of the 1990s as genuine humiliation*. The resulting tensions brought NATO and Russia back into conflict, with each side strengthening their own security system. But, as Gomart pointed out, *such enmity is necessary on both sides*. This explains why, despite the attempts we have reviewed, the Atlantic Alliance and Russia were unable to transform the European security structure created by the Cold War.†

With the departure of Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999, the arrival of a new occupant in the Kremlin, and the impact of 11 September 2001, relations between Moscow and the Allies would be deeply affected once more.

3. The resurgence of Russia and its long-term effects

3.1. The rollback doctrine

At the turn of the century, it seemed that the rollback doctrine, the policy of repelling communism, if not Russia, favored by John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), former Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, prevailed over the containment doctrine advocated by George Kennan. *It is as if the weakened Russia was prey rather than a non-hostile power: NATO expansion, encouragement of Ukrainian, Azeri and Uzbek nationalism and, thanks to the oil companies, a plan to open up Central Asia*, wrote the celebrated geopolitical expert Gérard Chaliand and the historian Jean-Pierre Rageau in the *Atlas du millénaire* in 1998.‡ Somewhat paradoxically, as we have seen, the economic, military and geopolitical weakening of Russia during this decade enabled the Allies to reduce their sphere of influence,

* France: *le piano ou le tabouret*, Entretien avec Pierre Nora et Marcel Gauchet, dans *Le Débat*, n°95, Paris, Gallimard, mai -août 1997, p. 165-182. Reproduced in H. Védérine, *Une vision du monde*, p. 292.

† Thomas Gomart, *L'affolement du monde, Dix enjeux géopolitiques*, (Paris : Tallandier, 2020) , p. 144-154.

‡ Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Razgeau, *Atlas du millénaire*, (Paris : Hachette, 1998) , p. 182 ; David Teurtrie, *Russie, Le retour de la puissance*, (Paris : A. Collin, 2021) , p. 128.

while denouncing Russia's call for a sphere of influence of its own and moving the NATO forces significantly closer to its borders. In addition, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention practiced by the Alliance without United Nations approval, as tested in Kosovo, was a source of major uncertainty for the Kremlin, where Boris Yeltsin remained in power until 31 December 1999. As a result, in a Russia in which Yeltsin had appeared to be a beacon for the Westernization of the country and a bulwark for its fledgling democracy, the assessment at the close of the century was disastrous: the image of the United States and Europe was deteriorating, and NATO was the main enemy once more. For the elite and the population at large, nationalism was being rekindled by a new Russian characteristic, based on opposition to Western values.*

At the White House, in Ottawa, and in the European capitals, this view was more nuanced. For the NATO leaders, the Alliance was trying to respect both Russia and Ukraine. In 1999, at the Washington Summit, the Allies still felt that *security in Europe cannot be built without Russia*, and that they needed to try to establish trust and cooperation with Russia in order to overcome the divisions of the past and address, together, the security problems of the future. They pointed out that this objective was at the heart of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security signed by the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Member States and Russia in Paris two years earlier. They still hoped for a commitment from both parties to help *build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe based on partnership and mutual interest*.† Point 8 of the Washington Declaration of 23 and 24 April 1999 proclaims as follows: *Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe*. It continues: *NATO is an essential pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility. Working together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible*‡. At that time, the Spanish Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, could still claim that *history will see the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as a key step towards a Europe of co-operation and integration, towards a Europe without dividing lines*.§

3.2. Vladimir Putin rebuilds the strategic partnership

For the observers of the time, the arrival of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin appeared in many respects to be a change of direction. Head of the Security Service, the FSB,¶ since 1998, after extensive education, including at the University of Leningrad, and a career in the KGB, followed by political and administrative experience working alongside the liberal mayor of St. Petersburg, he succeeded Sergei Stepashin as Prime Minister under Boris Yeltsin on 9

* Jacques Sapir, *Bilan et héritage de Boris Eltsine*, in *Universalia 2001*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2001) , p. 89.

† *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, p. 95-96, NATO, 1999.

‡ *The Washington Declaration, Signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>

§ *History will see the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as a key step towards a Europe of co-operation and integration, towards a Europe without dividing lines. The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, p.82, NATO, 1999. <https://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde/rdr-gde-e.pdf>.

¶ The Federal Security Service of the Federation of Russia (FSB).

August 1999. Benefiting from the early retirement of Yeltsin, whom he succeeded on an interim basis, his career was nothing short of meteoric since he was elected President of the Russian Federation in the first round on 26 March 2000. At 47, he was then the youngest leader of Russia since at least 1917. The portrayal of him at the time by Jacques Sapir revealed a significant departure from the path followed by his predecessors in the Kremlin. For Sapir, Director of Research at the EHESS [School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences] in Paris, Putin was a *man of order* and a *fervent Russian patriot*. He observed that the new president, supported by Mikhail Gorbachev, appeared to be a *moderate reformer who wanted to combine economic openness with reconstruction of the State*. Sapir also noted that *Vladimir Putin has generated a movement of hope in Russia and has enjoyed a level of support that few leaders have experienced*.*

During the presidential election campaign, Vladimir Putin sent signals to the West on the issue of expanding NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact countries and on relations with NATO which were demonized at the time. In his famous *Why not?* comment in response to a BBC journalist who asked him about the possibility of joining the Alliance, Putin said that, if that were the case, Moscow would have to have the same status as the other members. The interim president underlined that Russia was part of European culture and that he could not imagine his country existing outside Europe and the civilized world.†

From the moment he took office, the new president took steps to turn over a new diplomatic leaf after the pain of NATO's intervention in Kosovo and to bring Russia out of its relative isolation. The events of 11 September 2001 gave him the opportunity to change his relations with Washington in a positive way. On the very day of the attacks, Vladimir Putin was one of the first leaders to offer the United States his country's assistance to respond to the act of terrorism it had suffered‡. Moscow approved the use of its airspace and its bases in Central Asia to enable the Americans and NATO to intervene against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.§ Similarly, the change in strategic dynamic in the United States and Europe at the time encouraged him to reconsider Russian membership of an Atlantic Alliance that was turning into a political organization and moderating its expansion to the East.¶ In addition, the brutal nature of the war being waged in Chechnya, a legacy of the Yeltsin era, meant that its objective of tension with the West was becoming irrelevant since it was ignoring the great struggle against Islamic terrorism.

Despite the unilateral decision of George W. Bush to withdraw his country from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) at the end of 2001, a genuine strategic partnership was established between Russia and the United States. On 24 May 2002, in Moscow, the two countries signed a treaty on the mutual reduction of their nuclear arsenals, then, on 28 May, they met in Rome to set up the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), in which the Russians shared

* Jacques Sapir, *Vladimir Poutine, Vies et portrait*, dans *Universalis 2001*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2001) , p. 404.

† Yuriy Davidov, *Should Russia join NATO? Final Report, NATO Research Fellow*, p. 23, Moscow, NATO Office of Information and Press, Academic Affair Unit, 2000.

‡ Charles Zorgbide, *Histoire de l'OTAN*, p. 253, Brussels, Complexe, 2002.

§ Jacques Sapir, *Les années Poutine*, in *Universalis 2009*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2009) , p. 115 ; – Vladimir Putin, *President of Russia* in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Updated on March 5, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Putin>

¶ William Drozdiak, *Putin eases stance on NATO expansion*, dans *Washington Post*, October 4, 2001, p. A1.

common interests on an equal footing with the 26 countries of the Alliance and which replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The Rome Declaration was based on the objectives and principles of the Founding Act of 1997, which was then renewed as the basic formal instrument for relations between the Alliance and Russia.* Against this relaxed background, Russia again took part in the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans—including in Kosovo, as part of KFOR—and was involved in NATO military initiatives launched after the 11 September attacks, including Operation Active Endeavour,† an initiative to tackle terrorism in the Mediterranean, in which the Russian fleet participated in the Black Sea.

3.3. Russia, in between New and Old Europe

In 2003, the NATO partnership was rocked by the Iraq Blunder. On 22 January 2003, whereas the administration of George W. Bush had, for months, been exerting pressure on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (1937-2006), who was suspected of supporting terrorism and having weapons of mass destruction (WMD), France and Germany declared that the United Nations Security Council alone was authorised to launch military action against a third country. The following day, at a press conference, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (1932-2021) popularised the divide between what he called the *New Europe* and the *Old Europe*. According to Reginald Dale, a researcher at Stanford University, the former consisted of the countries willing to form a new military coalition against Saddam Hussein, plus the new members of NATO. Most of these countries were applying to join the European Union, particularly the Poles, whom President Bush considered *the most stalwart allies of America*,‡ and the other new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Rumsfeld used the term *Old Europe* to refer to France, Germany and several countries which opposed the war in Iraq and wanted a more integrated European Union as a counterweight to the United States.§

When, on 27 January 2003, the NATO Foreign Ministers signed a call for Iraqi disarmament, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac demanded that UN Resolution 1441 be implemented by peaceful means and refused to legitimise the war against Saddam Hussein and his government. This led to direct confrontation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who was very close to the US President. At that time, Madrid, like Berlin, was a rotating member of the United Nations Security Council. London and Paris were permanent members. The US conservatives were close to regarding the Franco-German partnership, along with Belgium and Sweden who shared their point of view, as traitors to the Alliance, and they rallied the other European allies around their diplomacy of military intervention. They were joined by Italy, under Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. At the end of January, on the initiative of Aznar, eight European countries wrote a letter in support of the US position, denouncing

* NATO-Russia Council, NATO, Jan. 13, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm

† Operation Active Endeavour, Archived, NATO, Oct. 27, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm

‡ Leah Pizar, *Orange sur l'Atlantique, La France, les États-Unis et la deuxième guerre en Irak*, (Paris, Fayard, 2010).

§ Barry James, (International Herald Tribune), *Rumsfeld visits Europe with more frank words*, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 2003. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/08/news/rumsfeld-visits-europe-with-more-frank-words.html?searchResultPosition=3>; Reginald Dale, *Old and new Europe: European divisions don't help America*, in *The New York Times*, June 23, 2004. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/opinion/IHT-old-and-new-europe-european-divisions-dont-help-america.html?searchResultPosition=5>

the Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction which, in their words, represented a threat to world security. The letter was signed by Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the three new members of NATO—Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. On 5 February 2003, the day on which US Secretary of State Colin Powell (1937-2021) presented to the United Nations Security Council the fabricated evidence of the presence of WMD in Iraq, a number of other European countries, the so-called Vilnius Group, which had not been approached regarding the initial letter, added their support for military intervention: Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It should be noted that, at the NATO Summit held in Prague in 2002, the last seven countries on this list had received confirmation of their future entry into NATO, with membership set for March 2004. Thus, for the Americans, they strengthened the New Europe clan whereas, on 17 February, at the end of a European Council meeting, Jacques Chirac memorably stated that, by displaying their solidarity with Washington, *these countries have missed the opportunity to keep quiet*.*

On 10 February 2003, on a visit to the Elysée Palace in Paris after talks in Berlin, Vladimir Putin distanced himself from *the special relationship he had established with George Bush since the start of his presidency*,[†] and aligned himself with the French and German view of Iraq, while French President Jacques Chirac (1932-2019) highlighted the efforts made by the Kremlin, which had just launched a referendum on Chechnya. On that occasion, France, Germany and Russia signed a joint declaration in which they called for the inspections in Iraq be continued in an attempt to avoid intervention. While indicating that they did not disagree with the United States on the issue of disarmament, they demanded a United Nations mandate prior to any intervention.[‡] Russian Foreign Minister Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov explained that this was not a challenge to America but, on the contrary, that it was necessary to do everything possible to maintain the anti-terrorist coalition without provoking a war which would radicalise the Muslim world to no avail.[§] On 17 February, on the initiative of European Commission President Romano Prodi, the European Commission also called on Iraq to comply, underlining that war was not inevitable and that force must only be used as a last resort.[¶] Officials from France, Germany and Russia met in St. Petersburg on 5 March to call for the diplomatic route to be continued. Thus Berlin, Paris and Moscow were in step with each other, which concerned Washington greatly.

As Jacques Sapir wrote in 2009, it would be an understatement to say that the Kremlin's commitment to the United States in the war on terror *was not paid back*. From 2002 to 2008, he wrote, US policy was characterised by a succession of aggressive and provocative actions towards Russia, of which the installation of anti-missile systems on its borders and the proposal to open up NATO to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States

* Natalie Nougayrede, *Jacques Chirac et la Nouvelle Europe*, in *Le Monde*, December 11, 2006. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2006/12/11/jacques-chirac-et-la-nouvelle-europe-par-natalie-nougayrede_844204_3232.html

† L. Pisar, *op. cit.*, p. 1841.

‡ Vladimir Putin, *President of Russia in Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Updated March 9, 2022. April 24, 2022 ; L. Pisar, *Orange sur l'Atlantique*, p. 1814-1815.

§ Interview of Igor Ivanov in *Le Figaro*, 12 February 2003, quoted by L. PISAR, p. 1841-1842.

¶ Leah Pisar, *Orange sur l'Atlantique*.

(CIS), actions in clear violation of the treaties signed in Moscow and Washington in 1991 and 1992, are just a few examples.*

The Alliance's winning diplomacy became increasingly less restrictive. The more attractive it became in areas where the body of the former Soviet Empire was concerned, rather than just its borders. The old red line was starting to unravel. After the expansion in March 2004 to include the seven countries mentioned above, the momentum envisaged in Prague for the Membership Action Plan (MAP) began to build. As Philippe Boulanger noted, in October 2004, it was Georgia that established a partnership with NATO, then Azerbaijan in May 2005, Armenia in December 2005 and Moldova in May 2006. The Alliance intensified its dialogue with Ukraine in April 2005, then with Georgia in September 2006[†]. In response, Vladimir Putin increased his multilateral approach to international relations in line with the Primakov doctrine. With some success, he took steps to strengthen his relations with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and with India and Iran within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), an evolution of the Shanghai Group. Putin also re-established the former Russian alliances with the Middle East, in particular with Syria and the Palestinian Authority.[‡]

On 7 June 2006, the Duma adopted a resolution warning that Ukrainian membership of the NATO military block would have very negative consequences for relations between the *brother peoples* of Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was worried about the Alliance's expansion plans, the reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe, the deployment of elements of the American anti-missile defense system, and NATO's refusal to ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Minister Lavrov issued a warning: any movement by Ukraine or Georgia towards NATO would constitute a *colossal geopolitical shift for Russia*.[§]

According to some observers, the speech given on 10 February 2007 by Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference was interpreted, at least by some in Russia, as a defining moment similar to the speech given by Winston Churchill, in Fulton in March 1946, where the former Prime Minister gave the world the expression *The Iron Curtain*.[¶] For The New York Times, this speech by President Putin reflected Russia's renewed arrogance on the world stage and *it certainly could become a historical marker*.^{**}

Vladimir Putin stated his irritation at the developments in international relations. In front of Chancellor Angela Merkel, US Defence Secretary under President Bush Robert

* Jacques Sapir, *Les années Poutine*, in *Universalia 1999*, (Paris: Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1999), p. 115-116. - This idea of Western engagement with Russia is highly contested in 2022. Yet in 1995, Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs that he reminded Western politicians of the assurances they had given during the German reunification talks that the Atlantic Alliance would under no circumstances extend its jurisdiction eastward. M. Gorbachev, *Mémoires. Une vie et les réformes*, p. 858, Paris, Éditions du Rocher, 1997.

† Philippe Boulanger, *L'élargissement de l'OTAN. Les enjeux et les risques du Sommet de Bucarest* (April 2 to 4, 2008), in *Echogéo*, 2008. <https://doi.org/10.4000/echogeo.5083>

‡ *Ibidem*, p. 116-117.

§ Nick Paton Walsh, *Russia tells Ukraine to stay out of NATO*, in *The Guardian*, June 7, 2006. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/08/russia.nickpatonwalsh>

¶ Winston Churchill, *Fulton's Speech*, Westminster College, Missouri, March 5, 1946. (BBC Archives) www.winstonchurchill.org

** Stephen Lee Myers, *No Cold War, perhaps, but surely a lukewarm peace*, in *The New York Times*, Feb 18, 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18myers.html>

M. Gates, and several dozen diplomats, the President of the Russian Federation observed that the *uncontained* and *hyper use* of military force in international affairs was plunging the world into a succession of conflicts in which finding political solutions was becoming impossible. Vladimir Putin's particular target was the United States, which, he said, had disregarded the basic principles of international law and overstepped its national borders in every area. For the Kremlin leader, this situation was extremely dangerous as people could no longer seek protection from international law, a situation which would restart the arms race and stimulate terrorism. It was necessary, he said, *to seriously think about the architecture of global security*.

The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law has a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

Vladimir Putin continued by condemning the establishment of American bases in Bulgaria and Romania and the fact that NATO was moving its frontline forces closer to Russian borders. He observed that NATO expansion had no relation with the modernization of the Alliance or with security in Europe but was instead *a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust*. The President considered that Russia had the right to ask against whom this expansion was intended and what had happened to the assurances made by its Western partners after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. And he recalled the declarations in the speech given by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner on 17 May 1990: *“the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”*. *“Where are these guarantees?”*, asked Putin.*

Although Robert Gates tried to cushion the effect, this speech left its mark on Western minds and, even then, foreshadowed the violent anger which the Russian president would later express at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, so infuriated was he at the American proposal to allow Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO.†

* We mentioned this speech by Mr. Wörner in the first part of our paper. Vladimir Putin quotes the text correctly, except that he places it in Brussels, whereas it was given at the Bremer Tabaks Collegium. *I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience of what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO Secretary General Mr. Wörner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees? Putin's Prepared Remarks at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, Munich, Feb. 10, 2007, Transcript. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>;*

Discours du Président russe sur la sécurité, Munich, 10 février 2007, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada. <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMDictionnaire?iddictionnaire=1886> - Manfred Wörner, *The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s*, 17 May 1990 : *The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees.*

https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_23732.htm?selectedLocale=en; Laurent Zecchini, *Vladimir Poutine dénonce l'unilatéralisme américain*, in *Le Monde*, 12 février 2007

https://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2007/02/12/m-poutine-denonce-l-unilateralisme-americain_866329_3222.html

† R. Service, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

At the NATO Summit held at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest from 2 to 4 April 2008, a Russian Head of State was, for the first time in the Alliance's history, due to attend the NATO-Russia Council which closed the meeting. Although Vladimir Putin was expected in Bucharest, problems arose not only on the issue of the membership of former parts of Yugoslavia, such as Croatia and Macedonia, but primarily on the membership of Georgia and Ukraine. Russian minorities were under pressure in the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As for Ukraine, a few days before the Summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov again expressed his opposition to the idea of Ukraine joining the Partnership for Peace as part of a further expansion of that country which would merely accentuate the division of Europe.* The divide between the New Europe and the Old Europe was rearing its head again: Poland, the Baltic states and nine Eastern European countries supported the position of President Bush and the diplomatic efforts by American and Canada in favour of expansion, whereas France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, followed by six other Member States, objected to it based on the need to take into account the role and the sensitivity of Russia.† However, Montreal-based newspaper *Le Devoir* saw their misgivings as a concern not to irritate the important neighbour who supplies gas to the entire continent.‡

In his analysis of the Bucharest Summit, Philippe Boulanger thought a potential expansion of the Alliance to include Georgia and Ukraine would risk a collision with Russia. He noted that the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexander Grouchko, had considered that integrating the two former Soviet republics would be a major strategic error, with serious consequences for security in Europe. Thus, for Russia, NATO expansion was progressing too fast and too far across a territory under Russian influence.§

It must be recognised that the Bucharest Declaration falls short of taking into account the concerns expressed by the Kremlin: *NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO*. It goes on to say that *[w]e agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. (...)*¶

After noting certain concerns over relations with Russia, the next paragraph of the Summit Declaration states that the members of the Alliance consider that the potential offered by the NATO-Russia Council is not being fully exploited, and that they stand ready to define and maximise the opportunities for joint action, as a group of 27, while reiterating the principle that NATO and Russia act and take their decisions independently. The Summit reaffirmed the idea of an Open-Door policy for Russia but based this on *opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability*, with no mention of the possibility of membership.**

* Ph. Boulanger, *L'élargissement*, p. 13.

† *Ibidem*.

‡ Christian Rioux, *Sommet de l'OTAN, Poutine souffle le chaud et le froid*, in *Le Devoir*, April 5, 2008. <https://www.ledevoir.com/monde/183741/sommet-de-l-otan-poutine-souffle-le-chaud-et-le-froid>

§ Ph. Boulanger, *L'élargissement*, p. 20.

¶ *Bucharest Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

** *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 28.

When he attended the closing session of the Summit, Vladimir Putin demonstrated his desire to maintain a constructive dialogue with NATO while also highlighting Russia's significant differences regarding the approach of an organisation which, he pointed out, was founded to combat a Soviet bloc that no longer existed and included certain members who continued to demonise Russia. While claiming to be satisfied with the postponement of Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership, the Russian president did show his irritation at the guarantee given that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO one day. Putin stated: *the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders (...) will always be considered a direct threat to Russia*. In his view, *NATO cannot guarantee its own security at the expense of the security of others*.*

It did not prevent US Vice President Joe Biden from visiting Ukraine on 21 and 22 July 2009 and assuring Viktor Yushchenko, who had been in office since the Orange Revolution in 2004, that the United States still supported Kyiv's request to join NATO, despite the delay in the integration process.† However, tempers were flaring with Moscow. President Dmitri Medvedev wrote an open letter to Yushchenko, describing him as anti-Russian for disrupting Russian gas supplies to Europe. The Kremlin also criticized Yushchenko's efforts to have the famine that affected Ukraine in 1932-1933 recognized as genocide attributable to the Kremlin, and to rehabilitate the Ukrainian nationalists who had fought against the Soviets alongside the Nazis during the Second World War.‡

3.4. A stick with two ends

The climate of disintegration which had characterized Russia at the turn of the century, and the realization of the increasing weakness, if not inability, of the State to hold its own on the international stage and also domestically had a significant effect on Russia's elite and, undoubtedly, on its leader. The reactions to what Thomas Gomart called "Russia's 9/11"—the hostage-taking at Beslan school in North Ossetia on the first day of term in 2004, which resulted in 331 deaths, including 172 children, and more than 540 wounded—told Putin that Russia had shown weakness and the weak get a thrashing. *Some want to snatch a juicy morsel from us, others are helping them do so as they consider that Russia is still a threat because it is one of the world's major nuclear powers—a threat which must be eliminated*.§ Gomart, head of the Russia/ICE programme at the French Institute of International Relations, noted in 2005 that, by indiscriminately mixing up international terrorism, the power game and the destabilization attempts coming from abroad, Vladimir Putin was cultivating a mental confusion and a scheming outlook which would help to explain his attitude towards Ukraine,¶ but also probably towards Caucasus.

For David Teurtrie, the Russia-Georgia conflict in the summer of 2008 was a paradigm shift in relations between Russia and the West.** While South Ossetia and Abkhazia had

* R. Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, p. 566 ; Christian Rioux, *Sommet de l'OTAN, Poutine souffle le chaud et le froid*, in *Le Devoir*, April 5, 2008.

† David R. Marples, *Ukraine*, in *Universalia 2010*, (Paris : Encyclopaedia Universalis, 2010) , p. 514.

‡ *Ibidem*.

§ Thomas Gomart, *Russie : trop-plein d'énergie ou d'inerties*, dans Th. de MONTBRIAL et Ph. MOREAU DEFARGES dir., *Rapport annuel mondial sur le système économique et les stratégies (RAMSES)*, p. 84, Paris, Dunod-IFRI, 2005.

¶ Th. Gomart, *Russie : trop plein d'énergies...*, p. 86.

** D. Teurtrie, *Russie, Le retour de la puissance*, p. 131.

proclaimed their independence in 1991 and 1992 respectively, their secessionist aspirations had not been taken into account either by the international community or even by Russia. However, in 2006, Vladimir Putin had posed the question: *if someone thinks that Kosovo can be granted full independence as a state, then why should the Abkhaz or the South -Ossetian peoples not also have the right to statehood?*^{*} Thus, as Jaume Castan Pinos noted, the Russian president considered that Kosovan independence would constitute a precedent which could potentially cause Russia to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[†]

Kosovan independence from Serbia was proclaimed on 17 February 2008 and recognized the following day by the United States, whose Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that, *as Kosovo today begins its life as an independent state, the United States pledges to continue to be its close friend and partner.*[‡] A few days later, Vladimir Putin observed that this event constituted *a terrible precedent* which would trigger a chain of unpredictable consequences. He added: *ultimately this is a stick with two ends, and one day the other end of this stick will hit them on their heads.*[§]

In the Caucasus, relations between Tbilisi and the separatists deteriorated when, after several incidents, Georgia bombarded and invaded South Ossetia, and also threatened the Russian peacekeeping forces which had been deployed in that region since 1992. Russia entered the war against Georgia and pushed back its armies. On 26 August, Moscow recognized the two republics and justified its action in a diplomatic statement from Dimitri Medvedev—who had replaced Putin in May—similar to that used for the NATO intervention in Kosovo.[¶]

The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and its subsequent developments could appear to be *a point of no return* in relations between Russia and the West. This crisis arose, firstly, from the division among the Ukrainians on the choice they had to make between the association agreement with the European Union and the Customs Union which Moscow was offering them and, secondly, the suspicion felt by the Russians that the West was trying, once again, to separate Ukraine from Russia.^{**} In 2003, Putin had proposed the creation of a single economic area of 215 million inhabitants, comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Orange Revolution had ended Ukraine's involvement in that project which, in 2010, became the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union. The election of Victor Yanukovich saw Ukraine again being encouraged to support this plan rather than join the European Union. When Yanukovich refused to sign the association agreement with the EU in 2013, he was toppled by the *nationalist, pro-Western opposition supported by Brussels and*

^{*} *If someone thinks that Kosovo can be granted full independence as a state, then why should the Abkhaz or the South-Ossetian peoples not also have the right to statehood?* (Kremlin, 2006), in Jaume Castan Pinos, *Kosovo and the Collateral Effects*, p. 163.

[†] J. Castan Pinos, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[‡] *As Kosovo today begins its life as an independent state, the United States pledges to continue to be its close friend and partner.* Condoleezza Rice, *US Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State*, Washington, US Department of State, February 18, 2008. Archive. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm> last modified 26 April 2022.

[§] *Quoted by J. Castan Pinos, op. cit.*, p. 164.

[¶] *Medvedev's Statement on South Ossetia and Abkhazia*, in *The New York Times*, August 26, 2008. - *Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev*, Moscow, Kremlin, August 26, 2008. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1222> J. Castan Pinos, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

^{**} David Teurtrie, *Russie, Le retour de la puissance*, p. 132-133.

Washington.* For the Kremlin, the overthrow of President Victor Yanukovich, who had been elected in 2010 and who had signed, with Medvedev, the Kharkiv Pact on Russian use of the Sevastapol naval base for a further 25 years, was a blow for Moscow. The Kremlin viewed the Euromaidan movement as a Western power grab. It is clear that nationalism emerged stronger, particularly when Parliament granted precedence to the Ukrainian language and further discussions took place in Kyiv on the possibility of increasing military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.†

The Russian response took the form of a media campaign in which the authorities in Kyiv were described as Nazi sympathizers.‡ There was also reaction from Crimea, where the Parliament refused to submit to the new authorities. The Russian and associated armed forces occupied the peninsula on 27 February. The Crimean Parliament voted to hold a referendum on becoming part of Russia. Although the result was broadly in favor, the United Nations, in its Resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014, rejected its validity.§ For the Russians who voted in favor of joining, it was *reparation for a historical injustice*.¶ With great fanfare, Vladimir Putin signed the accession treaty with the representatives of the Republic of Crimea. For the West, as for the majority of UN members, this was an action designed to disrupt *the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine*.** The European Union and the United States then imposed a raft of sanctions, which they expanded as the fighting intensified in the Donbas region.

A Protocol was signed between representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the Donbas separatists in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, on 5 September 2014, under the auspices of the OSCE, to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. As a result of continuing clashes, the Minsk Summit of 11 February 2015 brought together on the initiative of French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, representatives from Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany in an attempt to end the conflict in the Donbas region. During the summer of 2021, Tatiana Kastoueva-Jean, Director of the Russia/NEI Centre at the *Institut français des Relations internationales*, noted that this process, which was a pivotal element in the relations between Russia and the West, had reached an impasse and that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who had taken office on 20 May 2019, was taking a harder line than his predecessor Petro Porochenko, who had held that role since 2014. She observed that his initiatives, such as closing down three pro-Russian media outlets, imposing sanctions on Viktor Medvedchuk, an ally of Vladimir Putin, and creating the international Crimea Platform, were provoking the Kremlin into an escalation of tensions on the Ukrainian border.††

From April 2014, following Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine, the Atlantic Alliance suspended all practical cooperation with Russia, including in relation to

* D. Teurtrie, *Où en est l'Union économique eurasiatique? Entre instabilité sociopolitique et ambitions géoéconomiques*, dans Thierry de Montbrial & Dominique David, Ramses 2022, (Paris : IFRI-Dunod, 2021) , p. 161.

† R. Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, p. 580.

‡ *Ibidem*.

§ United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted on March 27, 2014. Ukraine Territorial Integrity. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/resolutions.shtml&Lang=F

¶ David Teurtrie, *Russie, Le retour de la puissance*, p. 133.

** *Résolution*, p. 2.

†† Tatiana Kastoueva-Jean, *La Russie après la réforme constitutionnelle, La dérive autoritaire se poursuit*, in Thierry de Montbrial & Dominique David, Ramses 2022, (Paris : IFRI-Dunod, 2021) , p. 146.

COR, the European Committee of the Regions. However, it decided not to close down the communication channels within COR and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in order to maintain exchanges of views on the subject of the crisis in Ukraine. The members of COR met three times in 2016, three times in 2017, twice in 2018, and twice in 2019. The most recent meeting was held on 12 January 2022.*

4. Conclusion: Thinking the Unthinkable?

One trajectory, several bifurcations

If we had to describe the trajectory of the changing relations between NATO and Russia, from the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) to the launch, in 2014, of the operations in Crimea and then in the Donbas region which are still continuing in 2022, we would hesitate between words such as mutual misunderstanding, divergence of interests and strategies, and, naturally, arrogance on either side of the red line that is constantly moving eastwards. The limits to understanding this path are immediately apparent: we are in the presence of a complex system based, first and foremost, on human actors whose empathy, for example, as the power to identify with a partner, is not a constant virtue. We are also operating in a dynamic in which the actors are pursuing their own path: alone—the United States, France, Russia, Germany—, or within a collective murmur mentality—the Commonwealth of Independent States in its various configurations, the European Union, the Old Europe, the New Europe, to use the typology attributed to Donald Rumsfeld, and so on. In parallel with our trajectory describing the relations between the Alliance and Russia, we could add two others, demonstrating that they often resonate with each other: the chaotic relations between Russia and the United States, on the one hand, and the expansion and integration of the European Union, on the other, including the vain attempts by the Union to establish a common defence mechanism and even the much-fêted European identity within NATO. Other key factors weigh heavily and are particularly influential at times, even though we have seen them mentioned very infrequently, if at all: global geopolitics, defence budgets,[†] disarmament processes, terrorism and, above all, economic and social changes and energy issues. So many black boxes that would need to be opened and integrated into the model.

There are some essential bifurcations on our trajectory. The first was the period from the negotiations on German reunification, the *Deutsche Einheit*, on 3 October 1990, until the collapse of the USSR on 26 December 1991. This was a time of intense diplomatic activity during which questions were asked about the endurance of the Alliance, while considering, with varying degrees of humility, that the West had the upper hand.

We have pinpointed the second significant bifurcation in 1999. In its final year, the 20th century bequeathed us two debts, which will be costly and ugly for us to honor in the 21st century: the Washington Summit of 24 and 25 April 1999 marked the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, its renewal, and the expansion of its missions, but it also highlighted the Alliance's capacity to violate international order, as the organization did when it attacked

* NATO-Russia Council, NATO, January 13, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm

[†] Voir par exemple : Éric Sourisseau, *Les conséquences militaires et stratégiques de l'élargissement de l'Europe*, *Annuaire stratégique et militaire*, Paris, FRS, Odile Jacob, 2003.

Kosovo, despite misgivings from some of its members and the absence of a mandate from the United Nations. These events tainted the previously constructive dialogue between the various protagonists. At that precise moment, as the French historian and journalist André Fontaine wrote, NATO had unquestionably failed to create trusting, enduring and effective relations with Russia.* On the contrary, the Alliance had showed Russia powerful leadership, humiliated it on the international stage, and admitted three former members of the Warsaw Pact, despite repeated requests from Russia to join at the same time, if not earlier. The ceremony held in Independence, Missouri, clearly showed that the momentum was first and foremost with the Americans.

The pre-emptive war launched on 20 March 2003 in Iraq jeopardised relations between the Europeans and the United States, and especially between the Europeans themselves. The challenge to American prominence by France and Germany, the old allies of the United States, irritated Washington greatly, all the more so since an axis was created with Moscow which, despite the affronts, had remained fairly obliging. Since the fall of the Wall, any rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin was a sensitive matter for American diplomacy. The demand for multipolarity advocated by Evgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin should also be viewed in this context. The events of 2003 were soon followed by the Munich speech by the President of the Russian Federation in 2007, and the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The Europeans were divided over the question of NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia. It was these divisions that blocked it, probably more than the focus on Vladimir Putin's anger. Georgia in 2006, the Donbas region and Crimea in 2014, and the frontal Russia-Ukraine war from 24 February 2022 represented a single escalation and, at the same time, the worst response from Russia to the ostracism it had suffered, which, at least for a time, would merely be accentuated. As Hubert Védrine pointed out on 20 April 2022, the *Russian attack on Ukraine shatters Europe's vision of world affairs*. Further on, the former French Foreign Minister wonders whether, at a given point, the West could have been smarter?†

To hell with that! We prevailed and they didn't!

Fifteen years earlier, the same Hubert Védrine had observed that, because the West had believed, with the end of the USSR, that they had won the battle of history and would be able to *reign supreme*, they were bewildered by a world that conformed so little to their expectations. The United States, he wrote, were triumphalist. *They considered their leadership and their benevolent supremacy necessary for world stability and security.*‡

What is, today, increasingly clear to researchers—and I think that we have begun to discover this in this journey—, is that, since 1990, American policymakers had wanted German reunification to result in *carte blanche* for the United States by cementing a reunified Germany into NATO and enabling all the American diplomatic options within the new strategic landscape of Europe.§ The comments made by George H. Bush at his meeting with

* André Fontaine, Pierre Melandri, Guillaume Parmentier, *NATO, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique nord*, dans *Encyclopædia Universalis*

† Hubert Védrine & Pascal Boniface, *Comprendre le monde, Après la guerre en Ukraine, une vision du monde*, April 20, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYMm2XKh6uA>

‡ H. Védérine, Adrien Abecassis and Mohamed Bouabdallah, *Continuer l'histoire*, (Paris : Fayard, 2007) , p. 7-9.

§ J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 5

the West German leaders at Camp David, on 24 and 25 February 1990, are characteristic. The American president considered that *the Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany's relationship with NATO. What worries me, he said, is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that! We prevailed and they didn't. We can't let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.**

That period, which seems very distant to us today, is still a point of reference when one is in Moscow, particularly the speech of the NATO Secretary General on 17 May 1990, the interpretation of which is the subject of passionate arguments and even divides international relations analysts and historians into two schools. These two approaches are also the basis for two narratives which have a profound effect on the possible interpretation of current events.† In his speech, on 24 February 2022, in which he justified his operation in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin took only twenty seconds to refer to thirty years of efforts by the Kremlin to reach an agreement with NATO on the principles of European security. And to assert: *in response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.* The President of the Russian Federation goes on to mention the signs of disregard for international law which he attributes to the West: *this array includes promises not to expand NATO eastwards even by an inch.* (...)‡

After visiting a number of archives, including some of which I have presented here, particularly those declassified by the NSA, the American researcher Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrinson noted, in 2016, that the leaders of his country had offered the Soviets informal guarantees against NATO expansion on several occasions during the talks on German reunification in the spring, summer and autumn of 1990. Shiffrinson, who was Professor of International Relations at Texas A&M University, then at Boston University, showed that this was common diplomatic practice. In this instance, these guarantees were part of the negotiating position of George H. Bush's administration, and they indicated that the European order after the Cold War would be acceptable to both Washington and Moscow. As a result, NATO would remain in place provided that the security architecture of Europe included the Soviet Union. *Collectively, for Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, this evidence suggests that Russian leaders are essentially correct in claiming that U.S. efforts to expand NATO since the 1990s violate the "spirit" of the 1990 negotiations: NATO expansion nullified the assurances given to the Soviet Union in 1990.*§

* The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany's relationship with NATO. *What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that! We prevailed and they didn't. We can't let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.* Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p. 253; J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 35.

† Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion*, in *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 7–44. (Harvard College and MIT). See for example: Hannes Adomeit, *NATO's Eastward Enlargement: What the Western Leaders Said*, in *Security Policy Working Paper*, nr. 3, 2018. - Bruno Tertrais, *L'élargissement de L'otan : ni développement naturel ni erreur historique*, in *A quoi sert l'OTAN ? Questions internationales*, n°111, January-February 2022, p. 22-23.

‡ Address by the President of Russian Federation, Moscow, *The Kremlin*, February 24, 2022. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843#Transcript>; Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine, *Bloomberg News*, US Edition, February 24, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24>

§ *Collectively, this evidence suggests that Russian leaders are essentially correct in claiming that U.S. efforts to expand NATO since the 1990s violate the "spirit" of the 1990 negotiations: NATO expansion nullified the assurances given to the Soviet Union in 1990.* J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 5.

But the American researcher developed the argument further in his paper, which was endorsed by Harvard and the MIT, indicating that there was growing evidence that the United States was insincere when it offered the Soviet Union informal guarantees against NATO expansion. Referring to the works of the historian Mary Elise Sarotte from the European Studies Centre at Harvard,^{*} he noted that *declassified materials from U.S. archives suggest that U.S. policymakers used the diplomacy of German reunification to strengthen the United States' position in Europe after the Cold War.*[†] And he added that, contrary to what was claimed by many policymakers and analysts, there was significant evidence that Russian assertions of a “broken promise” regarding NATO expansion had merit. Applying insights from international relations theory to both new and pre-existing evidence on the 1990 negotiations, he considered that *Russian leaders [were] essentially correct: NATO expansion violated the quid pro quo at the heart of the diplomacy that culminated in German reunification within NATO. There was no written agreement precluding NATO expansion, but non-expansion guarantees were still advanced in 1990, only to be overturned.*[‡]

As noted in 2021 by Jean-Marie Guehenno, former Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations and Professor at Columbia University, *the hypocrisy of the strategic relationship with Russia was perhaps inevitable, but such lies come at a price. To dispel them, it would have been necessary to suspend our doubts on the future of Russia and reflect on the significance of a NATO of which Russia would become a member. But raising this issue would have required us to think not in terms of victors and the vanquished, but of joint leaders in a new world to be constructed.*[§]

This analysis, which certainly overturns our traditional—and, it must be said—generally Manichean approach to international relations, invites us to reflect on the path outlined at the beginning of this conclusion. The changing relationship between NATO and Russia must clearly be based more on the power balance between the parties, as Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin urges. In his work entitled *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*,[¶] the Boston University professor analyses, from a historical perspective, the decline process of great powers that lost their economic, military and strategic capabilities and saw other powers emerge at the same time. Their decline is particularly significant when compared with the increasing power of their neighbours. Itzkowitz Shiffrin conceptualises a predation theory and applies it to several cases, including one in which he charts the strategy of the United States and the decline of the Soviet Union. Thus, based on sources from the US State Department and the National Security Council (NSC), he demonstrates

* Mary Elise Sarotte, *Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence, The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets out” and Move NATO in*, in *International Security*, vol. 35, N°1, Summer 2010, p. 110-137, p. 118, 135. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40784649> - Also: M. E. SAROTTE, *How to Enlarge NATO. The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993-1995*, in *International Security*, Vol. 44, N°1, p. 7-41, Summer 2019. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00353

† J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 34.

‡ J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 40.

§ Our translation. Guehenno, *Le Premier XXIe siècle, De la globalisation à l'émiettement du monde*, (Paris : Flammarion, 2021) , p. 35.

¶ J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 2018; Brent Scowcroft au Président, *Turmoil in the Soviet Union and U.S. Policy* 18 août 1990, dossier *USSR Collapse: U.S.-Soviet Relations thru 1991* (August 1990), Boîte 91118, Scowcroft Files, GBPL. p. 40. “Even as the United States helped reunify Germany and prepared for possible NATO expansion, U.S. leaders were concerned with Gorbachev’s political survival. If forced to choose between helping Gorbachev stay in office or reinforcing U.S. preeminence, it is debatable which option the United States would have pursued. For an appreciation of the dilemma, see Brent Scowcroft to the President, *Turmoil in the Soviet Union and U.S. Policy* August 18, 1990, folder *USSR Collapse: U.S.-Soviet Relations thru 1991* (August 1990),” box 91118, Scowcroft Files, GBPL. 40.

that the conditions for German reunification were conceived during the 1980s and 1990s to maximise the domination of the United States in European security matters while minimising Soviet influence.* The predation theory approach is enlightening when the researcher highlights an NSC archive from 1985-86 in which, at a time when Gorbachev was moving closer to the United States in an effort to turn the USSR into a *decentralised, modern and efficient State*, Jack F. Matlock, Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser and future US Ambassador to Moscow from 1987 to 1991, posed the question of whether this USSR would be good for the United States, bluntly concluding: absolutely not.† This strategy of systematically weakening Russia, under Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush,‡ and probably their successors, was the key to a more proactive and central path for relations between NATO and Russia, which incorporated a desire for American leadership, ostracism of Russia and perpetuation of the pre-eminence of the United States in Europe within a context of relative subservience for which Washington relied on the inclusion of new actors in the East. NATO was the instrument of this policy—an integrated structure, an emblem of official Western values, and an instrument of power.

“Can we envisage Russian membership of NATO, as some thought possible thirty years ago?”

As a result, we have a better understanding of history since 1989. If the objectives of the United States were, first and foremost, to instill harmony while ensuring its predominance on the continent of Europe by relying on the former satellites of Moscow, and at the same time to establish a distance between Germany and Russia, it is unclear why they would have allowed Moscow to join the Atlantic Alliance at any time.

What does the future hold?

The foundations for foresight reflection are partially laid. There is obviously much to do to plot the next twenty years, identify the long-term challenges and respond accordingly. A number of projects have been launched in recent months, at the regional and the international level. By 2050, a multitude of transformations are possible, both good and bad. But can we envisage Russian membership of NATO, as some thought possible thirty years ago? At first glance, this is a difficult question. Readers even shudder at the thought of it, all the more so since 24 February 2022 and the Russian attacks on Kiev, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Marioupol, Kherson, etc. How can we even contemplate it?

Investigating paths towards futures possible by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045 and 2050 widens the scope of the review and highlights the changing stakeholders involved. Whatever assumptions one might make regarding the presidency of Russia, the United States, the evolution of NATO, its missions in relation to the United Nations, the integration and expansion of Europe, its desire or its lack of genuine desire to construct a common defence mechanism and weapons industry, the growth of the emerging powers, China, India, the

* J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Rising*, Ke. 2964.

† *Ibidem*, Ke. 3135.

‡ *Contrary to what U.S. officials told their Soviet interlocutors, the Bush administration privately looked to use the collapse of Soviet power in Central-Eastern Europe to enhance U.S. preeminence on the continent.* J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 34.

logic of economic decline and harmony mentioned above, the capacity of States to begin cooperating to respond to transitions, climate change, space ambitions, and so on, it is clear, today, that the twin Russia-NATO system is far from limited to the continental context. What are the views and positions of the twenty countries which refused to condemn Russia's aggression in the United Nations, including China and India which represent a majority of the world's population?*

But reflecting on the future does not only mean exploring possible futures. It also means setting in motion desirable futures which meet the challenges of the future and offer of variety of aims through a shared vision and concrete, operational action strategies.

Discussing the future of Russia and NATO means, above all, thinking about peace, particularly peace between Ukraine and Russia, since, to date, the Atlantic Alliance has regularly stated that it is not at war. Peace and friendship are hard to envisage when television and social media are full of atrocities, particularly those committed by the side we support.

During the Rambouillet negotiations between the Kosovan insurgents and the Serbians, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made overtures to the warring parties by offering them the example of Gerry Adams' Northern Ireland peace process and the ability of our societies to move from violence to peaceful political and social relations.† The role of the IRA during the Second World War did not prevent London and the organisation which practised bloody terrorism at one of the worst moments in British history from negotiating a peace settlement. I tried to apply this example to Islamic terrorism in a NATO foresight seminar organised by the Millennium Project at Falls Church, in Virginia in 2016.‡ Similarly, there are many examples, including Pearl Harbour, the bombings of Tokyo and Dresden, the Oradour-sur-Glane massacre and the Battle of the Bulge, which, although not forgotten, may be forgiven.

In my research, I have also met numerous assumptions of evolution which may be a source of inspiration for us. To take just one example—but one I feel is central,—Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin mentioned an approach which involved granting a more important decision-making role to NATO members who are less enthusiastic about expansion than the United States, with the aim of strengthening or increasing NATO's presence in Eastern Europe and abandoning military deployments, such as those announced in early 2016.§. In 2007, the French Senate lamented the fact that US-Russian relations were having a direct impact on the atmosphere surrounding Russia's dialogue with NATO.¶ The question being posed again is that of the Europeanisation of NATO, an idea suggested by John Fitzgerald Kennedy back in the early 1960s, with its two equivalent Alliance pillars—American and European. But, once again, we are faced with not only American leadership but also the national egos of its European partners.**

* H. Vedrine and Pascal Boniface, *Comprendre le monde, Après la guerre en Ukraine, une vision du monde*, April 20, 2022.

† Jonathan Freedland, *They've made one Good Friday; Let's hope they can make another*, in *The Guardian*, March 31, 1999.

‡ Philippe Destatte, *Counter-Terrorism in Europe 2030; Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights*, in Theodore J. Gordon e.a., *Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning*, p. 87-105; NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2017.

§ J. R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, *Deal or No Deal?*, p. 44.

¶ Jean François-Poncet, Jean-Guy Branger and André Rouvière, *Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur l'évolution de l'OTAN*, Sénat français, July 19, 2007 https://www.senat.fr/rap/r06-r06-405-r06-405_mono.html#toc32

** Estelle Hoorickx, *La Bel'ique, l'OTAN et la Guerre froide, Le témoignage d'André de Staercke*, (Brussels : Racine, 2022) , p. 303.

In this mass of data and alternatives, it is important not to neglect the immediate prospects for emerging from the current crisis at some point. In this regard, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017) gave us some recommendations, in 2014, in the form of several scenarios. It's a pity he wasn't not only heard by President Putin, but also by NATO! The first scenario involved seeking a compromise with Ukraine by ending the attack on its sovereignty and its economic well-being. This, he said, would require *wisdom and perseverance* on the part of Russia, Ukraine and the West. Such a compromise would mean the end of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine from within, the end of any threat of a larger invasion, and some sort of East-West agreement involving tacit acceptance by Russia that Ukraine was on a lengthy road towards possible membership of the European Union. In parallel, Ukraine would no longer seek to join NATO.

In the second scenario presented by President Jimmy Carter's former National Security Adviser, Putin could continue to support military intervention in certain parts of Ukraine. The Western response would have to be a protracted and genuinely punitive imposition of sanctions designed to make Russia understand the painful consequences of its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. This scenario would destroy the economy of both countries.

Brzezinski's third scenario saw Putin invade Ukraine, which, he wrote, would not only lead to reprisals by the West but could also provoke Ukrainian resistance. *If this resistance was sustained and intense, NATO members would be under growing pressure to support the Ukrainians in various ways, rendering the conflict much more costly for the aggressor.*

*For the Kremlin, the consequence of this third option would not only be a Ukrainian population of more than 40 million permanently hostile inhabitants, but also a Russia that was economically and politically isolated, facing the possibility of increasing domestic problems.**

Brzezinski, who was Polish by birth and also a leading political scientist, supported the idea of finding a compromise solution which would involve Russia abandoning the idea of using force against Ukraine. However, he felt that the issue of Crimea could not be resolved. He condemned the nationalism and highlighted the scale of the risks of this scenario for Russia itself.

As we can see, Brzezinski did not mention what remains a possible scenario: allowing Russia, Ukraine and Georgia to join the Alliance.[†] However, at the start of our path, in 1998, Brzezinski, who had been hawkish in his policy towards the USSR, stated that *the United States, as the principal power in NATO, should explicitly declare that, at a given moment in the future, even Russian membership of NATO might make sense.*[‡]

This is exactly the position that I have advocated on numerous occasions over the past twenty years regarding Ukrainian membership of the European Union. Perhaps Moscow

* Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Putin's three Choices on Ukraine*, in *The Washington Post*, July 8, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zbigniew-brzezinski-putins-three-choices-on-ukraine/2014/07/08/ba1e62ae-0620-11e4-a0dd-f2b22a257353_story.html

† Charles A. Kupchan, *NATO's Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance*, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 3, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, pp. 100–12, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25680919>.

‡ Z. Brzezinski, *On to Russia*, in *The Washington Post*, May 3, 1998.

and Kyiv should join together. Or perhaps they do not qualify. Because if Ukraine is part of Europe, Russia is also part of Europe.* Let us use this assumption in relation to NATO, by 2050, if the Alliance still has a mission in this world.

It is unclear how the West will, in time, find a solution for a strategic coexistence with Moscow. The alternative we would be faced with was clearly defined by the researcher Sumantra Maitra at the Royal Historical Society in the United Kingdom in summer 2021: *is it right to negotiate a compromise with Moscow and allow Russia its own little sphere of influence in parts of Europe where it already has bases and established interests, or is it better to exclude Russia from the equation and run the risk of triggering a localized war of attrition through proxy factions?*†

There is a concern that, as a result of the momentum generated from the Russian offensive of February 2022, we are already firmly established on one of the possible routes, at the cost of an increasing number of human lives. We therefore also need to take a long-term view.

In the process that has led to this dramatic situation, the European Union has been largely absent, apart from a few initiatives by some of its members, in particular President Emmanuel Macron. Yet it is from Europe that we could have expected diplomatic wisdom and conciliatory initiative.

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* Gérard Chaliand, *Un homme de terrain décode le nouveau désordre mondial*. "La Russie c'est l'Europe" explique le géostratège Gérard Chaliand, France 24, March 15, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7FsR94QN3M>

† Sumantra Maitra, *L'élargissement de l'OTAN, la Russie et l'équilibre de la menace*, in *Revue militaire canadienne*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 2021, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-article-fr-page35.html>

Implications of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*

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Abstract

We are at a turning point in history and are faced with a choice: should we go back to the past or embrace and accept the present, wherein lies the answer to our present problems. Russia has always had an aggressive attitude towards countries that lie in its geographical periphery. It has always demanded compliance from these nations and since Ukraine stood up for her rights and was defiant, Russia attacked her. The article strongly calls for Goodwill and Trust in resolving the conflicts humanity faces today, especially the Russia-Ukraine war.

Since 24 February 2022, the world has been witnessing the unprovoked, brutal aggression of one country against its neighbor for no apparent, logically explainable reason, other than the imperialistic fantasy of celebrating the 350th anniversary of Tsar Peter I by duplicating the territorial conquests which led to Peter I taking on the title of Emperor in 1721.

It will be recalled that Tsar Peter I acquired his title as “the Great” because of the reforms he introduced and his modernization and Westernization of a backward and unstable Russia, as well as by cutting “a window to Europe” on the shores of the Baltic sea. He did this by conquering territories until then under the rule of kings of Sweden and of Poland, including what are now Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Ukraine, as well as the fortress of Azov on the sea of the same name. Those events, set in motion by a ruler born 350 years ago, are now publicly declared by President Putin as a point of reference for creating a new world order, in flagrant contravention of the Charter of the UN and international law.

Peter I did not want just more power and more territory. He also wanted his country to become more advanced and more progressive, even if some of the changes he introduced, such as cutting the long beards of his boyars, were more superficial than deeply substantial. Sadly, the current president of Russia, who sees himself as an uncrowned Peter the Second in his own delusions of grandeur, is achieving the very contrary of his historical idol. He is isolating Russia and reducing it to a pariah state, shunned by all those who aspire to a rules-based international order. While the barbaric depredations of his army in Ukraine and the scorched earth policy of destroying everything in their path are a direct echo of what Peter the Great did to that country during his war with King Charles XII of Sweden, the repression of all freedom of thought and speech in his own country represent a frightening rebirth of the totalitarian terror of the Soviet Union, especially during its Stalinist times.

* This article is a reproduction of the author's talk delivered at the opening session of the IX Baku Forum on 16th June, 2022

The events now happening in Ukraine are not just devastating that country, but we are seeing waves of negative consequences that are spreading out and rippling across the whole world, including far-away continents. Madame Rosalia Serrano, former president of Ecuador, mentioned that the banana growers in her country, for instance, are also negatively affected by what is now happening on the European continent. The same destructive domino effect applies to many other problems currently facing the world. We have just heard an outline of the plans for approaching them from the president of our host country, which set the tone for a solutions-oriented approach in responding to the multiple crises that we are facing. We are always facing some kind of crisis but the current crisis concerning the world order lies at the center of this year's program for the Baku Forum. We are at a turning point in history and are faced with a choice: Whether to accept the present and work with the given of the present in order to move into a better future, or whether we look behind us and take on this retrograde direction by deciding to single out some period in history that seems to us more pleasing, or at least more pleasing to the vanity and imagined grandeur of some leaders. Such revisionism, which refuses to accept the existing situation and yearns for a return to injustices and wrongs of long ago rather than rectifying them in the present and future, represents an attitude that truly bodes ill for all concerned, whether directly or indirectly.

We are at a point where we need solutions, to paths that we might follow in a world situation where we see regress rather than progress, where we see gross injustice rule, rather than international law and international order. We see the threat of increased poverty, and indeed famine, in many parts of the world, just because of the grandiosity and claims to exceptionalism of Russia, its leader and its people. What amounts to a collective paranoia, a nation-wide mania of grandeur of one single country, is producing real threats to world stability. Meanwhile, in Ukraine itself, death and destruction continue, soldiers and civilians die or are mutilated, crimes against humanity are being committed.

The outlandish accusations that Russia has addressed to Ukraine as excuses for the invasion of 24 February 2022 are but the latest and most extreme expression of President Putin's unwillingness to accept the verdict of history and the overdue and well merited collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Instead of seizing the opportunity to convert Russia itself to a free and democratic state, President Putin has devoted his energies to revanchist attacks on all the former parts of the Soviet Union that have recovered their independence and become prosperous and modern states. We have recently heard open threats against neighboring countries expressed by deputies of the Russian Duma. Admittedly, as President Putin himself told me years ago in direct conversation: "whoever listens or pays attention to what the deputies of the Duma are saying!" Nevertheless, whatever these deputies may be saying must necessarily be in tune with views developed in the Kremlin. That is why it is alarming to hear a deputy of the Duma propose to declare null and void, for instance, the agreement whereby the Russian Federation accepts the declaration of the renewed independence of Lithuania after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some journalists have already interpreted this as implying that the next country Russia is going to invade will be Lithuania, unlikely as it is to happen. Nonetheless, I am sure that Lithuanians, just like Estonians and Latvians, are

very much comforted to know themselves to be under the collective security protection of NATO, because dire threats can never be taken lightly.

“A solution to the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine must not be achieved by leaders from other parts of the world “cutting a deal” with the president of Russia without the Ukrainian people being a party to the discussions and without the will of the Ukrainian people being respected.”

The inimical and aggressive attitude of Russia towards territories that at some historical time or another have been under its occupation or annexation is a real threat to every country on its geographical periphery. God knows Russia is already huge in terms of the expanse of its territory, yet evidently it is still not big enough to satisfy its ambitions of greatness. In this, there has been an uninterrupted continuity between tsarist Russia, Soviet Russia, and contemporary Russia. In addition to outright incorporation of neighboring lands, there has also been a continual concern about the spheres of influence extending beyond the borders of Russia proper. As President Putin has stated again and again over the years, Russia allegedly feels so threatened by potential aggression coming from other great powers, especially the Western ones, that it absolutely must be surrounded by a ring of compliant and subservient colonies, countries that would not dare take any important step without direction or approval from the Kremlin. Ukraine is now being attacked because it defiantly broke out of that mold, without having the protective cover of either NATO or European Union membership to fall back upon. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia broke out of the mold and did manage to become NATO and EU members. All countries that are part of what Russia considers its lifebuoy ring of vassal states, however, have what I call cuckoo’s eggs laid by Russia well in advance of their hatching into agents of internal friction or better still—areas of frozen conflict meant never to be peacefully solved.

When Stalin came to power in the Soviet Union, the ruling slogan of the day was “socialist in content but national in form”. The Great Dictator soon realized how dangerous this was, what with Ukrainian writers starting to publish in the Ukrainian language and those of other republics doing the same within their national cultures. The totalitarian vertical of power that was Communism in the USSR needed a strong cadre of supporters to reinforce the direct power of the Communist leadership and its organs of repression. Stalin soon saw that “all nations being equal under socialism” may have sounded good, but that one nation—the Russian people—being declared as superior to all others sounded even better. In addition, extensive plans were drawn up and realized for keeping all parts of the USSR interdependent economically to such an extent that any thoughts of disentanglement would appear hopeless. Ethnic cleansing was achieved through brutal mass deportations to Siberia and beyond the Arctic Circle, russification was achieved by mass immigration of either ethnic Russians themselves or simply any other nationality form near or far who would weaken the role of

any “native” languages in the public sphere. The long-term strategy of the Soviet Union was to occupy as many territories as possible surrounding the central core, which was Russia itself, and to make sure to implant in each peripheral region some time bomb or booby-trap that would explode at a conveniently chosen time in the future, or that could be encouraged to explode by creating animosity or conflicts both within and between neighboring states. The implementation and continuation of this strategy by the Russian Federation is largely responsible for the ring of zones of frozen conflicts surrounding Russia that remains in place up to this day. One example of this is the previously agricultural Republic of Moldova, which theoretically inherited the heavily industrialized and russified region of Transdnistria after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For all practical purposes, this region was quickly turned into an exclave governed by Russia. Since 2008, the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops has left that country shorn of nearly a fifth of its territory, the secessionist regions again coming under the control of Russia. Crimea was invaded and annexed in 2014, Donetsk and Luhansk as good as taken over by camouflaged Russian troops and recognized as independent republics soon to be begging for annexation in February 2022. And it is only since the open conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 that our host country has been able to recover most of its legitimate territory, which had been occupied by Russian-supported Armenia for the preceding decades.

It should be emphasized that frozen conflicts need not remain frozen forever and must be resolved at some point in one way or another. In the case of the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the international community has looked with renewed hope upon the recent negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Charles Michel as a mediator representing the European Union. A lowering of the tensions between neighboring countries is always desirable and one can only hope for a continuation of the very positive steps recently achieved toward a normalization of the territorial and political situation.

Mediation as a means of solving conflicts, however, cannot be done over the heads of those who are most directly concerned. A solution to the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine must not be achieved by leaders from other parts of the world “cutting a deal” with the president of Russia without the Ukrainian people being a party to the discussions and without the will of the Ukrainian people being respected. Only the people of Ukraine have the right to decide what kind of future that they want for themselves, whom they elect as their political leaders and what kind of partnerships they wish to form or alliances that they wish to engage in. In addition, mediation can never succeed without goodwill on both sides of a conflict and goodwill remains the *sine qua non* of any successful conflict resolution.

Goodwill is the basis of civil cohabitation between regions, between countries, as well as between individuals. I remember two letters I received shortly after being elected President of Latvia from a sister and a brother who had inherited a house from their parents after the restitution of private property in our country. They simply could not agree on how to divide their inheritance. Each said they could not live together under the same roof. Exasperated, the brother threatened to saw the wooden house in half and the sister wailed about the house about to be destroyed! When you have, within the same family, the inability to live together

and reach any agreement, you can imagine how inevitable it is that the world will continue to have conflicts. It will continue to have crises and it will continue to have challenges.

The questions concerning each nation's security, the questions about a new post-pandemic world order, of the ability of humankind to stop the dangerous acceleration of climate change and counter the threats of widespread hunger, the questions about good governance and social justice for all, these all are subjects that are on the agenda of the ninth Baku Forum, as they have been on the agenda of humanity as well.

I therefore thank you all for being here with us. I particularly wish to thank His excellence the President of Azerbaijan for his support to the Nizami Ganjavi International Center, without ever in any way influencing or guiding its content, giving us full freedom of choice with respect to topics addressed or persons invited. We truly are grateful for this freedom of expression and freedom of thought that the Baku Forum has always been known for. And I engage you as participants to feel part of this family of people of goodwill who are ready to address the problems that need addressing with whatever tools and resources that you have at your command.

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Lessons from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Moving the World Beyond War*

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Abstract

Russia's aggression in Ukraine has shaken the post-war liberal order, originally designed to prevent war in Europe and between advanced industrialised countries. While the mechanisms to avoid drawing neighbouring countries (and their allies) into the conflict appear to be holding, the risk of further escalation between Russia and NATO remains considerable. With deterrence, pre-emption and negotiation having failed, Western efforts have now shifted to actions that apply pressure for Russia to cease hostilities and withdraw all forces from Ukraine. The US and its allies have firmly ruled out direct military intervention, leaving escalating economic sanctions as the primary tool with which to respond to Russia's actions. While the package of sanctions in place to date is unprecedented (and continuing to expand) it remains unclear whether it will compel Russia to negotiate before achieving a military victory in Ukraine. Regardless of Russian military's success or failure, or the shape of the eventual compromise the parties may reach, the current crisis provides a number of observations and lessons with deep implications for both the parties involved and for the wider global order. If the world is to pre-empt future bloodshed and move conflicts without war, it will need to learn these lessons and create highly effective penalties on regimes as a deterrent against violence.

1. A Very Brief Context

The first land war in Europe between two sovereign states since the end of the Second World War has raised a series of alarm bells. The first and foremost is that advanced industrialised countries are neither too advanced nor too civilised to wage wars upon each other. Secondly, that Europe following 75 years of peace is still a theatre of war, and one with the potential to drag in the rest of the world. And thirdly, that the EU as the front line of the conflicts, and needs to be a cohesive force confronting global challenges in times of crisis where time is short and the stakes are high, rather than weakened by a UK establishing its own credentials following Brexit. It also implies that a dramatic shift is required in how the rules-based liberal order works with and across the world to prevent war. President

* This article was first published on March 3rd, 2022. It has been edited for clarity

Putin's aggression may well have inadvertently renewed the effort to address one of the most important projects for humankind, how to move the world beyond war.

Putting aside the debate over the possible role NATO's eastward expansion has played in the current crisis, there has been an overwhelming recognition that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an act of extraordinary aggression and a blatant violation of international laws and norms that cannot be tolerated. It demands an appropriate response for the sake of the people of Ukraine, their continued right to self-determination, and for the sake of a functioning rules-based security order.

Russia is now already politically isolated within the global order with only half-hearted support from China and with even the abstainers of the UN Security Council vote to condemn Russia's attack openly calling on it to end its hostilities. With the idea of NATO entering the war off the table, other means of coercion have come to the fore, among these are economic, social and media, and geopolitical levers. Given that the start of the war has not

gone as well as Russia had hoped, it therefore is widely expected to escalate its efforts with harsh consequences for the Ukrainian people, and the effectiveness of Western measures needs to be at a level that counters these, while paving the way for a peaceful resolution.

A renewed land war in Europe rings several alarm bells around the world ... advanced industrialised countries are neither too advanced nor too civilised to wage land wars on each other, Europe is still a theatre of war, and one with the potential to drag in the rest of the world, and that Europe needs to be a cohesive force in confronting challenges around the EU

2. Current Sanctions and their Context: Unlikely to Succeed

Sanctions appear to be at the core of the West's strategy to pressure Russia to withdraw. More than a century's use of sanctions across the world has shown that for a package to be effective, it needs to lead to real consequences for the target, inflicting severe economic and ultimately political pain that cannot be weathered or otherwise managed. However, throughout history, Russian leaders have demonstrated the ability to weather enormous hardships, often at the expense of the populace, so for sanctions to be effective they will need to be calibrated to be sufficiently severe while of course avoiding triggering a potential humanitarian crisis.

Russian prudence has enabled the accumulation of considerable foreign reserves, of c.US\$640 billion, the fourth highest in the world (compared to America's US\$129 billion), providing it with the capacity to withstand considerable economic sanctions

Effective sanctions against Russia need to recognise the reality of its fiscal and economic situation. Firstly, Russia is to some degree a strategic petrostate, its energy exports exceeding 10% of its annual GDP.¹ While it is critically dependent on these revenues, Moscow's conservative fiscal and monetary policy has set the

Russian budget to balance at an oil price of only US\$44, less than half the current market price. Secondly, this prudence has enabled the accumulation of considerable foreign reserves,

which at the beginning of the war stood at c.US\$640 billion and are the fourth highest in the world,² bear in mind that the US has only US\$129 billion. These reserves provide the regime the capacity to withstand considerable economic sanctions, particularly given that, thirdly, Russia has been reducing its exposure to foreign private dollar debt, from US\$500 billion in 2013 to less than US\$400 billion (c.25% of GDP) in 2020, an amount well covered by reserves.³

The current tranche of sanctions appears to be focused on four distinct areas, hampering the Russian financial system, import restrictions, barriers on the oil and gas industry, and sanctions against regime-aligned individuals (see inset).

Current Sanctions, Evident Framework	
<i>Sanction Area</i>	<i>Key Measures Enacted</i>
1. Financial system Restrictions: Hampering “core infrastructure”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected bank asset freezing • Correspondent bank denials • SWIFT suspensions
<i>Assessment: Disrupts majority of forex transactions and Central bank access to reserves but allows trade transactions to continue</i>	
2. Import Restrictions: Limitations on dual use goods.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU restrictions on semiconductors, telecom, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics, and maritime technologies • Planned restrictions on oil & gas technologies
<i>Assessment: Significant short term supply chain disruptions with the potential for alternative imports from China over the mid-term</i>	
3. Export Restrictions: Oil and gas exports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suspension of the US\$15 billion Nordstream II gas pipeline • No restrictions on current oil and gas exports
<i>Assessment: Russia continues to export US\$350 million of energy to the West every day. Supplying 40% of Europe’s gas, Russia is too big a part of global energy markets to allow comprehensive sanctions against it</i>	
4. Sanctions on Individuals: Focus on regime supporters and enablers	Asset freezes and travel bans on <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oligarchs and business leaders • Parliamentarians • Cabinet members
<i>Assessment: Oligarchs’ ability to influence Putin is questionable, given his track record of keeping them in line through imprisonment, asset seizing, or exile (e.g., Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky)</i>	

Russia’s dominant position in global energy markets, financial conservatism, and the inward turn of its economy since the Crimean invasion provide a series of defences for Moscow. While this inward turn has occurred at the expense of international investment, trade, economic diversification and long-term growth, over the near term it provides it with a significant buffer to weather restrictions. Other sanctions, such as airspace restrictions for Russian aircraft, or corresponding sanctions by allied countries like Australia and Canada

have also been put in place, but it remains to be seen whether the current package of sanctions will force Russia to the negotiating table, particularly given Putin's need to show strength in the face of adversity.

The impact of the current sanction regime on Russian GDP in 2020 was estimated in the early days of the war as being 1%. While this seems like a significant number for a country previously projected to grow at only 3% that year as one of Europe's most sluggish economies, Russia has proven its ability to withstand prolonged economic shocks. The (ineffective) sanction imposed on it after the invasion of Crimea in 2014 caused a 2.5% drop in Russia's GDP, indicating that to be effective, sanctions will need to be significantly more disruptive.

3. The Compelling Challenges and Lessons Emerging from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

This war has taught the world a series of sombre lessons that it had perhaps optimistically thought it would no longer need to be taught, that land wars in Europe are an outdated part of the past. Following weeks of anticipation and increasingly confident predictions of military action, Russia's invasion of Ukraine moved into full swing.

Western efforts initially focused on increasing pressure for Putin to cease hostilities and withdraw all forces from Ukraine, as well as continuing to arm the defenders. If the international response is insufficient, and Ukrainian defences are overcome, the terms of Ukraine's on-going governance and way of life will likely be on terms dictated and favourable to Moscow.

While Russia continues its advance and the West escalates sanctions, and ordinary Ukrainians resist and fight back, the future shape of events remains unclear, the only certainty is that the reality is different from the plan. Regardless of Russian military success or failure and the shape of any ultimate peace deal, there are a number of key challenges and lessons that have already emerged from the crisis, and that have major implications not just for the parties involved but also for the wider global order. The key lessons include:

1. **The West's Current Leaders are on a Journey to Being Coordinated in Global Crises.** While the major western powers of the US, EU and the UK are clearly aligned in their ultimate objectives, their engagement with Russia and with each other lacked coordination at the outset and impeded the effectiveness of their responses in the face of threats, with leaders appearing to compete for face time with Putin. While the current group of leaders appears to be determined to stop Russia, it is uncertain whether each successive cycle of elections in the West will put leaders with more or less determination in place.
2. **The US Will Not Deploy its Military to Support 'Non-Strategic' Interests.** Having failed to support Georgia in the 2008 invasion by Russia, and Ukraine in the Russian invasion of the Crimea in 2014, US non-intervention in the current war provides further confirmation that the US will not treat all its allies in the same way and for most, it will not automatically defend them in the face of foreign attacks.

3. **US Political Divisions and Interests Abroad are Potentially Leverageable.** The US political partisanship has now reached levels such that members of the political opposition (including former president Donald Trump and right-wing journalists) initially publicly praised a foreign aggressor and discredited the US government. This creates a wedge that can potentially be exploited by America's competitors for propaganda purposes, and has indeed been used by Russian media.
4. **Without US Leadership, NATO Still Appears to be More Like Just a Collection of States, For Now.** NATO is not organised to act effectively without US leadership and the default mode is for individual members to prioritise their own interests and struggle to pursue shared ones, acting based on national economic considerations or domestic political ones.
5. **The EU Lacks What May be Critical in its Crisis Response Capabilities if it is to Wield the Power that it has.** While its external leverage is predominantly economic, the Union lacks the organisational power to wield this leverage to full effect needing to balance the priorities of 28 diverse member states, and while it has achieved more than many would have predicted, it has further to progress to respond to live crises in real time.
6. **Multi-lateral Institutions are Structurally Unsited to Intervene in Such a Situation.** Institutions built on a consensus driven global security order are unable to address conflicts involving major countries or blocs of countries, with governance mechanisms not allowing for effective action, as evidenced by the more peripheral or supporting role of the UN in the current crisis compared to NATO countries.
7. **Encirclement is A Key Component of Western Security Strategies in the Face of Regional Threats.** Western security doctrine is based on the idea that the best defence against potential security threats is to form alliances to encircle opponents, neutralising an opponent ideally without the need for offensive strategies, whether in Europe through NATO or in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad.
8. **Gaps in Spheres of Influence Leave a Vacuum That are Inevitably Filled.** Maintaining spheres of influence requires the constant exertion of power and any interruption in this power creates gaps in a country's sphere of influence that are at a risk of being filled by economic, military or political competitors.
9. **War Still Requires Boots on the Ground.** Despite Russia having among the world's most advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, there have been no significant cyberattacks on critical infrastructure or government reported to government, implying that tanks and guns are still the primary assets of warfare in the 21st century.
10. **Casualties Still Matter Despite COVID.** Six million deaths during the past two years from COVID has not inured the public to outrage over reports of loss of life in military actions; while 200 daily deaths from COVID are deemed sufficiently low in some countries to drop all coronavirus restrictions, 200 dead from a military invasion still elicit shock and outrage by the public.

11. **False Flags are Quickly Exposed in Today's Networked World.** Russia's claims of troop withdrawals and reports of Ukrainian aggression were quickly debunked by countless sources on the ground, making large scale false flag operations very challenging in a networked and connected world, and very short lived as a result.
12. **Aggressive Action Damages Soft Power by Ceding the High Ground.** Russia being the aggressor in an offensive war has caused it to cede its claim of being wronged by NATO expansion with its incongruous and indefensible actions, having led to a loss of support from former allies and supporters, including large parts of the Russian émigré diaspora. While Russia appears to place little value on soft power, other potential aggressors may do so.
13. **Asymmetric Escalation and the 'Mad Man' Act have a Limited Effect.** When Putin countered 'aggressive statements' by NATO powers and 'illegitimate Western sanctions' by ordering Russian nuclear forces on high alert, Western countries largely ignored the move and thereby effectively side-stepped Russia's attempt at asymmetric escalation, at least for now.
14. **The Threat of Action can be More Powerful than Action Itself.** While the threat of action creates risk that can be used as a tool to extract concessions, acting resolves uncertainty, often with unforeseen consequences that rob the action of its effectiveness. Russia has demonstrated the shortcomings of its military planning and execution, some of the limitations of its soldiers being asked to fire on Ukrainians, and the apparent inability to align its government⁴ as well as its diaspora including major oligarchs with the Putin.
15. **Strategic Exports Provide a Critical Counterweight to Sanctions.** Sanctions on Russia have been explicitly tempered to allow energy exports to continue to flow, given Russia's importance in global energy markets and its position as Europe's leading gas supplier demonstrating that scaled or strategic exports provide a critical counterweight to sanctions.⁵
16. **An Aggressor's Justification for Their Actions is Irrelevant to the International Response.** Rationales for invasions that are based on the higher strategic value of the target to the attacker, relative to the defender or the international community, are flawed since even if a territory has little strategic value to the global community, the invasion itself can provide the rationale for isolating, alienating, and countering the attacker.
17. **Economic Independence and Reserves Are Valuable in a Crisis...** Russia's economic inward turn in the past decade will enable it to withstand much greater western pressure on its economy and better than it has in the past, given its reduced dependence on foreign debt and high foreign currency reserves.
18. **...But Do Not Fully Safeguard an Economy in the Face of Concerted Efforts.** While Russian reserves provide an important buffer to its economy, the Central bank still needed to double interest rates to 20% to shore up the rouble, a move that is set to hurt borrowers and businesses, and further escalation may put the country under pressure.

19. **Social Media Quickly Unites the Individual and the World.** Russian aggression has galvanised the world to unite quickly with individuals, interest groups, media stars and personalities with tens of millions of supporters, galvanising online against aggression and raising the stakes for their politicians.
20. **The Private Sector is a Powerful Force for Boycotts.** The private sector has emerged as a powerful force for effective economic pressure, with companies from a range of sectors not subject to sanctions withdrawing from Russia in response to public pressure, closing businesses there and suspending trading activities.
21. **The West Can Unite, Coordinate and Exact a Heavy Price, and Quickly.** Despite the oft quoted accusation that the West is soft, divided, in decline and increasingly incapable of addressing major issues, and the initial seemingly uncoordinated nature of the Western response seemed to bear that out particularly in the run-up and launch of the invasion, the measures launched in the first four days demonstrate impact and speed.

4. Preventing Future Wars: Creating an Effective Alternative to Killing

At some point, the world must move beyond waging wars fought with deadly weapons to wars fought with words and sanctions, and eventually move beyond that too. Taken together, the lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine have significant geopolitical implications and risks in that, if successful and without dire consequences, it (re)establishes lethal wars as a credible means of achieving strategic goals in bilateral relations. While the other major deadly conflicts in the world underway today in places like Yemen, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, are civil wars with in some cases significant foreign interference, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a war between two sovereign states in Europe fighting one another with conventional armed forces, and one of the aggressors is one of the great powers that fought the Nazis in World War II.

5. Emerging Lessons for Potential Aggressors

Regardless of the outcome of the current invasion, the events to date provide a series of insights for other aggressor countries willing to take lives to achieve their objectives. While it is too early to draw the full range of lessons in a live and quickly changing situation; at this juncture, the key insights for prospective aggressors include:

- i. The global community of advanced economies lacks the willingness or ability to intervene militarily in third party conflicts, even near their doorsteps unless the considerations are strategic or retaliatory.
- ii. Most current military planning is based on previous conflicts and does not consider appropriately the increased complexity of today's digital and interconnected world.

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- iii. Highly egregious aggressors can unite the world to counter forcefully against them.
- iv. A ‘playbook’ of sanctions for use by the international community is emerging,
- v. This may provide future aggressors with the opportunity to pre-empt future sanctions by building resilience against them and require the ‘policemen’ to constantly innovate and renew sanctions.
- vi. Ultimately, mature geopolitics requires ‘conflict potential’ to be actively managed, forestalling the need for war, and this requires a change in the approach to and governance of world affairs.

Depending on the circumstances of each country and on the conclusions drawn by its leaders, the lessons above can serve as both a deterrent to war and as a playbook on how to manage one.

6. Shifting from War to Diplomacy Backed by an Arsenal of Penalties

Shifting from war to diplomacy, requires the international community to make the cost of war fundamentally unaffordable, rather than something that can be justified given sufficient benefits. This will require further breakthroughs in existing alliances and international cooperation, the development of clear escalation protocols and the rethinking of long-standing political principles and policies. In the unfolding crisis there are increasing signs that such breakthroughs are occurring, but more will be required, both to resolve the current crisis, and to reduce the likelihood of future crises around the world. In this regard, there are a number of insights for leaders of international community will need to consider.

For a system of penalties to be effective it would need to be multifaceted, high impact and quick and powerful enough to safeguard against all-out war. It would not, of course, substitute for diplomacy but would be an effective deterrent providing certainty around the minimum level of the penalty for waging war.

The key elements of such an arsenal, some of which are now being deployed to varying degrees of severity against Russia, include:

- I. **Banking and Finance:** Hobble the Banking System. A full suspension of access to the SWIFT system, would bring hobble the financial system, causing Russia’s economy to contract by an estimated 5% by limiting investment, portfolio flows, cross border transactions and trade;⁶
- II. **Imports:** Ration Non-Essentials. Broad based export control with limited exemptions for food, medicine and other essentials to shut down the Russian industry and discretionary consumption;
- III. **Exports:** Stop Revenue Flows. Energy import restrictions by the EU severely limiting foreign cash inflows to the Russian economy;

- IV. **Energy and Resources:** Withhold Energy and Resource Security. This is a key component of any effective sanction regime, Russia as the world's largest gas and as a major producer of metals and minerals is autarkic with regards to resources, making restrictions less relevant here;
- V. **People: Interrupt the Flow of Human Capital and IP.** Systematic visa restrictions for Russian nationals in the West, including targeted cancellations negatively affecting business and government relations;
- VI. **Strategic Relations:** Damage International Position. Sanction participation in multi-lateral political, security and economic organisations, damaging Russia's standing in the world, and applying pressure on allies and holdouts to condemn its actions;
- VII. **Culture, Media and Soft Power.** Exercise soft power levers to exclude Russia from the community of nations, blocking participation in sporting, cultural and economic events and leveraging media platforms to highlight illegitimate Russian actions;
- VIII. **Domestic Political Position:** Undermine the Powerbase at Home. Prioritise sanctions designed to impact domestic government support, incentivising key stakeholders, including voters, financiers, security force, and others, to apply pressure on governments;
- IX. **Military:** Arm the Victim When Direct Engagement is Not Possible. Where physical presence is not the favoured option, arming the victim can exact a higher price from the aggressor and in certain situations may buy time for negotiation, events to change or be changed. And for future aggressors, may be a critical factor to sway the decision to attack.

7. Some Observations on the Size, Scale and Scope Required to Succeed

To reverse and forestall future wars requires extreme actions. The list of penalties is an extreme one and represents a degree of severity that has never been applied in totality with intent to a major country before, and without it, war remains an option and countermeasures require warring.

Applying measures to a global economic nation is new territory for the world. While elements of the above, like total SWIFT exclusion and export embargos have been applied to smaller countries like Venezuela and bigger ones like Iran but never to a top 15 global economics.

Sanctions are a double-edged sword, even before retaliation is taken into account. Effective sanctions will clearly have a blowback effect, hurting not just Russia but the sanctioning countries and global economic and financial stability as well, and the world will need to prepare for that for the future. Such high-cost sanctions are powerful though, since they send an important signal about the pain the sanctioning party is willing to bear to achieve their aims. Germany's suspension of Nord Stream 2 is a good example since it creates a material problem for the country's energy security that Berlin has proactively chosen to embrace despite the expected future cost to the country.

To be effective, disproportionate pain needs to be borne by the aggressor. Ultimately though, the West will need to work closely to minimise the cost of sanctions to itself, supporting those bearing a disproportionate share of the costs, which in turn of course creates more new headroom for the imposition of additional sanctions and escalation. Sanctions will hit Russia much harder than they will the rest of the world overall, given that Russia's share of the global economy is less than 2%, although its dominance in European energy markets will create significant regional disruptions.

While history has shown that the Russian people can endure nearly unbearable hardships, in the past century they have also toppled both imperial and communist Russia via mass revolutions

power, driven by mass unrest by the Russian population. An 'information and soft power' war therefore is likely to be needed to create the momentum to unseat a leader who enjoys approval ratings of 60-70%.⁷ While history has shown that the Russian people can endure nearly unbearable hardships, in the past century they have also toppled both imperial and communist Russia via mass revolutions.

The ultimate arbiter may well be a threat to the aggressor's own political position. Having weathered political and economic storms in the past, Putin is unlikely to be swayed by anything less than a real threat to his continued

When one wages war (even non-lethal war), one has to prepare for retaliation. Effective sanctions are painful and may well trigger responses similar to those used against military threats. Russia has proven highly willing to wage information warfare against the West, including cyberattacks and misinformation, even in times of peace, and so may escalate to more drastic responses, both virtual and physical through the use of proxies.

De-escalation requires a way out. Countries employing sanctions will need to sign-post clear 'off-ramps' that provide opportunities for de-escalation, allowing sanctioned countries to backdown and or backout at any time, which requires continuous engagement and regularly planned interventions for negotiation.

Sanction and engagement architecture to maximise participation across the world. Sanction regimes need to be supported by a critical mass of countries, implying a design that allows states to participate in varying ways based on their own circumstances, and an engagement strategy to pressure holdouts seeking to free-ride from sanctions regimes imposed by others.

Engaging civil society around the world to mobilise the individual against violence. Truly effective sanctions go far beyond the level of government policy and are supported by a global mass-movement. Corporations, cultural and sporting institutions, non-government organisations are not just expressing their support for Ukraine, they are enhancing the sanction regime with bottom-up boycotts of their own, withdrawing assets, cancelling commercial contracts and events, and otherwise breaking off relations with Russian counterparts in a show of global solidarity.

Pre-emption, forestalling war, remains of course the necessity and the best solution. While effective sanctions are the last resort before needing to fall back to violence, the best solutions forestall confrontation entirely through political engagement, whether through treaties, *détentes*, inducements, or even implicit threats.

“To prevent war in the future requires a new architecture for international relations no less and a new arsenal of measures and practices to address aggressors.”

8. Conclusion: Beyond Territorial Spheres of Influence to Mutual Interest

This war appears to be an anachronism. It follows a pattern long enshrined in human history, whereby disputes are resolved or aims are achieved through violent conflict. As the reactions to the war across the globe have demonstrated, it is out of sync with the world as it is today and fails to understand the architecture of the world emerging from an ever-connected information era. In essence, the conflict needs to accelerate or leapfrog to an endgame rather than go through the destruction of war itself.

To break the pattern of this war, and a potential occupation at the end, requires an urgent catalyst—this may be an actor that may be one of the ‘abstainers’ of the UN Security Council resolution censuring Russia’s attack, China, India or the UAE—to accelerate to a positive end game, or stop its destructive progression at one of the milestones enroute to the end game, which include:

1. **Pause as a Prelude to Exit.** With Russian military operations not moving with the speed Moscow had hoped for in the early stage, Putin could likely choose to step up efforts to crush Ukraine’s armed force and overrun the country. The benefits of such a move looks to be increasingly questionable. A full-scale military assault would likely cost countless civilian lives and shred the last remains of Russia’s international reputation and continued civil resistance would necessitate a brutal occupation regime from which it will be difficult to plot an exit strategy.
2. **Provide for ‘victory’.** Putin has hinted at his desire for regime change in Kyiv but it is abundantly clear that Ukrainians will not recognise the non-elected pro-Russian government he would put in place. And so, a Russian ‘victory’ may find Putin occupying a territory he can neither safely hold nor safely withdraw from without the risk of the West accelerating Ukraine’s economic and security integration (into the EU and NATO, respectively) as soon as Russian forces are gone.
3. **Negotiate Peace Sooner Rather than Later.** Even the most crushing and one-sided victories ultimately lead to a negotiated settlement, and at some point the parties will need to engage to find a solution. What remains to be seen is at whose point of choosing these talks will take place. For Ukraine the critical priorities are clearly the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian troops, protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and

democracy, and the freedom for its people to determine the course the country will take in the future.

4. **Address Russia's Perceived Security Concerns.** The goal of mutual security is shared by the West, who are also focused on the regional peace, the preservation of Europe's security architecture, and demonstrating the futility (and in acceptability) of waging war. For Ukraine's and Europe's sake, they will also need to be focused on reducing the threat of future Russian aggression, which will ultimately require addressing the country's own perceived security concerns.
5. **Address Russia's Need for a Sphere of Influence.** Leaving aside any assumed expansionist or revisionist delusions about reconstituting a Russian Empire, Putin has stated that NATO's eastward expansion is a betrayal of prior promises.⁸ In addition to demanding that Central and Eastern European NATO members effectively demilitarise, Russia is insisting on a halt to further expansion of the alliance. The most charitable interpretation of Russian demands indicates that its desired solution is the creation of a sphere of influence that includes carving out dependent breakaway republics from countries on its borders and a further zone of non-aligned countries, either neutral or under its political and economic influence (as it has done in Georgia and started to do in Ukraine). This needs to be addressed, not necessarily acquiesced to.
6. **Integrate Interests, Moving Beyond Spheres of Influence.** Even real security concerns do not result in the right to a sphere of influence, a concept common to Great Power relations in the 19th Century. Such spheres clearly run across modern conceptions of national sovereignty and self-determination, disenfranchising millions of people who end up subject to de-facto foreign rule, and they have therefore fallen out of favour in the eyes of the West in the post-war period, having been replaced with greater economic and political integration, as the integration of France and Germany into the EU have demonstrated with them relinquishing their previous spheres of influence.

Russia may have provided the perfect incentive for the world to create a new architecture for international relations and provide a warning to those that might see violence as a low cost means of achieving their goals

However, with the current prospects of greater integration into Europe's political, security and economic architecture appearing quite slim, Russia's security concerns seem unlikely to be addressed over the near to medium term, creating an on-going source of risk in Europe. At some point however, the two sides will need to respect each other's interests and find a common cause.

To prevent war in the future requires a new architecture for international relations no less and a new arsenal of measures and practices to address aggressors. Russia may have provided the perfect reason to the rest of the world to create this. It may also provide a warning to those that might see violence as a low cost means of achieving their goals.

Successful grand strategy achieves great victories at little cost. On the current trajectory Russia appears to be heading towards minimal gains at exceedingly high costs. Sun-Tzu, the ancient Chinese general and author of “The Art of War” famously quoted, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” By this measure Russia has already lost. It just remains to be seen how high the price is for itself, Ukraine, the EU and the world at large.

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Notes

1. Statista
2. Central Bank of Russia, Reuters
3. Central Bank of Russia
4. As witnessed by Putin’s dressing down of his top security officials during a televised meeting on 22 Feb. See <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-60485967>
5. See: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/biden-spares-russia-s-crucial-energy-exports-from-sanctions>
6. Estimate by Russian Finance Ministry 2014
7. Source: Levada Center
8. Despite Russia having officially acknowledged this expansion in the NATO Russia Founding Act in 1996.

Pressing International Responsibility: A New Concept of Human Security

Federico Mayor

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*“There is no challenge beyond the reach of
the creative capacity of human beings”.*

– *John F. Kennedy, 1963*

Abstract

The transition to the future we long for requires moving from imposition to discussion, from power to word, from the use of weapons to mediation. And to reduce or, at least, cease to increase the arsenals of bombs, allocating all necessary resources to youth, education, health, intergenerational legacy, so on and so forth. We urgently need a new conception of security and a governance model that supports this new paradigm. It is clear that the solution will not be found in economic formulas, but rather in the timely implementation of profoundly human ethical references and examples. This article thus calls for a mobilisation of powers to fight against short-term gains and embrace long-term goals and human security.

Thanks to digital technology, human beings are now aware of everything that is happening all over the world, and they can express themselves freely. “Transforming* the world, my dear friend Sancho, is neither madness nor utopia, but justice,” wrote Cervantes. What must be done now, at last, is to put into practice the wise words found at the beginning of the Charter of the United Nations: “We the peoples,... are determined to save future generations from the scourge of war”. At that time it was too early. And “the peoples” were solely represented by States and by men.†

Equal dignity has been gradually reached with no discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, ideology, sexual sensitivity... Women, with their underlying values, have an essential role to play in the transition from a culture of imposition, domination, violence and war to a culture of encounter, conciliation, dialogue and peace... The solution lies in daring to be oneself, exercising without restriction the distinctive capacities of the human species: thinking, imagining, anticipating, innovating, creating!

In 1997, the UNESCO General Conference approved a great resolution on the responsibilities of present generations towards future generations... Now at last it may

* Chomsky, Noam and Pollin, Robert, “Cambiar o morir”, Ed.Clave Intellectual, 2020.

† Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation towards Future Generations (12/11/1997). http://portal.unesco.org/es/ev.php-URL_ID=13178&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

be implemented. Now, at last, women will get on the stand on an equal footing...; *young people will at last become aware of their responsibility regarding the quality of their intergenerational legacy*, and they will take firm action so that measures are taken to prevent humanity from socially collapsing and to avoid the deterioration of the quality of life.

“Scientists, academics, artists and intellectuals should, in particular, place themselves at the forefront of an overall mobilization against big powers that are exclusively driven by short-term interests, and choose not to remain blind and ignorant when faced with a situation that puts at risk the habitability of our own planet.”

Women are “the cornerstone of the new era”. That is what President Nelson Mandela told me* in 1996 in Pretoria, when I conveyed to him how disappointed I was to see how little acceptance the culture of peace had gained at that time as opposed to the culture of imposition, violence and war that had prevailed for centuries. “That is because since the dawn of time a few men have ruled over the rest of men and over all women.” President Nelson Mandela completed his statement about the central role of women saying that the reason was “that women only use force exceptionally while it is exceptional for men not to use it.”

“I have the feeling that we are living the end of many eras”, wrote Miguel Delibes who always foresaw the future. The vast majority of international leaders are still anchored in the past, without realising that, finally, after centuries of absolute male power, when most human beings were anonymous and invisible, profound transformations are about to occur in leaps and bounds, which will progressively allow everyone “to be”, to cease being impassive spectators and become actors.

Until a few decades ago a vast majority of human beings were born, lived and died confined within reduced spaces. And, consequently, they were silent†, fearful, obedient... “If you want peace, be prepared for war” was the sinister adage everybody took for granted—and irresponsible leaders still do today—confining women “to their home, their kitchen and their sewing tasks.”

“We are going to change everything!”—proclaimed millions of women on March 8, 2018. How wonderful! What great news it would be if equality without limits finally allows us to establish the new directions we have been longing for, and which absolute male power has not allowed us to reach!‡

* Blog “Madiba, siempre presente”, dec. 2013. <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2013/12/madiba-siempre-presente.html>

† F. Mayor Zaragoza, “Delito de silencio: ha llegado el momento. Es tiempo de acción”, Ed. Comanegra, 2011.

‡ María Novo, “El coraje de decir NO”, Ediciones Panacea, 2019.

Women will no longer be the spouse of X and the mother of Y. They will be themselves, because their unique and unrepeatable life shall never again be dependent, hidden, postponed... *Women's equality is a precious and irreplaceable prerequisite for the new age.*

One of the distinctive faculties of human beings is their capacity to anticipate, to use knowledge to foresee, and foresight to prevent. Today, at the dawn of the 21st century and the beginning of the third millennium, this prospective capacity has become more relevant than ever because, for the first time since the dawn of time, mankind must face global challenges that could lead to points of no-return if they are not dealt with *in due time*. All inhabitants of the Earth must be held responsible for this potential irreversibility. However, scientists, academics, artists and intellectuals should, in particular, place themselves at the forefront of an overall mobilization against big powers that are exclusively driven by short-term interests, and choose not to remain blind and ignorant when faced with a situation that puts at risk the habitability of our own planet. Not only do these powers maintain their hegemonic ambitions, but they also make use of the huge media power to turn most citizens into a passive and indifferent audience.

At the end of the two great “hot” wars, in 1918 and 1945, two prominent American Presidents, Wilson and Roosevelt respectively, tried to establish a global order based on the power of reason rather than the reason of power. Unfortunately, on both occasions the perverse adage “If you want peace, be prepared for war” was applied without restrictions, always driven by the big weapon manufacturers and, as it had for centuries, security prevailed over peace. In 1919, President Wilson had come from New York to Brest, horrified by the terrible war of exhaustion, bringing a message of peace to the world: the “*Convention on Permanent Peace*” would allow conflicts to be resolved through a Society or League of Nations having its headquarters in Geneva. Simultaneously the Permanent Court of International Justice would be created. The reaction of his own country did not take too long: the President had not been elected to be the champion of peace but rather the champion of war. And the interdiction even led the United States—a huge contradiction that has to be taken into account from a historical point of view!—to refrain from joining the Society of Nations created by the American President himself.

Everyone knows what happened next. Germany rearmed itself, Nazism and fascism adopted dictatorial ways of acting and in 1939, World War II broke out. It was a terrible confrontation with the Holocaust, genocide, and a complete contempt for basic humanitarian standards that somehow relieves the most horrendous aspects of military conflicts. Germany and Italy were joined by the Empire of the Rising Sun which completed its incredible and ambitious “Tanaka Plan” by attacking the United States Navy in Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.

In 1944, when the end of World War II seemed to come to an end, President Roosevelt made a great proposal to achieve worldwide peace: assistance for the defeated with the Marshall Plan; funding for reconstruction and development by the World Bank... and the creation of international agencies whose field of expertise could be very effective for the United Nations: food (FAO); science and culture (UNESCO); health (WHO); labour (ILO);

promotion of development (UNDP); children's protection (UNICEF)... But it did not take very long for "the peoples" to be supplanted by the States as members of the UN General Assembly; soon the victors led by America replaced the vote with the veto and international cooperation—the verb "to share" should have been the keyword for a new future—was superseded with exploitation. Another failed opportunity, because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 3 years later clearly stated the glittering standards that could *efficiently lead humanity as a whole towards a new era where the very foundation of these standards would become true: the equal dignity of all human beings.*

The third opportunity, also spoiled by the Republican Party of the United States, with the United Kingdom as a coadjutor, came immediately after the end of the "Cold War". In 1989, when there were signs of peace everywhere, the Soviet Union became—thanks to the talent of Mikhail S. Gorbachev—a Commonwealth of Independent States ready to start their long march towards public liberties; when the racial *apartheid* was eradicated, thanks to the extraordinary magic of a prisoner who went out of prison with open arms and, instead of calling for revenge, cried out for reconciliation and forgiveness and did achieve them; when peace was reached in Mozambique, and in El Salvador ... and the peace process was restarted in Guatemala ...

When there were signs of peace everywhere, President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher set off *a globalizing neoliberal system that replaced democratic principles with the laws of the market, and the United Nations by plutocratic groups (G6, G7, G8...G20).* In just a few years, there was a real ethical and economic debacle. Markets became the masters of the situation and relentlessly pressed and excluded political power. The consequence was inequality, poverty, arms race, the degradation of the environment, thousands of deaths every day from hunger... dreadful "collateral effects" of a system where the poor become poorer and the rich become richer. In terms of budget figures, we must insist on this and be ready to mend reality—every day millions of dollars are invested in weapons and military expenditure while many thousands of people die from hunger*.

We were all expecting that, once the "Cold War" ends, we would at last see the beginning of a new era of peaceful coexistence and global conflicts would be solved through strengthened international institutions. The last events favoured—as I have already said—this hypothesis: the collapse—symbolized by the Berlin Wall—of the entire Soviet Empire without a single drop of blood, thanks to the magic of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, and the elimination, as in a dream, of racial *apartheid* in South Africa, thanks to another unparalleled personality of the 20th century: Nelson Mandela.

Unfortunately, in each of these three opportunities, the United States Republican Party, guided by hegemonic ambitions, prevented peace initiatives from reaching a positive conclusion.

The drafting of both the United Nations Charter and the Constitution of UNESCO, its intellectual branch, was entrusted to thinkers with great ethical and political clairvoyance.

* <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2016/05/y-la-sociedad-del-bienestar-mirando.html>

As I have already mentioned at the beginning, *the Charter of the United Nations begins with the following words “We the peoples ... have decided to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”*. This sentence summarizes the solutions the world as a whole is calling for today, because they should allow us to effectively tackle the serious challenges we are currently facing. It is certainly the peoples, who must take the reins of our common destiny into their hands. And by doing so, they shall commit themselves to the succeeding generations, assuming a responsibility that is today one of the most serious deficiencies of international political action. And they shall succeed in building peace because to avoid war they will demand from the United Nations the peaceful resolution of conflicts; by means of diplomacy, encounter, reconciliation...

“The supreme commitment of each generation, according to President Nelson Mandela, is to take into account the following one.” Intergenerational responsibility comes to the fore, at a time when we are obsessed with the present but realise that we have forgotten what is most important: the well-being of our children and descendants, the habitability of the Earth, the quality of an ecological context in which all human beings, who can now be identified, who are visible and able to express themselves, can fully exercise their distinctive faculties.

But the hegemonic neoliberal ambitions—triggered by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher—have frustrated the aspirations of mankind as a whole. They indeed marginalized the United Nations—neglecting UNESCO and then launching the International Trade Organisation outside its scope—and they replaced—what is even worse—ethical principles with the laws of the market, and moral values with those of the stock market.

And, thus, the aim of “globalizers” was that the destiny of mankind be decided by plutocratic groups made up of 6, 7, 8 and, later on, 20 most prosperous countries instead of a democratic multilateral system accepted by everyone.

Despite such adverse circumstances, the United Nations continued to set guidelines for action and terms of reference for appropriate planetary governance: Education for everyone during their whole life, in 1990; the Agenda 21 on the environment, as a result of the Earth Summit in 1992; social development, in Copenhagen, in 1995; women and development, in Beijing, in the same year in which the *Declaration on Tolerance* was also made public, whose Article 1 establishes the main lines along which international coexistence based on the equal dignity of all human beings should run in the future.

In 1999, the *Declaration and Action Plan on a Culture of Peace* was the preliminary step. Just at the beginning of a new century and a new millennium, of the *Earth Charter*, surely it was one of the most glittering documents that was no doubt needed at a time of such gloomy omens, together with the global objectives that had to be achieved from the year 2000 onwards.

But it finally came to nothing. Neo-liberalism—which believed peace had to be a mere invocation, a greeting or a prayer—still reinforces “territorial security” in the countries that are members of the wealthy quarter of the global village, *investing staggering figures on weapons and military expenditure (4 billion dollars), while—I never tire of repeating it—thousands of people die of hunger, most of them boys and girls between the ages of one and*

five. This and no other was the bitter balance sheet facing the whole Planet at the beginning of the year 2000, during which the disproportionate relocation of production—“due to greed and irresponsibility” in the words of President Obama—further disrupted the situation of countries with very low labour costs, turning China in particular into a “factory of the world”, turning a communist country into a greatest capitalist country on Earth. All these incongruities cannot be regulated by plutocratic groups or by the Nation-States which are progressively becoming weaker for the benefit of gigantic multinationals.

“In order for “We, the peoples” and “intergenerational responsibility” to play the central role in the new era, it is essential to regulate the huge and expanding power of large technological companies.”

In the supranational context, total impunity is the rule, allowing criminal trafficking of all kinds—weapons, capital, patents, drugs, people...—without any possibility of implementing a set of generally respected legal standards.

The same situation is found with regard to the environment, whose clear deterioration cannot be stopped or slowed down by a globalizing machine exclusively focused on profits filling to the brim tax havens, and displaying a huge lack of social solidarity.

We are facing the advent of the Anthropocene—human activities have an effect on the environment—and the transition from force to word must prevail once and for all. But the big global corporations continue to base the “progress” of humanity on fossil fuels.

In just a few years’ time, we will have to favour the recapture of carbon dioxide by phytoplankton in the seas, find alloys that can transport large quantities of electricity, promote renewable energies (photovoltaic, geothermal, solar thermal, wind power..., panels in houses and buildings, hybrid and electric cars, etc.) by investing once and for all in *life safety*, a share—30-40% would be enough—of the expenditure currently devoted to military security, which covers only 20% of mankind.

*Now, specific transitions that seemed inconceivable a few years ago have become possible. We cannot miss another opportunity, now in the Anthropocene. The power of citizens will, in a few years’ time, drive the transition from a culture of imposition, violence and war to a culture of conciliation, understanding, alliance and peace. The Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in September 1999, is the new path that will no doubt allow humanity to reach a “new beginning”. The transition from subjects to citizens, with the advent of a new world as a result of the implementation of the four “Contracts” I proposed, at the end of my mandate as Director General of UNESCO in 2000 : a new social contract; a new natural contract; a new cultural contract; a new ethical contract.**

* Mayor, F. “Un mundo nuevo” (“Un nouveau monde”; “The World Ahead”), Circulo de Lectores, Galaxia Gutenberg, 2000.

Let's review history. Let's review what has happened and let's make sure that what deserves to be repeated happens again and what should have never happened does not occur never again. *Let's never forget, in our everyday behaviour, the past which is vital to allow us to make the right decision on tomorrow's paths.**

It is clear that *the only solution lies in the promotion of genuine democracy at all levels. The Universal Declaration of Democracy†* includes sections dealing with *social democracy, political democracy, economic democracy, cultural and international democracy.* Article 11 deserves special attention because it states that *all dimensions and features of economic democracy shall be subordinated to social justice.*

A new beginning. The same response? Absolutely not.‡ It is necessary and urgent to create a new world. And it will be the power of citizens that will make possible the implementation of the radical changes that are about to occur.

In contrast to the short-sighted heads of government who cannot see beyond the bleak horizons of today, let's hear the voice of the scientists, the voice of the peoples in favour of changes that can still allow us to leave behind an adequate intergenerational legacy.

As Obama and the Pope have reiterated, time is running out, as it usually happens. In order to fulfil our pressing intergenerational responsibilities, a few specific commitments have to be made regarding the right ecological behaviour on a global scale.

“We, the peoples”. Now at last: now the peoples: civil society shall play the role it is expected to play. “We, the peoples...” is the best expression of democratic multilateralism, the sole global governance formula that can eradicate plutocratic groups that have been imposed upon us by neoliberalism and have led to a deep-seated systemic crisis.§

In order for “We, the peoples” and “intergenerational responsibility” to play the central role in the new era, it is essential to regulate the huge and expanding power of large technological companies.¶

The transition to the future we long for requires moving from imposition to discussion, from power to word, from the use of weapons to mediation. And to reduce or, at least, cease to increase the arsenals of bombs, allocating all necessary resources to youth, education, health, intergenerational legacy...

At this specific time, the fact that some of the phenomena are potentially irreversible *implies an additional intergenerational responsibility, which is now at the very top of the*

“Today, with no further delay, a new concept of security is needed.”

* Capdevila, Gustavo. “Otra tarea para la ONU en 2020: los oligopolios digitales”, Other News, 30.1.2020 <http://www.ipsnoticias.net/2020/01/otra-tarea-la-onu-2020-los-oligopolios-digitales/>

† Declaración Universal de la Democracia <https://declaraciondemocracia.wordpress.com/>

‡ F. Mayor Zaragoza, “¡Basta”, Ed. Espasa, 2012.

§ Inaplazable pacto mundial sobre las personas refugiadas y migrantes (Mayor Zaragoza, Federico, Sept.2019). <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2019/09/inaplazable-pacto-mundial-sobre-las.html>

¶ Anuario CEIPAZ 2016-2017 <https://ceipaz.org/anuario/seguridad-internacional-y-democracia-guerras-militarizacion-y-fronteras/>

list of inescapable values that should inspire world governance. The possibility of reaching points of no return, specific situations that would allow us to say, based on good reasons, “this is hopeless”, is the most powerful “human” lever for action, for mobilisation, for great popular clamour.... Our descendants will understand many things, many decisions and hesitations... except those having irremediable consequences.*

Today, with no further delay, a new concept of security[†] is needed. Today, with no further delay, we must implement—through an efficient multilateral system—the 2030 Agenda and SDGs.

When we see the radical difference between investments devoted to potential conflicts and resources available to face recurrent natural disasters[‡] (fire, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis...), we are horrified to realize that the concept of “security” that is still favoured by major weapon manufacturers is not only obsolete but highly prejudicial for mankind as a whole, and that radical changes must be made without delay under the close scrutiny and direct involvement of the United Nations. *We will not reach a new era if we do not build a new concept of security.*

We see hundreds of US military bases scattered around the world and the arsenals filled with rockets, bombs, planes and warships, submarines and we turn our eyes towards the thousands of human beings who are dying of hunger every day, and towards those who live in conditions of extreme poverty without any access to adequate health services. We are appalled to observe the progressive deterioration of the Earth’s habitability conditions, though aware that we should take action without delay because points of no return are about to be reached in essential issues connected with our intergenerational legacy. We must not forget that if only a reasonable part of the daily expenditure in military expenses and weapons was dedicated to increasing aid for an endogenous sustainable and human development and the environment, ensuring that the irreversible deterioration of the Earth’s habitability does not take place, the bleak horizons of today could become brighter. *Efficient international cooperation would allow the implementation of the big priorities of the United Nations (food, water, health, ecology, education, peace...) and should enable the “new beginning” requested by the Earth Charter, which is today more necessary and pressing than ever before.*

It seems that we are still lacking evidence despite the social gap. Having become much bigger due to a speculation-based economy, despite the relocation of production and the war, and with the COVID-19 pandemic it has become clear that *a new concept of security is urgently needed.* It should not only deal with the adequate defence of the territory, but also with the security of human beings living in these well-protected territories: food, drinking water, high-quality health services, environmental care, education and peace.

As was the case with other manifestos and global calls (*the Statement of Nobel Peace Laureates*,[§] *Barcelona, December 2015; the Campaign on “Disarmament for Development”*,

* Gabriel, Markus. “Ética para valores universales para el siglo XXI”. Pasado y Presente Ediciones, 2021.

† Mayor, Federico (11/09/20) <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2020/09/menos-bombas-mas-bomberos.html>

‡ Mayor Zaragoza, Federico. “Inermes frente a las catástrofes” (“Público”, 05/06/10) http://fund-culturadepaz.org/spa/03/2010/ART-Inermes_frente_a_las_catastrofes.pdf

§ <https://declaracionconjunta.wordpress.com/>

at the initiative of the International Peace Bureau, Berlin, September-October 2016), any eventual echo to the Paris Statement was silenced by the gigantic media power, which is always keen to favour a submissive and misinformed attitude from audiences.

“We must now move from having a Charter to implementing it. We have to yearn for “better” and not for “more”.”

Coinciding with the “International Day of Peace” in October 2021,* on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and UNESCO, the Spanish Federation of UNESCO Centres (FECU), with the Culture of Peace Foundation and the DEMOS-PAZ Institute of the UAM, and the initial support of organizations and individuals already committed to promoting the radical changes that the 2030 Agenda and SDGs endorse. launched an *urgent appeal on multilateralism, compliance with the 2030 Agenda and democracy to the Secretary General of the United Nations*, to citizens,—men and women—communities, educators, educational institutions at all levels, students, the media, employers’ and workers’ unions, political parties, governments, parliamentarians, national and international NGOs, organisations of the United Nations System... and in particular well-known and respected figures in the cultural, sporting, artistic, scientific, academic, literary fields...

The Paris Agreements on Climate Change (COP) that were reached during United Nations’ meetings on this subject, as well as the proposal of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the period 2015-2030 came about as steps in the right direction. On the contrary, the “non-binding” commitments of the recent meeting in Glasgow—what a nerve, if they are non-binding they cannot be commitments!—have given rise to uncertainty and despair because it is clear that a big share of the conscious citizenry is aware that the last chances to confront and redirect the current situation have disappeared. Will all these wise appeals be once again shelved in the drawers and in the minds of those in power?†‡

There is no doubt that the solution to the serious problems mankind is facing today lies in moving—against the wind—from confrontation to conversation, from imposition to dialogue. According to a well-known saying, “the best way to understand one another is by talking to each other”. The terrible balance mentioned above—the huge daily expenditure on weapons while thousands of people are dying from starvation, is a covert genocide of neglect and oblivion. It must be firmly resolved by the “peoples” through *the mobilisation of citizens who—once they become aware of their power—will give rise to a historical shift and, at the dawn of the century and the millennium, will allow the yearning for peace to become a reality.*

* For the 75th anniversary of the United Nations: radical and urgent reforms for the governance of a new era (Mayor Zaragoza, Federico. Anuario CEIPAZ 2019-2020). <https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/3.2020-FedericoMayor.pdf>

†F. Mayor, Blog “Glasgow, Nosotros los pueblos” <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2021/11/glasgow-nosotros-los-pueblos-compelidos.html>

‡ F. Mayor, Blog “Glasgow, conciencia global para cambiar de rumbo” <http://federicomayor.blogspot.com/2021/11/glasgow-conciencia-mundial-para-cambiar.html>

The huge power of social nets shall be the corner stone of the great transition from subjects to full citizens, from force to word. The digital revolution shall be, due to its scope and depth, the most important since the dawn of time. In anthropological, social and economic terms, the world will no longer be as it was. Increased longevity will allow us to have at our disposal the knowledge and experience we need to make come true the universal dream of equal human dignity. The prosperous neighbourhood of the global village will expand in such a way that the asymmetries and inequalities that blur the horizon today will shrink and finally disappear.

The challenges we are currently facing are unparalleled. The same goes for the solutions. We have to think them through, discuss them, invent new solutions. Only if we become aware of the reality and the existence, for the first time in history, of potentially irreversible global processes, will “We, the peoples” be able to put into motion the actions that can preserve our common destiny under acceptable conditions. And, for this to happen, I must insist that we have to participate in such a way that we are not only counted but also taken into account. The leadership of the scientific, academic and artistic communities is absolutely essential, because only through knowledge, with the rigour of judgement that is indispensable to redirect current trends in time, will we achieve the desired inflexion.

Those who believe we are facing a short-term crisis and that the previous “order” has to be restored are missing the point. We have reached a historical turning point that will allow *all* human beings, and not only a few of them, to live a life that is worth living. We must now move from having a Charter to implementing it. We have to yearn for “better” and not for “more”, and the “asymmetric wealth” must be replaced by a freely chosen moderation shared by all.

We are facing moments for decision-making that cannot be postponed. This is how the Earth Charter begins: “We stand at a critical moment in the Earth’s history, when the community must choose future... We must join together to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace”. We must take action at once, with no further delay, especially when irreversible processes are at stake. We have been living, especially in the last few decades, in the midst of an extraordinary conceptual confusion, ecological degradation, extreme poverty, unjustified inequalities, nuclear threat, lack of an efficient multilateral approach..., disaster, that is, in money- and short-term-oriented system.

In his introduction to a recent issue of “*Futuribles*” entitled “*From one Era to Another*”, Hugues de Jouvenel emphasizes how wise the Club of Rome was, under the leadership of Aurelio Peccei. In 1972 it already stressed the “limits of growth” and the urgent need—and duty arising from our inter-generational responsibilities—to replace as much as possible the natural resources we are consuming, and to avoid environmental degradation.

What is most important is a transformation, a new lifestyle adopted by all human beings. Each one of us should have the right to know and the right to decide. The right to have a good knowledge of reality and to invent the future. In this respect, the use of digital technology and the “*big data*” is essential... but natural intelligence must always prevail over “artificial”

intelligence. I remember what Prof. Hans Krebs told me at Oxford in 1966, when I insisted that we should obtain all accessible data of his perfectly equipped laboratory instruments, in comparison with the ones I had available in my Chair in Granada: “Investigating is being able to see what others also see... and thinking what nobody has ever been able to think!”. “*Sapere aude!*”, daring to know, said Horace. Yes: dare to know... and knowing how to dare, by fully using the distinctive faculties of the human species, and putting into practice the conclusions with nerve, resolution and urgency, in order to fulfil our responsibilities towards the next successive generations.

“Be the change you wish to see” was the big challenge put forth by Mahatma Gandhi. Now, there will be thousands of millions who will gradually embrace a global awareness, a global citizenship, who will freely express their opinions, in particular young people.

It is clear that the solution will not be found in economic formulas, but rather in the timely implementation of profoundly human ethical references and examples.

I would like to conclude by reading a few verses I wrote in August 2003:

***“Here I am,
away from the turmoil,
alone, facing myself,
ready to proclaim
surrounded by silence
calmly and firmly,
that I shall not kneel,
I will keep standing up
driven
by the soundless
clamour
of a million voices
yearning
to change course,
once and for all,
and live
to be up
to the equal dignity
of all human beings”.***

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The Cold War

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Note

This article is a reproduction of the keynote address by Harlan Cleveland at the William G. McGowan Theatre on October 21, 2006 in the National Archives and Record Administration available at <https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/symposium/cleveland.html>

I am not a historian, so don't look for dispassionate recording of the Cold War in what follows. I was of course an eyewitness to bits and pieces of the whole period we call the Cold War—but don't look for fragmentary anecdotes which would not do justice to the serious purpose of this symposium. What I will try to do is something in between—an essay about this fascinating almost-half-century—not just what happened, but why, and especially why it came out the way it did. I was fortunate to work, during the 1960s, with a superlative writer named Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. Shortly before we joined forces in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Tom had almost finished a vignette of history, which was published in 1962. Cold War and Common Sense, he called it—and indeed his book is not only readable history but full of common sense, about matters which were most uncommon and often nonsensical. Especially for those parts of the story that I didn't myself see unfolding, I have leaned heavily, with posthumous thanks, on his version of the whos and whats and whys. You will find in this text several unattributed quotes; those are passages lifted directly from Tom Wilson's writing...

I.

When did the Cold War start? The answer is classic irony in the somber shadow of today's headlines. For it started when the President of the United States decided to protect Iran from our wartime ally, the Soviet Union.

The wartime allies had used Iran—with the Soviets occupying northern Iran and the British and American forces occupying the south—as a back-door Allied supply line to the Red Army. At their Teheran Conference in 1943 all the allies had agreed to clear out of Iran within six months of an armistice in Europe.

The Western allies withdrew before that deadline, which was March 6, 1946. The Soviets did not. Indeed, in early March one Red Army column started south from Azerbaijan toward the Persian capital, Teheran, and another swung west toward Iraq and Turkey. Iran, Britain and the U.S. complained to Moscow; when that didn't work, the case was appealed to the UN Security Council. Since the Soviets had a veto there, that couldn't work either.

So—it's still March 1946—Harry Truman decided (after consulting only with his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes) to send Stalin secretly what he describes in his memoirs as an "ultimatum." He threatened to deploy U.S. naval and ground forces in the Persian Gulf if the Soviets didn't pull the Red Army out of Iran. Before the end of March Andrei Gromyko announced that Soviet troops would leave Iran, and before long they actually left.

During that same spring, it became clear that the Soviets wouldn't abide by the Potsdam agreement that Germany should be treated as an economic unit. The Western allies—Britain, France, and the U.S.—started to consolidate the non-Soviet zones, thus ratifying the de facto division of Germany.

That summer, another crisis brewed. The Soviets proposed to put an end to the international supervision of the Dardanelles and establish Soviet bases in Turkey. Twenty-five divisions of the Red Army were maneuvering near the Turkish border to show they meant it.

This time President Truman did consult his Cabinet officers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and summed up their consensus with Trumanesque informality: "We might as well find out now, rather than five or ten years from now, whether the Russians are determined to take over the world." Faced with resistance from Turkey and tough U.S. and British diplomacy backed by the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt's "courtesy calls" in the Mediterranean, Stalin "stayed his hand" in Turkey—but tightened the screws on Greece.

The climax came when the Greek government, controlling only a "shrunken area" around Athens, appealed for international help. Almost at the same moment, in February 1947, the British government delivered to Washington a formal note saying that it could no longer afford to help either Greece or Turkey beyond the end of March. Also in February, a rigged election put Communists in power in Poland—and another piece of Allied postwar planning, the Yalta agreement, was snuffed out by Soviet non-compliance.

In American politics the stars were not aligned for a strong reaction to all this. Americans were delighted the war was over, welcomed the wholesale demobilization of troops, They were looking for some normalcy, maybe even some prosperity. They were certainly far from ready for another kind of war. In November 1946, U.S. voters had put Republicans in charge of both houses of Congress. Senator Robert Taft, "Mr. Republican" in those days, was focused, he said, on "straightening out our domestic affairs."

Yet in March 1947, with the indispensable help of a senior Republican, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, President Truman laid it on the line in a historic address to a joint session of Congress. He called for massive help to both Greece and Turkey—which was authorized and funded by overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and the House in less than two months.

The great confrontation we came to call the Cold War had quite suddenly become the next stage of world history. What began in Iran in 1946 lasted for 45 years, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

II.

Four months after the Truman Doctrine speech, a Commencement address by Secretary of State George C. Marshall added another theme to the symphony of Western cooperation. Marshall was already famous as the general manager of America's largest and most successful war, and more recently renowned—though unsuccessful—as mediator in China's civil conflict. He had just come back from weeks of fruitless haggling at a Moscow conference of foreign ministers. On the flight home, he had witnessed the hopelessness of Europe soon to be described by Winston Churchill as “a rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate.”

The Marshall speech was not in itself a cold war maneuver. “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” In this humanitarian tone of voice, General-now-Secretary George Marshall launched the United States and its European allies on the most ambitious, riskiest, and arguably the most successful peacemaking adventure in American history.

The Marshall Plan was a brilliant series of improvisations on a deceptively simple theme: Europe needed help, and only America could supply it. Precisely because it wasn't a cold war move, it turned out to be a key to the cold war's outcome. It was even open to the Eastern Europeans; but once the Soviet foreign minister Molotov attended a first planning session in Paris, the Kremlin pulled its satellites out of what looked, from Moscow, like a dangerous opportunity to cooperate.

Measured by the cost of failure, let alone the standards of modern war, the Marshall Plan was not expensive. Its first-year (1948) cost, five billion dollars, did provide something like five percent of Western Europe's GNP. But the total amount of transatlantic aid, \$13 billion in its four years, was a fraction of defense spending and a marginal blip on Europe's own recovery effort—though hugely important because it lifted Europe's spirits and helped fill Europe's dollar gap.

The priceless ingredient was of course immeasurable: reassurance and hope from across the Atlantic Ocean, for Europeans who were losing hope fast as the Soviets mounted an impressive political effort on the quite rational assumption that Americans, weary of Europe's wars and anxious to get back to creating America, would stay out of Europe's next crisis. The Marshall Plan provided above all a source of dynamism-in-action to reverse a growing hopelessness in Europe.

Without the Marshall Plan, Western Europe was endangered by “poverty, desperation, and chaos”; and Communist parties backed by the Soviet Union were poised to pick up the pieces. With the Marshall Plan, the Western Europeans were able to jump-start their economic recovery from World War II; to commence a bold if baffling effort to build a European Union; and to create an inclusive framework within which a new Germany could be both strong and safe. And then, the Europeans were able to face east with such comparative prosperity and panache that their Eastern European neighbors in time decided to join the Western future—and the Soviet Union itself eventually dissolved.

But meanwhile, the Marshall Plan provoked a wide range of Soviet efforts to sabotage it. Tom Wilson the historian watched this at close hand, and eloquently describes it: “Every medium of propaganda which the Communists controlled was used to the hilt. Communist posters plastered the walls of the cities. Handbills were passed out to the workers leaving their factories. News sheets appeared on the walls of remote villages. Counterpropaganda was torn down or painted red by Communist crews in the streets by night. The radio programs from Eastern Europe kept up a drumfire of anti-Marshall Plan messages...

“Rocks were thrown through the screens of motion-picture theaters showing newsreels of Marshall Plan projects. Riots were staged at U.S. information exhibits. Bundles of U.S.-sponsored newspapers were thrown into rivers from trains crossing bridges by night. The Communists spent seven times as much for propaganda as the United States spent for the Marshall Plan information service.

“Against these odds, the U.S. services worked overtime and well. The best film crews that could be assembled turned out news clips, film magazines, and documentaries at prodigious rates...” Some of you have seen excellent examples of this good work in the “Selling Democracy” screenings shown by Sandra Schulberg at the National Archives this week.

We Americans also derived from the Marshall Plan benefits that are as hard to quantify as they were obvious to see and to feel. We were associated with a dependable group of European allies in a troublesome postwar world. We helped build a large and congenial market in which to buy and sell. We helped create a political attractant that lured Eastern Europe away from totalitarian rule, and withered Soviet Communism on the vine. And we generated, besides, the good feeling among Americans that we could do something right—something that we hadn’t known how to do.

A young historian—David Reynolds, too young to have lived through it but very perceptive about its place in history—summed up the Marshall Plan this way: “Between 1948 and 1951, the United States pumped about \$13 billion into Western Europe. Between 1948 and Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union extracted some \$14 billion from Eastern Europe. These statistics are crude but telling. They deserve a place in any history of postwar Europe.”

Helmut Schmidt of Germany said it all in one sentence: “The high probability of failure was averted thanks to leaders who did not act according to plan, but instead relied on their moral and national visions as well as their common sense.”

III.

Even before the Marshall Plan got under way, the transatlantic allies had put together a military alliance designed to persuade the Soviet Union that military militancy would not pay. The architects of history’s greatest peacetime alliance were acting out one sentence of a speech by a Soviet Foreign Minister to the U.N. General Assembly two decades later, in 1968. “History takes revenge for forgetfulness,” Andrei Gromyko declared with unintended irony, “if somebody deliberately forgets the significance of European affairs or neglects them.”

The North Atlantic Alliance was signed in 1947. Six decades later, despite pressures, threats, ultimatums, provocations, and crises, there has been no war among, or armed attack on, the members of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Anyone with a smattering of modern European history can appreciate how extraordinary and unprecedented a piece of good news this is.

Something must have been done right. The early stress on a massive program of economic recovery; the psychological and economic lift of the Common Market; the curiously credible threat of strategic nuclear retaliation for tactical transgressions; the symbolic integration of NATO armies; the willingness of wartime allies to make an ally of West Germany without awaiting a final peace settlement; the long and ultimately successful search for an Atlantic “nuclear sharing” arrangement; the West’s espousal of a policy broad enough (and ambiguous enough) to accommodate both defense and détente; the willingness to bring in additional members—each of these policies played its part. But shining through the military half-measures and the tepid ministerial communiqués was a moral solidarity that somehow made more out of what was objectively not enough.

The real deterrent to Soviet ambitions was this: by and large, with occasional and temporary exceptions which fortunately turned out not to be critical, the Atlantic allies stuck together.

The glue that has held the allies together is a large, complex, and dynamic bargain—partly an understanding among the Europeans, but most importantly a deal between them and the United States of America. The specifics of the bargain, and the comparative burdens to be shared, keep changing. But the constant is that there has to be a bargain.

The Treaty form of the deal is “We’ll help defend you if you’ll help defend us.” But despite Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s legally correct allusion to the Bering Straits as the “Western flank” of NATO, most Americans think of NATO the way most Europeans do, as essentially an arrangement to ensure the defense of Western Europe. The price of mutual help is self-help: “We Americans will help you Europeans, if you will (a) help defend yourselves, and (b) get on with building a united Europe.”

The transatlantic bargain, kept alive by continuous consultation, kept 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons and some 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe for the long generation we call the Cold War. Whether that was enough for defense we fortunately never had to discover. It did turn out, in the end, to be enough for détente.

IV.

The Cold War was called cold because the featured heavyweights, the Soviet Union and the United States, were nominally “at peace.” But they engaged in circling each other, jabbing at each other, testing each others’ supposed weaknesses in every part of the world, in the Byzantine politics of the United Nations, and in a couple of dozen other international organizations. We don’t have all day for a complete inventory, but it may be useful to provide some examples of the variety of “preliminary bouts.”

One early bout was in divided Berlin, where the Soviets had a natural advantage: Berlin was completely surrounded by East Germany. In 1948 they suspended all road and rail traffic between Berlin and West Germany. In response the Truman administration decided to supply Berlin entirely by airlift. This extraordinary operation, run by Air Force General Curtis LeMay, came to be known as the LeMay Coal and Feed Company. It “flew in corridors only twenty miles wide, at staggered altitudes, in all weather, twenty-four hours a day, sometimes harassed by Soviet fighter planes, and landing at airports only four minutes from each other. ...At its peak, an incredible 1,398 trips brought 13,000 tons of supplies into Berlin within a twenty-four hour period... More than ten months after it began, and more than 250,000 flights later, the Berlin airlift came to an end... The Western Allies were still in Berlin [and] the cold war was still cold.”

But the world seemed to be heating up fast. In 1949 the Soviet Union tested an atomic explosion. In 1950 the North Koreans rolled south across the 38th parallel in their Russian-made tanks. Under a UN mandate, the U.S., South Korea and more than a dozen other countries resisted; three years later the dividing line in the Korean peninsula was about where it had been before. But casualties on both sides had been enormous. And the resulting arms race engaged all the NATO allies—the U.S. itself moved to “a state of semimobilization, jumping its military budget from \$18 to \$35 billion.” Before long, the United States was formally allied with forty-two nations in military pacts around the world.

Josef Stalin had pushed as hard as he could. Harry Truman, with plenty of help from others, had pushed back just as hard. After seven years of not-quite-war, “the result was a stalemate.” But the Soviet Union was still in control of whatever the Red Army had controlled at the end of World War II.

In 1953 General Eisenhower, whose last military job had been Supreme Commander at NATO, became President of the United States—and two months later Stalin died. The Soviets achieved an H-bomb, which meant that deterrence had become mutual. And Nikita Khrushchev began to emerge as a new kind of Soviet leader—just as pushy, occasionally more reckless, but also more inclined to play the peace-and-coexistence card, and much more confident that the Soviet economy could compete with Western capitalism and attract support around the world with economic and technical aid “without strings.” Later he more dramatically cut ties with the earlier régime by denouncing the “cult of personality” and the “absolutely insufferable character” of Stalin. But he continued to dramatize his own personality at every turn.

The notion of “rolling back” Communists from Eastern Europe, floated in 1953 by President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was itself rolled back when the Soviets reacted harshly to a Hungarian government that wanted to defect from the Warsaw Pact. In the midst of a crisis with its own allies about Suez, the United States helped thousands of Hungarian refugees, but did nothing to help those who stayed in Hungary to face the Soviet tanks.

Americans had been competing with the Soviets around the globe, but were shocked when Moscow launched the first earth-circling Sputniks into space. Once again the U.S.

government pushed the money button, to increase appropriations both for military and space technology.

Back on earth the U.S. was reaching out with a series of overseas visits by President Eisenhower; he was received by “tumultuous welcoming crowds” in four continents. The climax of this personal diplomacy was to be a Summit Conference with the Soviet Union in Paris. But shortly before that conference Khrushchev “startled the world with an angry but triumphant announcement: an American pilot had been shot down near Sverdlovsk, deep in the heart of the Soviet Union. The pilot was an employee of the CIA—in one of the high-flying U-2s that had been making overflights of the U.S.S.R. for some years past.”

Khrushchev did come to Paris, but the Summit Conference “was over before it officially started when Khrushchev delivered a personal attack on President Eisenhower which probably has no precedent in diplomatic history.” He cancelled the invitation to the American President to make a state visit to the Soviet Union. And “to rub it in, he held a press conference in Paris at which his violence and vituperation came so close to hysteria that he threw away most of the enormous propaganda asset that the American spy in the sky had placed in his hands.”

By 1960, despite the theatrics both in Soviet behavior and in American politics, the Cold War was still a stalemate.

The next protagonist on this moving stage was a new American president, John F. Kennedy. I will skip lightly over his first meeting with the Soviet leader, who still had not returned to his earlier theme of peaceful coexistence, and the United Nations session at which Khrushchev belabored the UN Secretary General and made UN history by banging his shoe on the podium. The next confrontation, a critical moment in the Cold War, was of course the Cuba Missile Crisis.

To this day it’s not clear why Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues in Moscow thought it would be useful to plant nuclear missiles on an island 90 miles from Florida. They added nothing to the strategic nuclear threat. America had no missile defense; every U.S. city was already infinitely vulnerable to nuclear missiles launched from deep in the Russian land mass. So the Cuba missiles were nothing but an in-your-face ploy. Any U.S. president would have had to react strongly when it was revealed.

President Kennedy had a psychological advantage when the missiles were discovered by another of those useful U-2 “spies in the sky.” He was experienced enough by then to react in a way that put the ball in Khrushchev’s court, by arranging an instant Hemispheric “quarantine” of Cuba and making the Soviet missiles public in a sudden drama conducted in the UN Security Council by his UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who showed in his televised presentation photos of the missile sites—before the slow-moving Soviet bureaucracy had instructions to admit that the missiles were there.

Khrushchev was evidently alarmed that this might really lead to war; he wrote an anguished personal message to Kennedy. That was followed by a harder-line message obviously written by others. But the President decided to reply only to the first letter, which left the way open

for the only sensible deal—the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba, and the U.S. wouldn't invade Cuba (which, absent the missiles, we weren't about to do anyway).

The missiles duly departed, and after several months of negotiation the issue was, if not “settled” exactly, swept under a complicated diplomatic rug. In the years that followed, there was still plenty of pushing and shoving between the heavyweights, here and there around the world. But nothing else in the Cold War was remotely comparable to the Cuba Missile Crisis as a proximate threat to civilization.

V.

During the 45 years of the Cold War, many in the West doubted, as Alexis de Tocqueville had doubted a century and a half earlier, that democracies could “regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles.” But as things turned out, the vigor and attractiveness of life in the democratic, market-oriented West got through to those in the Communist, planned-economy East, who were deferring their gratification because their leaders told them it was necessary for socialism. Close readers of de Tocqueville might have predicted this outcome from his long-ago insight—not in his best-known work, *Democracy in America*, but in a speech he made later on. “Democracy and socialism,” he said, “have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: While democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.”

Both the Soviet and Chinese strategies of “reform from within” were revolutions promoted—and, their leaders hoped, managed—from the top. The difference was that Deng Xiaoping thought he could have economic reforms, even the openness to “let the market decide,” while maintaining a monopoly of political power in one party dominated by a tight little group of lifetime associates, friends, and relations.

At first Mikhail Gorbachev was rhetorically clear that politics had to go hand in hand with economics. During those ticklish days of May 1989, when he visited his Chinese peers in Beijing and found himself the darling of the students demonstrating for democracy, he put the matter bluntly to the élite assembled in the Great Hall. Soviet experience, he said, has shown that “economic reform will not work unless supported by a radical transformation of the political system.”

The milling Chinese just outside, in and around Tiananmen Square, were not permitted to hear Gorbachev's speech. They soon learned all about it from the radar effect of the electronic media. Stories filed with foreign news services were quickly played back to the students in the square by modern information technologies, producing the world's first fax revolution. But the demonstrators' educated intuition had already enabled them to reach a quick verdict: top-down reform will never go far enough fast enough to match the rising expectations it creates.

Leakage of information was a two-way boulevard. It didn't take long for street-demonstration fever to bounce halfway around the world to Central and Eastern Europe. Although political change has moved swiftly in other times and places, it is hard to think of a historical moment with a comparable rate of acceleration. One observer said that, in 1989,

the ouster of a Communist party took roughly 10 years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in East Germany, ten days in Czechoslovakia, and ten hours in Romania. Real history doesn't come in such neat packages, but the remark helps remind us of that cascade of political surprises that filled our television screens in the autumn of 1989 and again in the autumn of 1991, when the Soviet Union itself fell apart and its republics started trying to pick up the pieces.

What is increasingly clear in retrospect is how much the tumbleweed of political change was blown across language barriers, national frontiers, and political obstacles by information technology. Telephones and fax machines, radio and television, orbiting satellites, and computers hitched to telecommunications supplemented, reinforced, and intensified the oldest and most trusted of communication systems, word of mouth. As in Beijing, so in Europe's "Soviet bloc," it was not the miserably poor but feisty and frustrated educated people who set the parade in motion—once Gorbachev's Kremlin made clear that the lid was off and bubbles would not be prevented from rising. Suddenly, the label Communist became as poisonous in public as it had long been in private. One after another, each in its own style but mostly with little violence, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe discovered to their surprise that they were pounding on unlocked doors. They started pouring through, and before long some found themselves on the Western side of Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.

The abrupt turn of events was widely seen as a victory for "containment." George Kennan, the diplomat and historian who in 1947 proposed the "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies," later said the NATO military shield was not the main agent of change but rather the fact that the industrial democracies were so clearly outperforming the Soviet Union: "the realization upon the part of many intelligent people in the Soviet Union that the whole system was going downhill, that it was no longer competitive, that the capitalist countries were going far beyond it." From that judgment flowed in quick succession the turnaround in the Soviet Union, its jettisoning of Marxist economics, its tolerance for the breakaways in Eastern Europe, the flood of migrants from East Germany, the breaching of the Berlin Wall, the surprisingly bloodless breakup of the Soviet Union.

Vaclav Havel, the dissident playwright who became Czechoslovakia's president, was asked on U.S. public television in February 1990 how he felt as a dramatist about the theatrics of 1989. It was, he replied with unrehearsed elegance, a "drama so thrilling and tragic and absurd that no earthing could have written it."

The central lesson from that time in our lives seems clear enough: the people, not their leaders, were doing the leading. Well-known names, presidents and prime ministers of the world's military powers and economic powerhouses, stared at the nightly news with ill-concealed astonishment. The people-power cavorting on the world stage after the summer of 1989 had remarkably little to do with the customary measures of power—weapons, armies, gross economic product. More than anything else, the power of ideas was in play.

The impatient mobs were moved not by distant visions of Utopia but by spreading information about neighbors who were obviously getting more goods and services, more

fairness in their distribution, and firmer guarantees of human rights than their own bosses and planners seemed able to deliver.

What caught up with the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was what went on in the democracies of Western Europe and North America. They observed that people in the West chose both their leaders and their lifestyles and therefore seemed to be better fed and clothed, more affluent, and despite all their problems, happier. The news of this contrast readily leaked eastward—by word-of-mouth stories of travelers, by the written word, by telephone and facsimile, and especially by radio and television.

For Eastern Europeans in the 1980s, TV was an envy-thy-neighbor machine that bred intolerance of corruption and foot-dragging by longtime leaders, who couldn't liberalize their policies fast enough to escape the viewers' wrath. Most of the leaders tried, in the end, to change their spots. But the protesters, seeing unaccustomed light at the end of the tunnel, condemned the very leaders whose sudden conversion made that vision visible.

So leadership changed, rising from the roiling streets. Women and men of all kinds and colors and modes of speech were suddenly sticking up for themselves, by the hundreds of thousands on one public square after another, by the millions when they got a chance to vote their own destiny. Their "established" leaders were behind them, way behind them, hurrying in breathless pretense that the new-style parades would still need old-style drum majors. Meanwhile new leaders emerged, increasingly women as well as men, mostly educated people—journalists, writers, professors, labor leaders, entrepreneurs, civil servants, even some professional politicians—pushed into formal positions of power by the volcanic rumblings of the newly articulate crowds.

It was not the end of history. But it was the end of the Cold War.

War or Dance? Blind Spots and the Locus of our Fears

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Abstract

War is the ultimate expression of polarization. It instantly invokes in all of us the binary divide of life and death. Being supportive of the victims of aggression is a humane mandate. At the same time, the active engagement in the binary logic of war prevents us from recognizing the systemic and violent nature of modern international relations. If we intend to end violent conflicts among humans, a deeper perspective is required. Hopefully, this could contribute to paving the way for a truly Pluriversal World to emerge before it is too late.

1. In and Out, Us and Them

“Nothing human is alien to me,” so said Terence, a playwright born in Africa and brought as a slave to Rome, more than two millennia ago. The statement is so deep that it gives room for multiple interpretations. For one, it points to the fundamental relatedness of all humans. This has more than once fed the idea of universality, that we all share the same fundamental values. But “*the universal is always the universal of somebody*,” as Barbara Cassin puts it. Universality has been too often the banner of the powerful to crush other people. In my view, Terence’s words bring a deeper sense of reflection: any of us is capable of connecting with all human feelings and actions, even the most different from ours, and the most terrible. It is easy enough to connect with the many forms of beauty that humans are able to produce, as well as with the pains of all victims. But we can also connect with what makes humans commit atrocities, like waging devastating wars against other humans, and against nature. It might be unpleasant to face it but we have to recognize that both the evil and the divine are in all of us.

When ignoring that fundamental ambivalence, we continue practicing the fantasy of exclusion. The first principle of social organization is still to establish who is “Us” and “Them”. There is an “In” of the circle of people we treat by default with respect, trust and generosity. That circle builds on and expands the foundational experience of a mother caring for her children, but for now, we continue drawing a line and leaving most of humanity “Out”. For sure others are not us, but there are critical differences between distinction (“you are not me”), separation (“you don’t belong to my circle”) and exclusion (“I don’t have to care about you”), and we override those differences all the time. People who are “Out” do not have by far the same rights as people “In”. Heritage is still based on kinship, and we indulge ourselves with the concept of the individual as a microcosm, while

when we are alone we are nothing. Not only do we create artificial boundaries, still dealing in the 21st century with the nationalism that originated in the 17th century, we also take for granted a moral superiority of “Us” over “Them”. On those boundaries, we practice zero-sum games, avoiding recognition of and responsibility for the many forms of injustice and exploitation we impose on “Them”.

“War is an extreme case of denial of the possibility to learn new patterns.”

When Ursula von der Leyen says “*Ukraine is one of us*”, she is also saying “and *Russia is not*”. It is easy to connect with the sense of solidarity leading her to say so, and the solidarity with the victims is of course right, but the exclusion is not. Unless we address the fact that Russia is also one of us, as everyone else is on the planet, human or not, we will not start climbing the steep ladder to overcome not only this terrible war but also the structural elements leading to violence. With the images of destruction in Ukraine flooding our screens everyday, this may sound naive, utopian and even cynical. But this perspective is not pantheist nor illusory, it is just systemic. Russia and in particular Vladimir Putin are certainly to blame for this war but if we only do that, we miss its cybernetic nature: this tragic episode is one more in the vicious circle of geopolitics, whose logic is equally fed by all actors looking for hegemony. These may appear as enemies but they all contribute to keeping the logic alive. Nothing better for an empire than another one to fight, in a mutually reinforcing confrontation forcing everyone to choose between “Us” and “Them”.

2. Denial of Complexity

The fantasy of exclusion is linked to another blind spot. In our obsession to have reality under control we split it into pieces, we ignore interdependencies and we look for reductionistic explanations and binary qualifications like “right” and “wrong”, “good” and “evil”. Complexity is seen as an issue while it is the essence of Life: what makes living systems unpredictable is the same that makes them alive. And that is the capacity to learn, in the deep sense of the term, i.e. to reconfigure the system in completely new patterns. War is an extreme case of denial of the possibility to learn new patterns. It evacuates tensions through the destruction of the complexity we do not like to deal with. But this happens not only on the side of the aggressor. Putin frames the attack on Ukraine as an act of defense of the interests of Russia and the Russophone Ukrainians. This is a tragic simplification, but not less is the framing of the Western response. We have no option left but to be with or against Putin and Russia. The whole country is now excluded in all sorts of manner, and anyone having relationships with Russia has become suspicious of complacency with evil.

We live in terrible times. That binary reaction is perfectly aligned with the arguments of Putin: it actually confirms that the West never had and will never have the intention to integrate Russia as “one of us”. As shown in Hollywood movies in the last few decades, the Russians are always the villains. Should not we pay serious attention to the fact that most Russians perceived what happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a terrible humiliation? By claiming that Russia should be punished for being evil, we just continue feeding the logic of war. And it could be wise to remember now what happened with Germany after World

War I. A similar sense of humiliation contributed to the unfolding of an absolute tragedy of unprecedented scale. As said by Aurelio Peccei long ago, we suffer from a “human gap”, the difference between our capacity to act and the capacity to understand and deal with the consequences of our actions. We know more about how Life works than we use everyday in the framing of what is correct or incorrect. It is more than time that we learnt what we already know, for the sake of desirable futures.

“Instead of suspending intellectual property due to the exceptional circumstances and the role of the state in funding the research of vaccines, we have allowed a worldwide tragedy to be addressed in a totally unfair way: no vaccines for the poor countries and billions of financial wealth for the happy few.”

3. The Violent Nature of International Relations

One essential aspect to overcome the logic of war is to realize that international relations continue to be, in the 21st century, dominated by the brutal exercise of power under the “Us and Them” framings. We dream that it is not the case, that a multilateral framework of global governance ensures most of the time that conflicts of interest are solved in a peaceful way. Unfortunately, this is an illusion, at the very least for Most of the World, 6 out of 7 parts of humanity living in so-called “developing” countries. The dominant framing says that violence is associated with “under-development” and that once a society becomes “developed” in the Western sense of the term, it leaves violence behind. And then, the solution is obvious: apply the Western recipes to your own country and you will become peaceful and prosperous. For privileged people like myself, having lived all my life in a quite appeased Europe, this sounds fantastic. But as Gandhi warned us, the issue with Western civilization is that “*it would be a good idea*”. It is still that, an idea. My guess is that you can only assess the moral value of a political and economic system by asking the excluded how they feel they are treated. The incumbents’ profit from the system, it is all too human for them to see only its advantages. What do “Them”, those who are “Out”, think?

I am afraid that those excluded from power think the global system we have is brutal and totally unfair. It is based on the use of force of different kinds, including military power, and it is not at all democratic since power is concentrated in the hands of countries representing a small and declining minority of the global population. The terribly sad history of the Cold War is just part of a long list of brutal and mutually reinforcing interventions by the USA and the USSR to prevent any other country from following a path different from being with “Us” or “Them”. The list of cases is too long to state here. With the collapse of the Soviet Union came the hope of “*the end of History*” à la Fukuyama. This proved to be completely misleading.

Powers, and especially the winners of the Cold War, continued to behave basically in the same way, including the practice of illegal and devastating military interventions whenever it suited their interests. Among many others, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is recent enough to

undermine any kind of moral superiority when contesting the invasion of Ukraine. And Most of the World is well aware. Not to talk about the moral hypocrisy of (rightly) doing a lot to help Ukrainian refugees, while rejecting all others from different origins and skin colours and paying other countries to deal with them. The terrible fantasy of exclusion is all around as if we could ignore the consequences of the tragedies that we created by building an unfair world while pretending otherwise.

4. Democracy as Unfair Competition?

These days we are being told that the war in Ukraine is a fight between democracy and autocracy. And that Putin should not win because that could be a fatal blow to fragile Western democracies. Again, we see here the “Us and Them” framing in action. In this case by blaming others for the degradation of our own political systems. Blaming Russia for producing “fake news” and interfering in national elections, and blaming our compatriots, stupid enough to vote for Le Pen or Trump, are just other ways of ignoring our blind spots. For around 40 years, the political and economic systems of Western countries have been shifted towards a systematic production of social inequality. Well-being has been at best stagnating for most of the population, only to be lured by debt-driven consumerism, while huge amounts of financial wealth have been created ex-nihilo in the hands of a very small elite. The COVID-19 pandemic is the latest example of the same. Instead of suspending intellectual property due to the exceptional circumstances and the role of the state in funding the research of vaccines, we have allowed a worldwide tragedy to be addressed in a totally unfair way: no vaccines for the poor countries and billions of financial wealth for the happy few.

At the same time, globalization processes have made sure that national politics is less and less capable of creating possibilities for most people. We have been consistently ignoring the fractures created by this dynamic at work for decades, and now we realize at last that our democracies are fragile. Absolutely yes, but do not blame Putin for that. As Shakespeare said, “*the fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves*”. If democracy is about real equality of rights and opportunities for all, it is simply absurd to expect that an economic system based on rewarding more and more of the already privileged could in any way contribute to it. The central tenet of democracy is inclusive collaboration in respect of the dignity and the value of every human being. Could we really expect unfair competition to be the instrument for that?

5. War or Dance?

We easily fall into the blind spots described above because they are deeply rooted in our many fears, the fear of pain and hardship, the fear of loneliness and irrelevance and of course the ultimate one, the fear “*to rule them all and in the darkness bind them*”, that of our sure death. We feel that we are increasing the contradictions between our human drive and the future of life as a whole, on a planet whose biophysical limits have been reached, whose climatic stability is endangered by human activity, and whose living and mineral resources are being exhausted at a great pace, all of that without eliminating human hardship. And afraid as we are of this permanent conflict with the world, we invent self-delusions to alleviate our fears. The fantasy of exclusion, the denial of complexity, and the hypocrisy of the stories we invent to make sense of the world are ways we use to protect ourselves, not so

much from need but from the anxieties we face everyday in our eternal quest for meaning. Are they the right response to our fears?

Keeping alive the logic of war, either military, economic or cultural, will not improve our situation, it will make it worse. As realised by Donella Meadows at the end of her life, dancing is a much better metaphor when dealing with complexity. It also mobilizes energies but in a more positive way, by creating new patterns and levels of learning which go even beyond conscious reasoning. The cultural transformation we need is made of this kind of shift in metaphors, from war to dance.

How do we open the space of possibilities for humanity to build desirable futures? This is the critical question we have to ask. And it is hard to address it within the paradigms that have been prevalent in the global scene (see Table below). It is quite clear now that the “One World” idea was a misleading fantasy. But it does not make the “Multipolar World” in which we live the appropriate response to the existential challenges of humanity. In my view, it is more than time to consider a completely different paradigm, the “Pluriversal World”, built on trust and curiosity rather than fear and greed. The seeds of this world already exist, they play a silent melody that we do not hear, busy as we are in making a lot of noise to ignore our fears. I hope the time has come to open the space of possibilities in that direction, for the sake of ourselves and of generations to come.

Table 1: Elements of Different World Paradigms

One World	Multipolar World	Pluriversal World
One recipe fits all	Few centers of power	Diversity of Pathways
IMF, WB, experts, standards	Competing institutions and standards	Learning together, liberation from helplessness
“End of History”	“Us and Them”	“The Web of Life”
Policies & technologies for control Top down & scaling up		Decentralized pathways to wellbeing in the biosphere
Separation, competition, scarcity		Relationships, infinite richness of Life
Financial capital	Military power	Vitality, heritage, creativity
Greed	Fear	Trust, curiosity
“People are problematic”		“Trust the humanity of everybody” “Allow Life to be alive”
“For things to remain the same, everything has to change” (Lampedusa)		“Nothing has changed, but everything has changed” (Tamkeen)

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The World Will Never be the Same: The Russia-Ukraine Conflict as a Trigger Point for Deglobalisation

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Abstract

This paper makes the case for why we believe that the Russia-Ukraine crisis signals the end of a global era defined by globalisation. Even though Russia's economy is only a fraction of the US, EU or China, its role in the world is much more relevant and the events in Ukraine are triggering a cascade of effects that will redefine the political, social and economic thinking and interactions among nations long into the future. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the "peace dividend" of recent decades is gone as military budgets are increasing significantly around the world. Energy and raw material dependency on other countries is considered a strategic weakness. The war has disrupted global supply chains and nations are now shunning the exposure to other countries, especially ones that do not share similar values. The macroeconomic environment has changed as growth prospects are depressed and inflation is on the rise. The world is moving to a period of reorganisation and instability.

1. Preamble: Thoughts for the people affected by the conflict in Ukraine

Before discussing mostly economic aspects that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered, we would like to emphasize that no financial consideration and economic discussion should let us forget that this conflict has seen human suffering on a scale that Europe had been previously spared for a long time.

We want to express our deepest sympathies with everybody who has been drawn into this conflict and suffers because of it. Our thoughts are with the many civilians and soldiers who have lost their lives and their family and friends, with the victims who have been hurt, the people who had their homes and livelihoods destroyed, and with the refugees who had to flee their homes.

2. Introduction

Geopolitical events come and go. And while wars are human tragedies, unless they affect major economies their effects on financial markets and the enveloping economic eco-system are usually limited and transient. The historic databanks are full of examples of how stock and bond markets recover after an initial shock. Sometimes this takes longer, but the conventional wisdom is that unless there is a major and lasting disruption to the world economic system, the world will keep turning and finance will move on.

In this paper, we will make the case for why we believe that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is different. It is different for several reasons. Even though Russia's economy is only a fraction of the US, EU or China, its role in the world is much more relevant than this. In the GDP ranking of nations, Russia only occupied the 12th spot in 2019 with a GDP according to the IMF of USD 1.67trn. To compare, this is one spot above Spain and four below Italy. And Ukraine figures in 57th position, with a GDP of USD 147bn.*

“It is not the Russian war in Ukraine that causes the future to be different. It is a different future that begins with the Russian war as the first major event of a new era.”

Qualifying the conflict as having only limited impact purely because the GDP of the nations involved is small compared to the rest of the world, neglects the role of Russia as an important producer of energy, in particular fossil fuels, and of commodities, especially metals and uranium. We shall analyse the latter in more detail, but even though Russia is a top producer of many raw materials, our reasons for why this crisis will have longer lasting effects lie elsewhere.

The Russian crisis is an inflection point at the end of an era. For several decades, the world moved ever closer and globalisation brought unprecedented growth and prosperity to many parts of the world. Lasting peace allowed many nations to reap a “peace dividend” in the form of lower military spending, which allowed more investments elsewhere. However, a few years ago this trend started to slowly reverse.

As the Russian bombs are bringing devastation to a European country, several things suddenly become more apparent: First, with an unprovoked attack by one of the leading military forces in the world on a neighbouring nation, the premise of global (relative) peace, at least among the larger nations, no longer holds. The world is reacting to the Russian violation of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty by rearming itself. The peace dividend is gone.

Second, the energy and raw material dependency on Russia has created a deeper rethink about sourcing and supplying in the future. While Europe is at the forefront of changing its procurement systems, particularly sensitive given its high dependency on Russia, it is not alone. Other nations are reconsidering how far they should have concentration risks in their economic production system and are keen on reducing them.

Third, while the COVID-19 pandemic already led to nations becoming more occupied with themselves, the war has disrupted global supply chains to a larger extent than the GDP-weighting of Russia or Ukraine would suggest. Nations are now shunning the exposure to countries that do not share similar values and have government systems that are different from their own. While during the period of accelerated globalisation the thinking was that closer interconnectedness would lead to change and transform autocratic governments into

* Source: IMF data as per www.imf.org/en/Data, accessed on 29 March 2022.

democratic ones, Russia has demonstrated that this is a fallacy. As Russia attacked Ukraine, the world looked at China and Taiwan with trepidation.

And finally, the world is waking up to a new macroeconomic environment. The long period of ever lower interest rates and tame inflation is truly behind us. Many countries will see inflation in 2022 like they have not experienced in the working lives of many of their adult population. According to the IMF, the annual inflation rate in the US accelerated to 7.9% in February 2022, the highest since January 1982. And Europe and other leading nations are likely to experience worse. As inflation is on the rise, the future growth prospects are falling. The world is likely to move from a period of relatively constant growth, that not even the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic could derail for long, to a period of reorganisation where growth will be very uneven and overall lower.

It is not the Russian war in Ukraine that causes the future to be different. It is a different future that begins with the Russian war as the first major event of a new era.

3. Geopolitical Situation

3.1. The slow but steady departure from globalisation

For the better part of the past 75 years, the world moved gradually towards closer interconnectedness. Modern infrastructure, especially transport and communications, made it possible to create supply chains stretching tens of thousands of miles across the world. They facilitated the growing exchange of information, investments, goods and services on a world-wide scale. Globalization became the term used to describe not only this exchange but the resulting growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations.

The creation and then steady expansion of what is today the European Union, the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and finally the World Trade Organisation were important milestones towards more globalisation. Seminal events like the fall of the Iron Curtain, the rise of the Asian Tiger economies and particularly the accession of China to the WTO exemplified the movement towards increasingly closer (esp. economic) relationships amongst nations.

However, that trend slowly started to lose its impetus and began to even reverse upon itself. While world trade as percentage of GDP* increased from 25% in 1970 to 61% in 2008, it then started to decline, falling to 51.6% in 2020.† Foreign direct investments (FDI), another indicator of world interconnectedness that had grown for a long time,‡ fell to USD 1.5trn in 2019 (the last year before the pandemic), thus being much lower than the USD 2.7trn in 2016 or indeed the peak of USD 3.1trn in 2007.

* Source: World Bank Data as per data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?end=2020&start=1970, accessed on 25 March 2022.

† While the global coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic saw a sharp drop in 2020 in global trade as percentage of GDP, which stood in 2019 at 56.3%, it is notable that the growth trend had been broken in 2008, for every year since then has been lower than the peak value of 61%.

‡ Indeed, FDI grew steadily during the 1990s and then suffered two periods of set-backs, from 2001 to 2003 in the aftermath of September 11 and the dot-com stock crisis, and then again from 2008 to 2009 as a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis. However, FDI grew fast after these periods making up lost ground fairly rapidly and reverting back to an upwards growth trend. It has only been in recent years that the long-term growth trend was broken.

Seminal events in recent years that underline the new movement towards deglobalisation include: the shift in US foreign policy (especially vis-à-vis China), Brexit (the first major reversal of the European integration trend since World War II), a reconsideration of far-reaching production chains under climate change considerations, as well as the often very nationalistic and protectionist response to the COVID-19 pandemic (incl. independent and uncoordinated measures to contain transmission, limitations to global vaccine distribution, arbitrary travel restrictions etc.).

With the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, two things have happened very quickly. Firstly, the previously rather overlooked movement towards de-globalisation has received a massive boost and is now more widely recognised. And secondly, next to the prior mostly economic and financial considerations regarding supply change organisation, another dimension came to the fore: the increased vulnerability to political events and military operations. The latter has led, in turn, to a reconsideration of national attitudes towards countries that do not form part of the same economic and military alliance.

3.2. The Russian invasion of Ukraine as a trigger point

When the Russian tanks started rolling into Ukraine, it was not merely the start of a local military operation but became the cause for a series of widespread and cascading reactions by many countries opposing the invasion. These in turn led to several rounds of retaliatory responses amongst the involved nations and their allies. First and foremost, there is the military dimension: all aspects directly relating to the ongoing war in Ukraine, from military procurement to battlefield action and strategic military planning. The conflict has triggered a rethinking regarding security needs by many nations, not just those directly involved in the conflict but practically the world over.*

Second are the very significant geopolitical consequences. Immediately following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, security experts around the world began to not only wonder about possible other Russian threats but grew particularly worried about other non-democratic regimes, especially China.† In the meantime, discussions on NATO enlargement through membership of Finland and Sweden—two countries who since World War II have pursued a policy of neutrality—are gathering traction.‡

And thirdly, the avalanche of economic and financial measures that was unleashed by and upon the world, such as the introduction of sanctions and embargoes by the US, the EU, Ukraine, Russia and many of their respective allies, is having widespread impact.§

* See e.g. the speech of Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz of 27 February 2022 in the German Parliament that was widely seen as a total re-write of Germany's post-war foreign and defence policy: www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378 accessed on 5 May 2022.

† On 28 February 2022, the US sent a delegation to Taiwan led by former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen amid fears Beijing could invade the island during Ukraine crisis. See <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-biden-sends-former-top-defense-officials-taiwan-show-support-2022-02-28/>, accessed on 28 April 2022.

‡ On 14 May 2022, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö told President Putin how fundamentally the Russian demands in late 2021 aiming at preventing countries from joining NATO and Russia's massive invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have altered the security environment of Finland. President Niinistö announced that Finland decides to seek NATO membership in the next few days. <https://www.presidentti.fi/en/press-release/president-niinisto-spoke-with-russian-president-putin-6/> accessed on 15 May 2022.

§ We shall discuss this in more detail later in this paper.

However, as the conflict unfolded, it became clear very quickly that its ramifications would not be limited to the military, geostrategic and economic dimensions, but be far more pervasive. The exclusion of Russia from international bodies (ranging from the economic and financial like the Swift payment system to the cultural like sporting events), the introduction of travel bans, operational restrictions, asset freezes and seizures have unravelled also cultural and social ties that previously had existed for many decades. Suddenly the world is clearly headed in a new direction.

3.3. The renaissance of national and regional independence and autonomy

After the Second World War, the Allied nations that had fought fascist Germany and Italy in Europe and imperial Japan in Asia came to the realisation that a repeat of the punitive policies following World War I was not the best approach to create lasting peace and stability. Instead, they aimed at reforming political and social structures in the countries that had lost the war, pursuing a strategy where closer financial links, economic cooperation and social interaction would make a war less likely. This plan was hugely successful in Europe and Japan, sparking the creation of the European Common Market (later the European Union) while in Asia, Japan became an important partner to the US and Europe.

This valuable lesson was not lost on the Europeans and as the old Soviet Union disintegrated, the European Union, led by Germany as the driving force, adopted in the 1990s a similar policy towards Russia. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder coined the phrase “*Wandel durch Handel*”, i.e. “*Change through trade*”, trying to pull Russia closer towards Europe by creating close economic ties and making Germany consciously gradually more dependent on Russian commodities, especially oil and gas. Other European nations followed.* The idea was again to avoid conflict through closer interconnectedness and mutual dependency.

The wisdom of this idea with regard to Russia is now being called into question. The European Commission announced on 8 March 2022 that it “...*has today proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, starting with gas, in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.*”† The wider conclusion now drawn is that closer economic and financial connectedness, especially without deeper social and political reforms, are apparently not enough to prevent military conflict.

And this lesson is being applied not only to Russia or Belarus by Western nations but also reshaping the position towards China and other nations. Back in 2009, the European Parliament wrote that it “...*believes that democracy requires an effective civil society, which is in turn strengthened by trade and economic relations with the European Union; therefore believes that ‘change through trade’ is a way to aid China’s transformation towards being an open and democratic society benefiting all sections of society*”.‡ Since then, the European

* The IEA (International Energy Agency) writes on its website that “In 2021, more than half of Russia’s oil exports went to Europe, which received about one-third of its oil imports from Russia. Germany was the largest European buyer of Russian oil, followed by the Netherlands and Poland.” www.iea.org/articles/frequently-asked-questions-on-energy-security accessed on 9 May 2022.

† ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511, accessed on 29 March 2022.

‡ European Parliament Resolution of 5 February 2009 on Trade and economic relations with China (2008/2171(INI)) www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2009-0053_EN.pdf accessed on 29 March 2009.

Union has been more guarded regarding those ambitions while the US already engaged in a trade war with China in 2017* and wondered openly following Russia’s attack about China’s intentions regarding Taiwan.


So, while a general and fundamental reappraisal of the risks inherent in international trade and the dependency of a nation’s production systems on other countries is being undertaken, the driving force of globalisation has turned into the contrary and the ideological paradigm of “change through trade” is replaced by a desire for more independence and greater autonomy.

4. Economic and Social Consequences

4.1. International dependency on Russian primary goods

According to the World Bank, the Russian Federation had total exports of USD 427bn and total imports of 247bn.† The GDP of Russia in 2019 was USD 1.69trn. The Federation’s exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP amounted to 28.54% and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP was 20.91%.



A visualisation of Russia’s export and import data is shown below.‡




* For a deeper analysis of the 2017 to 2021 trade war between the US and China see e.g. Chad Bown’s paper “The US-China Trade War and Phase One Agreement”, published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp21-2.pdf

† Last available data for 2019 wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/RUS accessed on 29 March 2022.

‡ Using the CEPII database for 2019, visualised as per OEC.





With a positive trade balance of USD 180bn and a fairly limited value of imports (at least in proportion of the overall GDP), the Russian economy is not as dependent on foreign goods as many other open economies. However, its exports are highly concentrated and consist of predominantly fossil fuels and metals, which together make up about two thirds of all exports.

From a strategic point of view, the EU countries are highly vulnerable to an interruption of

Russian oil and gas deliveries. The International Energy Agency provides the ratio of Russian imports to domestic fuel consumption in 2020 as in the inset table.*

While the US is one of the top 10 destinations of Russian fossil fuels in absolute terms, those make up only a very small part of the US energy needs and can readily be covered

Country	Share of Russian oil*	Share of Russian gas
Finland	100%	67.80%
Netherlands	100%	35.90%
Greece	90.90%	38.90%
Poland	76.10%	46.40%
Hungary	59.20%	100%
Germany	37.20%	45.70%
Sweden	33.10%	14.10%
Italy	18.70%	40.90%
United Kingdom	16.90%	3.00%
France	16.70%	20.00%

* www.iea.org/reports/russian-fossil-fuel-reliance-data-explorer accessed on 29 March 2022. A value of 100% could actually also mean that more Russian oil was imported than used during the year by the country in question.

domestically or by other producers. For the UK, it is somewhat harder to replace Russian oil (especially diesel) than Russian gas, but its dependency is also far lower than that of the EU. This explains, at least in part, why the US and the UK were quick to ban Russian fossil fuels whereas the EU has been playing for time, particularly to get out of the all-important heating season in Central Europe.

Other sectors are important too: The Food and Agriculture Organization's Corporate Statistical Database lists Russia as the top exporting nation for grain in 2020. In 2019, Russia was also the 2nd worldwide producer of platinum, 2nd largest world producer of cobalt, 2nd worldwide producer of vanadium, 3rd largest world producer of gold, 3rd largest world producer of nickel, 3rd largest world producer of sulphur, 4th worldwide producer of silver, 4th largest world producer of phosphate, 5th largest world producer of iron ore, and 6th largest producer of uranium (2018).*

According to Trade Data Monitor, Russia was the world's leading exporter of fertilizers. In 2021, it shipped out USD 12.5 billion worth of fertilizers, up 78.4% from 2020.†

In summary, the world is having a hard time replacing Russian exports but is feverishly trying to do so.

4.2. Disruption of supply chains and their reorganisation

As the Russian war in Ukraine is having a direct impact on certain supply chains, it is also calling into question whether long and complex sourcing arrangements spanning the globe are indeed the best way forward. For many years, supply chain managers tried to optimise cost as their number one priority, often at the expense of resilience. This changed somewhat, albeit only gradually, with the slowing of globalisation, but it became a hot topic when the *Ever Given*, a huge super-container ship, ran aground and blocked the Suez Canal in March 2021.‡ Suddenly, global supply chains looked not cheap but vulnerable.

However, the Russian attack has also triggered a more fundamental and holistic reconsideration as the world's largest country is being perceived as unfriendly and unreliable by many nations.§ At the same time, more questions are being asked about the relationship of the Western democracies with China. An important part of the answer seems to be near-shoring or on-shoring of production systems, thus curbing the reliance on other nations, particularly those that do not share democratic systems, free speech, human rights etc.

In a world where alliances are being redefined stricter along lines of differing philosophies of governance and control, supply chains are likely to follow those lines closer than in the past.

* USGS data as per pubs.er.usgs.gov, accessed on 29 March 2022.

† Cited from tradedatamonitor.com/index.php/data-news-articles/145-gold-oil-diamonds-and-fertilizers-10-things-you-need-to-know-about-russian-exports, accessed on 29 March 2022.

‡ For a more detailed analysis see Lee, Jade & Wong, Eugene. (2021). Suez Canal blockage: an analysis of legal impact, risks and liabilities to the global supply chain.

§ The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution on 2 March 2022, demanding that Russia immediately end its military operations in Ukraine. A total of 141 countries voted in favour of the resolution, which reaffirms Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Only 5 voted against. See news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152, accessed on 29 March 2022.

4.3. The ESG dimension

Wars are human disasters of the biggest kind. However, any war is also a catastrophe from an ESG perspective, with massively negative consequences for the environment. Just consider the CO₂ emissions of armies, the impact of first destroying and then rebuilding the infrastructure after the conflict, the pollution from ammunition and war materials etc.


Nevertheless, longer-term there might be a silver lining for the global environment and the ESG movement. The important shift away from long supply chains will reduce transport emissions in the future. Shorter supply chains require less energy and create consequently lower emissions. In addition, as more supply chains end in countries with high environmental standards, such as the EU and the US, than in those with lower standards, such as e.g. China or Russia, basing more production in such ESG-orientated countries should further reduce greenhouse emissions and avoid other adverse environmental impacts.

While there are currently discussions underway, especially in Europe, to counter the reliance on Russian oil and gas by burning more of the dirtier coal, these solutions are largely meant to overcome a short impasse. In the long term, the most promising solution is to curb the dependency on fossil fuels for transportation and heating and replace it with renewable energy. For many years, politicians in the EU have strongly advocated for a move towards greener energy and a lower dependency on external energy provision.* This position has been recently reinforced as renewables are seen, too, as a solution to the Russian energy crisis. EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson said, “...ultimately, the best and the only lasting solution is the Green Deal—boosting renewables and energy efficiency as fast as technically possible. We are still far too dependent on fossil-fuel imports; but boosting home-grown renewables help us out of this trap.”†

4.4. Economic Demands of the Future

4.4.1. Energy

In the previous sections, we looked at the longer-term consequences of the war in Ukraine and how particularly Europe is in dire straits to find workable solutions. As many countries are keen on replacing Russia as a key energy provider, the regional energy infrastructure will have to change to accommodate this goal. Firstly, short-term alternatives have to be found to replace Russian oil and gas. It is expected that nuclear energy production will play a more prominent role, as already announced e.g. by



Source: ourworldindata.org/renewable-energy

* “The European Commission is committed to policies that will contribute to the European Green Deal ambition of achieving carbon-neutrality by 2050. They are also aimed at boosting the internal energy market, making our energy more secure, more sustainable and more affordable.” See ec.europa.eu/info/topics/energy_en, accessed on 29 March 2022.

† Remarks by Commissioner Simson at the IEA press conference on 3 March, as per ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/simson/announcements/remarks-commissioner-simson-iea-press-conference-its-10-point-plan-reduce-european-unions-reliance_en, accessed on 29 March 2022

France and the UK.* Other countries like Germany that have tried to avoid it on the grounds of the dangers of its production and the unresolved storage problem of nuclear waste will find it harder to reverse their policy of shutting down nuclear power plants, but the pressure to bring them online again will mount as other alternatives are expensive and slower to build. Dirtier technologies such as an extension of coal burning in Europe are very likely only a brief stop-gap measure while the systems are adapting to the current supply shock.

In the longer term, the expected winners of the energy transformation are widely expected to be renewable power sources, especially those that also work well in countries with colder climates. Oil and gas shall increasingly be replaced by hydropower, wind farms, bioenergy, solar power or geothermal energy, a development for which there is now an even stronger incentive than before.

Already over the past years, the worldwide energy production mix has moved towards renewables. In Europe it already comprises 16.5% of total primary energy consumption. While many countries are actively changing their energy mix, this has a direct impact on the energy infrastructure. Instead of Russian gas pipelines, Europe will need a more powerful electrical distribution grid, especially as the production of renewable energy takes place in different locations to where the existing power plants are. Those locations will have to be connected to the grid and the grid made more intelligent. Countries in other parts of the world will take notice of the solutions adopted and likely emulate them.

Besides the supply of energy, alternative forms of flexibility for the power system have to be scaled up as well, notably seasonal flexibility but also demand shifting and peak shaving. Governments, particularly in Europe, need to step up efforts to develop and deploy sustainable and cost-effective ways to manage the flexibility needs of the power systems. A range of options will have to be explored, including intelligent grids, more energy efficiency and increased electrification (esp. instead of direct gas use). In addition to demand-side responses, long-term energy storage technologies have to be deployed alongside short-term sources of flexibility such as batteries or pump stations.

Europe also needs to ensure that there is adequate regulatory support to accelerate the business case for these investments.

4.4.2. IT and Communication

The biggest change in the use of IT and communication technologies in the past decade has been the adoption of work-from-home practices as required by the lockdown restrictions introduced in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Suddenly, with the exception of essential jobs, entire countries started to produce mainly services but also a few goods from home. The existing IT and communications infrastructures were put to a collective stress test.

While the outcome from a business continuation perspective has been largely a success, some shortcomings have become apparent as well. Abundant residential bandwidth and ubiquitous connectivity are still elusive more than 2 years since the first lockdowns, even

* See e.g. reporting by the Washington Post as per <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/04/15/nuclear-energy-europe-ukraine-war/> accessed on 5 May 2022.

in the most advanced economies. The reliability of systems is not high enough while data transmission and storage demands shall grow faster than in the past. In this area, further investments will be required as most office workers are expected to mix limited office presence with more productivity at home as part of their normal job routine. Already, several institutions, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), have called for the establishment of a routine 3-day work-from-home/2-day office presence arrangement to save energy.*

The Russian war in Ukraine is providing further momentum to the trend of decentralised production. The rapidly rising costs for transportation as a direct outcome of the oil and gas crisis in the wake of the invasion will further disincentivise travel—both locally to the office as well as regionally and globally. The alternative is a further adoption of video conference technology and the introduction of more integrated production systems that can readily assemble an otherwise dispersed workforce. This will require more investment into broadband technologies, 5G telephone systems, data centres and home IT technology.

4.4.3. Transport

While general mobility has been subdued since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion will further delay, if not entirely prevent, a return to pre-COVID levels. According to Google, the workplace mobility during the week to 21 March 2022 was 22% below pre-COVID levels. In Germany it was -14%, in France -12% and in the UK -27%. Retail and recreation mobility, i.e. mobility for places such as restaurants, cafés, shopping centres, theme parks, museums, libraries and cinemas, was down significantly as well: -12% in the US, -13% in Germany, -14% in France, and -15% in the UK.†

As mobility becomes more expensive, the reliance on delivery systems will continue to grow. This is changing the mix of traffic. More and heavier goods vehicles are replacing family cars. The road networks will have to keep pace with the shift in usage.

At the same time, Europe needs to ramp up its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports if it wants greater independence from Russian gas. The resulting move towards more LNG, which shall come from overseas, will have to be connected to the existing power system. New LNG terminals and the build-out of the supporting transport and regasification infrastructure are necessary.

Experts at the IEA believe that there is some potential to scale up biogas and biomethane supply in the short term even though the lead times for new projects are significant. The technology is low-carbon and offers important medium-term upside for the EU's domestic gas output. However, also in this area infrastructure investments will be necessary as the biogas has to be transported as well.

5. Key Challenges for Financial Markets

For the further discussion, there are three core assumptions with regard to how the Russian-Ukrainian war will affect financial markets in the longer term:

* See www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-cut-oil-use, accessed on 29 March 2022

† As per <https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility>, accessed on 25 March 2022.

- Increased volatility
- Challenges to economic growth
- Surge in inflation

5.1. Increase in long-term volatility

As described in earlier chapters, the Russian invasion has triggered a retaliatory response by NATO and its allies of an unprecedented kind, employing a forceful strategy of economic and financial isolation against the aggressor that few observers would have expected. The full ramifications of those actions and the subsequent reactions by Russia are not all clear yet, but they have already added to a higher degree of uncertainty. As the involved actors' countenance measures and countermeasures, it becomes harder for financial markets to project into the future, which in turn creates more volatility.

From a purely military perspective, the probability of a tail-risk scenario, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, just multiplied as the Russian invasion was failing to achieve the desired quick victory. This tail-risk scenario has arguably become more probable than at any time since the fall of the Iron Curtain, with unknown consequences for the world. Even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict were to end soon and without further escalation, the world realised how precariously close it might have come to see the deployment of nuclear weapons on the battle field, thus creating a lasting effect on military risk analysis for the future. A retrenchment from this scenario would only happen very gradually and over a long period of time.*

As the bombs keep falling in Ukraine, international contracts are being ripped up or unilaterally changed. The US, Europe and other allies refuse Russia access to central bank reserve funds held in their jurisdictions, while Russia seizes foreign assets and declares existing contracts null and void.

For several decades, the level of confidence in international treaties and contracts—be they between nations or between companies of different nations—has been rather high by historic standards and reinforced by a series of international institutions, such as the WTO. However, the Russian conflict has undermined this confidence and going forward investors will have to take into account that economic sanctions and financial measures happen faster and become more painful than during the previous era.

As the world is retreating more within national borders and striving for more autonomy, it will also place less weight on international treaties since they are seen as less binding and thus becoming slightly less relevant for the functioning of a nation. While more interdependence among nations was meant to create more stability, less interdependence is very likely to lead to the contrary. And less political stability means more financial volatility.

5.2. Growth Challenges

There are some very obvious consequences that stem directly from the current conflict in Eastern Europe and which have an impact on economic growth:

* Note: The closest historic parallel that is being drawn up is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which very nearly ended in the deployment of nuclear weapons and shaped security thinking for decades to come.

- The war is costing Russia and Ukraine billions of dollars in military expenditure.
- The allies who are supporting Ukraine's defence effort, are also spending billions providing weapons, logistical and economic support.
- Russia and Ukraine are destroying important parts of the European infrastructure, which have to be rebuilt.
- They created additional costs for other nations, especially NATO, who responded by moving military personnel and equipment, adjusting their defensive capabilities.
- They triggered rearmament around them.*
- In Ukraine, the war has devastated large parts of the economy already
- The economic and financial sanctions implemented will lead to a deep recession in Russia
- Energy and commodity prices, especially those provided by Russia, surged.
- International companies are leaving the Russian market and future direct investments are curtailed
- Supply chains are being rerouted
- Millions of citizens have left their homes and jobs and are resettling elsewhere
- The IT infrastructures of various countries were attacked
- A further escalation of the energy delivery stand-off between Russia and the EU carries the risk of a European recession

All the above have a negative impact on growth: very significant in the short term but in many cases reducing growth prospects in the longer term as well. A new phase of stagflation has become much more likely. The negative supply shock, coupled with a wider adjustment to the new security landscape, is expected to create higher prices in the absence of meaningful growth.

However, there is an additional element to take into account. The Western retaliation to the Russian invasion was to freeze Russia out of the global financial system. The lessons for nations not dealing in US dollars or Euros is twofold: First, when foreign currency reserves can be frozen so readily—as happened to the Russian assets held at the central banks in the US, EU, Japan, UK, Canada, Australia and Switzerland—then the value of those assets is far less relevant than in the past. As a consequence, other nations will build them less and use them less. Second, when payment systems and banking networks can cut off a nation's financial infrastructure, then that nation—and others like it—will design alternative strategies. It seems that the participation of the countries of the world in American and European designed and dominated financial infrastructures will be considerably lower in the future. This means that transaction costs, which gradually declined as part of the globalisation process, will rise again, thus also dampening future growth.

* The most visible example being Germany's decision to ramp up defence spending by EUR 100bn and committing to keeping it above 2% of GDP in the future. See the earlier mentioned speech by German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz on 27 February 2022. As per www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378, accessed on 5 May 2022

5.3. Surge in Inflation

For many years, inflation in the developed world was more of academic interest than a real business concern. As central bankers watched over inflation developments, the era of globalisation and especially the integration of China into the world economy on a large scale, led to a period of sustained low inflation.

Immediately following the Russian invasion, markets reacted by sharply pushing energy prices up: crude oil is almost 80% dearer year-on-year, gas more than 100%. Other commodity prices have moved sharply upwards as well: lithium over 250% (year-on-year), magnesium 150%, nickel 100%, tin and cobalt over 60% while oat, cotton, coffee, wheat and palm oil are up by between 60 and 80%.*

As energy becomes more expensive, so will the goods that further downstream depend on energy. The inflationary shock to the system has already started to create secondary waves and it is likely that those will not only multiply but are likely to become more pervasive and entrenched. Inflation feeds to a certain degree on itself as it pushes everybody's expectations upwards, thus creating an environment where it can become self-fulfilling. In a low-growth environment, as discussed above, the tools for governments and central banks to combat inflation are severely restricted.

For investors this means that they need to adapt their strategies. Asset classes that provide direct or indirect inflation protection are likely to outgrow those that do not. It will be hard to make a case for bonds in such a scenario and even inflation linkers have their limitations as adverse movement in spreads could frustrate the investment goal.

Overall, it is expected that manufacturers and consumers alike will test their pricing power in the new economy. While most experts expect a period of higher inflation, it is less clear for how long this will last. Monetary policy could yet help dampen it and the adjustments to the production systems might bring more growth faster than we currently think.

At the same time, inflation will not be uniform as certain sectors can pass on costs more readily to the market while others cannot. Equally, the impact on wage growth is going to be diverse from one sector to the next. Specialists in those areas that are growing and those sectors that are most relevant to the adaptation process will see their income prospects rise.

6. Final Reflections

When Herbert George Wells wrote in 1914 about World War I that it would be “the war to end all wars”,[†] it was idealistically perceived as being the entry point to a new era of peace. However, as it turned out, it was the aftermath of World War I that should directly contribute to World War II, as too many questions remained unstable and problems among nations not only unresolved but exacerbated. It was only after World War II and ironically

* Data as per Bloomberg and Reuters, accessed on 29 March 2022.

[†] H. G. Wells (1914): *The War That Will End War*. Note: The quote “the war to end all wars” is the more modern and popularized version of the originally used “the war to end wars” by the author.

with the emergence of the stalemate between the US and the USSR as dominating world powers with rivalling ideologies that ushered in a period of stability and economic growth, especially for Europe.

The last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st saw an acceleration of the trend to connect nations more intimately with each other. The participation in a modern intertwined production and consumption networks allowed more countries to participate and reap the benefits of global co-operation. Greater cultural exchange ensued as well and thus globalisation was born, resulting in more economic growth and wealth creation worldwide.

However, as we posit in this paper, we see strong indicators that the Russian-Ukraine conflict marks the end of this period of relative stability, (relatively) low global military spending, and wide-spread international co-operation. Of course, even during the past three decades, the inevitable conflicts arose from time to time, but usually they remained localised events that never seriously called into question the overall trend towards ever more globalisation.

This is now changing as nations have begun to entrench and decouple in search for greater independence and autonomy. National security and questions of sovereignty are moving up the list of priorities.* The key question for everybody on this planet is, what will come next?

The answer to this question should be in our hands. A phase of de-globalisation does not *per se* have to be bad. It is likely that the coming years will see smaller economic advancements for individuals as the peace dividend and the benefits of accelerating globalisation are disappearing while the frictional cost (military spending, near-shoring expenses, border and transit complications etc.) are rising again. However, this phase could be used to address the vulnerabilities that have built up in the relations among nations. The new world order is not set and even though many expect a similar duopoly to emerge between US and China, thus replacing the US-USSR duopoly of old, this is not a forgone conclusion and history hardly ever repeats itself in the same way.

One thing seems certain though, after more than 10 weeks into the Russian-Ukraine conflict: Following this war, Russia will have to come to terms with the harsh reality of being no more a top tier power in the world—nuclear weapons alone do not justify such a standing. Given the direct and especially the indirect cost of the confrontation, Russia will fall economically even further behind the US, China, India, Brazil and the leading European nations. Geopolitically, it will have a reduced sphere of influence, particularly as previously neutral nations in Central and Eastern Europe (such as Finland, Sweden, Switzerland or Austria) are realigning themselves while Russia's neighbours (such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria as well as the Baltic states) are detaching themselves further, too.

Russia will have to determine whether it wants to continue antagonising Europe, where it has its traditional historic ties, as well as the US and other NATO states. The consequence would likely be a drift towards becoming a vassal to an economic and militarily far superior

* See e.g. the UK's (Br)exit from the EU, where a small degree in additional sovereignty was acquired at the price of significant economic disruption, lower growth, higher inflation and the reversal of a decade-long trend towards more European integration.

China. But maybe Russia can find a role again as a dependable international partner that ideally excludes or at least significantly reduces military aggression from the list of acceptable policy options. This might be hard to imagine under the current leadership. However, the same would have applied to Germany and Italy in the early 1940s. And while “*Change through trade*” might have been the wrong formula for dealing with an autocratic regime, it might be an option if and when Russia decides to become a real and sustained democracy. The world, especially Europe and the US, should have an interest in helping Russia on this way rather than writing the nation off completely.

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An Assessment of the Efficacy of Economic Sanctions in Response to Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine

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Abstract

Economic Sanctions are being deployed by the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict at a level never before attempted with the intention of wrecking the Russian economy. Very little attention is given to the dismal record of sanctions or the consequences of sanctions on civilians, mercantile enterprises, global and regional economies, and the economies of countries applying the sanctions. This paper examines the unintended consequences of sanctions and argues that they are ineffective at countering military aggression because they are ambiguous when calibrated against military actions which require precise responses with strong signals. Criteria for the evaluation of possible responses to military aggression are proposed.

Embargoes have historically been an important tool of war. Athens issued the Megarian Decree in 432 B.C. to embargo an ally of Sparta. The embargo became an unintentional factor in sparking the Peloponnesian War.¹ In 1806, in response to British blockades, Napoleon created the Continental System prohibiting trade with the United Kingdom in an effort to cripple its economy. However, trade by the British found other routes and the blockade did more harm to the continent than to the UK and contributed to his ultimate defeat. Britain's counter embargo sparked the War of 1812 with the US over maritime rights.² Embargoes have a spotted history.

The modern idea that economic punishment is the best tool to discourage aggression has its roots in the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson called it "something more tremendous than war...the threat of absolute isolation". The idea that economics is a better weapon to conduct war caught on and persists to the present day. Article 41 of the UN Charter authorizes the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council. The UN imposed its first sanction in 1966 on Rhodesia. By 2019, the US was imposing economic sanctions on twenty-one countries. The EU currently imposes economic sanctions on over a dozen countries. In addition, Russia has employed economic sanctions against the pro-Western governments of the former Soviet Union.

While embargoes are focused on goods, economic sanctions can be precisely targeted at money and are often used by governments to punish individuals, companies, and governments through the financial system. One of the longest-lived economic sanctions is the US against Cuba, which started as an embargo in 1962 to punish the regime and encourage regime

change. It has clearly failed. The UN has repeatedly denounced the Cuban sanctions in near-unanimous votes by its member states.³

“This war marks a significant shift in the world power structure with serious implications for the role of nuclear weapons.”

Despite widespread use, sanctions have had limited effectiveness. Western governments have been willing to impose sanctions as punishment for nuclear proliferation, human rights violations, authoritarian rule, etc. For example, the US placed severe sanctions on Vietnam, Iran, and North Korea. While these sanctions may have slowed down their economies somewhat or even disrupted the supply of vital goods, they have not resulted in either policy shift or regime change.

Nonetheless, support for sanctions remains strong in the West. The US, for one, thinks it has found a better way to conduct war—with economists instead of generals. Under the leadership of the White House, the West has formed a powerful financial coalition determined to push the Russian economy into an abyss with this coercive tool of economic warfare. History suggests that the outcome of this effort is all but certain. At the end of World War I, the victors chose to impose severe sanctions on Germany to suppress its economy. The result was WWII.

The assault by Russia on Ukraine is an assault on freedom and democracy. These values are not revered in Russia, China, or Iran as they are in the West. Indeed, democracy is perceived as a threat. Likewise, the West views authoritarian regimes as a threat to peace and sees democratic government as the only long-term solution to the problem of violent conflict. It is this growing enmity that fomented a hot war in Ukraine. NATO in Ukraine is viewed as an existential threat by the Russian state. In such circumstances, the possibility of a nuclear response is real.

Reluctance to come to the aid of Ukraine with troops, heavy arms, and aircraft lies in stark contrast to the global public outcry that has accompanied the invasion. Politicians are quick to condemn Russia and just as quick to warn about escalating the conflict. But how is it that a vigorous defense is now seen as an escalation? A counterattack on Russian soil would likely be viewed that way, but why would military action within the borders of Ukraine be taken off the table for fear of provoking the aggressor? The nuclear risk is real, but surely Russia would not use nuclear weapons if its homeland is not threatened—or would it?

While their forces face off against each other with Russia brandishing nuclear weapons, both sides realize that nuclear war means mutual destruction. Instead, conventional war is fought against a backdrop of Armageddon, each side skittish that it does not escalate the conflict too far beyond bullets and bombs. As a result, we see Russia using tanks and infantry to blow up buildings and kill civilians and Ukraine pushing back with Western-supplied arms, but without the Western troops or air support needed to check Russian military power. Sanctions are intended to provide a check on Russian military aggression.

Though the advantage to Russia of its nuclear arsenal is real, so is the West's control of the global financial system. The desire to wreak havoc without provoking a nuclear response is the catalyst for economic warfare on a scale never before seen. These are no ordinary sanctions. There is intense pressure on the ruble. Interest rates have soared to 20% as the central bank attempts to contain capital flight. The West's goal is to bring the Russian economy to its knees by cutting off access to the global banking system and the global economy, which is 60%-80% denominated in dollars.

“The West’s reliance on economic sanctions to thwart aggression is dangerous, strengthening rather than weakening the political base of autocratic regimes.”

Unfortunately, the sanctions used as a stand-in for military power are fraught with unintended consequences. First, sanctions are a powerful motivator for authoritarian regimes to move away from the dollar as the world reserve currency. China has already made efforts to weaken the dollar as the world's reserve currency.⁴ Its recent negotiations with Saudi Arabia to price oil in yuan are further in that direction.⁵ Second, China's economic success enables it to mitigate the effects of sanctions on other authoritarian regimes. For example, it can covertly or overtly purchase Russian and Iranian oil or any other fungible commodity without easy detection. Sanctions work best when a united international coalition implements them, which is rarely the case. Moreover, while sanctions might not provoke a conventional military response, Russia has other ways of countering sanctions, including cyberattacks capable of significant economic impact on the West in a manner not dissimilar to the economic sanctions the West is imposing.

Sanctions also have the perverse effect of harming the global economy. Just as with other developed countries, Russia has resources and competencies in many industries that are not easily replicated. For every Russian seller that cannot sell, there is a non-Russian buyer who cannot buy and vice versa. Some foreign companies that depend on Russian goods and services will be forced to shutter their businesses. Likewise, many suppliers to Russia will see their businesses shrink or close. In a global economy, everyone benefits from open trade. These mutual benefits disappear when sanctions close markets. Though the cost of lost jobs and profits accruing to the imposer of sanctions is largely ignored by the imposing country, US sanctions in 1995 may have reduced US exports to 26 target countries by as much as \$15 billion to \$19 billion.⁶ This cost was spread across the business community and ultimately falls on consumers.

Sanctions generally fall on the people harder than on the government. As North Korea has shown, governments have the coercive power to take what they need—the people do not. The shuttered stores and bare grocery shelves in Moscow bear witness to the effect of sanctions on ordinary people. Less obvious but more severe is the ripple effect of sanctions on small businesses of every ilk. These companies rarely possess the resources to weather

economic hardship and many will fail. Moreover, many essentials like medicine and food are affected by sanctions, which fall principally on the innocent. Russia and Ukraine are two of the world's largest grain exporters. The UN has warned of a global famine due to the imposition of grain embargoes on both countries.⁷ These embargoes will cause great harm to consumers in the Middle East and Africa, as well as raise global prices.

Sanctions can easily backfire politically, stoking nationalism. Sanctions are mistakenly viewed as a way to turn civilians against their leaders. Instead, the suffering population usually perceives sanctions as a crime against the people rather than an indictment of the government. When this happens the popularity of the targeted regime can rise, as is happening now in Russia where Putin's popularity has risen to over 80%.⁸ Many in the West point to Putin's control of the media as the source of his popularity. Nationalism due to the war effort and a backlash against the West is a more likely cause.

This war marks a significant shift in the world power structure with serious implications for the role of nuclear weapons. The West is sending another clear message to its adversaries that nuclear weapons are an essential bargaining chip by not intervening militarily. Sanctions are seen as a way to punish while avoiding the risk of a nuclear war. So, economic sanctions have become a fallback—somewhere between doing nothing and doing something militarily provocative that might have horrendous unintended consequences. But, while sanctions are a recognized tool of warfare which can inflict severe punishment, the response by a targeted country is not likely to be a reduction in hostility.

While sanctions may effectively alter bad trading behavior, they are weak disincentives for military aggression. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed economic sanctions in 2019, interviewing officials and reviewing academic studies. When applied by a global organization or by a large trading partner, sanctions were found to be most effective at altering market behavior. Although sanctions can be shown to impact the target's overall economic health in certain situations, the GAO concluded that there is no evidence to support their effectiveness in achieving broad policy goals.⁹

The West's reliance on economic sanctions to thwart aggression is dangerous, strengthening rather than weakening the political base of autocratic regimes. It creates powerful incentives for autocratic states to align ever more closely in trade, banking, and military activities. The Russia/China friendship agreement is a strong signal that such an alignment has already begun. This alignment has the potential to effectively negate many of the intended effects of sanctions. Russia has the natural resources that China needs, and China has the manufacturing capacity that Russia needs. Together they are capable of autarky. Both are eager to undermine reliance on the dollar and Western trade.

Cooperation in the global arena is essential for peace and prosperity. Therefore, when one country or coalition of countries illegally attempts to impose itself militarily on a neighbor, there must be an immediate and unambiguous response. Unfortunately, economic sanctions are unambiguous only in an economic setting. In a military conflict, they are completely ambiguous. This form of asymmetric warfare is impossible to calibrate against military action.

Wartime diplomacy requires that the aggressor understand three things: the response will be painfully swift, disproportionately light (non-escalatory), and will end immediately upon the restoration of cooperation. Economic sanctions meet none of these requirements. Economic sanctions are slow to show effect. They trickle through supply chains and banking systems and their full effect is unknown for years. Economic sanctions can continue to drag down an economy even after a conflict has ended because the breakdown of systems that support commerce and banking takes time to be reconstructed. In the end, it is hard to know if economic sanctions are more or less severe than the military aggression they are attempting to redress.

Economic sanctions punish innocent civilians, are ambiguous and difficult to calibrate, and harm the global economy. Sanctions drive civilians into the arms of their autocratic leaders. They create perverse incentives for autarky and foster alliances of authoritarian regimes as well as subversion of the dollar as the global currency. Sanctions have a dismal history of failure in the face of military aggression. Yet, they remain the weapon of choice as Western governments sidestep the difficult choice between neutrality and direct military intervention.

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Energy – Adjusting to a New Global Order

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Abstract

Globalization was challenged by the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced the European Union to acknowledge its limitations on many fronts, from access to raw materials to manufacturing, and from control of data to innovation in general. The ongoing geopolitical situation, which promises to be a game-changer for years to come, only reinforced the consciousness that we might be heading towards a new (old) reality of different blocks with little to no interaction between them. In the EU, the matter of strategic sovereignty has never been so urgent. Especially in regards to energy. The question, now, is how can the EU quickly release itself from the present excessive dependence on a single foreign supplier, while at the same time remain aligned with its green transition goals. Diversification of energy sources, with an emphasis on research and innovation; suppliers and supply chains, with a focus on interconnections; strategic reserves and energy efficiency; joint public procurement and the development of a true European Single Market for Energy. In this paper, I reflect on these and other possible solutions for the present energy crisis.

1. The Problem of Energy Dependence

Energy is the single most important asset in the modern world. Even the perspective of inadequate or unaffordable access to energy has severe consequences, due to the immediate reaction it instils in the markets. The population is affected, all industrial sectors are affected, especially energy-intensive industries, the economy suffers and all our societal goals, including the fight on climate change, are put in check. When a bloc, such as the European Union, allows itself to be placed in a position of considerable dependency on a single external provider of such an important commodity, the risks are considerable. It is time to change the *status quo* and this is precisely what the European Union is doing.

The measures currently being adopted targeting energy imports from Russia serve a political purpose but they are also an important part of a fundamental policy change aimed at reclaiming our energy independence. Over the years, the main guiding lines in European energy policies have been, first, affordability, and more recently sustainability. Now, security must also be a part of the equation. The EU will likely restore its economic relations with Russia to some degree, after the current conflict ends, but it will never again allow itself to be placed in such a fragile position.

This is not to say that nothing was done in the recent past to address energy dependence. Over the last decade, several Member States managed to significantly reduce their imports,

which was achieved mostly by investing in renewables, while others worked on diversifying their suppliers. In 2011, the EU spent €148 billion on energy imports from its main supplier. Ten years later, in 2021, according to the European Commission, it was spending €99 billion.

“These are demanding times for the EU, which has been forced by the circumstances to balance long-term goals with measures aimed at addressing its immediate needs. However, the present predicaments are also a rare opportunity to correct our mistakes, rethink our strategies and set the path to a much better future in terms of energy security and sustainability.”

Still, rather than representing a conscious movement or an anticipation of the problems we are now experiencing, this effort was driven essentially by economic rationality, and from the perspective of each individual Member State. Moreover, this was an uneven process within the European Union, with some countries actually maintaining or even increasing their dependency. Germany obviously comes to mind in this last category, which poses an additional problem, because what happens in Germany reflects in the entire EU. We need to step up our efforts.

In 2021, 40% of the gas consumed in the European Union, 46% of coal imports and 20% of oil imports still came from Russia. Central and Eastern European countries are the most reliant on Moscow’s energy, while Southern and Northern Member-States have a more diversified energy mix, in terms of both energy sources and providers. These discrepancies pose additional challenges to the EU, given the different interests at stake. However, they also provide us with an opportunity to find the solutions within our borders, taking advantage of the untapped potential of several Member States to serve as alternative energy suppliers or intermediaries. Natural gas, as it will be explained ahead, is a critical element in this equation.

2. A Route for Sustainable and Affordable Energy

In the present legislature, the first milestone, in terms of a new common European policy towards Energy was the European Green Deal, presented by the European Commission in 2019, where the transition towards sustainable and affordable energy sources plays a decisive role. These intentions started to gain form with the Climate Law and were followed by the very comprehensive Fit-for-55 package, divided in seventeen different files that cover every dimension of the society and the economy. More recently, the RePowerEU package was presented, as a specific response to the supply problems caused by the situation in Ukraine.

It is this author’s opinion that, although comprehensive in their analysis and clear in their intentions, all these legislative proposals lack specific measures and investments aimed at helping European industries and the European societies in general to adjust.

A strategy aimed at ensuring the sustainable and affordable energy supply of the EU must rely on three major pillars: research and innovation, infrastructure and a strong single market.

Research and Innovation, driven especially by the Horizon Europe framework programme and its initiatives, and also by the National Recovery and Resilience Programmes and other lines of funding, will be essential for Europe to develop and scale-up clean and affordable energy sources, while also critically improving energy-efficiency. A strong and constant investment in research and innovation will be decisive. This is what will allow us to maximize the potential of established renewables, bring other technologies from the development to the implementation stage and continue to make important discoveries and breakthroughs on this front.

According to the European Commission's proposal, still subject to negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) establishes an increased target for renewables in EU energy mix from 32% to 40% by 2030, which implies more than doubling the 19.7% they represented in 2019. The Energy Efficiency Directive replaces non-binding 32.5% target for energy efficiency savings in primary and final energy consumption by 2030 (in comparison with 2007), with binding targets of 36% and 39% savings in final and primary energy consumption. None of these goals is achievable without the full transformational power of R&I.

At the same time, however, non-renewables will still have an important part to play as transition energies. This is where the infrastructure becomes important. The EU needs to prepare itself for new energy sources and vehicles, such as hydrogen. At the same time, it must not neglect its present needs, which include finding alternative suppliers and supply chains for gas.

As part of the RePowerEU initiative, the Commission is currently mapping the most urgent needs in terms of storage capabilities and gas and electricity interconnectors. However, it is assumedly favouring electricity projects. Gas interconnections, which were until recently a part of the EU list of Projects of Common Interest, are being kept on hold. First, because the European Commission does not believe they could have an impact in terms of the most urgent actions, aimed at preparing for the Winter of 2022 and, secondly, because it is still sensible to the claims made by some sectors that investing in gas contradicts the Green Deal objectives.

This is, however, a fallacious justification. Natural gas will remain a necessity for years to come, as transition energy. Not acknowledging that fact does nothing to advance our climate goals and it creates a real risk for the energy security of Europe. Projects such as the Mid-cat interconnector, crossing the Pyrenees, would allow the EU to benefit from the existing LNG terminals in Portugal and Spain, creating an alternative route to the Centre of Europe. Naturally, all these projects must be designed and implemented bearing in mind their compatibility with other low-carbon energy sources and vehicles, notably hydrogen.

Consolidating the single market for energy will be equally essential. The surge in energy prices that started in 2021 has shown us that we need a much more coordinated approach,

especially on gas. Member States need to share clear information on storage, monitoring of availability, expected deliveries and levels of reserves. Rules and regulations must be tested and, if proven necessary, revised in order to reduce bureaucracy and other artificial market burdens. Joint procurement and, eventually, the establishment of temporary price-caps are also open options to reduce the inflationary pressure.

These are demanding times for the EU, which has been forced by the circumstances to balance long-term goals with measures aimed at addressing its immediate needs. However, the present predicaments are also a rare opportunity to correct our mistakes, rethink our strategies and set the path to a much better future in terms of energy security and sustainability.

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Can the Future be Predicted? Deliberations on a war we cannot afford

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Abstract

The war on Ukraine is a wake-up call. Not because not all wars are atrocities that steal lives and future. It is a wake-up call, because it so bluntly reveals the violent perpetuation of a dominance model that has held human evolution captive for 6000 years. The article looks at the underlying pattern that creates, keeps and recreates structures that give rise to mad men and psychopaths who then think appropriating a country (or a woman, or people, or natural resources, or else) is a legitimate act. It explores the still so widespread power narratives that we need to urgently overcome and suggests that investing into the pro-active building of a new power narrative is what needs to underscore all of our efforts towards sustainability transformations. It concludes that, for the paradigm shift to be successful, we must build—throughout the world—resilient partnership approaches anchored in a female reference system of care and consensus building.

For many of the people that I know, the 24th of February 2022 was a date when the frightening feeling arose, somebody is stealing our future. Many people are stealing our future and that of future generations every day, many are complicit with the constant act of endangering our life support system, but the day when the war in Ukraine began, was a different kind of wake-up call. It all culminated in the feeling that a mad man, a psychopath, trying to re-write history, is determining our future—like so many mad men before. It felt as if this would not fit into the modernity of the 21st century, into our efforts and ambitions to save this planet, mitigate climate change, revive our societies and regenerate our ecosystems. We cannot afford this war was the inner cry, and we know that we cannot afford any war. Those who still hold the dream of peaceful egalitarian societies, were confronted with a reality they could not believe, as if they had been transported into a movie, of which they knew neither script nor director, and failed to understand their role. Those of us who are feminists and convinced that changing power structures between genders is a prerequisite for peaceful and life-supporting egalitarian societies, were hit hardest. It is as if an old normality re-emerged, one that most of us were convinced we had overcome. We know patriarchal rebounds were on the rise with the resurgence of right-wing movements, strong dominant men and more violence against women. But the bluntness of this invasion, even using misogynist terminology as if Ukraine were a woman, made us gasp. And seemingly silent.

What followed is known: a global outcry, hundreds of statements as well as deliberate absence of statements, politically motivated silence of some, calls to action of many others,

bundles of sanctions, a huge rise in production and delivery of weapons, a massive military rearmament, a rise of the complaints that this war gets more attention than others—all accompanied by the sight or the knowledge of people being forced to leave their homes, people being killed, people being tortured, women being raped. War as war is and always has been, no matter when and where in this world. This is the way humankind has seen war for about 6000 years. As inhuman as always, today it is slightly more sophisticated in tactics and technology than a few hundred years ago, and vastly more dangerous than ever before. The threat of the usage of nuclear weapons was built into communication.

“Since we need both power in the sense of responsibility and power in the sense of impact for a vital and sustainable future in which everyone envisions a future that is worth living, it is important to understand what the phenomenon of power has to do with how we recognize power pathologies and how we can avoid them if possible.”

1. Could this war have been predicted? The answer is a clear yes.

The following deliberations will not look at the Kreml’s strategy and communication or an analysis of failed European and US politics. It will not look at whether diplomacy had failed and developments had been misinterpreted. Instead, it will look at the underlying pattern that creates, keeps and recreates structures that give rise to mad men and psychopaths who then think appropriating a country (or a woman, or people, or natural resources, or else) is a legitimate act. The economist Mariana Mazzucato, who is chairing an all women council of the WHO on *Economics of Health for All*, reminded us in an article on 8th May 2022 that during the first year of the pandemic, the global GDP grew by \$2.2 trillion as a result of military rearmament*. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditure continued to grow, particularly in Asia, and also in Russia and the US, and reached another record level in the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. It has been on the rise for 7 consecutive years and has reached an all-time high†. With the war in Ukraine leading to further rearmament, this figure is likely to increase. Hence, we have literally been sleeping on a bomb. It exploded in Ukraine.

Humankind’s history has shown that rising military expenditure never led to peace. Yet peace is the number one turnaround we need in the world to master all other turnarounds that are required: sustainable food, renewable energy, economic justice, recovering ecosystems and overcoming poverty. The economic structure behind rearmament is obvious: war, as we can see now from the effect of the war in Ukraine, will damage not only those directly hit

* <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/valuing-health-for-all-new-metrics-for-economic-policy-and-progress-by-mariana-mazzucato-2022-03?barrier=accesspaylog>

† <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time>

by war atrocities, but over time through our global interdependency all of us, and those less economically endowed more and more. Others, particularly the weapons industry, will make a fortune without paying those that suffer from wars a dividend.

“If we think our planetary crises can be solved without abolishing the so deeply ingrained and pervasive pathological power structures globally, we are naïve. It will not work.”

2. Have we, while combating (notice the term!) the COVID-19 pandemic, been blind to diseases that are even more dangerous?

The simple summary is: we live in a world where a combined pathology is at work—the pathology of dominance, legitimizing abuse of power and warfare combined with the pathology of an economy that extracts life from people and the planet. As humankind, we have been walking in this pathology for thousands of years, knowingly or unknowingly.

Could the war in Ukraine have been predicted? The systems scientist Riane Eisler, author of the world bestseller *The Chalice and the Blade*¹ as well as the visionary book on economics (*The Real Wealth of Nations*), would say: from the patterns emerging over time—yes. Why?

There is a hidden connection that we need to reveal, remember, and bring to the surface again and again. The increase in military spending combined during the pandemic is combined with an increase in violence against women.* The rise in violence in communication, literature, movies, games, topped with the popularity of strong men is a pattern that shows a resurgence and reinforcement of androcratic societal dominance structures. These structures are accompanied by institutionalized male toxicity, disdain for women who want to be free and often enough culminating in male leaders of totalitarian regimes. Highly pathological, these totalitarian regimes celebrate heroic maleness, thrive on fear and install all possible institutionalization of oppression. They create enemies that need to be destroyed by all means. They create reasons for a war and implement it without mercy and with the cold-blooded logic that helps to perpetuate their dominance. We need to become aware that on the route to androcratic totalitarian regimes is the millennia-old mental model of declaring war against egalitarian societal relationships. Hence, there are many steps of androcratic dominance towards its pinnacle—the totalitarian state. Not only today with social media and cyber wars, has the production of myths been part and parcel of the building of totalitarian regimes. What history books do not show and teachers do not teach, is that *the men behind violent oppressive dominance are not simply narcissists or psychopaths—they are a product of sanctioned societal and mental structures that rank women as secondary objects, the life of people not important enough to not kill them, and nature a place to conquer*. Power, in this androcratic mental structure, is always a power over something or someone. However, this is not the true meaning of power—it is a power pathology. Here and now, in the 21st century

* <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/womens-month-break-the-bias-by-ellen-j-sirleaf-and-lilian-best-2022-05>

that many of us believed would be a gateway to a regenerative human future, we live in the mud of a pervasive power pathology that needs treatment.

3. How do we get out of these power myths that increase military spending at the expense of all of our future? How can we predict and above all, create egalitarian societies that are peaceful, fair and sustainable?

The dazzling connotations of the phenomenon of power run through the entire history of mankind and we usually associate nothing good with it. More precisely: when we think of power, we first think of power pathologies, i.e. of all the phenomena in which power was either really misused or at least not used for the benefit of all. We know from history and the present that pathologies of power in the political sphere can reach dramatic proportions, lead to war or oppression and bring suffering and grief to millions of people. But in business, too, we know the pattern of power pathologies when executives enrich themselves, act unethically or unfairly eliminate competition. In the overwhelming majority, although not exclusively, these appear to be phenomena manifested by men. It would therefore be fair to ask whether power pathologies and our notions of heroic masculinity are intrinsically linked, or whether our societal structures draw men more easily into power pathologies, or at least make them vulnerable. Since we need both power in the sense of responsibility and power in the sense of impact for a vital and sustainable future in which everyone envisions a future that is worth living, it is important to understand what the phenomenon of power has to do with how we recognize power pathologies and how we can avoid them if possible.

The concept of power has been and is described, analyzed and interpreted by many philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists. Most of them have been male scientists. Few but very interesting and well-known exceptions are **Hanna Ahrend, Riane Eisler and Mary Beard**—three women whose understanding of the phenomenon of power differ significantly from that of their peers, and who provide us with key elements for an understanding of power that is future-proof and useful for transformative leadership.

It is not surprising that power as a concept has always been interpreted and analyzed against the background of the visible phenomenon of actions between people. The attempt to understand power is thus based on its perceivable effects. As with all sociological and psychological concepts, the understanding of the concept of power is embedded in the *zeitgeist*, in social values and thought structures. The concept of power is interpreted as visible behavior with visible effects, i.e. as a phenomenon, so to speak, above the water surface. However, how the phenomenon of power is interpreted, but also lived, depends to a large extent on all the invisible layers of the iceberg below the water surface: on mental models, thought structures, unquestioned social agreements. Therefore, no definition of power will be simply valid, but understanding the phenomenon broadly can help us to rearrange our own relationship with power and use power in terms of effect for transformation in a justifiable way.

A very common definition of power that is often quoted and therefore probably firmly anchored in the thinking of many people in the world who claim power, is that of Max

Weber.² For him, power is always a form of enforcing one's own will (or that of a group) against the will of others. A number of scientists who deal intensively with planetary crises would welcome politicians acquiring this assertiveness and implementing future-oriented measures even against the will of others. But the history of mankind has shown that there are great differences between the power of persuasion and manipulation, as well as between the assertion of interests and the processes of negotiation. The boundary point that separates power as a transformative effect from power as abuse, hence power pathologies, is often blurred. Yet, unless we know this boundary point and its underlying mental and institutional structures, we perpetuate the pathology we live in. This is not what we need for a sustainable and regenerative future.

The transformations we need to bring forward for a lovable and livable future need to be centred on systems aliveness, societal and ecosystems vitality, leadership of many and dynamic self-organization. This is not a naïve dream, but the only way to go. I am repeating this: this is the only pathway into a sustainable future. If we think our planetary crises can be solved without abolishing the so deeply ingrained and pervasive pathological power structures globally, we are naïve. It will not work. All reputable systems scientists would agree on this—including the late Donella Meadows, the lead author of the famous report to the Club of Rome, *Limits to Growth*, that predicted the collapse of the world as a result of a pathological growth addiction, which is part and parcel of the androcratic power pathology.³ Systems scientists have known for about more than a century what most indigenous communities have kept as old and often female knowledge: the sweet spot of resilience lies in the dynamic equilibrium at the edge of chaos. It is love and the urge for aliveness that bind our planet together and keeps our societies thriving. Care, as Mariana Mazzucato* and Jayati Ghosh† emphasize, lies at the core of our pathways into the future. Agile, innovative, participatory, egalitarian societies with equality between genders and strong governments, and trustfully legitimated power, are the evolutionary advantage we ought to understand, notice, and work towards. If we allow the dominance model to continue—in our heads, in our relationships, in our organizations, our societies, in our global organizations and in our military spending, we are heading for suicide. The dominance model will, rather sooner than later, drive us from the edge into total chaos. For the transformative leadership we need, we get no further with enforcing measures and manipulating behavior, even if the boundaries between persuasion, influencing and manipulation are indeed very fluid.

In the age of the Anthropocene, which is beginning to turn into the age of digitalization, algorithms read our most secret desires, cyber-attacks are increasing and election results are influenced by manipulation. Power is often something that is not directly perceptible: it can work in the background, influence our thoughts and actions or act subtly as a so-called silent power.⁴ This opens doors to reinforcing power pathologies. But as the integral investor Mariana Bozesan‡ says, “We know what to do. Now, we must do what we know.” With a new paradigm of power, digitalization can support our future by supporting life.

* <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/valuing-health-for-all-new-metrics-for-economic-policy-and-progress-by-mariana-mazzucato-2022-03?barrier=accesspaylog>

† <https://socialeurope.eu/the-feminist-building-blocks-of-a-just-sustainable-economy>

‡ <https://www.cadmusjournal.org/article/volume-4/issue-5/essay3-integral-approach-social-transformation>

Hence, we are getting no further with the traditional definitions of power, which are mostly power pathologies, but we still have to deal with the phenomenon of power. Because the future emerges collectively on the continuum between power, effect and influence. Basically, the most common power definitions, in particular Max Weber's understanding of asserting one's own will against the resistance of others, are by no means definitions of the concept of power, but already the description of power pathologies that justify mad men's behavior and their attractiveness to many other mad men (and to many women). This is a viral disease. Simplified, such definitions of power are based on a misinterpretation of Darwinian theory, which, falsified as social Darwinism, assumes the right of the strongest: in power pathologies whoever is stronger has power. Darwin was more concerned with the fact that the best future prospects are those species that are best adapted to a specific context, i.e. that are also flexible. If we want to make use of an evolutionary advantage, we will have to go back and pick up our history from 6000 years ago. Thanks to the work of the well-known archaeologist Marija Gimbutas* about Old Europe and the Mediterranean Culture, we know that egalitarian societies existed (probably globally), which put a high value on the feminine, organized a distributive economy, had thriving arts and culture and invented most of the technologies we have since then developed further and had thriving arts and culture. Power, in this original historical paradigm, is a connecting element that has an effect on future-making—connecting the individual potentiality with the collective potentiality, the individual interest with the collective interest. It is, as the historian Mary Beard⁵ emphasizes, the process of empowerment, a skill anchored in a female reference system that humankind has known forever. We would not be able to raise children, care for the sick and elderly, educate people or invent and improve democracies. This is what we need to strengthen by all means. Power needs a new narrative.

With the outdated conventional interpretations of power, we do not get any further for transforming the world towards thriving in a safe operating space. On the contrary, power and influence lived according to the dominance paradigm, of which the military is the strongest manifestation, leads to the nature-destroying and people-degrading systems of superiority and subordination that have led to the massive sustainability challenges of our time. So, we have to look for other explanatory patterns on the subject of power.

As a Jew, the political scientist Hannah Arendt experienced pronounced power pathologies, more precisely the unleashed terror of the Nazi regime, and these experiences have shaped her work. That is why she very clearly worked out the difference between power and violence in her works and made it clear that power needs resonance and relationality in order to have an effect, i.e. an agreement between people about its effect.⁶ Violence, on the other hand, begins exactly where this no longer exists and where an attempt is made to maintain power as an end in itself. This is the starting point for domination and terror, and thus for the many manifestations of institutionalized violence based on the spread of fear. From this, basically from power pathologies, totalitarian rule arises—the enforcement of a will, an ideology,

* For an easy introduction into her phenomenal work about Old Europe, this video is worth watching: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-k34hXty4iw>. For the scientific reader, her research is collected, among other books, in *The Civilization of the Goddess*. Harper, San Francisco 1991.

a world view and a future-making, either manipulatively or with brute force. In Hannah Arendt's understanding, however, power does not necessarily have to degenerate into the pathological domain. On the contrary, Arendt sees violence as a symptom of increasing powerlessness that has to resort to brutal means in order to maintain or manifest a certain influence, a structure or the implementation of a certain goal. Then, power becomes terror. Hence it is the fear of powerlessness, the fear of the diminishing androcratic dominance structure in the world that accelerates narcissistic power pathologies. In too many cases this has and is developing into totalitarian rule and ruthless wars. This takes us back to the war against Ukraine. It is the fear of diminishing power and the pathological clinging to a past anchored in the androcratic domination model, coupled with a global male playground of competition for hegemonic mental and physical territory, hence pathological power that lies at the source of this war. It lies at the source of so many other wars, and at the source of a destructive economic system that displays a deep disdain for life.

“Marija Gimbutas, the well-known archaeologist, shows how 6000 years ago, warlike organized societies asserted themselves with weapons, overrunning peaceful societies. This happened in several waves over 2000 to 3000 years and began in the eastern part of today's Europe, which can be roughly located in today's Ukraine and Moldova. The invasions transformed entire cultures into hierarchical, androcentric societies, established power as the right of the strongest, and subjugated women.”

However, power in and of itself is inherently neutral. For Hannah Arendt, power is something that a person or a group does not simply possess, it is more situational, i.e. it arises from perception and action in the relationship between people—it is a potentiality. Power in this sense is based on relationship—relationality—and requires communication processes. It has to create resonance in people in order to be effective. If it does not do that, it loses its potential. It dissolves or, as described above, mutates into tyranny. The fear of losing power is therefore an important building block in the pathologization of power into violence and domination. In Arendt's view, asymmetrical relationships do not necessarily belong to power; on the contrary, power as a potential effect requires a high degree of agreement among equals. From these insights, three aspects are essential for our ambition to transform the world with a new narrative of power.

One aspect is the understanding that power arises communicatively, i.e. it is attributed to people or groups of people who are able to build *resonance*. These can be visions, pictures of the future, hopes, thinking about possibilities, etc., i.e. power arises through an attribution of power, which in egalitarian relationships can also be mutual. Of course, pathologies can also

arise here, such as communicative manipulation, many of which we have known for a long time, not just since digitalization and social media. The limits to manipulation are fluid, it is important to perceive them and make them transparent, on a small and large scale. This is important for transformative leadership, because even commitment to a sustainable future is not immune to pathological striving for power. So, it needs both people and mechanisms that promote transparency and demand it again and again. The second aspect is the realization that power arises through collective agreement, i.e. it is a result of cooperation between people. To a large extent, power is the result of a negotiation process that establishes the *legitimacy* of power. This is the only way that modern constitutional states and democracies can function. This means that people grant other people power in the sense of a potential impact, but can also withdraw legitimacy. Structures and control mechanisms must be in place for this. This brings us to the third aspect, an essential point of the concept of power. In order to prevent or minimize the danger of power pathologies, what is often called *checks and balances* is needed, known in the political and certainly also in the corporate sphere as the separation of powers. Power as an ability to create future requires mechanisms that quickly uncover pathologies and prevent them from establishing and spreading. This is important at the societal level e.g. through democratic and dialogical procedures, at the level of companies and organizations through governance and management systems, and at the individual level through structured reflection. Knowing the difference between human tendencies towards the omnipotence of power pathologies and a meaningful individual or collective effectiveness is not always easy. This knowledge should be taught at schools and universities with history as a guide book, including the knowledge about the functioning of egalitarian societies more than 6000 years ago.

In the psychological sense, power is both something factually structural, i.e. the degree of possibility of influencing the future, and something emotional—the kick, maybe even the drug that we feel when we can influence the future. And we are all susceptible to that to a certain extent. Because the feeling of power gives energy, because it so enormously increases one's perception of vitality, it is a drug whose mechanism of action we need to know if we want to create a sustainable future. In reasonable doses, power as a sense of efficacy is medicine, and it is helpful when there are internal and external controls over its ingestion. If we surrender to it, as protagonists of power or as those who ascribe power, we become addicted. Ultimately, this always has negative consequences, for us, for others and for the world. So, in addition to our own vitality and the vitality of the system we are responsible for, we have to understand the connection between systems' vitality and power. Because power can enhance individual and societal vitality and it can destroy both. If power increases one's own vitality or that of one's own system at the expense of other systems, then we are on the wrong track.

With the global trend towards sustainability, which has taken a long time to establish itself throughout all layers of society, and which is certainly not yet as firmly anchored as it should be, we have at least made important steps in the direction of guard rails for navigating power as new narrative. We must retain their importance of effectiveness and maneuver the new narrative out of the many traps of pathological trajectories. It is worth taking up Riane

Eisler's insights on this. The US-based systems scientist was born in Austria in 1931. Similar to Hannah Arendt, Riane Eisler experienced terror first-hand when she and her mother had to flee Vienna from the Nazi regime as a child. Growing up in the slums of Havana, she began early to draw a connection between the structures that produce poverty and those that produce terror. In her case, too, the attempt to understand how such structures arise and reproduce themselves again and again led to an interdisciplinary research that produced a holistic and, above all, historical approach. In her cultural transformation theory, she distinguishes between two fundamentally different narratives of power that shape societies and become the basic model of their organization. For the *dominance narrative*, she chose the blade as a symbol because it is associated with armed violence from the very beginning of known history. It

thrives on enforcement, superiority and subordination, as described in conventional power theories. Asymmetric relationships are taken as given. Destruction of life and living things—in the form of nature as well as people—is sanctioned as normal in this narrative. For the *partnership narrative* she has chosen the chalice as a symbol, because a life-giving force is at the forefront. It thrives on consensus, cooperation, commitment and diversity. Preservation of life and liveliness is the focus here. Symmetrical relationships are the norm. However, Riane Eisler not only supports the thesis that the global spread of social partnership models must be our future if mankind wants to survive in the long term, but that it was also our past. In her detailed scientific work, she takes us on a journey to prehistoric societies, which provide archaeological evidence, at least for the old European region, that for thousands of years there have been cultures, comparatively high developed, which were not perfect, but by and large lived peacefully. Marija Gimbutas,⁷ the well-known archaeologist, shows how 6000 years ago, warlike organized societies asserted themselves with weapons, overrunning peaceful societies. This happened in several waves over 2000 to 3000 years and began in the eastern part of today's Europe, which can be roughly located in today's Ukraine and Moldova. The invasions transformed entire cultures into hierarchical, androcentric societies, established power as the right of the strongest, and subjugated women. What followed were societal structures based on the dominance narrative. Superiority and subordination were initially established primarily between the sexes. While the partnership-based prehistoric societies were more egalitarian with a special reverence for the female as a life-giving force, worshipped as a goddess, the prevailing narrative of dominance subordinated women to men—with effects that we have not yet overcome. Unlike in the millennia before, women increasingly assumed a subordinate position. The cult of the goddess was gradually replaced by the worship of male gods and finally one male god. This historical perspective on power as the enforcement of a societal model of dominance is important because it also frees us from the assumption that humans are intrinsically warlike and dominating. Looking back at the social development that took place 6000 years ago, the roots of the planetary crises we deal with today go very far back.

“This war could have been predicted and it could have been prevented, if we had attended to the many features of the misogynist dominance narrative much earlier.”

It tells us that we have to fundamentally change the narrative of how we co-create the future, i.e. shifting the power narrative towards one that is life-enhancing.* Many far-reaching positive things have emerged in the last few thousands of years, but one could argue that this happened mainly because the origins of the partnership narrative have asserted themselves time and again. They have balanced warlike and oppressive social developments and despite numerous manifestations of power pathologies, the pendulum kept swinging back in the direction of consensus and cooperation. The work that people have done and which has cost many of them their lives should not be underestimated. For there has always been active resistance to the dominance narrative. All modern movements for social justice, equality, peace, women's rights, environmental protection, climate protection and sustainability, which have not only existed since the last century but have intensified since then, have gradually prepared the ground for a fundamental change in the narrative of power. Riane Eisler rightly claims that, given the planetary emergence we are driving towards, it is no longer enough for the partnership narrative to keep the dominance narrative in check. The partnership narrative, strongly anchored in a female reference system that honors life, needs to become mainstream. This is only possible with global networks dedicated to the partnership approach. More than ever, humanity has no time for the escapades of pathological narratives of dominance. Riane Eisler therefore calls the return to the partnership narrative as a survival strategy for humanity.

The partnership approach is therefore central to transformative leadership, which needs a new narrative of power to focus on system vitality. Power in a new narrative is above all communal, something that in cooperation and communication brings about a future devoted to the many practical aspects of a systems vitality—from the individual to the planetary system. The English historian Mary Beard challenges us to rethink power, to reconceive it as something communal, something that values people who advance the future in mutual support. Power, she reminds us, comes from empowerment and is thus the description of a process of action, a movement and not at all a static possession. It is the ability to operate in the world together, in cooperation and complementarity. That does not mean that everyone has to be the same, equally strong, equally knowledgeable, or equally visionary. It does mean, however, that power as a manifestation of leadership builds communicative resonance and must be mandated and legitimized, must face checks and balances and be committed to a partnership narrative. In this understanding, with such a new narrative, power and effectiveness belong to collective leadership. If we are serious about a sustainable future, it is time to leave power pathologies behind us and ensure that a new narrative of power, based on a system of thought and action based on partnership, becomes resilient.

Truly egalitarian societies with gender equity, accompanied by cultural equity and economic equity are the evolutionary advantage that will take us out of the dark ages that we have been struggling for millennia with and which we are still struggling with today. So many steps have been already taken in the right direction. It is time we became clear that these are not struggles in isolation, not anymore islands of partnering dreams in the sea of dominance, but

* The scientific reasoning can be found in Kuenkel, P & Waddock, S. (2019): Stewarding Life in Troubled Earth System. Vol. 4, Issue 1. Cadmus Journal <http://www.cadmusjournal.org/article/volume-4/issue-1/stewarding-aliveness-troubled-earth-system>. What this means for the transformation of our economic system is described here: Kuenkel, P. (2021): Repurposing Economies Towards Life. Vol. 4, Issue 5. Cadmus Journal, <http://www.cadmusjournal.org/article/volume-4/issue-5/repurposing-economies>.

the emergence of a more mature humanity that has fully embraced a female reference system for ways to organize societies. Egalitarian societies with legitimate governments, people taking care of each other and the natural and social life support system—this is our future. Helping Ukraine to defend itself, as many people say is a war for freedom and democracy. The historic realization that exactly in this area the brutality of power pathologies started, is a frightening insight. It is a call to action: we need to make the partnership narrative and all its different forms of societal systems more resilient—everywhere in the world, at every level. This is our future. If we take this seriously—our sustainable future can be predicted. It will be sustainable.

“Societal and economic action needs to be clearly driven by a new purpose: revitalizing, enhancing and sustaining life. This is an essential female quality and as all female qualities, has been sidelined and silenced for millennia.”

4. Will partnership systems work without gender equity and economic equity in egalitarian societies? Will they work without economic systems change? No.

Even democracies will fall back into the old trap of dominating exclusionary societies unless the basis of subordination of the female sex is not abolished. The last 10 years have given evidence to many examples of a resurgence of the dominance narrative, delivered by male psychopaths. Hence the war in Ukraine is indeed a wake-up call, and should be—not only for feminists who need to get together in a collective practice and form a global transformation network, but for all of us. This war could have been predicted and it could have been prevented, if we had attended to the many features of the misogynist dominance narrative much earlier. Empowering women everywhere and making partnership systems resilient globally, is the call to action that we need to heed. It is not something that is outwardly nice to have, an add on, something that can wait, a luxury—but an essential step that will take us into a different future. All our efforts in sustainability transformations need to reflect this: bringing women into power, making their lives safe, educating them, removing barriers to their political and economic participation and listening to the way they act and co-create the future differently. No, we do not just want to integrate women into a pathological system, we want them to change the system. This is something we cannot afford not to do. Societal and economic action needs to be clearly driven by a : revitalizing, enhancing and sustaining life. This is an essential female quality and as all female qualities, has been sidelined and silenced for millennia. This is what we ought to do: strengthen the female. The basis for partnership systems is gender equity. In all areas. This is not just a number, but women in power positions, in decision-making roles. Women who create the future based on a strong female reference system inspired by care and life-enhancement. Men can join in. This is not

naïve, but humanity's chance to become collectively intelligent. It is the future. We have no other option.

5. So, can the future be predicted? Yes, if we understand and expose underlying destructive or life-enhancing patterns.

We need the latter—life-enhancing patterns of action and organization. If we change the underlying patterns, the mental structures, the purpose of our actions or what Donella Meadows calls the paradigm, it can be done. Individually and collectively, every day, everywhere. We have no time to waste, if we want to maintain and revitalize the planetary life-support system. Let us remember that we are not creating something entirely new, we are revitalizing a human quality that has existed for most of human history. The androcratic dominance model has only occupied human evolution for a historically short period albeit with disastrous consequences. A different future can be created.

If we want to end the war in Ukraine, end the other wars active and lingering around the world, we need to heed the call: empowering women and making partnership systems resilient all around the world. No step in this direction is too small. No ambition is too big. They will add up to the transformations we want to see.

We then may have a chance to predict the future we want to see.

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The Significance of the Ukraine Crisis

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Abstract

When we view the world from above, can the Ukraine crisis be seen as the beginning of a grand opening and synthesis towards a world unified through collaboration? We are in the aftermath of the pandemic, faced with an increasing worldwide poverty through exploding energy and food prices and the accelerating climate disasters and have to wonder whether a viable future is possible without collaboration on war-footing and on an unknown scale. With such a scenario the Ukraine crisis can become a blessing in disguise that will indirectly free the world from all possible dictators and all sorts of dictatorship. Is collaboration the universal value that will usher us in an era where the centre stage of ego is replaced by the centre stage of being WE and save us all?

1. To Fathom the Significance of the Ukraine Crisis

If we would like to fathom the significance of the Ukraine crisis we have to station ourselves above the world and observe. Being inside and part of the problem we will not be able to observe the whole, we will not be able to reconcile the opposites and the opposing positions. Only in transcending all the parts of the problem we can attempt to discover the overriding world-trend behind the Ukraine crisis that impacts and moves the world to a certain goal.

*“All
knowledge
should belong
to humanity
freely.”*

2. Collaboration

Looking from above at the world of today it strikes us that the value of collaboration is the great force that seems to be behind ‘all’ forces. All world problems issue from a lack of collaboration and harmony and can be solved by collaboration. The question then is: are we all in danger that threatens us? Are we pushed to solve the danger by collaboration and cooperation?

3. Examples of Collaboration

Climate change and its emerging disasters can only be stopped and averted by the whole world collaborating to reach the climate goals as soon as possible. The energy crisis can be solved quickest by the total focus of the world on collaborating in the goal of 100% renewable energy. Pandemics can best be solved by transforming the patent system in an open-source collaboration of all science centers, universities and the like. Extending the transformation to

the elimination of all copyright in the world, is true collaboration and will give an enormous boost to content in education. In short: all knowledge should belong to humanity freely.

4. Collaboration and the Ukraine Crisis

One of the first things that strikes one is the lack of power of the UN Security Council. The veto-right of the 5 exclusive members makes the Security Council lightweight in terms of power and it should be left to the discretion of all other states to vote against this misplaced veto-power.

Another is the lack of collaboration between the European countries. The establishment of a European army has so far been met with scorn. The Russian defense budget is only one third of that of the EU countries together. The fact that a European army will cost less than half of the total of present defense budgets and will be so much more efficient in deterrence is so far not a weighty argument enough to take a European army seriously. President Macron though has long been a supporter of establishing a European Army.

On the positive side is shown that collaboration is becoming a determining power to weaken the stance of Russia. It is long thought that sanctions are not very effective to disrupt the rule of the opposing powers. The sanctions that rain on Russia are of a different order though. Governments are collaborating at an unknown level of sanctions that are backed by a flood of big and small companies that have ties with Russia. The range of sanctions are totally unexpected and overwhelming. They strike at the heart of support for the invasion and cannot be outdone by propaganda.

5. Ego-position vs We-position

Seen from above the Ukraine crisis strongly gives the impression that the era of the determining power of the ego-position is giving way to a new equilibrium that we can name the we-position. It runs parallel to the silent revolution in the world where the focus on numbers is replaced by a focus on values. In the Ukraine crisis governments and companies have left financial calculations as the determinant of action for choosing values as the determinant of their response. Compassion for the fate and suffering of the Ukrainian people is uppermost in the minds and hearts of the European people. All refugees are welcomed with wide open arms.

6. Significance

Summarizing the above, the significance of the Ukraine crisis is that it acts as a successful and true instrument for unifying the world through values.

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The War in Ukraine Must Stop Now

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Abstract

The extreme dangers of nuclear war are discussed against the background of Russia's brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine, during which Vladimir Putin put Russia's nuclear weapons on high alert. It is recommended that the United States and its allies should stop sending arms to Ukraine, that they should halt the eastward expansion of NATO, and that they should withdraw nuclear weapons from positions close to Russia. A diplomatic solution to the conflict must be found under the wise guidance of UN Secretary-General Guterres.

1. The Ukraine War and Nuclear Weapons

After his illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin put Russia's nuclear forces on high alert, thus threatening the world with an all-destroying nuclear war. The threat brought back memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world was balanced on the edge of a suicidal and genocidal nuclear war. We are once again reminded of the urgent need for the world to rid itself of nuclear weapons.

2. The Danger of Nuclear War

War was always madness, always immoral, always the cause of unspeakable suffering, economic waste and widespread destruction, and always a source of poverty, hate, barbarism and endless cycles of revenge and counter-revenge. It has always been a crime for soldiers to kill people, just as it is a crime for murderers in civil society to kill people. No flag has ever been wide enough to cover up the atrocities of war.

But today, the development of all-destroying thermonuclear weapons has put war completely beyond the bounds of sanity and elementary humanity.

Today, the existing nuclear weapons have half a million times the power of the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A thermonuclear war would destroy human civilization, together with most of the plants and animals with which we share the gift of life.

Research has shown that fire-storms produced by a nuclear war would send vast quantities of smoke into the atmosphere, blocking sunlight, and blocking the hydrological cycle. The climate would become very cold for a period of about ten years. Human agriculture would fail. Plants and animals would also be killed by the nuclear winter.

Can we not rid ourselves of both nuclear weapons and the institution of war itself?

We must act quickly and resolutely before our beautiful world is reduced to radioactive ashes, together with everything that we love.

“UN Secretary General António Guterres has urged Russia and Ukraine to negotiate an immediate cease-fire and a mutually agreeable settlement to end the conflict. However, this rational solution is opposed by politicians in the United States and elsewhere, who are influenced by money from giant arms corporations.”

3. The Invasion of Ukraine cannot be called Unprovoked

To understand how Russians feel about having western weapons and troops poured into a position on their nation’s borders, we should imagine how the United States would react if large numbers of Russian weapons and troops were stationed in Mexico or Canada.

In 1991, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, promised Mikhail Gorbachev that if he agreed to the unification of Germany, NATO would not expand eastward, toward Russia, “not one inch”. The promise was broken almost immediately by Bill Clinton, who helped to bring the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO. Russians saw this not only as a betrayal, but also as an act of aggression.

4. The Monroe Doctrine

There is no document more fundamental to the foreign policy of the United States than the Monroe Doctrine. It states that interference in the Western Hemisphere by European powers would be interpreted as an attack on the United States, and would be opposed by the United States. The Monroe Doctrine has been used to justify U.S. interventions in Central America and in the Caribbean. Understandably, the United States wishes to have its backyard secure. Why should Russia not have the same wish?

5. The U.S. should stop threatening Russia

Because Russia’s fears are legitimate and based on historical suffering, the U.S and its allies should stop threatening Russia. Nuclear missiles should be removed from positions near the Russian border, and the eastward expansion of NATO should be halted.

6. A Diplomatic Solution to the Conflict is the only way to end it

UN Secretary General António Guterres has urged Russia and Ukraine to negotiate an immediate cease-fire and a mutually agreeable settlement to end the conflict. However, this rational solution is opposed by politicians in the United States and elsewhere, who are

influenced by money from giant arms corporations. Thus, more and more heavy weapons are sent to Ukraine, pouring oil onto the flames, and enriching the merchants of death. This must stop, and a diplomatic solution must be found under Secretary General Guterres' wise leadership.

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Globalization Weaponized, Dominance Fragmented, World Stability Ruptured

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Abstract

The current Russia-Ukraine military conflict reveals how the laws established by the United Nations to guide “war behavior” need to be realistically reconsidered in light of the changes since WWII that now characterize military conflicts. Today dominant nations circumvent rules of engagement by resorting to new tactics. It also unmasks a prevalent “global dominance by the West” favoring marketplaces for military weapons disguised in humanitarian rhetoric which reveals hypocrisy and double standards. This is reminiscent of how the COVID-19 pandemic has unmasked existing racial and economic inequalities especially in the prosperous West. But whereas the Pandemic was well managed by the United Nations, filtering down to local populations, demonstrating the strength of a globalized, inter-connected world, the current Russia-Ukraine conflict weaponized globalization when it dismantled economic linkages. Also the Pandemic has led to the creation of a vaccine against the virus, whereas the Russia-Ukraine war is yet to lead to a “vaccine”, as it were, against the use of military warfare as a solution to global issues of insecurity. This article suggests possibilities that might lead to a better path for humankind.

The Russia-Ukraine series of military confrontations and counter confrontations in a conflict over Ukrainian sovereignty felt like a bombshell (as it were), violently thrusting the world into a shock that rocked the ‘world order’ to the core. Notably, the humanitarian dimension (loss of civilian life and ensuing flood of refugees fleeing the conflict area) attracted the most attention in the media. In this humanitarian context, I invoke a few lines written by the late Palestinian Poet Mahmoud Darwish:

*The war will end.
The leaders will shake hands.
The old woman will keep waiting for her martyred son.
That girl will wait for her beloved husband.
And those children will wait for their hero father.
I don't know who sold our homeland
But I saw who paid the price.*

– **Mahmoud Darwish**¹

1. Back to Back: From the COVID Pandemic to War Panic

This article addresses the underlying processes leading to and resulting from the conflict over Ukraine between the Russian Federation and the United States of America (along with its partner, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)). The military encroachment of Russia onto its border-neighbor Ukraine was met with direct and indirect military activity by NATO and the United States. First, it is contended that there is a remarkable similarity at some level between this tumultuous event (the Russia-Ukraine war) and the COVID-19 Pandemic. The world is just now (February 2022) emerging from under the weight of the turbulent two-year pandemic and its devastation on people's health, livelihood and social well-being, as well as its serious devastation to the world economy, wondering whether life can ever go 'back to normal' after the fear, loss of life, social isolation that ensued (El Guindi 2020; El Guindi 2020 (April 27)), when it finds itself violently thrust into a bigger shock that rocks the people and the world order to the core.

“War itself is, of course, a form of madness. It’s hardly a civilized pursuit. It’s amazing how we spend so much time inventing devices to kill each other and so little time working on how to achieve peace.” – Walter Cronkite

Calls for a path alternative to war were made by academicians, scientists, scholars, and public intellectuals. Prominent among them, only as an example, is the famous quote by the late anthropologist Margaret Mead,² *“Our first and most pressing problem is how to do away with warfare as a method of solving conflicts ...”*. Another from the late prominent media icon Walter Cronkite, *“War itself is, of course, a form of madness. It’s hardly a civilized pursuit. It’s amazing how we spend so much time inventing devices to kill each other and so little time working on how to achieve peace.”*

2. Can Humans Carve an Alternative to War?

Clearly, the current intense efforts by nations and politicians to “solve” the current war problem, ranging from face-to-face negotiations between the two parties of direct confrontation, to telephone calls by world leaders, to appeals by the United Nations, to mediation efforts (such as those by NATO members who are not an involved party to the conflict, Turkey, and even indirect messages) suggest that in today's complex interlinked world efforts for cessation of military operations and suggesting compromises take place in parallel with the ongoing military conflict. Modern communication and United Nations' rules of engagement make it possible. Humanitarian corridors for the passage of civilians escaping the 'war zone', and neighboring countries to receive them made possible by UN coordination are also part of the character of current military confrontations. But voices grew, demonstrating that this war showed a double-standard in humanitarian empathy, and racism was revealed in rescue efforts for refugees pointing to an aspect of this war which

unmasked systemic biases by the West toward the East. Brown-skinned people in very similar, recent wars have not produced the same reaction, and blatant racism was explicitly expressed toward them, suggesting a justification of atrocities against peoples of darker skin is justified. It is interesting how the Pandemic had also unmasked similar patterns of systemic racism and inequalities based on skin color and economic status.

There is sufficient scientific evidence showing how humans have been resorting to violent conflict for millennia. These almost always were motivated by defense or plunder of food resources. Fortresses were built and walls divided groups. Weaker groups lost almost always. It is remarkable that the present Russia-Ukraine conflict is not just over security, but also over world dominance, marketing products of the military-industrial complex, dominating the world market of energy sources and its flow, and prominently using the globalized trade network and economic partnerships as weapons toward these ends. The ensuing food insecurity threatening people's lives around the world is not on the minds of nations trying to preserve their dominance. The term 'peace' in this context becomes elusive.

“The ensuing food insecurity threatening people's lives around the world is not on the minds of nations trying to preserve their dominance. The term ‘peace’ in this context becomes elusive.”

“The deep generational damage to human life occurred when depleted uranium was ‘dumped’ on Iraqi territory in such volume that today reports show deformities among newborn Iraqis are staggering, and were not even considered collateral damage.”

Civilians are always the victims of any war, deliberately as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and many other examples, or as unintentional consequence that is not given priority or consideration in this rush to plunder and dominate. The United States in its invasion of Iraq, used the vocabulary of ‘collateral damage’ for the loss of human life (El Guindi 1991a; El Guindi 1991b). The deep generational damage to human life occurred when depleted uranium was ‘dumped’ on Iraqi territory in such volume that today reports show deformities among newborn Iraqis are staggering, and were not even considered collateral damage. It was part of the mission of exporting democracy and freedom, to one of the most prosperous nations in the Arab World. But there is another damage receiving less attention, the damage to the cradle of ‘Civilization’ (by direct invitation of former US Secretary of State who led a commission to charge the United States with war crimes, to document the civilizational loss caused by the war. See El Guindi 1992).

Demonizing, threatening or enforcing sanctions, taking measure of economic strangling, or providing military or financial assistance to one of the warring parties is taking sides rather

than preventing war (for expounding on the dangers see the opinion article Hedges 2022 (March 15)). Transparent rules need to apply to the use, distribution and sale of arms and military weapons manufactured and owned by nation-states. Arming 'the other side' prevents negotiation aimed at ceasing hostilities. Intense campaigns of psychological deprecation, propaganda, demonization and other forms to diminish the other, are aimed to form camps (those with us and those against us) by galvanizing sentiment, instead of stabilizing relations.

“Is respect for national sovereignty a privilege granted only by the West for the West?”

3. Demonizing Russia

What has demonizing Saddam Hussein, Hafez El Asad, Mo'ammr Qaddafi and numerous Balkan leaders achieved? It is worth pondering over that mechanism deployed to invalidate or as in some of those cases to justify invasion of territories, breaking up regions and even eliminating leaders (under the regime change idea). Even if we leave out this element, let us consider whether this approach has successfully accomplished the contemplated goals. Moreover, is such action not considered a violation of sovereignty and hence against UN principles? Or is respect for national sovereignty a privilege granted only by the West for the West? Coverage of events pertaining to the current Russia-Ukraine uncovered a layer of racism and double-standards in comments on record that justify raising this as an issue.

A recently published opinion piece by Patrick Cockburn (Cockburn 2022 (March 15)) with the title “Demonizing Russia Risks Making Compromise Impossible, and Prolonging the War” brings up the point that in order to achieve compromise which is always the goal in military combat situations such as the present Russia-Ukraine conflict in which Russia has a number of demands from Ukraine, primarily, becoming a de-militarized, neutral country rather than seeking membership in NATO, and recognizing the independence of the Donbas (Donetsk-Luhansk) region on the eastern border, a border shared with Russia, as well as the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (access to the Black Sea) as part of the Russian Federation. Negotiation between parties from the countries in the conflict is ongoing as I write (March 17, 2022) and prediction of its outcome is not possible. I am certain, though, that taking sides (by declarations or arming, even when for humanitarian purposes) or demonizing Russia (as the cause of all evil in the world) as is widely occurring, as Cockburn suggests, cannot be helpful for the process.

In 1945, the United Nations was established and its Charter was formulated as a framework of legal principles with rules of law to be followed by the international body of nations. Three of the principles of direct concern here are: 1) sovereign equality, 2) a duty to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and 3) a duty to refrain from the threat of or actual use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state. Yet, the United Nations has not been able to prevent use of force to settle disputes in the present conflict or the even more devastating aggression against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Syria and

more. Why? True, its Charter includes the statement that “The threat or use of force to resolve disputes is prohibited under Article 2 of the UN Charter”. But has it been able to act on such prohibitions? I think not. I suggest a few reasons: by granting dominant powers to veto UN resolutions or actions, it has nullified the principles calling for equal application of the law.

“This is the challenge that the United Nations and concerned Academies and think tanks must work on—not to negotiate ‘peace’ agreements after the damage is done, but finding ways to prevent it from happening in the first place.”

By having a veto structure, the United Nations acknowledges the dominance of certain nations and control over the destiny of other nations. While the veto structure acts sometimes to balance possible biases, it simultaneously reaffirms the dominance structure and ironically leads to its own paralysis, the inability to enact its own rules. It is time to reconsider the veto structure itself and replacing it with a structure that acknowledges the equality of nations under UN law. This move would create a new approach that is built on trust instead of dominance among member nations.

Another point is that nations have now resorted to circumventions of the chartered principles, by avoiding direct military confrontations. Wars today take the form of ‘proxy’ combat, use of mercenaries and militias, contract military units, and volunteer fighters. Dominant nations also participate by providing military equipment indirectly into the war zone. This way the legal formulation is circumvented to achieve the same actions the law was established to prevent in the first place. It is possible that amendments to the Charter along these two suggestions would allow the United Nations to focus on the prevention of war rather than finding itself as a part of brokering for compromises after the damage has been done.

To metaphorically apply what has been learned as the world was faced with the rapidly transmissible virus COVID-19 and its mutations, expert knowledge must be deployed to determine the underlying conditions that lead to specific hostilities for use to prevent a clash before the damage is done. It should aim to deter hostile action, not deal with it as it escalates. Developing a “vaccine”, as it were, instead of minimizing the effect of the infection. This is the challenge that the United Nations and concerned Academies and think tanks must work on—not to negotiate ‘peace’ agreements after the damage is done, but finding ways to prevent it from happening in the first place. We do have the knowledge that would make this possible. What we do not have is the will of political leaders, particularly those running for office on a war agenda, but mostly by the dominant nations who are unable or unwilling to change from a dominance mode that serves their self-interest to a ‘working together’ mode for a stable and secure world.

The dominance hierarchy of nations needs to be dismantled in favor of a community of exchanging partnerships. Ironically, this war might have begun the process of dismantling the

dominance hierarchy of nations and the illusion of superiority of values held by Europe and the West. Values must be situated in different world traditions, not in terms set by Western historical formations.

4. The Rupture of World Stability & the Insecurity of Energy and Food

Ironically, while globalization processes are being weaponized in the conflict by the escalating destabilizing sanctions, which are threatening alliances that keep energy sources and essential foods flowing around the world (Mauss 1954 [1922]), they have been simultaneously demonstrating how entrenched these processes have become and how interlinked the planet earth is today whether by communication technologies and media platforms or dependence on the flow of energy and food among nations through partnerships and alliances. One act in one part of the globe shakes up fundamental parts in a distant part whether it is involved in the direct conflict or not. That is the key driving the engine of globalization. It is a key that ought not to be weaponized. Whether we agree with globalization or not, the world, as has also been shown during the Pandemic, is now vitally interconnected, and any senseless military confrontations can destroy humanity in many ways and damage what it has achieved so far. It is already a big loss that is being felt worldwide, not only in the interruption to our flow of sustenance resources, but also in the dislocation of innocent civilians, the extensive loss of lives, the growing distrust between East and West, and in some ways, very serious interruption to efforts for a sustainable drive toward a more livable planet. Instead of focusing on climate change (McDermot 2022 (March 4)) all attention now is on dealing with war and its shockwaves that perhaps are carving a path, not to prevent wars, but to de-globalize our world.

Anthropology has documented the genius of small-scale societies in historically dealing with preventing full-scale hostilities among groups. It goes back to the unique capacity of humans to form social groups, larger than limited dyadic units, and creating alliances among them by exchanges of trade and by linkages through marriage. Heads of tribes and small groups, just like royal marriages of Europe and the Middle East, have been getting married politically to women from a group other than their own to ensure ‘alliance’. The marriage between the former Shah of Iran and the former King of Egypt is well known. Today, the Emir of Qatar uses the privilege of the tradition of multiple wives by first marrying his cousin, in conformity with tradition, and then marrying women from other tribes in the nation. This in most times ensures a bonding that favors alliance over conflict. The choice of course remains with particularly dominant parties (or their leaders) in an exchange whether to use the alliance for hostilities or for peaceful relations.

The theory by the famous anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, known as “alliance theory” (Lévi- Strauss 1949), describes the universality of alliance through exchange systems of goods and services and through marriages across groups. This is not different from one major aspect of today’s globalization, global interlinkages among nation-states through the exchange of goods and services. This aspect, unfortunately, is threatened when armed conflict occurs, as is the situation today for the Russia-Ukraine war. Exchanges of energy sources, essential food, raw materials for industry are all destabilized. Interlinkages are used negatively in the conflict to penalize and take sides.

It is no contradiction to state that the United States had enjoyed being the only world power since the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Blum 2005). Nor has it been hidden that Russia has been re-emerging stronger and transformed since the break-up and is justifiably now seeking a place in the power equation. Why is this bad? There is no need for a self-serving clinging to a tired, over-militarized dominance structure. To quote former South African President, the late Nelson Mandela (1997), “How can they have the arrogance to dictate to us where we should go or which countries should be our friends? Gaddafi is my friend. He supported us when we were alone and when those who tried to prevent my visit here today were our enemies. They have no morals. We cannot accept that a state assumes the role of the world policeman”.

Unilateral dominance by military-driven power is when war becomes the only path to take to make room for ‘others’ in the world structure. Human cognition and creative capacity allow for imaginative and flexible solutions to problems. This is the most needed opportunity to apply such capacity. Drop the ego-centered, individual-focused, dominance-driven, or politically-motivated (such as running for office) world structure and adopt one of inclusivity. Instead of military coalitions claiming to be defending freedom and democracy, which are deployed by a dominant individual or regional powers such as NATO or AUKUS, what about a different paradigm that envisions a common destiny based on trade (El Guindi 2019) or a civilization-based national entity with non-invasive intentions, building a ring of exchanges of services and goods, equally established among nations? (El Guindi 2022) Such alternatives are worth trying. The only outcome would be a prosperous and secure world of sharing resources, services and protection of security. How can that be bad for the world?

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Notes

1. Darwish, Palestine's eminent poet is considered by Israel to be as "resistance poet". He was placed under house arrest when his poem "Identity Card" was turned into a protest song. He wrote that poem when he was just 24. He was pushed to live in exile and he shunted between Beirut and Paris for 26 years. Only in 1996, he was allowed to settle in Ramallah, a major city in the West Bank. In his lifetime, he published eight books of prose and 30 poetry collections. He also founded and edited *Al-Karmel*, a literary magazine in 1981. He died in 2008 in Houston, Texas following a prolonged illness. He published his first collection of poems, *Leaves of Olives*, in 1964, when he was 22.
2. Mead p. 351, *Telling it Like It Is*, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Telling_It_Like_It_Is/w8_p1eGVj8gC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=date+of++%E2%80%9COur+first+and+most+pressing+problem+is+how+to+do+away+with+warfare+as+a+method+of+solving+conflicts+%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D+Margaret+Mead&pg=PA351&printsec=frontcover
3. To quote former President George H. Bush (1992) "A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and pre-eminent power, the United States of America ... the world trusts us with power ..."; and another quote from former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1999) "The United States is good. We try to do our best everywhere"; and another from former President Clinton (1996) "... I was determined that our country would go into the 21st century still the world's greatest force for peace and freedom, for democracy and security and prosperity". These quotes are published in Blum 2005.

A Renewed Non-Aligned Movement

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Abstract

As the Russia-Ukraine war continues spreading human misery in its wake, more and more countries are being impacted directly or indirectly by it, bringing the world perilously close to a 1960s like Cold War scenario. As the world becomes divided once again, it is time for the Non-Aligned Movement to take its place in the world again. The Movement was founded to replace division, distrust and the threat of war with world unity, peace and development. A renewed and strengthened Non-Aligned Movement can provide the much needed dynamic, creative, values-based leadership we need today, and contribute to world peace.

The world has a compelling need for a clear, calm, brave and honest voice that can be heard above the din of war. The Non-Aligned Movement can supply this voice.

Seventy years ago, the world was similar to how it is today in some ways. Two rival power blocs were competing with each other. Both wanted to extend their spheres of influence, and different regions of the world became the unfortunate theatres of their play. It was also a period of decolonization that led to the creation of many newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. Leaders of these and other countries in the developing world wished to check imperialism, neo-colonialism, competitive bloc politics and military alliances. They all had a common interest in economic development, nation building and peaceful co-existence. Aligning with one of the two sides and getting involved in the bloc competition and arms race would perpetuate underdevelopment. Representatives from 29 of these countries met in Bandung, Indonesia at the Asian-African Conference in 1955 to focus on peace, human rights and economic development. The leaders sought greater collaboration in the developing world and reduced reliance on either of the two power blocs. This led to the movement of non-alignment.

The 1st Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was convened in Belgrade in 1961 under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia. 25 countries participated in the event and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was officially launched. The movement gave a voice to emerging nations and proved to the world and more importantly to the fledgling countries themselves that they could be a force in world politics. Since then, NAM has grown to include 120 countries from Asia, Africa, South America and Eastern Europe representing 55% of the world population. It is the largest grouping of countries after the United Nations.

NAM is dedicated to the interests and aspirations of developing countries. It has no formal constitution. All member countries have equal rights within the organization. Its positions are reached by consensus in the Summit conferences which are convened every three years. With the end of the Cold War, the movement's focus shifted from non-alignment to multilateralism, economic development and international cooperation.

“To put an end to the scourge of war in Ukraine, and for sustained global peace, we need an improved and strengthened Non-Aligned Movement that gives expression to the views of sincere, honest reason and goodwill.”

The war in Ukraine calls for a neutral organization such as NAM to step in and work for peace. It is not certain that UN Resolutions, trade embargos and economic sanctions against Russia can have an impact on the Russian leadership. But they are certainly causing an entire nation to suffer for the crimes of a few individuals. In addition, they have led to food shortage and starvation in Asia and Africa. They have disrupted supply chains the world over. Punitive measures of the victors of World War I led to World War II. Triumphalism of the winning side of the Cold War has led to what is today being called Cold War 2.0. NATO has announced that it is planning for a permanent military presence on its border in the future. Russia's strategic nuclear deterrents have been placed on high alert. It is time for countries that refuse to be aligned with one or the other side to step in, mediate, and secure peace. NAM, which has functioned successfully in similar conditions before, has a very significant role to play today.

The advantage of a non-aligned view is that it can see from both competing points of view. It can integrate contradicting perspectives and convert them into complementing parts of a whole. Victors tend to write history. They decide who is right and who is wrong, and determine punishments and reparations at the end of war. This version does not always coincide with the truth. It takes a neutral party to see the whole.

“There are many things happening in the world from year to year and day to day, which we have disliked intensely. We have not condemned them... because when one is trying to solve a problem, it doesn't help calling names and condemning,” Nehru explained in 1957 after Soviet intervention in Hungary. Non-alignment is not isolation, indifference or irresponsibility. It is a positive and dynamic approach with the aim to solve the problem. Emotions have a significant influence on cognition and effective functioning. When emotions run high between two conflicting sides, both become reactive, and the situation turns volatile. NAM as mediator can see both points of view better. It can be more tolerant of the constraints and compulsions of each side. It can prevent one side from construing the position of the other in a mischievous, prejudiced or mistaken manner. A genuine offer by one side is not discounted or misread but interpreted objectively. NAM can sincerely work for the quick resolution of the conflict and resumption of normalcy. The NAM countries spread throughout

the developing world are most affected today after Ukraine and Russia, and stand to gain from world peace and progress. Such a method that works for both sides can make way for the end of conflict, and equally importantly, ensure that it does not recur years or decades later.

NAM has had its own challenges and weaknesses. However, as former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi described, it is the largest peace movement in the world. At the height of the Cold War, it played an active role in containing the expansion of the rival blocs, preventing regional conflicts, calling for equality and human rights. It has given voice to the Global South. The world situation calls for a repetition of these achievements.

NAM is needed not just to bring peace to Ukraine. The list of countries that have been the victim of the egos of belligerent power blocs is long—Iran, Iraq, Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, Syria, and many other countries in East Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. Ukraine is the most recent, caught between the West's keenness to assert its preeminent position in the global order and Russia's imperial nostalgia. To put an end to the scourge of war in Ukraine, and for sustained global peace, we need an improved and strengthened Non-Aligned Movement that gives expression to the views of sincere, honest reason and goodwill.

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Ukraine: Sleepwalking into the Unknown*

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Abstract

The article raises some fundamental questions concerning the Ukraine-Russia war: why is the UN not intervening to bring peace? What does the West want? These are all questions that we should be asking urgently, but don't.

How is the war going to end in Ukraine, and what exactly does the West want in Ukraine? The question, while the fiercest war since the end of WWII is exploding in the center of Europe, in a rational world ought to be addressed with the maximum urgency. Surely, this is what the United Nations was created for. And why are the Blue Helmets of the UN not intervening in a massive peacekeeping operation to keep the belligerents apart?

To be fair enough, any practitioner in international affairs would respond. But the reality is different. The Blue Helmets intervened with little or no success in the Korean War, in the Middle East, in Former Yugoslavia, and in other parts of the world. The UN peacekeepers were and are invaluable in local conflicts, generally in the most remote parts of the world, and when the geopolitical interests of great powers are not in question. Otherwise, irrespective of humanitarian conventions and international law, the Stone Age principle that Might makes Right prevails.

The humiliation of UN Secretary-General António Guterres in his recent belated peacekeeping mission to Moscow is an example. For the meeting with Putin, with grotesque symbolism, the Kremlin brought out the Long Table. Guterres, eschewing controversy, said simply that he understood that in the Ukrainian crisis there were two very different positions. According to the UN Charter and international law, the Russian military intervention was flagrant aggression. Russia thought otherwise. But the SG has come as a messenger of peace. As a first step to negotiating a peace agreement, he was ready to act as a mediator for an unconditional ceasefire. That was surely in both parties' interest.

Putin at the end of the long table looked somber. In a lengthy monologue, using a funereal low tone of voice, he reiterated his position. Russia would not sign a peace deal unless Ukraine first agreed to "solve the issues of Crimea and Donbas". Guterres on the opposite side of the desk took meticulous notes with a long pencil on a legal notepad. He did not ask questions or interrupt. There would be no point. Then he flew to Kyiv to report to Ukraine's president what he already knew: "failure of a mission". That incidentally was the despairing

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title of the book by Sir Nevile Henderson, British ambassador to Berlin, in the times of Hitler. On Sunday, September 3, 1939, at 11 a.m., WWII, another war that nobody wanted, had started. It would last 5 years.

“World leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are incapable of projecting a coherent political strategy. Like a large segment of public opinion in the West, they assume that the Ukrainian tragedy somehow will be over, sometime in the near future. In other words, they are fatalistically “sleepwalking into the unknown.””

In Ukraine, it is hoped, there is still a chance to prevent an even more tragic catastrophe. But time is running out. As social scientist Boaventura de Sousa Santos points out in an Opinion article on *Wall Street International*, world leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are incapable of projecting a coherent political strategy. Like a large segment of public opinion in the West, they assume that the Ukrainian tragedy somehow will be over, sometime in the near future. In other words, they are fatalistically “sleepwalking into the unknown”.

Meanwhile, to appease their conscience somehow, the United States with Europe, Australia, and other parts of what, for lack of a better definition, can be described as the non-authoritarian “free” world, increasingly supply Ukraine, the victim of Russia’s brutal attack, with financial assistance, military training including intelligence and, above all, plenty of arms. Democracy must prevail over dictatorship, is the slogan. This is admirable in an idealistic society. But unfortunately, the world, free and not free, has to face some immediate problems. With the Russian blitzkrieg aggression which is doomed to be an obvious failure, the Ukrainian conflict has already become a grinding war of attrition that may last for months or even for years.

Worse still, the war of attrition which Russia has now launched, with devastating effects on Ukrainian cities, risks becoming a highly dangerous war by proxy, where Ukraine unwittingly assumes the role (in the ghastly terminology used by strategists) of a “country of sacrifice”. This is morally repugnant, no doubt. But, with the systematic destruction of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, up to 6 million refugees already fled mostly to Europe, and no realistic political initiative insight, the question, posed by *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations think-tank, to the US administration and NATO allies, is: what if the war in Ukraine does not end?

With typical frankness, unusual for his role, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (a former general) in his recent visit to Kyiv provided an answer that raises an even more fundamental question. “We want to see Russia weakened—Austin said—to the degree that it can’t do [what] it has done since invading Ukraine”. Was he alluding to the West expanding war

arms, or even perhaps implying that a longer war in Ukraine might be a useful objective to discourage and degrade further Russian aggression? Surely Americans and NATO allies, if their commitment to the conflict expands, would be entitled to know.

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War, Complexity, and One-dimensional Thinking: Thinking is Acting

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Abstract

Both democracy (nowadays known as “global democracy”) and war are examples of complexity. Simplification and closing-off (isolation) will never accomplish anything when dealing with either of these kinds of complexity. We have taken for granted that aggression, invasion and war are by definition immoral and illegal and that it is always necessary to distinguish between the “attackers” and the “attacked”, between the “oppressors” and the “oppressed”; war itself, in all of its unspeakable trauma, requires, no matter what the circumstances, a systemic approach to complexity, an analysis or explanation from a systemic perspective. Keeping in mind that there are currently a considerable number of conflicts in the world, ignored by the global media system and therefore completely forgotten, this latest war runs the tangible risk of escalating globally, with extremely heavy costs in human suffering and loss of lives, costs that will be “paid”, of course, by the civil populations, by the people of the world. The strategy of sanctioning, and even more so, of fostering hostilities towards Russian culture, systematically closing off all that comes from Russia or can be traced back to that country, risks further exacerbating the distances, reinforcing those “logics of separation” which render—and in the future, will continue to render even more impractical, not to say impossible, the (complex) path towards post-conflict reconstruction. Creating and fueling further divisions, in this moment, towards a people and a culture with—moreover—extraordinary qualities will end up radicalizing, even more deeply, dynamics that are already bellicose and highly destructive. The pathways of separation and isolation, in other words, run an all-too-real risk of permanently closing everyone off, including those who are struggling—using a range of effective instruments (not only in terms of “soft power”)—who are fighting an arduous and complex battle to construct modern democracies, to build societies that are truly open and inclusive. If we cut them off, the sole victims will be the populations, the people, the most vulnerable subjects. It has always been so. One “certitude” can indeed be taken to be certain: we must get ourselves back onto the path of diplomacy (by everyone, for everyone) and politics. These events, so dramatic for the history of humanity, have once again shown us how weak statesmanship is today, and how politics has by now become the “handmaiden” of economic powers. The very concept of an “international community” has laid bare its own incapacity to describe the current multi-polar global context. Let us start over, starting with politics, with diplomacy, “real” on-the-field diplomacy, continuous and systemic: less “theater” and more “backstage”; now is not the time for “simulated diplomacy” and/or media storytelling, which unfailingly leads us in the opposite direction from our expected and desired objectives. Let us start over,

beginning with politics and diplomacy, and also with the value of culture and education in mind, for the future: Ukraine's future, Russia's future, humanity's future, the future of our entire planet. Violence has never brought anything other than more violence, more division, more incurable fractures.

“It is a common error today to think of complex systems simply as complicated. A complicated system is completely different: it is an artificial system consisting of mechanical parts that can be counted, controlled, and predicted.”

It is never easy to speak/write about these “cases”: one runs a substantial risk, amongst the many, of communicating distance or detachment from the situations being analyzed, which are experienced in a “mediated” form. In these dramatic weeks, we are once again witnessing how fragmented and polarized public debate—not to speak of media debate—has become, characterized by reductionism and determinism, incapable of promoting *genuinely critical or strategic thinking*, or carrying out an analysis free from prejudices, pre-conceived frameworks, and platitudes. The inevitable consequences of this kind of flash and often flashy analysis, whose appeal is directed at boosting audience/hits/followers, are to polarize conflict rather than to stimulate generative conflict, which could achieve a systemic vision of the “facts”. Despite constant ostentation of concepts and approaches claiming to promote and deepen understanding (which is, by definition, multi/inter/transdisciplinary understanding) its logic leads in the opposite direction. On the contrary, only a deeper understanding can lead toward the sharing of “instruments”, of critical, systemic and strategic thinking and cognition, which are needed to deconstruct hegemonic/dominating narratives, and more generally, to create an-“*other*” glance, non-conformist and non-*hetero-directed*. An-“*other*” glance which is direly and drastically needed, and whose impelling urgency—what is more impelling than war?—should be felt as an irrevocable responsibility on the part of opinion makers and decision makers alike. Failure to do so is a moral choice, and those who make it will have to answer for it to the younger (and future) generations.

Obsessive declarations reiterating praiseworthy intentions of avoiding reductionist, conformist explanations, polarizations, and classifications notwithstanding, what happens in reality is that debates and public discourse continue to fuel all of the above along the same lines as with other important issues, past and present, not only for the purpose of furthering rationales of “usefulness”, but as said before, to win greater popularity. In fact, the term “complexity” is continually used—and misused—both by “complexity” cultists and by those glorifying “simplicity”, with equally counter-productive outcomes on both sides. As usual, the hidden objective is to divide and oppose, without ever going deeper into issues or widening perspectives for thinking “*other*”-wise.

Nevertheless, before delving further into our (brief) reflection, I believe that a modest quantity of agreement/clarity on concepts and related working definitions is called for. To

begin with, complexity is an essential feature of life forms, in other words, of biological, social, and human systems, i.e., *complex adaptive systems* (CAS), which are very well-structured in their hierarchy and organization and are capable of co-constructing, generating and organizing the parts of which they are composed, parts that in their multi-level myriads of systemic interconnections, interdependencies and interactions condition the behavior and non-linear evolution of the systems themselves and of their surrounding ecosystems. The structural connotations of complex systems, which are marked by extreme sensitivity to environmental perturbations in which continual processes of action and adaptation give rise to unpredictability, are their *emergent properties*. These properties, which cannot be observed initially, are characterized by a radical interdependency of the parts, which basically consist of “relations”, through which the system is capable of self-generating and self-organizing, and can be analyzed only through their non-linear evolution and through the dynamics of their phenomena. All CAS are irrepressibly dynamic, irreversible, unpredictable, heterogeneous and *dissipative* in their chaotic, non-linear evolution along the arrow of time, yet capable of holding together tensions, processes, phenomena, conflict, ambivalence, contradictions, paradoxes and apparently irreconcilable dimensions (Poincaré J.H., 1908, 1885; Mead G.H., 1934; Weaver, 1948; Wiener N., 1948, 1950; Ashby W.R., 1956; Heisenberg, 1958, 1959; Arendt H., 1958; Simon, 1959, 1962, 1997; Feynman, 1963, 2000; Hayek von, 1964; Neumann von, 1958, 1966; Lorenz E.N., 1963; Canguilhem G., 1966; Watzlavick P. *et al.*, 1967; Bertalanffy von L., 1968; Emery, 1969; Anderson, 1972; Bateson, 1972, 1979; Morin, 1973-2004; Holland, 1975; Capra, 1975, 1996; Le Moigne, 1977; Haken, 1977; Mandelbrot, 1977; Lovelock J., 1979; Prigogine-Stengers, 1979, 1984, 1997; Maturana-Varela, 1980, 1985; Prigogine, 1980; Foerster von, 1981; Kauffman, 1971, 1993; Luhmann, 1984, 1990; Gleick J., 1987; Stewart I., 1989; Kiel L.D., 1994; Gell-Mann, 1994, 1995; Krugman, 1996; Prigogine, 1996; Laszlo, 1996; Bar-Yam, 1997; Diamond, 1997, 2005; Mathews et al., 1999; Barabási, 2002; Israel, 2005; Dominici, 2005-2021; Nicolis-Nicolis, 2007; Taleb N.N., 2012; Kuhlmann M., 2013; Montuori, 2014; McCall R.-Burge J., 2016; Gentili, 2018; Turner-Baker, 2019). Having said this, it is a common error today to think of complex systems simply as complicated. A complicated system is completely different: it is an artificial system consisting of mechanical parts that can be counted, controlled, and predicted. Nothing to do with natural, complex systems, whose *open dialectics* consist even of *existential oxymorons* and of barriers that suddenly dissolve into *hybrid zones* and into indefinite and undefinable trajectories.

“The opposite
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but rather
reductionism.”

As I have been repeating for over twenty-five years, it is impossible to control or manage complexity. It must be clear that this is not a question of terminology or of words, labels or catchy slogans, despite the fact that today complexity is the “talk of the town”, and that self-professed experts in complexity abound. But the dimensions of “complexity” concern/pertain to/define a way of thinking, systemic thinking, a method we could call, “epistemology of uncertainty”, (Morin, 1973 and further works), regarding systemic and systematic doubt. A similar concept is “epistemology of error” (Dominici, 1995-6 and further works), an approach

and an alternative glance at reality and what we define and recognize as real. Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that *the opposite of complexity is not simplicity*, as simplicity zealots would have us believe, but rather reductionism (Ibidem). Thus the controversy between complexity and simplicity is yet another “false dichotomy” to add to a long list of delusions that keep human thought imprisoned within arbitrary barriers. To make matters worse, an even more strangled narrative hails from the other side, from those who depict themselves as experts on complexity, when they are not even capable of distinguishing the enormous differences between complex and complicated systems.

“A deeper understanding of complexity could truly provide a plurality of diversified perspectives for comprehending and analyzing the calamitous situation in Ukraine, and more generally, for interpreting so many of our unexpected, systemic and global emergencies.”

At this point, before going more deeply into why the battle between complexity vs. simplicity enthusiasts is misleading and deceptive, we should mention the recent criticism of one polarized faction coming from the opposite polarized faction, regarding the ongoing war in the Ukrainian territory. Those who have described the events characterizing and leading up to this conflict as “complex” have been accused of unacceptable justification; even of taking sides (the wrong side) in the catastrophic phenomena that is currently unfolding. Yet war is indeed complex, just as its causes and consequences are undeniably and tragically complex, as are all human endeavors, struggles and underlying motivations.

In fact, both democracy (nowadays known as “global democracy”) and war are examples of complexity. Simplification and closing-off (isolation) will never accomplish anything when dealing with either of these kinds of complexity.

Taking for granted that aggression, invasion and war are by definition immoral and illegal and that it is always necessary to distinguish between the “attackers” and the “attacked”, between the “oppressors” and the “oppressed”, war itself, in all of its unspeakable trauma, requires, no matter what the circumstances, a systemic approach to complexity, an analysis or explanation from a systemic perspective.

This being an argument I had already taken up during the pandemic, several comparisons can be drawn between these two events. In fact, after these trying pandemic years (yet another global and systemic emergency which had—once again—caught us unprepared for the unexpected...quite the contrary to the proverbial “black swan”), and which we chose to face, as usual, by falling back on the rationales of simplification and on reductionist, deterministic explanations, what should blow in this time but the umpteenth war. Keeping in mind that there are currently a considerable number of conflicts in the world, ignored by the global media system and therefore completely forgotten, this latest war runs the tangible risk

of escalating globally, with extremely heavy costs in human suffering and loss of lives, costs that will be “paid”, of course, by the civil populations, by the people of the world.

1. Simulation of Debate

Unfortunately, situations of this kind trigger standard polarizations, which are, ironically, produced by the very voices who shout them down the loudest. Today we are being presented with the latest, apparently irremediable diatribe, one we simply could not have done without, between “complexity enthusiasts” (consisting *not* of experts on complexity but of numerous intellectuals and scholars who have never even approached the subject and who have unfailingly demonstrated in their publications to be incapable of recognizing, much less adopting, a systemic approach to complexity) and “simplicity warriors” both of whom, beyond their mutually opposing positions and traditionalist frontline logics, continue to reproduce and foster reductionist, deterministic and rigidly schematic explanations and beyond that, to propose distorted and misleading analyses of complexity theory/-ies, of complexity science, of the very concept of “complexity”, and of the kinds of thinking and epistemologies that these implicate and promote.

The repercussions are evident, as the topics and arguments generally come down to an ideological clash, brimming with clichés and stereotypes, often related to themes and approaches of which the duelists know very little (as I always say, one cannot be an expert on everything); reductionist, deterministic explanations that have been efficiently pasted together and narrated in simplistic terms guaranteed to produce a sterile and aporetic dispute that, unfortunately—or fortunately as it may be—works very well in gathering consent and popularity. A dispute with no possibility of mediation that legitimizes the analyses, or better, the simple “solutions” and obvious *shortcuts* that have been proposed.

The result is that studies and research on complex systems are disregarded, while complexity itself, with the approaches, thinking and epistemologies that promote and characterize it, is still being used instrumentally as a slogan, more often than not distorted and discredited, despite the Nobel Prize awarded to the brilliant physicist Giorgio Parisi. Whereas on the contrary, a deeper understanding of complexity could truly provide a plurality of diversified perspectives for comprehending and analyzing the calamitous situation in Ukraine, and more generally, for interpreting so many of our unexpected, systemic and global emergencies. And yet, in trivializing, and even ridiculing entire traditions of study and research, which are undeniably supported by a vast quantity of scientific and multidisciplinary literature, there are those who—on both fronts—utilize the concept as a buzz-word, either a solution-word or a problem-word (thus echoing the categories proposed in the past by Edgar Morin—who has recently taken it upon himself, by the way, to speak out about the dramatic war in Ukraine), in one or the other sense, to magnify or demolish hypotheses, discussions, people. There are those who have taken on the title of “complexity professionals” without taking the trouble to do any research whatsoever on the topic, and those taking the opposite position, under the same conditions of ignorance, who rant against these so-called complexity professionals. Self-appointed experts claiming knowledge and skills on the topic without having carried out the necessary years of studies, activities or

research feel entitled to sling platitudes and labels in all directions in an effort to belittle genuine scientific researchers in the field. Once again, the factions clash without knowledge or consideration of the concepts, definitions, approaches, epistemologies, methods, and thoughts that characterize complexity. Significantly, it has become all too common these days to present oneself as an expert on subjects without having ever studied them, which inevitably leads to sketchiness at best, and most likely to harmful polarization when done without considering the damage that can be wreaked.

When these polarized positions culminate in senseless measures, driving more and more radical divisions and separations between peoples, volatile situations can easily blow up out of all proportion, leading to (what should be) unthinkable consequences, and the direct responsibility lies with those who have fostered these divisions.

Returning to the specific case at hand, the strategy of sanctioning, and even more so, of fostering hostilities towards Russian culture, systematically closing off all that comes from Russia or can be traced back to that country, risks further exacerbating the distances, reinforcing those “logics of separation” which render—and in the future, will continue to render even more impractical, not to say impossible, the (complex) path towards post-conflict reconstruction. Creating and fueling further divisions, in this moment, towards a people and a culture with—moreover—extraordinary qualities, will end up radicalizing, even more deeply, dynamics that are already bellicose and highly destructive.

Quite the contrary, now is the moment, by following the postulates of complexity and systems theory and sciences, to try to “open” (complex) systems, building precisely on a tangible and continuous dialogue, which cannot/must not be activated exclusively in retrospect—and on the strategic value of culture, on the rich uniqueness and diversity of cultures, complex devices capable of undermining even the most anti-democratic elites, who have always feared culture and free thinking in all forms, more than any weapon or military invasion.

Yet another semantic dimension/label that is erroneously attributed to complexity, and to the approach, thought or epistemology/-gies that it demands, is one that draws an association, not only with the inherent difficulties of facing so many variables of such enormous magnitude, but also with a supposed “lack of responsibility or accountability” in making choices or decisions. Saying, for example, that a certain phenomenon or problem is “complex”, *therefore there is nothing we can do about it*, is one of the points on which simplicity crusaders attack real or presumed complexity theorists, as though the concept of complexity were merely an attempt to elude a *relational corral of responsibility*. Quite the contrary, a complexity “culture” is a *culture of responsibility* (Dominici, 1996) and of prevention, for which a *long-term systemic vision* is indispensable. The problem is that this kind of temporal duration does not sit well with the timing and objectives that are generally set in politics and international relations.

In the meantime, there continues to be great confusion, even among so-called experts (“experts on everything”) and even, at times, amongst scholars regarding the meaning of the word “complex”, which is used, as in everyday speech, to signify “(very) difficult or

complicated”. As I said before, the same confusion reigns regarding the distinction between complex and complicated, and at times is even taken to simply describe something that has “bigger” dimensions or extensions. In the same way, complexity continues to be associated with *genericity of arguments* and with *lack of precision and/or methodological rigor and analysis*. As far as the aforementioned confusion between complex and complicated systems is concerned, I have in the past described this as the most fatal of all errors. Another far from irrelevant issue previously described is the mediocre habit of considering simplification to be the opposite of (and the solution to) complexity. We have already seen that it is reductionism which is in direct opposition to complexity; in any case, it is certainly futile to look for “simple solutions to complex problems” (Dominici, 1995-1996, 2005).

On the subjects of both complexity and responsibility, I would like to underline that in complex systems, it is impossible to be an external and/or neutral observer. The observer is inevitably an integral, interacting part of what is being observed, and the *very act of observing* will have an impact on the system observed, changing it in some way, while the observer (who is known in sociology as the observer/participant), will also be changed by what they are observing. This feature of complex systems is well-known to physicists, but is perhaps even more crucial to comprehend on a human scale when considering the complexity of social systems. We should keep in mind that any human conflict, above all/any war, will affect and will be affected by the observers. The responsibility we share is, therefore, twofold, and cannot be dismissed.

2. The Deepest Deviation

In these situations, the deepest and most worrying deviation consists of the fact that, beyond the positions taken (which are, as always, polarized and extreme) what emerges are public debates and “climates of opinion” (a concept that was coined by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann), wherein, almost inevitably, no chance for in-depth reflection or for an alternative point of view is permitted. It is all too obvious that public opinion(s), the (global) ecosystem of information and communication and, more generally, political and social cultures carry out the functions of *powerful agents of social control and conformism*, within apparently open, democratic societies as well. Any positive form of confrontation, meaning a *generative*, even if harsh conflict, has fallen by the wayside. The only conflict that remains is an ideological skirmish, a one-dimensional debate, in which all voices (including those who have always warned against polarization) fall back on hegemonic *narratives* and oppositions, on diatribes and rigid schemes, on “false dichotomies” (Dominici, 1995), which have nothing to do with complex thought.

I have always been struck by a similar lack of coherence, methodological rigor, and even, at times, intellectual integrity among experts, scholars and intellectuals, in particular by the fact that complexity and the approach it implicates have so often been used in these circles to criticize certain positions, only to subsequently execute an about-face and use them in the opposite manner according to whom they wished to attack. We saw this during the years in which terrorism was the main concern of governments and media. Those who claimed at the time that the only correct strategy was direct suppression and/or physical elimination of

the terrorists, without attempting to address the latent causes or to take into account that in certain areas terrorism had been deliberately triggered and fostered for strategic purposes, were always quick to call those who wanted to explore the *complex* roots and causes of the phenomenon as “sympathizers”.

“Risk, emergency, conflict, education, communication, politics, democracy and life itself: none of these can be simplified or reduced to mathematical formulas or sequences of data, although the aspiration of human beings to do so, and to try to achieve total control over every single aspect of life becomes paradoxically more and more obsessive as time goes by.”

Likewise, in more recent times, the “complexity paradigm” has often been used to criticize populist movements or to condemn those portions of society who take the most extreme positions on bioethics, dismissing them as ignorant or religious fanatics incapable of overcoming a *simplistic* approach to reality. As always, these paradigms and approaches are applied according to what is momentarily convenient, to demonstrate that one’s own ideas are the only ones acceptable. And how often have we witnessed these same thinkers and crusaders, including the *crème de la crème* of our intellectual ranks, alternate in either embracing or abandoning a “complex” approach according to circumstances. Hence it is particularly ironic but far from surprising to hear those who have always abhorred the ignorance of a simplistic approach on the part of populists, now calling populist or disloyal those who favor a more nuanced and complex approach to the current Ukrainian impasse.

It must be clear, however, in recalling the words spoken by the Italian thinker/intellectual Antonio Gramsci: “I hate the indifferent” (Gramsci, 1917), that the urgency of taking a position on injustice, crises, social and ethical issues is of the utmost importance. Our understanding of the complexity of life and our analyses of the complexity of conflict and war should not suffocate our choice to take a moral stand on human rights and human suffering. Too often, though, this position is not based on what is believed to be morally right, but is tempered by considerations of profit, prestige, and promotion on the part of those who seek fame and visibility.

In this manner, public discourse and debate completely overlook the contribution that a systemic approach to complexity could provide in analyzing, and in searching for a potential—and vitally important—way out of such a devastating event as war. Thus, today we find ourselves once more obliged to talk about war, while millions of human beings are obliged to endure it. These are, as I have been saying for years, very dark times indeed.

Let me repeat this: the pathways of separation and isolation run an all-too-real risk of permanently closing everyone off, including those who are struggling—using a range of effective instruments (not only in terms of “soft power”)—who are fighting an arduous and

complex battle to construct modern democracies, to build societies that are truly open and inclusive. If we cut them off, the sole victims will be the populations, the people, the most vulnerable subjects. It has always been so.

Ever since I was a child, I have heard history teachers, politicians, journalists and so many others repeat this cliché over and over again: “we must learn from history”: but this latest dramatic conflict is yet another demonstration that this formula is nothing more than an empty slogan, one we use to try to make sense of dramatic events that make no sense, to try to explain something that has no explanation, at any rate no “rational” one.

We are living, as I have said above, in very dark times, in times of one-dimensional thinking, or rather, of non-thinking. Thought is a complex dimension, which we persist in considering so marginal and irrelevant as to have decided to delegate it to so-called “intelligent” machines. Our hypertechnological and hyperconnected civilization—as I have been saying from the ‘90s on—is marked by a thinking crisis, by a distressfully inadequate thought process that is totally unprepared for facing the ongoing phase of radical change and complexity, a phase that is historically unprecedented in the evolution of human society. The lack of thinking generates—and will continue to generate—not only closed, asymmetrical and increasingly exclusive societies; it generates—and will continue to generate and escalate—tyranny and unspeakable monstrosities like war and the oppression of the “Other from ourselves”.

As Bertrand Russell once wrote: “Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth—more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tryed wisdom of the ages” (Russell B., 1916).

3. The Logic of Linear Thinking

The logic of linear and causal thinking can lead nowhere but to strife and discord, to an absolute incapacity for understanding complexity (which is not a synonym for difficulty) or for recognizing the coexistence of contradictions, dichotomies and open dialects (without a conclusive synthesis). The catchwords are the same as ever: all voices are raised unanimously against disinformation, against “fake news”, “bubbles,” and so-called “echo chambers”. All unanimously in favor of “critical thinking”, of “long-term” policies, but somehow, at the same time unanimously eager to label, simplify, reduce and trivialize the issues, *discrediting whoever does not think like “us”*. Once again seeking those “simple solutions for complex problems” (Ibidem). The bottom line is that these polarizations and one-sided rationales are very convenient, not only for enhancing the illusion of reducing or simplifying complexity, rendering it decodable and universally accessible, but also for fostering “cultural industries” and strengthening positions of high visibility and social prestige.

It is high time (and has been so for some time) to rediscover politics (i.e., politics unchained from economics) and diplomacy, which are always called for and/or applied with hindsight, after the dynamics and conflicts have played out—either with extreme or mild consequences—by framing them from a long-term, permanent, systemic and systematic

perspective. Otherwise, once war has “broken out”, and the fuses have been lit, merely mentioning the idea of a “peace culture”, or a “complexity culture” begins to look like close to useless rhetoric.

Apart from the dispute between those who calibrate their binoculars on complexity and those who choose to regulate their settings on simplicity, both of whose readings, at the end of the day, have little impact on real outcomes, the representations of the drama and the complexity of war itself, in many cases, tend to dwindle into simplified, self-redeeming narratives, as well as into mere *simulation of debate*, communication, and imagination, whilst criticism or praise of complexity is expressed without rigor, in an awkward and confusing manner, even by those who should feel it their duty to offer lucid interpretations and effective instruments for opening positive prospects and unexplored scenarios for peace.

As the recent global and systemic emergency has shown us, everything is related, everything is interdependent and *inter-independent* (a concept introduced by Panikkar). No planes of thought, analysis, or action can be kept separate. Furthermore, there is no dimension of phenomena or reality, no dimension of our lives and existence that is not complex. Complexity is not an indication of any kind of “higher level”; a cell, an insect, a leaf, a flower, a plant and a brain—the latter is perhaps the most complex system of all—an organization, a social system, all are complex organisms, all are interconnected, and “everything depends on everything else”, to borrow a concept from the Haida people of the Canadian territory.

Complexity, in other words, is a structural, connotative dimension of what is real, of what is social, of what is alive, even (or perhaps especially) in those dimensions, impossible to observe, that are emergent and unmeasurable. “Objects” should be seen as they really are: as *systems*, relations, and systems of relations, in which the smallest imaginable change can have an enormous effect on the entire system and on its environment, as illustrated by the famous metaphor known as the “butterfly effect.” And having said this, taking once more into consideration the recent pandemic, it becomes evident that not everything can be broken down or simplified into more basic elements. Risk, emergency, conflict, education, communication, politics, democracy and life itself: none of these can be simplified or reduced to mathematical formulas or sequences of data, although the aspiration of human beings to do so, and to try to achieve total control over every single aspect of life becomes paradoxically more and more obsessive as time goes by.

Furthermore, going back to the systemic “approach” I have been speaking of, it is a characteristic of complex social systems to adapt constantly to changes, even those that are dramatic and traumatic, so it is impossible to make any kind of prediction regarding dynamics that turn out to be increasingly chaotic, and at times/often, indecipherable.

One “certitude” can indeed be taken to be certain: we must get ourselves back onto the path of diplomacy (by everyone, for everyone) and politics. These events, so dramatic for the history of humanity, have once again shown us how weak statesmanship is today, and how politics has by now become the “handmaiden” of economic powers. The very concept of an “international community” has laid bare its own incapacity to describe the current multi-polar global context.

Let us start over, starting with politics, with diplomacy, “real” on-the-field diplomacy, continuous and systemic: less “theater” and more “backstage”; now is not the time for “simulated diplomacy” and/or media storytelling, which unfailingly leads us in the opposite direction from our expected and desired objectives. Let us start over, beginning with politics and diplomacy, but also with the value of culture and education in mind, for the future: Ukraine’s future, Russia’s future, humanity’s future, the future of our entire planet. Violence has never brought anything other than more violence, more division, more incurable fractures. *Let us stay human!*

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A Brief Review of Major Divergences Underlying Current Human Security and The Modern World Order

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to focus on learning major divergences for understanding global human security and modern world order in the 21st century, with the strategic perspective of an integrated approach for peace and economy, considering current events. No global structure of peace can be stable and secure unless all parties recognize others' legitimate security interests. The best way for the major powers to begin to achieve that is to choose the path of mutual understanding and de-escalation over Ukraine and Taiwan. In the meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party concluded that it could grow rich without giving up power, in fact it could buy off rebellion and rival America's strategic superiority. Whatever the outcome of the current crises, what is now clear is that Moscow and Beijing are not going to become like us any time soon, and we need to accept the regrettable reality that we are entering another period of strong divergence for global human security and world order. The ultimate problem we face today in EU is still our inability to solve most of the shared existential challenges we face quickly. But there is hope. Openness is the only way through which we will learn to get through global crises.

1. Introduction

Yeltsin's tenure as President seemed not only to echo a second-rate "America's poodle" status, his handling of the Russian economy proved disastrous for the average Russian, but lucrative for a handful of Russian oligarchs, who in turn were connected to American business interests (Wikipedia, 2022). Boris Yeltsin sums up his actions in this way.

The rise of Putin has been remarkable, perhaps even charming, in some supernatural sense. In a span of five years (1996-2000) Putin moved up the Russian government ladder from Deputy Chief of the Presidential Property Management Directorate to Prime Minister of the Russian Government and finally to Acting President of the Russian Federation. Putin was appointed Prime Minister by Yeltsin on Aug. 9, 1999. Less than five months after that, on Dec. 31, 1999, Yelstin resigned, and Putin became President.

On assuming presidency and his election to a full first term, Putin resolved to end this economic domination by "the oligarchs," but in so doing, he antagonized their internationalist capitalist partners in the West on Wall Street and in Brussels.

Criticized by some domestic opponents for not following punctiliously all the hallmark benchmarks of Western style "democracy," Putin insisted that the difficult path to Russian

democracy was different than the model so often pushed (and imposed) by the United States around the world. Nevertheless, the average Russian citizen experienced more real liberties and more economic freedom than at any time in Russia's long history, and the credit for that must be Putin's (Lynch, 2011, p. 69-74; Stuermer, 2008, pp. 199-200).

Putin's first reign as President of Russia was from 1999-2008. He then took the lower office of Prime Minister again from 2008-2012. Then he was elected to the presidency again, this time from 2012 until 2018, a 6-year term that ended when he was 66. He was president, then he was not, then he was again. Putin's reigns have been marked by one recurring theme: His political enemies mysteriously die or find themselves imprisoned.

But Putin was no Yeltsin. While initially following the Yeltsin pro-American and pro-Western lead in foreign policy, Putin was also aware that Russia was undergoing a radical transition from a decrepit and collapsed Communist state to the recovery of some of its older traditions, including a mushrooming, vibrant return to traditional Russian Orthodoxy, a faith which he has publicly and personally embraced.

Putin believed that the largest nation in the world, which had thrown off the Communist yoke, merited a larger role. His desire was for a real partnership. But aggressive attempts spearheaded by the United States to incorporate formerly integral parts of Russia, areas that were and continue to be considered within the Russian "sphere of influence," even if independent, into NATO, largely dashed Russian hopes for partnership with the West. (Stuermer, 2008, pp. 191-196).

Today the Russian Orthodox Church is, by far, the most conservative, traditional and anti-Communist religious body in the world. It has gone so far as to canonize dozens of martyrs killed by the Communists and celebrate the Romanov tsar and his family who were brutally murdered by the Reds in 1918.

Such a phenomenon is not some Communist plot but represents a genuine desire on the part of the Russian people to rediscover their religious roots, ironically just as a majority of Americans now seem to embrace same sex marriage, abortion, and the worst extremes of immorality and the rejection of traditional Christianity.

Russia has rebounded from state atheism and is now the champion of religious morals, while the USA has steadfastly moved away from religion, and like Europe, has become more liberal.

A report by the Centre for Strategic Communications, a Kremlin-connected think tank, neatly summarized Putin's ambition: it is entitled "Putin: World Conservatism's New Leader" (Kaylan, 2014; Whitmore, 2013). The report argues that large, silent majorities around the world favor traditional family values over feminism and gay rights, and that Putin is their natural leader.

Russia's failure to embrace liberal, democratic capitalism, and America's and Europe's overly optimistic belief that Moscow's flawed, corrupt post-communist economic model would deliver the sort of wealth and prosperity that goes hand in hand with real law-governed competitive free markets was an especially grievous error.

Dependent upon resource extraction and export, Russia has poured immense sums into the military and foreign adventures but failed to diversify into strategic investments for social growth and development. Furthermore, stagnation and corruption have encouraged people to drop out of education or head abroad.

The largest country in the world by geography now has a population size not much bigger than France and Germany combined and lost more than a million people in 2021 alone, indicating serious failure to contain COVID-19. The threat that Russia now poses is borne of the opposite problem: it failed to develop a modern economy.

2. The Roots of the Innermost Hidden Belief in the Russian Federation

Resurgent religious traditionalism has fueled Russia's new law against sexual orientation proselytism to minors and its new anti-abortion law. Both laws also respond to Russia's demographic struggle with plunging birth rates and monstrously high abortion rates that date to Soviet rule.

As the largest nation in the world, with historic connections to the rest of Europe, and also to Asia, Putin understood that Russia, despite the Communist interlude, was still a major power to be reckoned with.

Putin has formed a close association with the Russian Orthodoxy, as Russian rulers typically have across centuries. He is smart to do so, as Russia has experienced somewhat of a spiritual revival... Orthodoxy is widely and understandably seen as the spiritual remedy to the cavernous spiritual vacuum left by over 70 disastrous, often murderous, years of Bolshevism.

Furthermore, it has deep roots in the Russian culture, history, and collective imagination. In fact, in the past centuries, there even used to be an attempt to form a sort of symphony between the government that ran everyday life and the party rulers that were in charge of ideology. For Moscow in the 20th century, like for Moscow in the 16th century, the symphony was not stable while the ruler had Messianic claims that were too strong.

Introducing the concept of the Third Rome with its three essential elements: symphony of powers, supremacy and universality, and its eschatological dimension, it is an attempt to create a strong reference frame for all future events (Laatz, 2011; Wikipedia, 2022, Moscow Third Rome).

(a) Symphony of Powers

One constitutive aspect was the so-called symphony that was formulated by Justinian in the sixth century. This idea was included in the decisions of the great council of Russian bishops of 1551, the Stoglav ("Council of One Hundred Chapters"). But the idea of the symphony of "sacerdotium and imperium" was already spread in the Muscovite society.

Thus around 1500 Iosif Volockij (Joseph of Volotsk), Abbot of Volokolamsk, led a monastic movement in the Russian Church that argued for a strong link between the church and the state, a political theocracy. Thus, in order to achieve religious uniformity, they

defended the theory of divine right of kingship and were willing to enlarge the powers of the state in church government (Berken, 1999, p.151).

The first Tsar Ivan, the Terrible used this idea for defending the Orthodox faith. His wars were against “Muslim unbelievers” and “the Catholic enemy of Christianity”. The mission of the Russian Church was directly grounded in the military victories (Berken, 1999, p.152).

This was an implementation of the concept of symphony, as it was then understood in Russia. But according to modern scholars this was not a real harmony. The partners in the symphony were unequal. The state or the monarch was the real head of the church. Ivan, the Terrible saw “the tsardom as a divine commission and himself as head of the church and representative of God on earth” (Bercken, 1999, p.154).

In the words of Wil van den Bercken: “The unity between religion and politics and between church and state which took form in sixteenth-century Moscow does not mean that a symphony between secular and ecclesiastical power was achieved” (Bercken, 1999, p.152).

(b) Supremacy and Universality

The other constitutive characteristic of the Third Rome is its supremacy and universality. Moscow as the newest Rome is above other countries. And as the supreme state, Russia is the holy Russia (Lettenbauer, 1961, p. 36). But this means that the supremacy was not an achievement of the country itself. The Third Rome was an instrument of God chosen by him for the fulfilment of his aims.

One of the most important characteristics of all of the three Romes was their universality. If the concept of symphony was introduced at the time of the Second Rome, then the concept of universality was there from the First Rome onwards.

The universality of Rome was connected to the concept of “pax romana”. The goal of Rome was to establish a universal empire, which would supersede the disorderly competition between nations and establish world peace (Meyendorff, 1989, p. 11; 1983).

The monk Filofei, one of the masterminds of the doctrine of the Third Rome, wrote that “all Christian realms will come to an end and will unite into the one single realm of our sovereign” (Meyendorff, 1996, p.136).

It is true that the title of the Muscovite tsar was not the Roman emperor. But he was the tsar of all Christian realms, of all Christians. In the same way the Byzantine emperor was emperor “of the Romans, which is of all Christians” (Meyendorff, 1996, p. 133). It is important to note that the term “Christians” refers to not only the Eastern Orthodox Christians who were in communion with the patriarch of Constantinople.

Now in the sixteenth century, the tsar of Moscow pretended also to be the emperor of all the Orthodox Christians.

Both the Byzantine and the Russian rulers were in a way universal emperors inside their own world. And the Russian tsar tried successfully to enlarge his world.

At first the so-called gathering of the Russian land was actually done by bringing together orthodox people under the tsar's sovereignty. One after the other, the Russian principalities and the free cities in Russia were incorporated into the ever-growing body of the Muscovite principality.

“By definition, the word “modern“ claims that “modern” practices cannot have existed before nineteenth-century Europe. As such, it means that in order for a nation to enter the “modern world” its people must adopt Western “modern practices” .”

But its appetite for enlargement was not extinguished by the Orthodox East-Slavonic countries. Ivan IV conquered Kazan and Astrakhan and incorporated their surroundings into his empire. But his appetite was farther into the West. Thus, he hoped to incorporate into his tsardom the Baltic countries as well.

Although according to the title he did not pretend to be the Roman emperor, nevertheless his intention was to be the universal emperor of all Christians. Even more, his intention was to enlarge step by step his world of Orthodox Christianity.

(c) Eschatological Dimension

There is another important aspect of the Third Rome that was not noticeable in the case of Constantinople but which was essential in the case of Moscow. This is the eschatological dimension. Moscow is not only the most important city, but it is chosen by God and in a way set apart from other places on the earth. Moscow has a special religious function. It is the centre of Christianity. It is in some way closer to God. But that is not all.

According to Filofei, Moscow is the Third Rome and “the third stands, and there will never be a fourth” (Bercken, 1999, p.146). Moscow is the last Rome. Moscow was the centre of history and therefore its fulfilment (Lettenbauer, 1961, p. 58). This means that Russia had to preserve its rich store of faith in purity in the last phase before the end of the world (Bercken, 1999, p.147). And this fact puts a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the Russians (Dvorkin, 1992, 32).

It is rather likely that at least the monk Filofei expected a close end of history (Tschizewskij, 1959). According to Florovsky this idea is rooted in Byzantine theological thinking (Florovsky, 1979). The world is approaching its end. The world exists only while Moscow exists. And Moscow exists only whilst it is the centre of the Christian, i.e., of the Orthodox world.

If Moscow perishes or ceases to be this centre then it is the end of the world. Now if the tsardom of Moscow is the eschatological tsardom, then its ruler is the eschatological emperor. This eschatological aspect makes him a special figure.

On the one side he has special functions to play. He has to protect the Christian, i.e., the Orthodox purity of the last Rome. He also has to establish its universality. In practice it means that he has to expand the realm of the eschatological empire.

On the other side, being the eschatological ruler empowers the tsar with special qualities and abilities. He must be able to fulfil his obligations. He must be able to preserve religious purity and must be able to execute the universality of the Third Rome.

This is beyond human abilities. Therefore, he receives these qualities and abilities from God. They are divine. Thus, the eschatological ruler is in a way deified. In this respect nobody in the world is equal to him. Even the head of the church is not like the tsar. This means that he, as the divine ruler of the tsardom, is also the divine ruler of the church.

However, the result of this self-understanding is the abolishment of the symphony of the church and the secular government. Actually, it does not mean the abolition of the concept. In the case of the divine eschatological ruler, the church and the state are rather closely connected. They both are under one ruler. So, it is more monophony than symphony.

It is impossible to discern where the church starts and where the state ends (i.e., we cannot observe the difference between the two realms).

There was a tendency in Byzantium towards “caesaropapism”. Caesaropapism is the idea of combining the social and political power of secular government with religious power, or of making secular authority superior to the spiritual authority of the Church; especially concerning the connection of the Church with government. A strong mixing of faith, superstition and ambition.

Although Justus Henning Böhm (1674–1749) may have originally coined the term “caesaropapism” (Cäseropapismus) (Pennington, 2010), it was Max Weber (1864–1920) who wrote: “a secular, caesaropapist ruler... exercises supreme authority in ecclesiastic matters by virtue of his autonomous legitimacy”. According to Weber, caesaropapism entails “the complete subordination of priests to secular power” (Swedberg, R. and Agevall, O., 2005).

In an extreme form, caesaropapism is where the head of state, notably the emperor (“Caesar”, by extension a “superior” king), is also the supreme head of the church (pope or analogous religious leader). In this form, caesaropapism inverts theocracy (or hierocracy in Weber), in which institutions of the church control the state. Both caesaropapism and theocracy are systems in which there is no separation of church and state and in which the two form parts of a single power-structure.

Although the rulers have never officially pretended to be divine or semi-divine beings, nevertheless they have sometimes been treated practically as half-gods.

Of course, Russian Christianity was above the rest of Christianity. But the holiness of Russia was something more. It was the self-understanding of Russia as elected by God and as having a special task in the divine story within the world. This consciousness of being elected and therefore being the messianic nation has survived even into the secular era.

3. Cindia on the Modern World Order

What exactly is the “modern” world?

There is a serious problem with the way the world views modernity because the word “modern” has become fundamentally associated with practices that emerged in Western Europe in the 19th century and ignores practices in other parts of the non-Western world.

By definition, the word “modern” claims that “modern” practices cannot have existed before nineteenth-century Europe. As such, it means that in order for a nation to enter the “modern world” its people must adopt Western “modern practices.”

It is an assumption that “modernity” is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not. It is also shaped equally by history and culture. “China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different” (Martin, 2010).

In short, the assumption that what is considered to be “modern” must have originated in the West needs to be corrected. It needs to be understood that what it is to modernize does not mean another country must westernize.

The title of this section “CINDIA” means thinking of China and India together (Rampini, 2006). If they were together, they would represent more or less half of the world’s population.

Of course, the two nations have very different degrees of development. The very advanced level of Chinese technology and economy is not surprising, after over three decades of heavy investments by China in the “Silk Roads” strategic initiative.

It is really crucial that India is also making great progress and is very attractive for Western investors as it has a widespread knowledge of the English language and a good level of techno-scientific culture.

However, relations between the two countries are not quite harmonious since there are territorial disputes, the aftermath of ancient tensions and above all economic and geo-political competition.

Naturally, the balance of forces is clearly in favor of China, especially in terms of exports.

It is enough to say that the smartphone market, which in India is developing exponentially, is dominated by four manufacturers who are Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo and One plus, all four obviously Chinese.

As the smartphone market flourishes, it is normal for apps to develop as well.

We live in a world where apps are not just more than simple “entertainment platforms”, but real “entertaining platforms” of political pressure. If someone is still not convinced, think back to the known issues between former President Trump and the various social media platforms like TikTok, Twitter and Facebook.

(a) China

How do we explain the recent return of China to global prominence?

Interestingly, Confucianism both impeded China's economic progress, allowing the West to surpass China, and it also facilitated China's sudden rise in economic success.

Confucianism, also known as Ruism or Ru classicism, is a system of thought and behavior originating in ancient China. Variouslly described as tradition, a philosophy, a religion, a humanistic or rationalistic religion, a way of governing, or simply a way of life. Confucianism developed from what was later called the Hundred Schools of Thought from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551-479 BCE).

Confucius considered himself a transmitter of cultural values inherited from the Xia (c. 2070-1600 BCE), Shang (c. 1600-1046 BCE) and Western Zhou dynasties (c. 1046-771 BCE). Confucianism was suppressed during the Legalist and autocratic Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) but survived during the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE).

Confucian approaches edged out the "proto-Taoist" Huang-Lao as the official ideology, while the emperors mixed both with the realist techniques of Legalism.

In the past, according to traditional Confucian beliefs, merchants were unproductive, uncultured, and preoccupied with profit rather than the good of society. The state reluctantly believed that merchants were a necessary evil. Some Confucian thinkers even commended commerce as necessary for the well-being of society (Andrea and Overfield, 2012). It is clear that Confucianism has affected and still continues to affect the commercial industry of China today.

Confucianism is an ideology that is humanistic and non-theistic and does not involve a belief in the supernatural or in a personal god. Confucianism rather is a deep respect and affection for the rich cultural Chinese past, what in the "*Analects*" is called, "*hao xue* 好學," meaning "the love of learning" (Ames and Rosemont 1998).

Xinzhong Yao, in "An introduction to Confucianism", explains that Confucianism is also considered an ethical system. He presents Confucianism as a tradition with many dimensions and as an ancient tradition with contemporary appeal. This gives the reader a richer and clearer view of how Confucianism functioned in the past and of what it means in the present (Yao, 2000).

With particular emphasis on the importance of the family and social harmony, rather than on an otherworldly source of spiritual values, the core of Confucianism is humanistic. Herbert Fingarette's conceptualisation of Confucianism is a philosophical system which regards "the secular as sacred" (Fingarette, 1972).

Confucianism transcends the dichotomy between religion and humanism, considering the ordinary activities of human life, and especially human relationships, as a manifestation of the sacred (Adler, 2014), because they are the expression of humanity's moral nature (xing 性), which has a transcendent anchorage in Heaven (Tiān 天) (Littlejohn, 2010). While Tiān

has some characteristics that overlap the category of godhead, it is primarily an impersonal absolute principle, like the *Dào* (道) or the Brahman.

This intuitive knowing of life cannot be grasped as a concept. Rather, it is known through actual living experience of one's everyday being. Its name, Tao or Dao came from Chinese, where it signifies the way, path, route, road, or sometimes more loosely doctrine, principle, or holistic belief (Zai, 2015).

Laozi in the "Tao Te Ching" explains that the Tao is not a name of a thing, but the underlying natural order of the Universe whose ultimate essence is difficult to circumscribe because it is non-conceptual, yet evident in one's being of aliveness (Laozi, 2018). The Tao is "eternally nameless" and is distinguished from the countless named things that are considered to be its manifestations, the reality of life before its descriptions of it.

To appreciate the role of China, we need to know the entire context and how the western society was during the time China was a world power. In the late eighteenth century, the political economist Adam Smith predicted an eventual equalization of power between the West and the territories it had conquered (Smith, 1776).

The core of Smith's thesis was that humans' natural tendency toward self-interest (or in modern terms, looking out for yourself) results in prosperity. Smith argued that by giving everyone the freedom to produce and exchange goods as they pleased (free trade) and opening the markets up to domestic and foreign competition, people's natural self-interest would promote greater prosperity than stringent government regulations.

This "free-market" force became known as the "invisible hand", but it needed support to bring about its magic. In particular it was the market that emerged from an increasing division of labor, both within production processes and throughout society that created a series of mutual interdependencies, promoting social welfare through individual profit motives.

In other words, once you specialize as a baker and produce only bread, you now must rely on somebody else for your clothes, somebody else for your meat, and yet somebody else for your beer. Meanwhile the people that specialize in clothes now must rely on you for their bread, and so on.

His invisible hand continues to be a powerful force today. Smith overturned the miserly view of mercantilism and gave us a vision of plenty and freedom for all. The free market he envisioned, though not yet fully realized, may have done more to raise the global standard of living than any single idea in history.

According to Giovanni Arrighi (Arrighi, 2007), Confucianism stresses the importance of maintaining balance within the family, harmony within the state, and by extension, the commercial market. The Chinese (Confucian) model of the type of market-based economic development, according to Adam Smith (1723-1790), who is widely considered the pioneer of political economy, was believed to be far superior to the European model and was "much more advisable for governments to pursue."

In fact, Smith even argued that even the late imperial China was the exemplar of market based economic development (Arrighi, 2007). So, Arrighi has provided an answer to this 18th century question; however, there still remains the question of how Confucianism, Confucian ethics, has much to contribute to today's current business ethics, the proper conduct of businesses and business people.

Historically, China held a significant position of world power until the 19th century. However, for the last two hundred years the West has dominated the world technologically, economically, politically, and its people have experienced the most social advancement out of all other world civilizations.

Why did China begin to lag behind the West during the past two centuries?

There were two major reasons. First, the Chinese were arrogant and believed themselves to be superior to all other foreigners. Second, China had a conservative Confucian-based bureaucracy governing the state. As such the bureaucracy stressed that the most important duty to its people was to ensure the maintenance of the Chinese State. This meant that they had to continue to stress the Confucian values of harmony and balance.

The point at which the West's global prominence began is often termed the "Great Divergence." Scholars have provided their own explanations for why the "Great Divergence" occurred (environment, geography, agriculture, population size, social organization, and technology); however, one of the major reasons for the "Great Divergence" is because of an underlying "Cultural Divergence," which began as far back as in the "Axial Age" (c. 800-200 BCE).

This "Cultural Divergence" was due to the beginning of the western philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in contrast to that of Confucius in China, to arrive at "Eurocentrism". These philosophers' ideas generated individualistic and democratic thinking, and they were reinforced by the Enlightenment thinkers during the Age of Enlightenment.

"Eurocentrism" is the idea that European civilization, "the West", has some unique historical advantage, some special quality of race or culture or environment or mind or spirit, which gave this human community a permanent superiority over all other communities, at all times in history and down to the very present (Blaunt, 1993).

How do we account for the rapid economic development of nineteenth-century Western Europe in comparison to China? If China is not Westernizing then how is it modernizing?

Historians such as Roger T. Ames, David L. Hall, and Henry Rosemont Jr., have presented the theory that the reason why China did not modernize before Europe is because European culture and that of China, art, politics, religion, the scientific principles and moral ideas, are products of belief systems that have shaped their culture. Not that "divergent paths were taken at a number of crucial moments in the development of Chinese and Western cultures" (Hall, and Ames, 1995). Therefore, because the originators' philosophies were very different from each other's, European culture and that of China are really quite distinct.

In fact, in contrast to Western thought, the Chinese have a widely divergent train of thought ingrained within their minds. The Chinese cultural belief systems are based on the

philosophies of such men like Confucius (the forefather of Confucianism), and thus have played, and still play, a role (though within the last decade this has decreased) in shaping Chinese civilization.

Understanding this “Cultural Divergence” is relevant today because it may help explain China’s lag behind the West, its recent ascent in economic power, and the impact of this cultural perspective on business.

In short, because of this difference in belief systems, the manner in which the Chinese society operates is drastically different compared to Western societies. Every aspect of the Chinese basic way of life is affected by their belief systems (not unlike the West), their government, values, customs, culture, relationships, and even the structure of the Chinese language.

The Chinese have been fundamentally a “relationship-based” society that places emphasis on taking care of the community as a whole.

Currently, a steady change has been developing in China. China has not only caught up to the West but its economy is continuing to accelerate at a rapid rate and may even surpass the West in the near future.

The return of China to global prominence is in part related to the embracing of Confucian principles in modern businesses (Martin, 2010; Ip, 2009). Cultural differences are the underlying, primary, and fundamental drivers of how the West and the East responded to their own differing opportunities.

In the meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party concluded that it could grow rich without giving up power, in fact it could buy off rebellion and rival America’s strategic superiority.

(b) India

The concept of the Absolute has been used to interpret the early texts of the Indian religions such as those attributed to Yajnavalkya, Nagarjuna and Adi Shankara (Hajime, 1964).

In Jainism, Absolute Knowledge or Kewalya Gnan, is said to be attained by the Arihantas and Tirthankaras, which reflects in their knowing the 360 degrees of the truth and events of past, present and future. All 24 Tirthankaras and many others are Kewalya Gnani or Carriers of Absolute Knowledge.

According to Takeshi Umehara, some ancient texts of Buddhism state that the “truly Absolute and the truly Free must be nothingness” (Umehara, 1970), the “void” (Oru, and Wang, 1992). Yet, the early Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna, states Paul Williams, does not present “emptiness” as some kind of Absolute, rather it is “the very absence (a pure non-existence) of inherent existence” in Mādhyamaka school of the Buddhist philosophy (Williams, 2002).

According to Glyn Richards, the early texts of Hinduism state that the Brahman or the non-dual Brahman-Atman is the Absolute (Richards, 1995; Chaudhuri, 1954; Simoni-Wastila, 2002).

The term has also been adopted by Aldous Huxley in his perennial philosophy to interpret various religious traditions, including Indian religions (Huxley, 2009), and influenced other strands of non-dualistic and “New Age” thought.

In Hinduism, Brahman (Sanskrit: ब्रह्मन्) connotes the highest universal principle, the ultimate reality in the universe (Lochtefeld, 2002; Raju, 2006; Fowler, 2002). In major schools of Hindu philosophy, it is the immaterial, efficient, formal and final cause of all that exists (Raju, 2006; Dhavamony, 2002; Clooney, 2010). It is the pervasive, infinite, eternal truth, consciousness and bliss which does not change, yet is the cause of all changes (Lochtefeld, 2002; Fowler, 2002; Brodd, 2009). Brahman as a metaphysical concept refers to the single binding unity behind diversity in all that exists in the universe.

Brahman is a Vedic Sanskrit word, and it is conceptualized in Hinduism, states Paul Deussen, as the “creative principle which lies realized in the whole world”. Brahman is a key concept found in the Vedas, and it is extensively discussed in the early Upanishads (Philips, 1998). The Vedas conceptualize Brahman as the Cosmic Principle (Philips, 1998). In the Upanishads, it has been variously described as “Sat-cit-ānanda” (truth-consciousness-bliss) (Goodman, 1994), and as the unchanging, permanent, highest reality.

Brahman is discussed in Hindu texts in conjunction with the concept of Atman (Sanskrit: आत्मन्), (Self), personal, impersonal, or Para Brahman, or in various combinations of these qualities depending on the philosophical school.

In dualistic schools of Hinduism such as the theistic Dvaita Vedanta, Brahman is different from Atman (Self) in each being.

In non-dual schools such as the Advaita Vedanta, the substance of Brahman is identical to the substance of Atman, is everywhere and inside each living being, and there is connected spiritual oneness in all existence.

(c) Technical-Scientific Culture

Technology has advanced throughout human history (though at varying speeds) and has accelerated greatly over the past, 100-150 years in particular. Technology is advancing rapidly across much of the world, but some countries are ahead of the pack, enabling their citizens to enjoy advanced benefits including more efficient transportation, the best healthcare, and green initiatives.

The National Science Board (Board) is required under the National Science Foundation (NSF) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1863 (j) (1) to prepare and transmit the biennial Science and Engineering Indicators report to the President and Congress every even-numbered year. The report is prepared by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES) within NSF under the guidance of the Board.

Indicators provide information on the state of the U.S. science and engineering (S&E) enterprise over time and within a global context. The report is a policy-relevant, policy-neutral source of high-quality U.S. and international data. The indicators presented in the

report are quantitative representations relevant to the scope, quality, and vitality of the S&E enterprise.

This report summarizes key findings from the nine thematic reports providing in-depth data and information on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education at all levels; the STEM workforce; U.S. and international research and development performance; U.S. competitiveness in high-technology industries; invention, knowledge transfer, and innovation; and public perceptions and awareness of science and technology. Indicators also include an interactive, online tool that enables state comparisons on a variety of S&E indicators. This report, the nine thematic reports, and the online State Indicators data tool together comprise the full Indicators suite of products (NSF, 2021).

Recently, the author was invited by the Vignan's Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (VFSTRU), to give a few presentations on "Computational Intelligence and Brain-Inspired Systems" (Cyber-Techno-Social Intelligence) at their affiliated institutions as the Lakireddy Bali Reddy College of Engineering (Fiorini, 2018). This was the right opportunity to personally check the state of scientific innovation and technology in India.

The number of prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology trebled in the space of a decade. But new arrivals are struggling to establish themselves and must quickly turn things around.

The Indian Institutes of Technology, such as IIT Delhi, are world-renowned for the quality of their students and faculty members. But India's Auditor General has expressed concerns about some of the newest institutions.

There probably isn't a country in the world that isn't looking to build or expand billion-dollar tech corporations.

The United States and China dominate the landscape of "unicorns", privately owned technology start-ups valued at US\$1 billion or more. But now some of the most rapid development is happening in India.

According to government data, India recorded 44 new billion-dollar technology companies in 2021, compared with 10 in 2020 and 9 in 2019 (the country has a total of 83 unicorns). Some analysts are predicting that 2022 will see another surge, with new companies in financial, agricultural, and educational technology joining new life-sciences companies, games companies and online marketplaces.

IIT Madras in Chennai, for example, is attempting to raise \$2 million for a new endowment fund to increase the proportion of women in assistant-professor roles from 15% to 20%. And in June 2021, IIT Bombay received funding to establish the institute's first faculty-chair position to be held by a woman. Such practices need to be shared more widely across IITs.

It is true that high-quality universities do not become high-quality institutions overnight. For example, when the Nature Index compiled a list of some of the world's leading universities under the age of 50, around 70% were at least 20 years old. But youth is not a reason for infrastructure delays, nor for failures in research governance.

India's national and state governments must work with IITs to address the audit report's concerns quickly. All need to grasp the nettle so that the IITs can continue to provide science and technology leaders for India and the world.

4. Conclusion

A few years ago, the two superpowers seemed almost to become one, such was the symbiosis between the world factory (Chinese) and its end market (American). That era has closed and will not return. What many experts considered impossible is happening. The tariffs were just the accelerator of a divorce that will change the maps of our future.

At 6:00 AM, on February 24, 2022, Russian Federation started its Special Military Operation, as defined by Putin, invading Ukraine.

At the same time a series of COVID-related shutdowns in China do not, on the surface, appear to have much in common, yet both are accelerating a shift that is taking the world in a dangerous direction, splitting it into two spheres, one centered on Washington, D.C., the other on Beijing.

The Middle Eastern representatives have no interest in abandoning relations with China, the leading trading partner for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, or breaking with Russia, which established itself as a force to be reckoned with when it saved Syrian President Bashar al-Assad through its military intervention in his war.

That said, they are watching Ukraine with fascination, because a Ukrainian victory, with a strong, united West behind it, would force a rethink about U.S. commitment and competence and shift the trajectory of declining transatlantic influence and relevance.

Conversely, Putin's victory, even at a huge cost to Russians and Ukrainians alike, would accelerate Western decline as an effective global actor.

From our perspective, taking into consideration analysis of the previous sections, we see the following global divergences emerging, which can be grouped into three main areas: (a) Religious-Political, (b) Sacred-Secular, and (c) East-West Cultural.

a. Religious-Political. There was a tendency in Byzantium towards "caesaropapism". Caesaropapism is the idea of combining the social and political power of secular government with religious power, or of making secular authority superior to the spiritual authority of the Church; especially concerning the connection of the Church with government. The Catholic Church shared communion with the Eastern Orthodox Church until the East-West Schism in 1054, disputing particularly the authority of the pope. Before the Council of Ephesus in 431AD, the Church of the East also shared in this communion, as did the Oriental Orthodox Churches before the Council of Chalcedon in 451AD; all separated primarily over differences in Christology. In the 16th century, the Reformation led to Protestantism breaking away. From the late 20th century, the Catholic Church has been criticised for its teachings on sexuality, its doctrine against ordaining women, and its handling of sexual abuse cases involving clergy.

- b. Sacred-Secular.** With particular emphasis on the importance of the family and social harmony, rather than on an otherworldly source of spiritual values, the core of Confucianism is humanistic. According to Herbert Fingarette's conceptualisation of Confucianism as a philosophical system which regards "the secular as sacred" (Fingarette, 1972). Confucianism transcends the dichotomy between religion and humanism, considering the ordinary activities of human life, and especially human relationships as a manifestation of the sacred (Adler, 2014). In short, the key difference between the West and China is that European society has always been focused on the "individual," whereas the Chinese have always centered their focus on "relationships," the interaction between people, or "guanxi 關係", westernized in "Junzi".

The concept of the Absolute has been used to interpret the early texts of the Indian religions such as those attributed to Yajnavalkya, Nagarjuna and Adi Shankara (Hajime, 1964). In Jainism, Absolute Knowledge or Kewalya Gnan, is said to be attained by the Arihantas and Tirthankaras, which reflects in their knowing the 360 degrees of the truth and events of past, present and future. All 24 Tirthankaras and many others are Kewalya Gnani or Carriers of Absolute Knowledge. According to Takeshi Umehara, some ancient texts of Buddhism state that the "truly Absolute and the truly Free must be nothingness" (Umehara, 1970), the "void" (Orru, and Wang, 1992). Yet, the early Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna, states Paul Williams, does not present "emptiness" as some kind of Absolute, rather it is "the very absence (a pure non-existence) of inherent existence" in Mādhyamaka school of the Buddhist philosophy (Williams, 2002). According to Glyn Richards, the early texts of Hinduism state that the Brahman or the non-dual Brahman–Atman is the Absolute (Richards, 1995; Chaudhuri, 1954; Simoni-Wastila, 2002).

Brahman is a Vedic Sanskrit word, and it is conceptualized in Hinduism, states Paul Deussen, as the "creative principle which lies realized in the whole world". Brahman is a key concept found in the Vedas, and it is extensively discussed in the early Upanishads (Philips, 1998). The Vedas conceptualize Brahman as the Cosmic Principle (Philips, 1998). In the Upanishads, it has been variously described as "Sat-cit-ānanda" (truth-consciousness-bliss) (Goodman, 1994), and as the unchanging, permanent, highest reality.

The point is, the spiritual and philosophical experiences of the East have determined the way they view commerce and the economy. Their economy is more culture-centric and focuses on the development of the society first as opposed to the rise of the Individual, which is seen in the important role given to the government than the individual. Though this trend is significantly changing, we see that notion of collective-centric governance is a by product of the countries' spiritual experiences and beliefs. Similarly, Putin is influenced by Russia's orthodox version of Christianity which certainly plays a role in influencing his recent actions, since he sees himself as a savior, a messiah.

- c. East-West Cultural.** The point at which the West's global prominence began is often termed the "Great Divergence." Scholars have provided their own explanations as to why the "Great Divergence" occurred (environment, geography, agriculture, population size,

social organization, and technology); however, one of the major reasons for the “Great Divergence” is because of an underlying “Cultural Divergence,” which began as far back as in the “Axial Age” (c. 800-200 BCE). This “Cultural Divergence” was due to the beginning of the western philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in contrast to that of Confucius in China, to arrive to “Eurocentrism”. These philosophers’ ideas generated individualistic and democratic thinking, and then were reinforced by the Enlightenment thinkers during the “Age of Enlightenment”. Western and Eastern thought have a widely divergent train of thought ingrained within their minds. The Chinese cultural belief systems are based on the philosophies of such men like Confucius (the forefather of Confucianism), and thus have played, and still play, a role (though within the last decade has decreased) in shaping Chinese civilization.

As a matter of fact, the United States has decided to throw China off track within this decade. China has played the Russian card to prevent this, by forging an almost unprecedented agreement with Russia. For the first time since World War II, the Americans are therefore faced with two great powers, the second and third of the planet, in a game that now follows the logic of war. In this triangular scheme, Washington has two options for avoiding a possible simultaneous confrontation with both rivals. The first, elementary according to the grammar of power, is to play the weakest against the strongest: Moscow against Beijing. The second, riskier, is to liquidate Russia first and then close the match with the now isolated China. By suffocating it in its corner of the world where, no longer being tied to the Russians, Beijing would be completely surrounded: along the seas by the India-Australia-Japan line remote-controlled from Washington. On the ground by almost all the neighbors, India and Russia in the lead. It is this second hypothesis that begins to circulate in Washington. And that Biden is illustrating to Atlantic and Asian partners, because America certainly cannot do it alone. The answers so far received from possible or actual allies are quite promising. Above all and first of all, obviously the British cousins. Global Britain lives in symbiosis with the United States. The geopolitical strategy of Boris Johnson, just fired, therefore presents a blatantly anti-Russian profile even before an anti-Chinese profile. In the line of the traditional, atavistic British Russophobia, but with that extra spice that Brexit and the consequent total alignment with Washington require. The “brilliant second” answered yes to Number One’s appeal: ready to take out Russia, by hook or by crook. Since the anti-Russian clash would all be played in Europe, and more specifically in that middle part of the continent that separates Germany from Russia, so that in history it has often been divided between the two empires.

On land and/or at sea, “accidents” with unpredictable effects could occur. With the Romanians ready to assert themselves, and to welcome any NATO contingents (also to resolve their Moldovan-Transnistrian question, a piece of Romania that Bucharest considers intimately its own, only provisionally independent). Between the Black and the Caucasus, after the clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh the Georgian powder keg is also likely to explode again. Here, among other things, the jihadist chain remains a non-negligible factor. If necessary, Americans and other Westerners could turn it on against

Moscow, along the lines of Afghanistan in the 1980s. And Russia? It is not too subtle. If it were in a tight spot, Moscow would be ready for war. Because she would be affected by her own survival. In the meantime, as per ancient custom, Americans are concerned with establishing or re-establishing profitable relations with Germany, France and Italy, the three main continental countries, which have never shared the anti-Russian passion of the former USSR satellites. The next few months will tell us whether this growing American pressure, via NATO, on Russia will be contained or if, perhaps inadvertently, it will produce the spark of a conflict with imponderable consequences.

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Ukraine: A Post-War Phoenix Perspective

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Abstract

This paper argues that science has not been very successful in preventing wars between nations, but may play a significant role in re-building a country or region after devastations from a military conflict. This is illustrated by the case of Ukraine. The specific potential contribution of regional science to the country's recovery process is highlighted (a 'phoenix perspective').

1. Territorial Conflicts and the Role of Science

The Russian invasion in Ukraine is a clear case of violation of international law, as was clearly stipulated in the recent statement of the World Academy of Art & Science on 'A Time of Solidarity!' (March 2, 2022). Unfortunately, such cases have been occurring time and again in the history of mankind. Geopolitical conflicts are apparently inherent in the development of civilisation. These conflicts emerge if political leaders in a given country rigorously seek to exercise power over a certain contested territory. It is noteworthy that in the civil law of most countries the ownership of land in a given area is normally unambiguously and legally specified and also included in detailed cadastral systems. But such cadastral systems do not exist *between* countries, and so, territorial property rights are often a source of dispute. And consequently, an act of war may be the result of ill-defined ownership rights for contested territories (or international waters).

"The lack of convincing scientific principles and of effective and accepted solution mechanisms for conflict management leads to a vulnerable global space-economy."

The ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey, Israel and the Palestinian nation, or Japan and China, to mention a few, illustrate that property and use rights of territories are not well anchored in mutually accepted agreements, and may in the worst case prompt violent attacks. Despite an abundance of scientific literature, there is not a binding logical system for

balanced conflict resolution among nations. And the United Nations is usually not capable of imposing mandatory and effective means for achieving a peaceful outcome. The lack of convincing scientific principles and of effective and accepted solution mechanisms for conflict management leads to a vulnerable global space-economy, as testified by the Ukrainian case.

2. Territorial Borders and the Role of Science

The observations made in the first section do not only induce questions on legal territorial ownership, but prompt also a complementary question, namely on the meaning of territorial *borders*. Clearly, there is no nation or region without borders, but there is also no border without a demarcated nation or region. In many cases, borders are a fuzzy construct and do not reflect an undisputed demarcation line. Borders may be the result of multiple—often historical—factors, for instance, physical geography (e.g. rivers, lakes, mountains), historical developments, culture, socio-economic conditions, language differences etc. Unfortunately, borders are often the result of military conflicts. But borders may also be based on explicit human or political decisions, such as the peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

There is a wealth of literature on borders—both their origins and their effects—and many studies have made a scientific attempt to classify borders in a rational or logical way, for instance, through functional, administrative or democratic criteria or procedures. And several disciplines, e.g. political science, sociology, political geography, international law or economics, have formulated scientific principles for borderline issues. Unfortunately, these often well thought ideas have not been followed in practice. At best, they are used for getting a better understanding of the complexity of border tensions or conflicts. Even the science of conflict management has not been very successful in mitigating or resolving military conflicts between two adjacent areas. What can science do, if it fails to develop accepted solution trajectories for war conflicts like in Ukraine?

3. Setting the Scene

Over the past decades, a wealth of literature has been published on shocks in dynamic systems, for instance, catastrophe theory, bifurcation theory or chaos theory. More recently, the attention has shifted to the analysis of recovery patterns after the occurrence of a shock or disruption (e.g., earthquakes, floods, wars). Much emphasis has been placed on these studies on the question whether and how an equilibrium state can be achieved, either the original state or a new balance. This has over the past few years led to a broad interest in vulnerability analysis and in particular *resilience analysis*. Resilience is interpreted as the capability of a dynamic system—once it is brought out of equilibrium as a result of a systemic perturbation—to reach again either the original equilibrium or to achieve a new equilibrium. Very recently, the notion of *prosilience* has been introduced to indicate that after a shock, through pro-active strategies and active interventions a positive system jump can be realised that puts the system concerned in a much better position on its performance ladder, as compared to its initial position. An avalanche of scientific studies has been produced to conceptualise and operationalise resilient trajectories for dynamic systems that were brought out of equilibrium as a result of a shock, e.g., in biology, psychology, political science,

geography and economics. It seems therefore, pertinent to explore whether the resilience concept is a useful vehicle for understanding and implementing the painful recovery process of the Ukrainian nation in a post-war situation. We will address in particular the potential offered by regional science, as a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of regions, cities, environment and infrastructure.

After the Great Recession (2008-2012), the Migration Crisis (2012-2020) and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-2022), our world has rather unexpectedly faced a fourth shock, viz. the Russian invasion in Ukraine. This is not only a violation of a nation's integrity, but also means an unprecedented human tragedy and suffering. During the previous three shocks mentioned above, regional scientists all over the world played a very active role in acquiring and disseminating evidence-based knowledge on the backgrounds, consequences and policy implications of the perturbations related to the Great Recession, the Migration Crisis and the Pandemic. And the regional science literature has been enriched with numerous advanced publications. So regional science has been rather alert and successful in coping with new challenges.

At the EURINT conference—held very recently (June 20-21, 2022) at the Center for European Studies, Iasi, Romania (close to the Moldavian and Ukraine border)—the alarming war situation was extensively discussed. We were very fortunate with the (online) participation of several Ukrainian regional science colleagues. During this EURINT conference, the plan was launched to offer to our regional science colleagues in Ukraine positive support during the geo-political conflict and to provide them with all scientific assistance that they would need during and after the crisis situation. This has been formulated in a jointly accepted Declaration by the EURINT conference participants (see Appendix).


4. Regional Science in Support of Ukraine

As argued above, solid regional science analysis—comprising expertise from regional and urban economics, economic and social geography and geoscience, and spatial planning (including transportation, infrastructure, environment and energy issues)—is instrumental in the necessary rehabilitation process of post-war Ukraine. Before sketching out concrete contours of a regional science assistance programme, it is useful to frame the type of knowledge and research that may be needed to re-build the country. Spatial (regional, urban and infrastructural) and socioeconomic development is the result of forces that shape the welfare and well-being of people. Based on previously tested research, we postulate that five key factors are responsible for structural and sustainable development of places: (i) productive capital (e.g. industry, factories, offices); (ii) financial capital (e.g. access to financial markets); (iii) social capital (e.g. presence of cooperative interactive networks); (iv) environmental capital (e.g. quality-of-life conditions); and (v) scientific capital (e.g. advanced research, access to modern digital technology tools). Clearly, these five factors are mutually dependent and may reinforce each other. They may be depicted in an often used so-called Pentagon model (see Figure 1).

We note that in particular scientific capital—with a high degree of accessible knowledge—is a catalyst for the other four Pentagon factors. And therefore, it is necessary that in the

reconstruction phase of the Ukrainian space-economy a major endeavour is pursued to provide a solid underpinning of reconstruction plans, based on the most advanced state of the art in science. Since any reconstruction plan of the devastated regional, urban and infrastructural system in Ukraine will have spatial implications, appropriate and effective use of intellectual resources in this field is needed. In the next section we will suggest several ways in which understanding regional science can support sustainable development of the Ukrainian space-economy.

Figure 1. The Pentagon Model



5. A Plan for Regional Science Support Activities

Starting from the effective potential of scientific capital, regional science can provide scholarly support to the reconstruction of Ukrainian cities and regions in three ways: A – Education and Training; B – Research and Capacity Building; C – Internationalisation and Knowledge Exchange. The concrete elements of these three successive building blocks for a regional science support plan for Ukraine can be briefly summarised as follows.

A. Education and Training

1. Short courses on modern regional science theory and methods for master's and Ph.D. students in Ukraine.
2. Practical training courses for professionals/practitioners, e.g., on public administration principles, procurement procedures, grant proposals, European project management, etc.
3. Advanced course for regional science academics in Ukraine.
4. Thematic training/support for staff from regional development agencies, cross-border cooperation agencies, etc.

B. Research and Capacity Building

1. Cooperative research projects on infrastructure/built environment/public facilities/environmental issues/spatial modelling of disruptions, etc.
2. Twinning publication projects with one or more Ukrainian regional science scholars.
3. Adoption plan for young Ukrainian regional scientists in ongoing or emerging research projects elsewhere or for a visiting scholarship, research internships, mobility exchange programmes, etc.
4. Support for curriculum development for undergraduate/master/training programs in areas associated with regional science.

C. Internationalisation and Knowledge Exchange

1. Involvement of Ukrainian regional scientists in ongoing regional science activities and/or committees, supported by digital tools.
2. Participation of Ukrainian research in international workshops and conferences.
3. Organisation of an international symposium on post-war Ukrainian regional and urban development, in cooperation with major international academic organisations.
4. Creation of Centres of Excellence in regional science, in Ukraine, with the support of other universities elsewhere.

It goes without saying that it is the responsibility of Ukrainian regional scientists to articulate their needs for scientific support.

6. A ‘Regional Science Marshall Plan’ for Ukraine

The redevelopment of regions and cities in Ukraine is more than a re-building of the built environment; it requires a strategic vision on the spatial constellation of the country in the future, seen from the opportunities offered by its space-economy. It requires a well thought strategy that has to be developed and implemented in the very short run. Clearly, the choice for any new spatial development of the country is a political responsibility of the Ukrainian people. It may be implemented from the perspective of a proresilience strategy. But as a sign of solidarity regional scientists all over the world are reaching out to Ukraine to offer all assistance needed by their colleagues. Such a massive mobilisation of relevant regional science knowledge in support of Ukrainian academics and professionals may almost take the form of ‘Regional Science Marshall Plan’. This ambitious plan supported by many colleagues all over the world intends to help the country and also to provide signs of hope in this depressing period. It offers cornerstones for a ‘phoenix’ miracle.

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Appendix Declaration

A REGIONAL SCIENCE ‘MARSHALL PLAN’ FOR UKRAINE

1. Regional science is concerned with sustainable spatial development of territories (cities, regions) in our world, in the spirit of the UN SDGs.
2. Regional science has developed a multidisciplinary scientific toolbox that has proven its validity and applicability all over the world, in cooperation with planners, economists, geographers, social scientists, transportation experts and environmental scientists.
3. Regional science is able to support capacity building in the recovery process of devastated territories and areas during the post-war period in Ukraine, as well as immediate scientific knowledge transfer and practical support whenever needed.
4. Capacity building comprises education and training of regional scientists, as well as structural science and research collaboration in all fields of the Ukrainian space-economy where regional science expertise and assistance is needed.
5. Given the urgent need for direct international scientific support in rehabilitating, in the short run, the regions and cities in Ukraine, regional scientists are prepared to help Ukrainian colleagues and practitioners with solid and practical advice on viable ways for creating sustainable spatial development.
6. Such a global support plan for Ukraine should not only be based on traditional physical planning methods and techniques, but should also be based on advanced digital technology and modern geoscience techniques (e.g., big data, machine learning, digital twins), as well as advanced spatial modelling.
7. Several scientific institutions and professional organisations (e.g., The Regional Science Academy) have already expressed their willingness to mobilise intellectual resources

in support of Ukrainian colleagues and professionals. To that end a broadly composed elicitation workshop (preferably in a safe zone in Ukraine) is planned in the near future, so as to bring supply and demand in that field of regional science together. It is foreseen that the results of this gathering will be broadly communicated to the international scientific community. This will herald the start of a REGIONAL SCIENCE 'MARSHALL PLAN' FOR UKRAINE.

Putin's Folly and Rethinking the SDGs

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Abstract

The invasion of Ukraine is widely seen as Putin's war, because he has a retrograde obsession to make Russia great again by reclaiming parts of the former Soviet Union. But Russia's autocrat made several huge miscalculations regarding his military efficacy, resistance by Ukraine, military support and strong economic sanctions by the US and other nations, and many corporations withdrawing from Russia. Putin may still "win" at a huge cost, or clearly lose; he may settle for a compromise, or a stalemate could last for many months or more. Overall, it will be a lose-lose war, not only for a devastated Ukraine and its many displaced citizens, but for the Russian economy, and the world, facing food security and energy security concerns, huge refugee problems, inflation, and supply chain problems. This setback, roughly equal to the many disruptions from the ongoing COVID-19 setback, could very well be worse. Putin's foolish and costly military action will lead to greater military spending in NATO countries, at the expense of other forms of security, such as addressing climate change and the necessary energy transition. Attention will focus on military security, at a time when more emphasis should be devoted to the broader concept of human security and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. The two broad setbacks to the SDGs are likely to result in little or no progress, and even negative progress for some goals. In response, a forward-looking "war" for human security and sustainability is needed, by ongoing rethinking of the goals and their low visibility. We cannot have sustainability without security, and vice versa. Security aspects of the SDGs should be widely emphasized, as well as the most cost-effective actions for each goal, why investments now are needed to avoid steeply rising costs, and how to best promote the goals as a better and less expensive future for all.

1. Prologue: A Lose-Lose War

At the time of this writing, the vicious and unwarranted Russian invasion of Ukraine is still underway, with no end in sight. The assault is more accurately seen as Putin's War, because the Russian autocrat has a retrograde obsession to make Russia great again by reclaiming nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine.

On the surface, it would seem to be an easy grab, similar to Crimea in 2014, because the Russian army is much larger than that of Ukraine. But Putin has made several huge miscalculations: he assumed that Ukraine would welcome him, he underestimated the fierce

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opposition of the Ukrainian people and the exemplary wartime leadership of Volodymyr Zelensky, and he underestimated American financial and military support for Ukraine. Moreover, he overestimated the efficacy of Russian forces, which were poorly trained and largely stalled because of poor command structure, corruption, low morale, and logistical problems of fuel and food. NATO has been strengthened as a result of Putin's war, which is quite the opposite of what he desires. Putin also underestimated the economic sanctions undertaken by the US and other nations, and many large corporations, to freeze Russia out of the world economy and to seize assets of Russia's oligarchs. Over 500 corporations have voluntarily left Russia or suspended activities there, including Visa and Mastercard, Coke and Pepsi, Uber, Shell, Dell, UPS, Starbucks, the 834 locations of McDonald's, and Netflix (which has become Nyetflix). Despite the stream of Orwellian misinformation from Moscow, Putin is correct in complaining about "economic war". But it is richly deserved, although still more is needed to force Putin into serious bargaining and withdrawal.

Four basic outcome scenarios suggest the broad range of possibilities: Putin wins, he loses, he settles for a compromise, or a stalemate lasting many months or more. Ukraine is already a huge loser, with tens of thousands of deaths, widespread aimless infrastructure destruction, and more than 4 million refugees and 7 million internally displaced from the 41 million population. But Putin is already a loser, with perhaps 15,000 military casualties (including six Russian Generals), widespread protests in the West and in Russia, despite arrests and threats of prison for the brave citizens who are speaking out, and growing evidence of war crimes and genocide. At present, Russian forces have withdrawn from the Kyiv region and are concentrated in the eastern provinces for what is widely expected to be a bloody struggle.

There is virtually no chance that Ukraine will give up in the short term, absent widespread use of chemical or biological weapons, or the unlikely but still possible detonation of a small nuclear weapon. If Putin somehow succeeds in conquering all or part of Ukraine in months and even years ahead, it will be a Pyrrhic victory at best. He will claim victory, but the world and many Russians will know better about the huge costs. Putin is already widely seen as a war criminal for attacking civilians. If he continues to double down, as he seeks to destroy the Donbas region, he can only descend to the status of "super war criminal"—a 21st century Hitler.

In contrast, Putin could be a big loser, if he is somehow removed from office, or assassinated (very unlikely). He is also reported to be in poor health and may die of natural causes. (But any successor will not necessarily be an improvement.) As Russia suffers more from economic sanctions, if the blanket of Russian misinformation is widely pierced, and if the enhanced attack in eastern Ukraine is thwarted, a huge Putin loss becomes quite possible.

Talks between Russia and Ukraine had been underway (Putin recently said they are "dead"), and a compromise might yet be reached, essentially involving Ukraine not joining NATO, and ceding Crimea and perhaps part of the eastern Donbas region to Russia. Ukraine presently insists it will cede nothing. Huge questions about security guarantees for Ukraine, reparations, and removing sanctions would have to be addressed.

One can go on and on about Putin's motivations, which side is winning and likely to prevail when and where, and whether any compromise and cease-fire can be reached—and maintained. Much has already been written about the war and will continue to be written. But relatively little has been written about the consequences of this *lose-lose* war: energy insecurity and rising worldwide prices for oil and natural gas, inflation, further supply chain problems, cyber-security concerns, food security concerns (especially in Africa and the Middle East), fertilizer concerns (Russia supplies critical components), and huge refugee problems. All of this is on top of many disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 setback.

“Putin’s War, whatever the outcome, will be a major setback to the SDGs and Agenda 2030. Instead of this hideous and unwarranted lose-lose war based on unfounded premises and outright lies (e.g. about “de-nazification”), nations should be widely engaged in a forward-looking good war for security and sustainability.”

2. Putin's War, Human Security, and Agenda 2030

Thinking more broadly in space and time, this article considers the impact of the war in Ukraine over the next decade on two umbrella concepts: Human Security and the UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals, a.k.a. the SDGs and Agenda 2030.

No matter the outcome of Putin's war, there will be a widespread loss in Ukraine, Russia, and the world at large—a setback roughly on the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic—and probably worse. If Putin wins or if some compromise is agreed on, it will probably be a setback for democracy. If Putin loses, it will be a victory for freedom and democracy, but still with widespread economic losses. In any event, there already is—and will be—far more thinking about traditional notions of national security.

The Human Security concept has been around for several decades, but with different definitions, as seen in the International Institute for Human Security (2001, Chicago), the Institute for Human Security (2001, Tufts University), the Institute for Human Security (2003, University of Pittsburgh), Human Security Centre (2013, London), Human Security Collective (2013, The Hague), and the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (2003, Bonn). Several other research organizations also seek to broaden the traditional notion of national security and military strength without using the “human security” term. It is virtually certain, however, that Putin's folly and the resulting reinvigoration of NATO will lead to greater military spending, at least in the short term, at the expense of spending on other forms of security such as addressing climate change and the necessary energy transition. Already, Germany plans to increase spending on armed forces by 100 billion euros, while Denmark and The Netherlands will increase national security spending to 2% of their GNP.

Security is not explicitly mentioned in the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, although it is suggested in the catch-all aspirations of SDG #16 on "Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions," which include the rule of law and the forlorn hope for a "significant decline" in all forms of violence. Putin's War is an obvious thrust in the opposite direction.

"Readers of this article are encouraged to seize the moment by adding to this listing and/or explaining why certain proposals are not feasible or desirable."

As for the SDGs, which apply to all nations, they are appreciated more in poorer countries that stand to benefit the most, but little-known in the richer countries which have the resources to help the poorer countries. The lack of SDG visibility in general is puzzling, but here are four possible reasons that keep them from being better-known:

- Complexity: the 17 goals and 169 sub-goals are difficult to grasp as a whole, even when summarized as six necessary transformations, as they sometimes are;
- Climate Dominance: climate change is by far the best-known and arguably most urgent global concern, as underscored in the recent IPCC report. Although recognized as SDG#13 (Climate Action), it is not seen in context as one of the SDGs;
- Thousands of Relevant Organizations Involved: for better and for worse, *The Security & Sustainability Guide* identifies some 2,500 largely international organizations (NGOs, government agencies, academic institutes, businesses, UN agencies and programs) involved with a single SDG (e.g. water, cities, poverty) or perhaps a few goals, but making no reference to the SDGs; these organizations include several hundred alliances, coalitions, consortia, and networks that are likely more effective in securing action, but also duplicative of effort and competing for funding and attention;
- Lack of Publicity: very occasionally, the SDGs get a passing reference at best in *The New York Times*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Economist*, *Time*, *The Guardian*, etc., where climate and energy issues are covered extensively.

To repeat, Putin's War, whatever the outcome, will be a major setback to the SDGs and Agenda 2030. Instead of this hideous and unwarranted *lose-lose* war based on unfounded premises and outright lies (e.g. about "de-nazification"), nations should be widely engaged in a forward-looking *good war* for security and sustainability in a troubled world of nearly 8 billion people, likely to grow to 9.7 billion by 2050, absent widespread war or pandemics.

3. Rethinking the Sustainable Development Goals

At a moment of widespread pro-Ukraine solidarity within and among most Western nations, *there will be another major setback to the SDGs*, adding to the slowly waning setback from the COVID-19 pandemic, which is not yet declining in some places as the BA.2 variant and

others appear. Many proposals for SDG action urge “acceleration,” but more likely or not there will be little or no progress, and even negative progress for some goals, with poor nations suffering the most. The urgency for action and seriously accelerating progress could—and should—lead to a mid-course rethinking of the goals. To this end, here are 12 suggestions:

- Recognize the Obvious: *we cannot have sustainability without security, or security without sustainability*;
- Disaggregate Human Security: stress the security aspect of eight SDGs: economic security (SDG#1 on poverty & #8 on work), food security (SDG#2), health security (SDG#3), energy security (SDG#7), mobility security for refugees (SDG#10), climate security (SDG#13), and anti-violence security (SDG#16 on peace);
- Prioritize Goals and Solutions: climate is paramount, followed by and interrelated with biodiversity and pollution (SDG#14 on “life below water” and #15 on “life on land”); more emphasis on established and start-up solutions, as well as indicators of progress;
- Prioritize Cost-Effective Actions for Each Goal: but reassess in light of new technology and information (Project Drawdown on reducing carbon emissions is an exemplar);
- Annual Nominations and Awards: for individual organizations and alliances for each goal (5% of the attention given to Hollywood’s hyped-up Oscars would be a big step ahead);
- A Better Slogan: for example, “Better Ways to a Better World for All” is arguably better than “17 Goals to Transform Our World” which is idealized, too complex, and perhaps scary to many;
- A Widely Recognizable Logo: similar to the World Wildlife Fund’s panda;
- Stress Economics as Well as Ethics: investment now vs. steeply rising costs later;
- Weekly or Monthly Sustainability Sections: in leading newspapers and magazines;
- Several SDG Champions in Each Nation: to speak on TV shows and write op-eds;
- Annual “Top 10” Reports: added to year-end Top 10 lists of books, films, and music;
- Brief and Popularized Versions of the SDGs: explaining their importance and cost-effectiveness to everyone, in every language, attuned to every culture.

Readers of this article are encouraged to seize the moment by adding to this listing and/or explaining why certain proposals are not feasible or desirable. A reset of the SDGs and their presentation is possible. Indeed, a final suggestion is to periodically consider a reset of the goals, and activities for effectively promoting them. We cannot have a positive “war” in the interests of all without frequently updated plans, visible coordinators for each goal, many commentators, widespread conscious participation in the war effort, and hope for winning.

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- *Climate Security: A QuickLook at (10) Leading Organizations*
- *Water Security: A QuickLook at (17) Leading Organizations*
- *Global Security: A QuickLook at (10) Leading Organizations*
- *Cyber Security: A QuickLook at (10) Leading Organizations*
- *Migrants and Refugees: A QuickLook at (16) Leading Organizations*
- *Environmental Peacebuilding: A QuickLook at (12) Organizations*

Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Working Group II, Feb 2022, 3,675p; Summary for Policymakers, 35p). “5 of the Main Findings from the U.N.’s [IPCC] Report” (*New York Times*, March 1, 2022, A8): 1) Climate hazards have worsened significantly in the past decade; 2) If warming isn’t slowed, the dangers will multiply; 3) Societies have not done enough to adapt and stay safe; 4) As warming continues, it will become harder and harder to cope; 5) Poor countries face much bigger challenges than rich ones... “3.3 billion to 3.6 billion people are highly vulnerable to climate change today.”

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“A Message to All UN Member States and Leaders of the UN,” Jeffrey Sachs and 36 signatories, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, April 14, 2022 (warns that “the war in Ukraine threatens not only sustainable development, but the survival of humanity” and proposes UN revival of peace talks). Also see “Nobel Laureates Support Ukraine,” *New York Times*, March 10, 2022, A7 (full-page advertisement from 170 Nobelists, condemning Russia’s military actions and denial of Ukraine’s legitimate existence), and “A Time for Solidarity! Statement of the World Academy of Art & Science” (March 2, 2022), condemning Russia’s military invasion that places “the security of the entire world at risk.”

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“Some of the Biggest Brands Are Leaving Russia,” *New York Times*, April 8, 2022, A23. Also see “Shell Says \$5 Billion Loss Is Cost of Russia Pullout” (*NYT*, April 8, B4) and “C.E.O.s Are Going Out of Their Way to Punish Russia” (*NYT*, March 11, A27).

“Conflict Is Cutting Off Food Supplies, Raising Specter of Global Crisis,” *New York Times*, March 21, 2022, A1. Also see “War in Ukraine Worsens Hunger in East Africa: Severe Drought Sets In as Food Prices Rise,” *NYT*, April 2, A1.

Sustainable Development Report 2021: The Decade of Action for the Sustainable Development Goals by Jeffrey D. Sachs and four others (Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and Cambridge University Press, June 2021, 518p). Includes

the SDG Index and Dashboards for 165 countries, and the six “SDG Transformations” scorecards.

Sustainable Development Outlook 2021: From Anguish to Determination (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sept 2021, 150p). On SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (health and well-being), 8 (growth and employment), and 10 (reducing inequality). The Executive Summary begins: “The COVID-19 pandemic has inflicted significant setbacks upon the progress made towards achieving the SDGs, leading to a profound shared distress in the international community. However, despite these setbacks, it is possible to convert anguish into determination...in the remaining years of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” It also notes “about half (45%) of the world’s population living in countries where inequality increased during 2010-2019. The unexpected COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation.”

New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity (UN Development Programme, Feb 2022, 175p). This report builds on the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report on human security, and the Human Security Commission report in 2003. In the Foreword, Secretary-General Guterres warns that “humankind is making the world an increasingly insecure and precarious place.” We face a “development paradox” where people are on average living longer, healthier, and wealthier lives, but these advances have not increased their sense of security. “More than 6 in 7 people worldwide perceived feeling moderately or very insecure just before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The pandemic has increased this uncertainty. It has imperiled every dimension of wellbeing and amplified fear across the globe, in tandem with rising geopolitical tensions, growing inequalities, democratic backsliding, and devastating climate change events. This threatens decades of development gains and throwing progress on the SDGs further off track. The Report argues for expanding the human security frame in the face of new threats, and adding solidarity to the strategies of protection and empowerment proposed in 2003, so that all of us can live “free from want, from fear and anxiety, and from indignity.” The SDGs provide an ambitious set of objectives, but efforts remain largely compartmentalized: “tackling them in silos appears insufficient in the Anthropocene context.” [NOTE: Although obvious, it deserves emphasis that this Report was issued just before the Ukraine invasion setback.]

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Evolving Meanings of the War for Ukraine: Winning, Losing, Fearing, Needing

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Abstract

The accelerating pace of change and even the near-term unpredictability of its consequences calls for more enlightened and timely analyses of the most globally disruptive events. The continuing war for Ukraine is indisputably such an event. This essay presents an academically unconventional assessment of what that war means, addressing its consequences in terms of four conditions; winning, losing, fearing and needing. Until the war, at least, stalemates, it will be, if not impossible, unwise to decide on the winners and the losers, or on the fears that were fully realized, or on what needs remain to be met. Every effort has been made to express the listed issues in ways that do not foreclose their analysis, recognizing that, for all of them, tomorrow will be different not only to 24 February but to yesterday.

1. Introduction

The war for Ukraine has made the transition to the next global ‘normal’ overwhelmingly intense, chronologically unpredictable, and massively costly.

Never before has a significant country had more than one quarter of its citizens displaced, abroad and internally, in only a few weeks. Never before in modern times have more families been ordered apart; for women and children to flee to safety outside their country, for the men to stay to fight. Never before have so many intelligence agencies been proved so inaccurate, on so many long-watched geopolitical fronts. Never before have so many established, even revered political, economic and military assumptions been destroyed. Never before in modern times has one crisis—the War for Ukraine—so thoroughly sucked the air out of attention to other global wicked problems; among them COVID-19, climate change, pollution, human displacement, and the obscene and rising inequality of wealth and opportunity.

After only two months, civilian and military deaths number in the tens of thousands, the displaced number in the millions, cities are besieged and some all but laid waste, even as the so-called ‘international community’ struggles to provide an uneven, ever-changing patchwork of far-from universal support for Ukraine. There is now a collective, if very non-consensual, opinion of three, or four, scenarios for the future. Although individually and collectively evolving and expressed in a variety of ways, these are, in descending order of plausibility *today*—stalemate, Ukraine wins, Putin wins, and compromise peace.

The latter is considered by far the most likely, the more so the longer the shooting war continues. Fiona Hill on 8 April stated that there will be no ending soon. William Browder

on 11 April stated that there is ‘no reasonable way for this to end, only an unreasonable way’. He foresees a slow simmering conflict going on for years and years, if not at the current level of awfulness. But it was Putin who probably nailed the notice to the post on 12 April when he announced: Russia will win; peace negotiations are ‘dead’.

The result today, which was different yesterday and will be different tomorrow, is that there are no final winners or losers, only those winning *today* or losing *today*, and a globally pervasive fear of being on the wrong side of the ledger, tomorrow and beyond. To add to the ‘storm’ of crisis, some are winning and losing simultaneously.

This accounting was first produced on Christian Good Friday 2022, 15 April, in the fog of the third week of war. This version attempts to reflect the evolution of the war and its global context since that time. A next full review will probably be appropriate after 9 May when Russia will, as usual, celebrate its WWII victory over Nazi Germany. That product will forgo a lengthy introduction in favour of an enhanced narrative to validate the reason each person, people, country, organization, or condition is on a list.

2. Winning

- China is unobstructed in its form of illiberal democracy.
- Taiwan, as China, is shown how hard invasion can be.
- Inequality is ever more unattended to.
- Other states in the region and elsewhere may settle their own border disputes through violence. Political leaders are positioning themselves taking sides in the Ukraine crisis according to their perceived political benefits at home.
- Arms makers are working full shifts today, ever more confident the future will be as profitable.
- COVID-19’s continued spread, as new variants cruelly highlight the absence of a necessary level of global attention.
- Climate Change: The war in Ukraine reinforces the consequences of the continued failure of the COP—latest; COP 26—to demand that countries’ pledges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions include those due to military/security related activity.
- Collective imperialism through global capitalism, with China growing ever more influential globally with the Belt and Road campaign on land and at sea.
- Mutual aggravation of simultaneous crises as the international *community* proves incapable of effective and durable collaboration on more than one crisis at once.
- The acceptance of virtue signaling by leaders as national ‘action’.

3. Winning and Losing

- Ukraine: An unexpected Churchill-like President leads his nation in repelling Russia, at horrific cost.
- US: A country setting a powerful example of material support to Ukraine, while mired in political polarization, chaos and uncertainty at home.

- NATO: Gained a mission and possibly meaningful new members, as it struggles with its members' diversity of opinion on Russia.
- EU: United in response to millions of displaced Ukrainians, while far from unified in response to Russia's behaviour.
- Germany: Sholtz' astounding national sea change on security and NATO, now forced to backslide due to energy and commercial realities
- Africa: Much attended to by Russia, and China and the US, promoting rising continental unevenness and disunity intensified by three (more) coups.

4. Losing

- Cooperative, and peaceful, Globalization.
- Progress on all the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, with no one having the clear urgency of the globe's worst wicked problems.
- Canada: The G7 poster child for promoting and being self-satisfied claiming virtue-signaling is action. Recent small military contributions to Ukraine's defence have only highlighted the sad state of its own armed forces and its 'reputation' in NATO.
- Afghanistan: Quickly forgotten as the promises made by retreating/departed NATO, US, UK, UN; suddenly atrophy, notwithstanding two decades of blood, sweat, tears and repeated political statements of commitment.
- International scientific research, particularly in and about the Arctic, the region and ocean for the next 'Great Game'. Seven of the eight Arctic Council members have shut down work until 2023, when Russia's term as Chair ends.
- Russia: Even if it "wins" the War for Ukraine, the country will lose more than it can 'afford' and has made its future fragile.
- Democracy: Autocrats are proving more effectively decisive in these times. The 'messiness' of democracy results in too little action, invariably too late.
- Sports is less and less an international unifier/pacifier.
- The UN: A 'goliath' tied down by a dysfunctional Security Council whose structure and mandate are for a long-gone era. The consequences of the agreement on the 'veto initiative' will be to highlight the problem.
- Nuclear disarmament and non-Proliferation are both now being re-contextualized, mostly negatively.
- Progress on Human Security, most especially 'social security' as implied first in the 1994 UN Development Program's Human Development Report.
- International Justice in the face of ever more, and more frequent, obvious crimes 'against' humanity.
- Food security, especially for those (many) for whom it was never strong and durable, but increasingly also where, until recently, enough food was never a concern.
- Energy Security, now dictated by the geopolitics of collective imperialism.

5. Fearing

- The words fear, fears, fearing, fearfulness and threat are appearing and being heard increasingly frequently from people and places everywhere.
- The intensification of already significantly weaponized geopolitics, economics, history, food, water, energy, trade, immigration, veracity, humanitarianism and international scientific research, each and all of which degrade cooperation and enable conflict.
- That sanctions are not sufficiently wounding Russia or dissuading Putin. Loopholes remain, significant external support continues, and the country's massive size and resources are 'insurance'.
- That Russia will continue to fight Ukraine beyond when the 'West' remains substantively interested in supporting it with military goods and services.
- Military escalation by Ukraine or by Russia or by NATO, by design or default, involves nuclear or chemical means.
- Irreversible fading of global collective resilience; for humanity and for biodiversity.
- Falling and increasingly uneven availability, accessibility and affordability of energy, globally. The (underway) responses by some; e.g., China (coal), the US (oil and gas) directly contradict what is needed to halt climate change before the 1.5 degree threshold is breached.
- German backsliding on its commitment to play a major geopolitical role, not wanting its people to 'freeze in the dark', poorly.
- The 24 April re-election of President Macron will not lead to better days for France, as a more constructive member of the EU and NATO.
- The ICC and the ICJ will continue to be incapable of meaningful action until too long after (even confirmed) crimes to dampen autocrats' willingness to exploit the impunity inherent in a bureaucratic if fair, 'justice' system. The average time from crime to conviction (in far calmer geopolitical times) has been decades.
- Increasing numbers of events and conditions that substantively distract attention from the 'other' inescapable wicked problems *that will not wait out the war for Ukraine*. Among them, of course, are climate change, in particular the lack of substantive attention to the contradictions among emissions gap and the adaptation gap and the rising global displacement.
- Legally enforceable compromises for durably settling conflict, now especially but far from exclusively the war for Ukraine, continue to take far too much time to be achieved before changing context invalidates them.
- That harmonization of Retaliation and Reconciliation by warring parties will continue to be impossible.
- A second term as US President for Donald Trump, Putin's friend. This scenario is widely seen as one of the most negative in the medium term.
- That Truth and Veracity are increasingly 'dead letters'. The information glut combined with deliberate generation of mis- and dis- information means virtually no one is able to

‘tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’.
And even if they could many would not believe them.

- The UN will remain hostage to a 1945 Security Council structure and mandate, the result being intensification of already significant damage to its reputation in its ‘charter’ field; international peace and security.
- That famine will become endemic, leaving more and more millions desperate and displaced. The war for Ukraine has not only provoked the displacement of more millions, but also the intensification of food insecurity.
- There is no limit to what Putin is willing to do to achieve his commitment to the ‘legacy’ *he* wants *for himself* and *for his Russia*, notwithstanding sanctions on his war resources.
- Russia has NOT miscalculated about anything globally important. Xi has signalled to him, and possibly informed him, that time is on his side unless NATO takes the field in Ukraine—which is unlikely.
- The fate of other European states; formal ones such as Poland and pseudo-states such as South Ossetia if Putin decides the results of the war for Ukraine is only a first step on the mission to return Russia to its rightful prestige.

*“The more time
wasted working
with imperfect
memories of the past
will leave less time
for anticipating the
future and preparing
for it much better
than has been done
in the past.”*

6. Needing

- A common, if not necessarily commonly *understood* acknowledgement that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine immediately changed geopolitics globally and the war is continuing to do so. There is not a single field of human activity that has not been impacted to some degree. This acknowledgement calls for an end to revisionism; arguing for a return to the ‘good old days’. This is not only because, as often as not, the good old days were not very good, but because the more time wasted working with imperfect memories of the past will leave less time for anticipating the future and preparing for it much better than has been done in the past.
- Strategic Foresight: anticipation of 21st century futures. Arguably, there will be as many as four political and military spheres of influence globally, each more or less capable of substantively influencing conditions for humanity and biodiversity: China’s, The US’s, Russia’s and the EU’s. Foresight will be more likely to be relevant if it begins with a review of the established definition and key determinants of influence. Reflecting on the characteristics and impacts of the war for Ukraine, climate change, COVID-19 and inequality, the four most important seem to be sovereignty, neutrality, justice and remediation.
- A clearing house for collecting and protecting the verbal, audio and visual record of the Ukraine war: This ‘third party’ repository must be independent of—at arm’s length

from—all parties to the conflict. It will *not* be responsible for assessing the veracity or analyzing the meanings of the record. This would be a fraught conflict of interest. Who and what will do those tasks is unknown today, and probably will remain so until, at least, 1) the Ukraine war is far less violent and not/not the pre-eminent global crisis, and, 2) the UN tangibly demonstrates not only its verbal willingness, but an inescapable commitment to the creation of a Security Council structure and mandate suitable for peace and security in the 21st century. The agreement to the ‘veto initiative’ may be a signal that this is possible.

- Money: COVID demonstrated that there is never ‘no’ money. However, the COVID-19 pandemic sickened and killed people in every country, whose governments were ‘locally’ driven to fund a response. The war for Ukraine, notwithstanding its global geopolitical impact, has displaced, wounded and killed citizens who are almost all from only two countries. Therefore a ‘fund’ subscribed to by many governments, all still under attack or recovering from COVID-19, is unlikely. Remediation for and reconstruction of Ukraine should be funded with Russian government and oligarch money held abroad, and the proceeds by sale after seizure of Russian-owned goods (mega-yachts, mansions, property, companies). In addition, since Ukraine’s application of the rule of law has not featured strongly in its reputation, funds of extremely rich Ukrainians should be accessed, ‘in the national interest’.
- A more visible and outspoken ‘diplomacy’, especially in and from ‘democratic’ countries: Naming, blaming and shaming should be formally established as accepted activities in international relations. If not, the next ‘normal’ and the ‘normals’ thereafter are unlikely to be more than brief chaotic periods between major disruptive or destructive events, whether natural or man-made, while the evil, the crooked and the selfish will continue to enjoy the fruits of anonymous impunity.
- A global learning and training package—not ‘higher education’, and not ‘graded’—that provides life-long learning about Human Security which promotes universal engagement in its preservation and promotion: The only ‘necessary’ cost for what would be an unprecedented transformation of civil society is the freedom to participate.

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The UN as a Guardian of World Peace and its Role in the Ukraine Crisis

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Abstract

*Following the Second World War, the international community was reinvigorated to design an international body with the capability to limit the onset of another world war. Enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter was the vision for the organization to be “a guardian of international peace and security, as a promoter of human rights, as a protector of international law, and as an engineer of socioeconomic advancement”. The idea that Vladimir Putin has reacted in the way that he has because he is determined to re-create the Soviet Union under the guise of a Eurasian Customs Union has become commonplace among the chattering classes in Washington. What is really driving an essentially pre-emptive and largely defensive move on Russia’s part is the prospect of Ukrainian accession to NATO. **In Ukraine, there may be no good options for resolving the crisis, but the “least bad” option would be a settlement brokered by the UN.** The United Nations and its members have a dream of World Peace just as you and I do. Actually we have arrived in the time of history which is a turning point. Humanity has a decision to make. Will we plant the root of World Peace or are we doomed to repeat the failures of the 20th century? A world of darkness, oppression and conflict deep in war. This paper will examine the question, do we want it to stay that way or should the UN take over what is given in the Charter, as well as to what extent the present position of the UNSC and tenets of international law can enable intervention when responding to internal conflict.*

1. Introduction

The UN was created in 1945, following the devastation of the Second World War, with one central mission: the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN accomplishes this by working to prevent conflict, helping parties in conflict, making peace, deploying peacekeepers, and creating the conditions to allow peace to hold and flourish. These activities often overlap and should reinforce one another, to be effective.*

Article 1 of the UN Charter states the following purposes:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, for the suppression of

* The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. There is no doubt that the most effective way to diminish human suffering and massive economic costs of conflicts and their aftermath is to prevent conflicts in the first place. The UN plays an important role in conflict prevention, using diplomacy, good offices and mediation. Among the tools the Organization uses to bring peace are special envoys and political missions in the field. See “Role of the Security Council” United Nations Peacekeeping.

acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends

“Since the late 1990s there have been many calls for reformations of the UN while there is little clarity or consensus about what reform might mean in practice.”

2. What is the role of the UN? The following quotes say it all. Not just in East Timor, but any conflict.

...on January 23, 1976, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, sent a top-secret cable to Kissinger in which he boasted about the “considerable progress” he had made in blocking UN action on East Timor. Moynihan later wrote: “The department of state desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective [on East Timor]. This task was given to me, and I carried it through with no inconsiderable success” (John Pilger, Guardian 21 September, 1999).

It is little misleading to speak of the role of the UN. The UN is nearly powerless as an abstract entity or even as a representative of the world’s nations. It can act, instead, only insofar as it is authorized by the great powers, which means primarily the United States (U.S.).

The organization suffers as well from an extreme shortage of funds because of the continual refusal of the U.S. to pay its dues.*

U.S. influence is the greatest in the Security Council, but some organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly or bodies dealing with economic and social issues, have had a Third World majority ever since the era of decolonization dawned. Accordingly, the primary focus of U.S. policy has been to undermine and marginalize the UN. The UN should have an important role in world affairs, but U.S. policy and the policies of other leading states

* For example, any peacekeepers sent to East Timor will probably not be a UN force because the U.S. Congress has required that there be a 15 days' delay before the U.S. government can approve any UN peacekeeping operation and has forbidden Washington from paying its authorized share of the costs of any such operation.

severely limit the international organization. From the point of view of U.S. policymakers, however, there is one crucial role played by the UN: it serves as a convenient scapegoat when something goes wrong. For example, the current catastrophe in East Timor is directly attributable to the refusal of the U.S and other Western powers to deter the atrocities there over a period of a quarter century, yet the UN will probably take the blame (*Stephen R. Shalom, Noam Chomsky, and Michael Albert, 1999*).

3. Why are the UN Reforms needed?

Since the late 1990s there have been many calls for reformations of the UN while there is little clarity or consensus about what reform might mean in practice. However, due to contrasting interests of different countries and diverse cultures, religions and ideologies, UN reform cannot be achieved overnight.

In the face of accumulating threats and challenges, especially in the maintenance of unity of the UN, reform of the Security Council, the crucial aspect, which scholars consider as a must, has attracted almost the greatest global attention.*

Security Council reform concerns the vital interests of all UN members and the future of the UN and will lead to major adjustment of the global governance system and international order, however, decades of attempts to reform the UN Security Council are comprehensively deadlocked.†

US supports the prioritization of increasing representation and say of developing countries, especially African countries, considering a collective rise of developing countries being the defining feature.

The country highlighted that reform must increase the opportunities for the small and medium-sized countries to sit in the Council and participate in their decision-making processes, saying that it is the only way to make the Council more democratic, transparent and efficient.

Experts say that the reform means the readjustment and distribution of interests and powers, and different member states and camps have their own demands.‡

In this regard, reform should be based on enhancing the UN's capacity to address global challenges and to lead the world in sustainable peace and development. Member States should work in solidarity and cooperation to support the UN's cause of peace, development and human rights, based on the consensus that the UN should play a central role in international affairs.§

* Reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) encompasses five key issues: **categories of membership, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Security Council-General.** See **Reform of the Security Council** .

† Experts say that UN reform means the readjustment and distribution of interests and powers, and different member states and camps have their own demands. (UN reform: What to change and what to keep? By Duan Fengyuan, UN reform: What to change and what to keep? - CGTN)

‡ Ibid.

§ The bright side is that in the face of multiple unprecedented challenges and threats as well as snowballing difficulties of global governance, the vast majority of the UN member states are rallying around the lofty ideal: making the world a better and safer place. This is bringing new hopes to the UN, though there is still a long way to go.

4. Armed Conflict in Ukraine and the Role of the UN

The security situation in Ukraine deteriorated rapidly following the launch of a Russian Federation military offensive on 24 February 2022. The armed violence escalated in at least eight oblasts (regions), including Kyivska oblast and the capital city of Kyiv, as well as in the eastern oblasts Donetsk and Luhansk which were already affected by conflict.*

“The world has been witnessing the inability of the Security Council to act aptly due to its structure for a while. The root cause of the crisis has been the misuse of veto power by the P5 members in most cases. The concept was considered essential post World War II.”

The current armed conflict in Ukraine has sparked all sorts of questions about the UN, particularly the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the General Assembly and the Secretary-General.†

5. Can the Security Council stop the Ukraine-Russian war?

“I urge the Council to do everything in its power to end the war and to mitigate its impact, both on the suffering people of Ukraine, and on vulnerable people and developing countries around the world” (Secretary-General António Guterres, 2022).

The current armed conflict in Ukraine has sparked all sorts of questions about the UN, particularly the role of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, as well as the question of why the UN cannot solve the Ukraine Crisis.

6. Conclusion

The world has been witnessing the inability of the Security Council to act aptly due to its structure for a while. The root cause of this has been the misuse of veto power by the P5 members in most cases. The concept was considered essential post World War II.‡

The only potential solution to this infinite loop is a change in the UNSC structure. It does not necessarily need to be the dissolution of the veto power. Instead, the veto needs to

* The escalation of conflict has triggered an immediate and steep rise in humanitarian needs as essential supplies and services are disrupted and civilians flee the fighting. The UN estimates that 12 million people inside Ukraine will need relief and protection, while more than 4 million Ukrainian refugees may need protection and assistance in neighbouring countries in the coming months.

† The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

‡ One of the primary reasons for the failure of the League of Nations and the happening of World War II was the lack of solidarity among nations. However, it has transitioned into a mere tool used by the P5 countries to make situations favourable to themselves. Another tricky part is that changing the structure or adding new permanent members is also a challenge, as the P5 will also veto such an idea.

be limited so that the UNSC does not face limitations in doing its intended work. (Role and Relevance of UNSC in Interstate Conflicts Prevention and Mitigation: An Analysis from the Perspectives of Russia-Ukraine Conflict). The UNSC will not be the place where the Ukraine crisis is resolved, though, especially if it escalates to open warfare, because that is exactly how the system was designed.*

That is not a good sign for the already slim chance of the U.N. intervening in any potential invasion. It is true that the U.N. was designed to act as a check on states willing to wage war against their neighbors.†

The UN Charter does say that countries that are party to a dispute as Russia is here, have to abstain on any Security Council resolutions regarding peaceful settlement of the conflict. But as UN analyst Richard Gowan explains, that does not necessarily mean there is a clever way to dodge Moscow's veto on Ukraine.

Neither the U. S. nor any of the other permanent five (P5) members of the Council are likely to want to create precedents for limiting their own veto powers in future, just to score what may amount to a symbolic point. Forcing Russia to veto a resolution as the West has often done over Syria would make the point equally clearly.‡

The UNSC could do nothing to respond to Russia's armed conflict in Ukraine, because reform must be made urgently.

The Security Council will not be the place where the Ukraine crisis is resolved, especially if it escalates to open warfare.§

During negotiations to establish the United Nations in the final years of World War II, the Soviet Union had a seat at the table as one of the Big Three, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom. (France and China round out the permanent five Security Council members we know today.) But the Russians were deeply wary about any constraints that the new international order would have on its own security. Being kicked out of the League of Nations in 1939 weighed heavily on Stalin's mind as he grappled with whether to take part in the new organization President Franklin D. Roosevelt was advocating.

Part of the agreement during the Yalta meeting of the Allies in 1945 was that the Big Five members would get a veto over most Security Council decisions. So, while a simple majority could bring any issue to the table, any coercive action needs the unanimous approval

* The Russians objected to the meeting, forcing the council's 15 members to vote on whether to discuss Ukraine at all—only Russia and China voted no. But, as Foreign Policy's Colum Lunch noted, the meeting did not go as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas Greenfield likely intended. While all the speakers urged diplomacy over conflict the U.S.'s condemnations of Russian troop buildups were not echoed quite as loudly as Washington would have preferred. We are still a long way from having "the world ... speak out in one voice," as President Joe Biden put it in recent statement.

† The classic example at this point is the Council's authorization of force to turn back Saddam Hussein's Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s. There is absolutely no chance though for direct U.N.-authorized action to turn back any Russian aggression or multilateral economic sanctions like those that were levied against Iran's nuclear program last decade.

‡ Making matters more difficult for U.N. diplomacy, Russia recently assumed the rotating presidency of the Security Council. That power means no amount of escalation will result in an emergency meeting of the council in the month ahead. And while the General Assembly, where every country has one vote, could condemn any Russian invasion of Ukraine, any solutions it offers would be non-binding on Russia.

§ That is not a good sign for the already slim chance of the U.N. intervening in any potential invasion. It is true that the U.N. was designed to act as a check on states willing to wage war against their neighbors. The classic example at this point is the council's authorization of force to turn back Saddam Hussein's Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s. There is absolutely no chance though for direct U.N.-authorized action to turn back any Russian aggression or multilateral economic sanctions like those that were levied against Iran's nuclear program last decade.

of all five. It was an acceptable trade-off for Moscow's negotiators, ensuring that the new organization could never be turned against the Soviet Union or its successor at the UN, the Russian Federation.

The UN Charter does say that countries that are party to a dispute as Russia is here have to abstain on any Security Council resolutions regarding peaceful settlement of the conflict. But as UN analyst Richard Gowan explains, that does not necessarily mean there is a clever way to dodge Moscow's veto on Ukraine:

Making matters more difficult for UN diplomacy, Russia assumed the rotating presidency of the Security Council. That power means no amount of escalation will result in an emergency meeting of the council any time ahead. And while the General Assembly, where every country has one vote, could condemn any Russian invasion of Ukraine, any solutions it offers would be nonbinding on Russia.

This is not to say that the UN will be completely useless here. There is definitely an element of public diplomacy involved in open Security Council meetings, offering a chance for member-states to blow off steam as Indiana University Professor David Bosco has argued. We may be seeing the results of that given the interest in diplomacy we have seen from all sides since the UN meeting.

The UNSC met to discuss tensions between Russia and Ukraine that may or may not end with the former further invading the latter.

That is not a good sign for the already slim chance of the UN intervening in any potential invasion. It is true that the UN was designed to act as a check on states willing to wage war against their neighbors. The classic example at this point is the council's authorization of force to turn back Saddam Hussein's Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s. There is absolutely no chance though for direct UN-authorized action to turn back any Russian aggression or multilateral economic sanctions like those that were levied against Iran's nuclear program last decade.

But all this means that there will be no firm action at the UN on this front. And that is exactly what the Soviet Union wanted from its seat at the table. Their position both allows for collective action but guarantees that the UN can be blocked from doing anything that is not in Moscow's own national interests.

There is a reason that for all of the Russians' griping about the United Nations and infringements on their sovereignty, they never threaten to leave entirely. Instead, they know that it is way better to be at the table with a veto than on the outside looking in. For fellow member states like Ukraine, though, that means that any promise of protection from aggression by the UN falls short when it is one of the victorious World War II allies knocking at their door. Yes, the United Nations has made important contributions for peaceful talks, but almost at its 70th anniversary the UN has not yet found a way to fulfill its founding purpose.

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Current Threats to Global Academic Collaboration

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Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shaken up the academic world. Universities in Ukraine have been bombed and academic staff and students have been killed and injured and many professors and students have fled the country. Institutions especially in Europe are trying to help the academic world in Ukraine and refugee professors and students are helped so that they can continue their studies and research. The consequences of this invasion cannot be foreseen. A cold war signs up with the splitting of the scientific and academic world into two or three large blocks depending on the position of China: “Russia-China and Europe/America”. This will have major concerns for the future of science that is vitally needed by this world, such as climate change, COVID, Space and in many other domains. It is now an important theme that optimal solutions for the future are sought in order to optimize the sad situation. The question raised is what place the World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS) can take here.

1. Armed Conflict is Always a Failure

The starting point for this reflection on academic collaboration is the war in Ukraine. Conflict between nations—whether openly in armed conflict or through political tensions or cyber-warfare—is indeed a context in which the mission of education and global academic collaboration must be able to continue, and the efforts of the international academic and scientific community need to adjust rapidly and creatively to progress to the overall benefit of humanity.

Like many leaders did with other conflicts, Pope Francis, reflecting on the invasion of Ukraine, reminds us that war is always “*cruel and senseless ... represents a defeat for everyone, for every one of us. We need to reject war, a place of death where fathers and mothers bury their children, where men kill their brothers and sisters without even having seen them, where the powerful decide and the poor die. [...] War should not be something that is inevitable. We should not accustom ourselves to war. Instead, we need to convert today’s indignation into tomorrow’s commitment, because if we will emerge from these events the way we were before, we will all be guilty in some way. Faced with the danger of self-destruction, may humanity understand that the moment has come to abolish war, to erase it from human history, before it erases humans from history.*”*

* Pope Francis, After the Angelus Prayer, Saint Peter’s Square Sunday, 27 March 2022. Retrieved on <https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/2022/documents/20220327-angelus.html> (as of May 27th, 2022).

Who would disagree with this?

War cuts off individuals from primary and fundamental needs—water, food, shelter, clothing, energy resources, electricity,—but above all a sense of security in one’s place of life, one’s school, one’s university, one’s place of work.

2. Keeping in Mind the Reality of Facts and Issues

Faced with such a complicated situation, how do we proceed?

As well as the widespread humanitarian tragedy that affects the whole population, Universities themselves have been the target for bombing. Many of the refugees now fleeing Ukraine are academics and students—and those students are at a critical phase in their lives where support for their studies and personal development should be an absolute priority. Across Europe, universities and other higher education institutions are collaborating to accommodate Ukrainian students entering the country as refugees: to help students with exchange visas, temporary residence permits for degree studies, application deadlines, documentation of prior education, admission requirements, funding, language requirements and housing. Strong collaboration with and support from governments and other relevant agencies is required for this to be a success.

The disruption in education and further learning spans children, young adult students, parents and grandparents in their life-long learning journey and research, through no fault of their own. This undermines inter-personal cooperation, though at this inter-personal level, messages of concrete support come out of the silence, actions aiming at supporting families and their individual aspirations. The educational community has organized itself locally and with neighboring countries to welcome refugees.

In Europe and the UK, all formal education and research relations with Russian academics, universities and institutions have been fully suspended. However, there needs to be caution over the treatment of students and academics of Russian nationality who are now based outside Russia. Recent calls by several United States and European politicians to expel all Russian students and scholars currently in the United States and Europe are counterproductive. In very many cases, there has been great support given by Russian immigrants, in particular students and scholars, to the Ukrainian people, as well as protests against the actions of the Putin regime. There are also fall-out effects from the financial sanctions against Russia, as Russian students can lose access to their bank accounts and be without any economic means. This needs to be understood and mitigated.

Therefore, regardless of great principles in this field of Global Academic Cooperation, we must never lose sight of the people involved, and the impact on them of actions at individual, institutional and national level.

3. May 2022 Declaration of Berlin: “a call for safe havens for students and scholars”

The Academic Exchange Organizations of the G7 states have presented a joint declaration

on international academic cooperation in times of crisis with partners from the European umbrella organization of internationalization agencies.

Against the background of the war in Ukraine, the signatories of the Berlin Declaration see themselves united “*in the belief that democratic states which cherish and share fundamental values such as freedom, including academic freedom, and the rule of law, should stand together, and that their higher education institutions need to continue to collaborate closely*”. They regard the mission of international academic cooperation as that of seeking and developing “*solutions to global challenges such as climate change, gender equality, healthcare and the peaceful resolution of conflicts*”. Moreover, it is reaffirmed that academic countries and higher education institutions should be “*safe havens for students and scholars that face persecution or were forced to flee their homeland due to armed conflict, irrespective of nationality*”^{*}.

Such an example of “*good science diplomacy*”, aimed to foster peace, sustainable development, and global progress, should not be allowed to be diluted or distorted. Much good has been accomplished in fields related to health, to technology in the service of human beings to improve their daily living conditions, and more generally to the deepening of knowledge in the most varied fields. This should be enhanced further and not abandoned. The fear and the unpredictable future generated by a conflict, far from separating and dividing scholars and students, must instead be directed into intensified collaboration, student training, and joint academic and corporate research. Nor can the scarcity of basic materials and supplies generated by wars have the effect of jeopardizing non-military research programs.

First and foremost, this kind of “*good science diplomacy*” involves the maintenance of personal scientific exchanges and collaborations between individuals who, regardless of the political circumstances affecting their countries, benefit from channels and freedom of expression to maintain and deepen their mutual esteem and trust, and expand their sense of the common good.

4. Impacted, the Academic community on the side of the attacked and the side of the attackers

“*Given the war in Ukraine and numerous crises worldwide, academic exchange is confronted with new geopolitical conditions.*”[†]

Before the invasion of Ukraine, concerns were being raised of research collaborations that could lead to misuse of technologies, for example in the development of communications hardware and software that can be repurposed for cyber-warfare. The reaction to the Ukraine

^{*} Michael Gardner, Berlin Declaration pledges support for threatened academics, 09 May 2022. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*: “The academic exchange organizations of the G7 states have presented a joint declaration on international academic cooperation in times of crisis with partners from eight further countries and the Academic Cooperation Association (ACA), the European umbrella organization of internationalization agencies. The “Berlin Declaration on International Academic Cooperation amidst a World in Crisis” is the outcome of the Higher Education Summit 2022 held in Berlin in early May by the ‘G7 + Partners’, a group of international education agencies from the G7 countries and ACA, plus international education agencies from Spain, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, the Czech Republic and Austria.” Retrieved on <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220509134247646> (as of May 27th, 2022).

[†] Michael Gardner, “Berlin Declaration pledges support for threatened academics”, 09 May 2022, *op.cit.*

war from the academic community has mirrored that of the political and business communities in suspending all ongoing activity for the foreseeable future.

Even more, within days of the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian scientists' fears of being "*doomed to isolation*" were already being realized. Russian universities and scientists have begun to face difficulties in cooperating with their foreign partners, and in many cases—including some high-profile cases such as with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—their cooperation agreements have been terminated. All international science conferences due to be held in Russia have been cancelled and Russian scientists have been withdrawn from participation in Conferences in the US and Europe. Russian scientists are also being denied publication of their papers in leading research journals.

In addition, the limits on free speech extend beyond universities. Criticism of "the war" faces punishment with imprisonment. Facebook and Twitter have been blocked: "*Liberal media, such as Echo of Moscow, Dozhd or Meduza are off-print and air*"*.

Quite clearly, in Russia, guarantees of academic freedom for students and academics have always been tenuous at best. Being a university leader has always been a precarious position, with spurious allegations levelled that can lead to replacement or even imprisonment. In recent years, we have seen a rising number of colleagues arrested or deported from Russia because of academic exchanges with an "*undesirable organization*"†. State support for international collaboration was on and off, with the result that top global institutions could not commit to collaborative activity. For Universities in Russia, the fact that severe consequences can follow, from having supported an international initiative to improve quality, is absurd.

Statements from Rectors in support of the "special operation"‡ have, however, been released. These are meant for a domestic audience. Internationally, Russian universities are silent. The sound of silence is dreadful. If the communication lines with Russian universities are cut, it will become harrowing.

These events show how political pressure can undo universities, turning them into something else entirely. Russian universities, state-funded and state-regulated institutions, have never had a chance to become fully autonomous. As an academic community, we must do everything in our power to reflect how this can be prevented from happening to a higher education system again. Constitutional protection of university autonomy, internationalization, diversified funding can work in democratic states, but they are not enough to safeguard universities against totalitarianism. We must figure out if there is a solution.

Whilst a declaration of support for the war was published by the Russian Union of Rectors and Academies, there are also Russian-based academics who are protesting against the Putin regime. This happens often at great personal risk of being arrested or fired, and the need to keep communication channels open with these individuals to express the support of the international community is important. The Russian Union of Rectors stated that Putin had

* Dara Melnyk, "Russian higher education: the dreadful sound of silence", March 9, 2022, *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved on: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220309175130783> (as of May 27th, 2022).

† Dara Melnyk, *in ibidem*.

‡ Dara Melnyk, *in ibidem*.

“exhaustively explained the reasons for the difficult but forced decision to conduct a special military operation”, but did not overtly support it or repeat his justifications for the action. It said the present situation calls for the consolidation of the university community. “The most important thing is to maintain the unity of the university community and its culture of trust, the high quality and accessibility of higher education, and the atmosphere of mutual assistance and understanding among students and professors. We must support each other and those who need it most – our students”^{*}.

For the global community, we must strongly affirm that our academic partners in Ukraine should and will receive our full solidarity and support.

As a positive example, the European Commission (EC) has approved a special budget of 25 million euros to support displaced researchers from Ukraine, among other things. The MSCA4Ukraine initiative, which is part of the EC-Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), provides researchers with resources to continue their work and to help them resettle in Ukraine whenever possible, with the aim of rebuilding the country’s research and innovation capacity. In addition, hundreds of Ukrainian scientists will benefit from an increase in the budget of EUR 1 million for the Human Frontiers Program for the “Scientists Help Scientists” initiative, as part of Horizon Europe’s program. A general provision has also been added to encourage all applicants to offer opportunities to researchers and innovators from Ukraine where possible.

5. Beyond the Belligerents: the case of Continental China

Worryingly, in this new geopolitical context at the gates of Europe and on the threshold of Asia, not only the combatants are concerned. The Russian example has thrown light onto practices in China.

Chinese Academies and universities have maintained excellent well-established collaborations with the Ukrainian academic and scientific world for many decades. The political links between Chinese and Russian presidencies have changed the situation, resulting in a forced break between the academic communities of both countries.

However, it must be observed that professors have been punished in the past for comments against government policies in China, and there are also incidents of students reporting professors and teachers to the authorities for politically “*inappropriate*” remarks in class[†]. Another example: “*last month Peking University’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies published a report which concluded that China would suffer more than the US in ‘decoupling’ technology—the report was removed from the web shortly after publication.*”[‡]

^{*} Brendan O’Malley, Russian Union of Rectors backs Putin’s action in Ukraine, 06 March 2022. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved on: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220306120204111> (as of May 28th, 2022).

[†] Yojana Sharma, “Academic dissent emerges on war in Ukraine but is censored”, March 9, 2022. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved on: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20220309155414980> (as of May 28th, 2022).

[‡] Yojana Sharma, Academic dissent emerges..., op.cit.; Yojana Sharma, “US targets Chinese talent in drive to ‘decouple’ science” December 12, 2020. *University World News: The Global Window on Higher Education*. Retrieved on: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20201211141413735>

Moreover, academics “*need permission*” to attend even virtual international conferences. Chinese universities hosting virtual conferences organized abroad are required to submit the agendas for advance approval together with details of all foreign participants. Chinese scholars, and those in the field of international relations, face some of the toughest restrictions, hampering communication with the outside world.

Within such a watchdog climate, China steers an ambiguous path on Ukraine—refusing to condemn Russian aggression yet supporting Ukraine’s right to exist—Chinese academic dissent is emerging against the official government line, albeit quickly censored. At the same time academics in China are scrambling to understand the fast-changing international landscape, with restrictions on international academic contacts still in place.

Moreover, Chinese professors have been restricted from airing their views and are reluctant to contradict the official Communist Party line on international relations and political events. However, a group of five prominent history professors from top Chinese universities was willing to go against the official narrative in a rare joint letter condemning the invasion of Ukraine.

The letter, signed by Nanjing University’s Sun Jiang, Peking University’s Wang Lixin, Hong Kong University’s Xu Guoqi, Tsinghua University’s Zhong Weimin, and Fudan University’s Chen Yan, described the Russian invasion as a “*war that began in the dark*”, and for an immediate end to the fighting. “*We emphatically call on the Russian government and President [Vladimir] Putin to stop the war and resolve any dispute through negotiations,*” it said, despite Beijing’s ban on airing views on Russia in Ukraine, outlined in instructions from the government in late February. However, the letter was immediately removed by censors when it appeared on 26 February on the Chinese social media platform WeChat, but not before it had been viewed and commented upon—including attacks on the professors on China’s social media with some calling them spies or traitors. Chinese social media has been dominated by nationalistic voices in the days since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They follow the official line blaming the United States and its Western allies for the crisis. “*We empathize with the suffering of the Ukrainian people,*” they said, adding that “*We are concerned that Russian military action will lead to turmoil in Europe and the entire world, and trigger wider humanitarian disaster.*”[†]

Finally, it should be added that beyond this specific case, international events have moved at breakneck speed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are indications that Chinese academics and think tanks are struggling to make sense of the changes. Some Western academics, particularly in Germany, noted that some Chinese academics had reached out unofficially to them in recent weeks to understand major changes under way in German foreign policy since the invasion of Ukraine.

Eventually, it is not clear whether China will side with Russia in this new Cold War or if either country will seek to cut itself off from global science. There has already been some

* Yojana Sharma, *Academic dissent emerges...*, op.cit.

† Yojana Sharma, *Academic dissent emerges...*, op.cit.

academic and scientific decoupling of China since the start of the global pandemic. Nor is it clear whether other partners will follow China's example.

6. In a new Cold War, academic engagement is still necessary

A new Cold War carries with it many threats and few opportunities. Therefore, should we, according to its statutory rules, unequivocally denounce the Russian attack on Ukraine and distance itself in all its actions from Russian science academies, universities and personal contacts? We may have to vest the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the "Four Freedom Speech": "*As a nation, we may take pride in the fact that we are softhearted; but we cannot afford to be soft-headed*"*.

Perhaps, it may also be sufficient to refer to existing breach of international and humanitarian law and the condemnation of peacekeeping bodies such as the United Nations[†].

Nonetheless, there are many reasons why continued engagement with universities and relevant research organizations is important in the long run. In that respect, it can be useful to reflect on academic relations during the Cold War between 1945 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and learn from previous experience. During that period, even in times of significant political tension, academic and scientific relations continued throughout—although on a modest scale and with considerable government supervision on both sides.

What the future will bring for academic cooperation and exchange with Russia, and the position of China as well, cannot be foreseen but complete academic isolation will be counterproductive in the long run. A new Cold War of some form is quite likely to happen

* Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Four Freedom Speech" State of the Union Address of January 6th, 1941. Retrieved from: <https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/fdr-the-four-freedoms-speech-text/>; <https://www.fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms> (as of May 27th, 2022).

† The Russian invasion, reactions of the UN (as of May 22, 2022): "Russia launched a military offensive on Ukraine on the night of 23-24 February 2022. The UN considers this attack to be a violation of the integrity of the territory and sovereignty of Ukraine. It is contrary to the principles of the UN Charter."

On February 25, the UN Secretary General appointed Amin Awad as the UN Coordinator for the crisis in Ukraine.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation for war crimes and crimes against humanity on February 28.

On March 2, the General Assembly adopted a resolution deploring Russia's "aggression" against Ukraine (141 votes in favor, 5 against and 35 abstentions).

The UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on March 4 calling for the "rapid and verifiable" withdrawal of Russian troops and Russian-backed armed groups from the entire territory of Ukraine.

The Human Rights Council decides on March 5 to urgently establish an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged human rights violations in the context of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine.

The International Court of Justice ordered Russia on March 16 to immediately suspend its military operations in Ukraine.

On March 24, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine, in which it demanded an "immediate" cessation of hostilities by Russia against Ukraine (140 votes for, 5 against and 38 abstentions).

On March 30, the United Nations appointed three human rights experts to investigate possible violations of international law committed during the conflict in Ukraine.

The UN human rights chief said on Monday, April 4, that she was "horrified" by the images of bodies lying in the Ukrainian town of Boutcha, discovered after the withdrawal of Russian troops, referring to "possible war crimes and serious violations of international law."

On April 7, the General Assembly adopted a resolution suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council.

At the end of April, the UN Secretary General visited Russia and Ukraine.

The UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution on 26 April 2022 asking the five permanent members of the Security Council to justify their use of the veto.

The UN Security Council adopted a statement on May 6, 2022, expressing strong support for the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve a peaceful solution in Ukraine. The Secretary-General welcomed the fact that for the first time the Security Council speaks with one voice for peace in Ukraine.

The Human Rights Council approved a resolution on May 12 in a special session on Ukraine calling for an investigation into alleged atrocities by Russian occupation troops". Retrieved on <https://unric.org/fr/onu-et-la-guerre-en-ukraine-les-principales-informations/> (as of May 27th, 2022).

as a result of the Ukraine war, with implications for universities and for research. But it will probably be quite different from the post-Second-World-War one: Russia has been integrated into global higher education for three decades; research and scholarship have become globalized.

“An important task for Academies is to develop models for fruitful future cooperation and strategies should be studied so that fundamentals of peace, dignity of every human being, and respect for property will be followed worldwide.”

Since the late 1980s and the end of the “Cold War” there has been a “golden age” of global academic collaboration. Joint research and teaching programs, academic exchanges, visiting Professorships, and student mobility have become embedded around the world, promoting University relations and scientific cooperation. Countries that had previously been distanced from international partnerships, including Russia and China, had seen unprecedented levels of interaction, with benefits to many areas of academic endeavor including medical advances. Besides, we must still consider the global challenges that face mankind: There is still international cooperation in, e.g., the space program. More than that, there is the global climate catastrophe. In this case, huge countries such as Russia and China are indispensable in developing and implementing solutions. Unravelling all this is a task that cuts across personal and national interests, and where the views of the younger generation need to be heard.

7. Practical steps now and later?

Even if the future global context of academic collaboration is largely uncharted, a wait-and-see position is not realistic.

Of course, the abrupt severing of ties will have major consequences, but it is to be hoped that contacts and collaborations can be re-established in the future, though this may not look the same as previously. And whilst many academic collaborations are built on personal contacts, the scenes from Ukraine and the deaths of respected university colleagues are increasing the resolve to send the strongest possible message to Russia and demonstrate support by the widest possible means to Ukraine.

In that regard, a Statement such as the one adopted by the International Association of Universities of the Third Age (AIUTA) could inspire WAAS. It firmly addresses the belligerents by recalling essential values swept away in any conflict and it keeps doors open to clear specific action in the short and long term*.

* “Athens Declaration, cradle of democracy, against war: AIUTA - International Association of Third Age Universities - Repudiates war and all forms of prevarication and supports dialogue, mutual knowledge and cultural sharing and collective memories, founding values of our civilization”. The April 2022 International Association of Third Age Universities (AIUTA) Declaration of Athens: AIUTA NYC 108th Board Meeting, Athens, April 8th 2022. Retrieved on: <https://www.aiu3a.org/v2/news2/news233-en.html> (as of May 27th, 2022).

Therefore, lines of action must be determined that probably combine the discreet strengthening of personal links and robust policy at the institutional level. In both cases, it must be clear that any firm action is temporary and strictly linked to the existence of a conflict between states.

8. Consequences of this inhuman act on the world academic scene

The brutal inhuman invasion, bombing universities, killing colleagues professors, students and academic staff in Ukraine, supported by the Union of Russian University Rectors and Academies—reflecting the overall majority: various hundred thousand/millions of the Russian academic and scientific people—and disturbing the world academic network of contacts and collaboration, should have important consequences worldwide and should be heavily condemned with severe reactions from the democratic academic communities worldwide and consequently... ‘you can’t just let this go’!

In the current context, my philosophy is those which I supported in the reputed academies in Europe, US etc., and in recognized European and International institutes and organizations and which can be resumed as follows:

- All contacts with the academic and scientific institutions and staff in Russia should be officially suspended for the immediate future.*
- One should withdraw all Russian colleagues from activities including membership of committees, participation in workshops or conferences, and publication in documents from our Academy.

It seems that some Russian scientists are indeed under pressure and are afraid to act. But the free democratic community must act. They should not form a group of exceptions to these consequences at this stage. All must feel that we mean it serious...including our former friends!

Contacts with other countries where academic freedom and expression is repressed should also be reviewed in light of recent events

- New mechanisms should be developed to enhance cooperation between democratic western countries.
- International science and academic collaboration should be built on a shared global philosophy of openness and collaboration, regardless of political agendas and rifts.

The war in Ukraine puts WAAS, as a global academy, in a difficult situation. Reflection on the limits to international collaboration need to be made and a new strategy needs to be developed in order to move on from the current circumstances.

An important task for Academies is to develop models for fruitful future cooperation and strategies should be studied so that fundamentals of peace, dignity of every human being, and respect for property will be followed worldwide.

* Editor's Note: The views of the author do not represent any expressed view of *Cadmus* or the WAAS Board of Trustees.

A war experience is harrowing. At an individual level, a generation of children, students and academics of all ages will see unprecedented disruption and misery. We hope that the resumption of future school or academic activities will take priority, once the better times return. But scholars and researchers, teachers and lecturers, will have, in such an uncharted new environment, to revisit their purposes, theories and view of the world of today, and be helped towards a greater, safer and happier common future.

Finally, clearly many resources will have to be directed towards reconstruction, which will also imply the use of available new technologies; and especially the restoration of academic and research programs to open up a reshaped Global Academic Collaboration.

An important task here for WAAS-WUC (World University Consortium) is the development of strategy and models for new global collaborations in academia, highlighting the criteria and conditions for participation. It should also highlight the great advantages of the disconnection of politics from academies for the welfare of all nation states.

Let us hope that the war will soon come to an end and that reparation of the damage done to the academic society in the world may take place. WAAS should consider what place it can occupy in that endeavor.

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Inside This Report

This special report to the World Academy of Art & Science is a compilation of articles by global thinkers around the world on the root causes and potential strategies for addressing the wide range of human security issues related to the current war in Ukraine. The articles look beyond current media coverage to explore the deeper political, economic, social, psychological and cultural origins of the war and propose solutions to end the conflict and prevent recurrence of the threats it poses to global peace and social evolution.